Statement of Rose Gottemoeller
Summary
Rose Gottemoeller outlines the distinct technological barriers and risks associated with nuclear versus radiological weapons, emphasizing that while nuclear weapons require significant amounts of weapons-usable material, radiological 'dirty bombs' are easier to acquire and can cause widespread panic. She proposes four urgent priorities for U.S. action: halting weapons-grade plutonium production in Russia, securing vulnerable facilities in the former Soviet Union, closing Russian warhead production plants, and improving security at sites storing lower-level nuclear materials. Gottemoeller suggests innovative funding mechanisms like 'debt-for-security' swaps to address these threats and notes that the nuclear industry's shift toward proliferation-resistant reactors may eventually simplify export control challenges.
Key insights
- The primary obstacle to acquiring a nuclear weapon is the requirement for large quantities of weapons-usable material; a sophisticated device typically needs 15-30 kg of highly enriched uranium or 3-4 kg of plutonium.
- Radiological weapons, such as 'dirty bombs' using conventional explosives to spread toxic material, are easier for proliferators to acquire than nuclear devices and, while less lethal, can cause significant contamination and public panic.
- The U.S. should prioritize four specific nuclear security goals: stopping weapons-grade plutonium production in Russia, securing vulnerable former Soviet Union facilities, ending warhead production at Russian plants, and enhancing security at sites with lower-level nuclear materials.
- Plutonium reactors in Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk produce approximately 1.5 tons of weapons-grade plutonium annually, enough for over 300 bombs per year, adding to Russian stocks that exceed 100 tons.
- To fund nonproliferation efforts, the U.S. could implement 'debt-for-security' swaps, forgiving Soviet-era debt in exchange for Russia investing rubles into agreed-upon security priorities.
- The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) aims to reduce the number of Russian warhead plants by half by ending activities at the Avangard plant in Sarov and the Start plant in Penza-19, though the latter has been hindered by under-funding.
- The nuclear industry is moving toward the development of proliferation-resistant reactors designed to burn plutonium rather than breed it, which could simplify future export controls.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Gottemoeller, R. (2001). Statement of Rose Gottemoeller. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2001/11/statement-of-rose-gottemoeller
- Chicago
- Gottemoeller, Rose. Statement of Rose Gottemoeller. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2001/11/statement-of-rose-gottemoeller.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite press release |last1=Gottemoeller |first1=Rose |title=Statement of Rose Gottemoeller |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=7 November 2001 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2001/11/statement-of-rose-gottemoeller |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001667)}}
- BibTeX
- @misc{gottemoeller2001statement, author = {Gottemoeller, Rose}, title = {{Statement of Rose Gottemoeller}}, publisher = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2001}, month = nov, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2001/11/statement-of-rose-gottemoeller}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001667} }
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