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This research paper warns that the decline of Western nuclear vendors has left Russia and China as dominant suppliers, potentially leading to a 'race to the bottom' in nuclear regulation. It proposes consolidating existing international conventions and establishing new norms on fissile material and weaponization research to maintain global safety standards.

Key insights

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  • The global nuclear industry has faced a decline due to modest demand, high upfront capital costs, cost overruns, and the decreasing cost of renewable and gas-powered alternatives, leading to the bankruptcy or dissolution of Western vendors Westinghouse and Areva.
  • Russia and China have emerged as the two dominant nuclear technology suppliers, utilizing state support and strategic exports to cement political ties in countries such as Turkey, Egypt, and Kenya, often prioritizing strategic relations over commercial viability or strict safety standards.
  • There is a risk of a 'race to the bottom' in nuclear regulation because Russia and China may not prioritize safety and security best practices, and other states may relax their own regulations to remain competitive, especially when exporting small modular reactors.
  • Nuclear accidents in 'nuclear newcomer' countries—which lack the resources and experience to manage such events—could cause global ripple effects, potentially triggering further nuclear phaseouts in other states.
  • To enhance nuclear responsibility, the author proposes that states should expect all nuclear deployers to implement six key conventions, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  • The document suggests establishing a global norm of 'commensurability' where the production of fissile material does not exceed practical civilian needs, drawing on the logic used in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
  • The author advocates for a norm of self-restraint regarding research and development activities that serve few purposes other than nuclear weapons, such as modeling nuclear explosions or designing multipoint detonation systems.

Cite the original document

APA
Dalton, A. (. L. T. (2017). Leveling Up the Nuclear Trade Playing Field. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/09/leveling-up-the-nuclear-trade-playing-field
Chicago
Dalton, Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby. Leveling Up the Nuclear Trade Playing Field. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/09/leveling-up-the-nuclear-trade-playing-field.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Dalton |first1=Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby |title=Leveling Up the Nuclear Trade Playing Field |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=7 September 2017 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/09/leveling-up-the-nuclear-trade-playing-field |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001575)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{dalton2017leveling, author = {Dalton, Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby}, title = {{Leveling Up the Nuclear Trade Playing Field}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2017}, month = sep, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/09/leveling-up-the-nuclear-trade-playing-field}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001575} }

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