Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition
Summary
This executive summary proposes shifting the focus of nuclear abolition from technical weapon counts to high-level political dialogue and the stabilization of nuclear competition. Its central finding is that nuclear disarmament is only possible if proponents of abolition join with proponents of deterrence to first negotiate measures that reduce 'nuclear overkill' and stabilize mutual vulnerability.
Key insights
- Current nuclear policy debates are flawed because abolitionists often ignore political-security conditions, while proponents of force building ignore the risks of inadvertent escalation and the need for mutual stabilization.
- Nuclear-armed states, including Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, Israel, and the United States, currently feel too threatened to relinquish their nuclear deterrence, and none can be forced to disarm unilaterally without risking political destruction for their leaders.
- The document proposes a goal to end 'nuclear overkill,' defined as arsenals whose size is driven by bureaucratic interests rather than rational deterrence and whose use would cause unjustifiable harm to noncombatants and the environment.
- To stabilize nuclear competition, the authors suggest six guidelines: basing policy on mutual vulnerability, eschewing preemptive counterforce plans, limiting homeland missile defenses, restricting nuclear use to targets that cannot be destroyed by other means, reducing inadvertent escalation risks, and codifying restraints to bolster confidence.
- The 'regime change problem' drives nuclear proliferation, as leaders in states like Russia, China, and North Korea view nuclear weapons as the ultimate defense against U.S.-led efforts to remove them from power.
- Technological advancements in conventional and dual-use weapons blur the line between conventional and nuclear war, increasing the risk that a non-nuclear attack could be mistaken for a nuclear strike, leading to inadvertent escalation.
- Military-industrial complexes in nuclear states often drive the development of capabilities based on 'worst-case' scenarios, creating a spiral of insecurity where one side's defensive measures are perceived as offensive threats by the other.
- The United States' shift from a universal rules-based nonproliferation approach to a competitive strategy—making exceptions for allies like India, Australia (AUKUS), and potentially Saudi Arabia—may undermine the global nonproliferation regime.
- Extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States to its allies is a necessary condition for nonproliferation, as it prevents those allies from seeking their own nuclear weapons.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Perkovich, G., & Yoshida, F. (2025). Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/rethinking-a-political-approach-to-nuclear-abolition
- Chicago
- Perkovich, George, and Fumihiko Yoshida. Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/rethinking-a-political-approach-to-nuclear-abolition.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Perkovich |first1=George |last2=Yoshida |first2=Fumihiko |title=Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=27 March 2025 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/rethinking-a-political-approach-to-nuclear-abolition |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-002206)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{perkovich2025rethinking, author = {Perkovich, George and Yoshida, Fumihiko}, title = {{Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2025}, month = mar, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/rethinking-a-political-approach-to-nuclear-abolition}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-002206} }
Full text
Collected · Record updated