How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation
Summary
The AUKUS pact creates a proliferation risk by allowing a non-nuclear weapon state to access highly enriched uranium and exempt materials from IAEA safeguards. The author argues this risk can be mitigated if AUKUS partners establish strict transparency benchmarks and a more holistic nonproliferation monitoring system.
Key insights
- AUKUS establishes two dangerous precedents: it allows a state without nuclear weapons to exempt certain nuclear materials from comprehensive IAEA safeguards and enables such a state to use highly enriched uranium for military purposes.
- There is a significant risk that countries like Iran could cite the AUKUS precedent to justify using a naval nuclear propulsion program as a cover for enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels while exempting it from IAEA monitoring.
- To mitigate proliferation risks, Australia should ratify and fully implement the IAEA's Additional Protocol, commit to not re-transferring fissile material, and agree that the US and UK only transfer fissile materials in finished forms, such as fabricated nuclear fuel.
- The author proposes that nuclear suppliers should use bilateral cooperation agreements to implement a 'know-your-customer' principle and incorporate nonintrusive monitoring technologies into nuclear fuel cycle products.
- Because fissile material acquisition will become a less reliable indicator of proliferation if more countries follow the AUKUS model, the nonproliferation regime needs a more holistic analysis model that includes R&D of nuclear explosion capabilities, weapon systems integration, and delivery vehicles.
- The document suggests that the renewed interest in nuclear power to mitigate climate change and the development of small reactors could provide the necessary motivation for a bargain to liberalize nuclear trade in exchange for new transparency requirements.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Dalton, A. (. L. T. (2021). How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/12/how-the-united-states-can-use-aukus-to-strengthen-nuclear-nonproliferation
- Chicago
- Dalton, Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby. How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/12/how-the-united-states-can-use-aukus-to-strengthen-nuclear-nonproliferation.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Dalton |first1=Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby |title=How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=16 December 2021 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/12/how-the-united-states-can-use-aukus-to-strengthen-nuclear-nonproliferation |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001876)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{dalton2021how, author = {Dalton, Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby}, title = {{How the United States Can Use AUKUS to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2021}, month = dec, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/12/how-the-united-states-can-use-aukus-to-strengthen-nuclear-nonproliferation}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001876} }
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