How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation

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The AUKUS pact creates a proliferation risk by allowing a non-nuclear weapon state to access highly enriched uranium and exempt materials from IAEA safeguards. The author argues this risk can be mitigated if AUKUS partners establish strict transparency benchmarks and a more holistic nonproliferation monitoring system.

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  • AUKUS establishes two dangerous precedents: it allows a state without nuclear weapons to exempt certain nuclear materials from comprehensive IAEA safeguards and enables such a state to use highly enriched uranium for military purposes.
  • There is a significant risk that countries like Iran could cite the AUKUS precedent to justify using a naval nuclear propulsion program as a cover for enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels while exempting it from IAEA monitoring.
  • To mitigate proliferation risks, Australia should ratify and fully implement the IAEA's Additional Protocol, commit to not re-transferring fissile material, and agree that the US and UK only transfer fissile materials in finished forms, such as fabricated nuclear fuel.
  • The author proposes that nuclear suppliers should use bilateral cooperation agreements to implement a 'know-your-customer' principle and incorporate nonintrusive monitoring technologies into nuclear fuel cycle products.
  • Because fissile material acquisition will become a less reliable indicator of proliferation if more countries follow the AUKUS model, the nonproliferation regime needs a more holistic analysis model that includes R&D of nuclear explosion capabilities, weapon systems integration, and delivery vehicles.
  • The document suggests that the renewed interest in nuclear power to mitigate climate change and the development of small reactors could provide the necessary motivation for a bargain to liberalize nuclear trade in exchange for new transparency requirements.

Cite the original document

APA
Dalton, A. (. L. T. (2021). How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/12/how-the-united-states-can-use-aukus-to-strengthen-nuclear-nonproliferation
Chicago
Dalton, Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby. How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/12/how-the-united-states-can-use-aukus-to-strengthen-nuclear-nonproliferation.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Dalton |first1=Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby |title=How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=16 December 2021 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/12/how-the-united-states-can-use-aukus-to-strengthen-nuclear-nonproliferation |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001876)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{dalton2021how, author = {Dalton, Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby}, title = {{How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2021}, month = dec, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/12/how-the-united-states-can-use-aukus-to-strengthen-nuclear-nonproliferation}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001876} }

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