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The research paper analyzes the rise of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as a dominant political figure in Iraq, arguing that his control over the Iraqi army was the primary mechanism for consolidating power. It details how Maliki used the military to assert central authority over provinces, marginalize political rivals like the Iraqiyya list and the Sadrist Trend, and engage in a strategic standoff with the Kurdistan Regional Government. The author highlights that a flawed legal framework and divisions among opposition groups facilitated this consolidation, leading to a climate of continuous political crisis and popular unrest in Sunni-majority provinces.

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  • Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's consolidation of power was primarily enabled by his control of the Iraqi security apparatus and army, which served as the only central government institution present across all non-Kurdish provinces.
  • Maliki utilized his role as commander in chief and acting minister of defense to oversee strategic decision-making, including the appointment and promotion of high-ranking officers and the supervision of Operations Commands.
  • The central government used the army to marginalize provincial authorities in Sunni-dominated provinces (Anbar, Ninewa, Salaheddine, and Diyala), leading to reduced local authority over security, budgets, and investment projects.
  • The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) remains the most significant counterbalance to Maliki's power due to its autonomous region and the exclusive control of the peshmerga forces, leading to a militarized standoff in disputed territories like Kirkuk.
  • Opposition efforts to remove Maliki in 2012 failed because of deep divisions among rivals, including the fragmentation of the Iraqiyya list and internal Kurdish disagreements between the KDP and PUK.
  • Iraq's constitutional and legal framework is described as flawed, with many national laws remaining unissued, which allowed Maliki to employ an expansive interpretation of his powers to appoint cabinet members and strategic ministries.
  • The politicization of the Iraqi army was fostered by the U.S.-led rebuilding process, where de-Baathification and ethnic/sectarian quotas encouraged officers to form allegiances with political parties to secure ranks and promotions.

Cite the original document

APA
Fantappie, M. (2013). Contested Consolidation of Power in Iraq. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/research/2013/02/contested-consolidation-of-power-in-iraq
Chicago
Fantappie, Maria. Contested Consolidation of Power in Iraq. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/research/2013/02/contested-consolidation-of-power-in-iraq.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Fantappie |first1=Maria |title=Contested Consolidation of Power in Iraq |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=20 February 2013 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/research/2013/02/contested-consolidation-of-power-in-iraq |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001887)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{fantappie2013contested, author = {Fantappie, Maria}, title = {{Contested Consolidation of Power in Iraq}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2013}, month = feb, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/research/2013/02/contested-consolidation-of-power-in-iraq}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001887} }

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