Thirty Years of US Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken

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This executive summary argues that U.S. policy toward Russia has failed due to unrealistic goals regarding democracy promotion and NATO expansion, recommending a shift toward prioritizing nuclear stability and accepting Russia's security requirements.

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  • U.S.-Russian relations have followed a repetitive 'boom-bust' cycle for three decades, where new administrations attempt a 'reset' that eventually collapses into pessimism and low points in the relationship.
  • Two primary U.S. policy failures contributed to the deterioration of relations: the attempt to reform Russia's political system through democracy promotion and the eastward expansion of NATO into the Eurasian space.
  • The 2008 NATO promise of eventual membership to Georgia and Ukraine crossed a 'red line' for Russia, which viewed these countries as critical to its security, prestige, and domestic stability.
  • Russian foreign policy is driven by three interconnected goals: physical security (seeking strategic depth), domestic stability (resisting foreign influence), and economic prosperity (maintaining hydrocarbon export routes).
  • The U.S. should prioritize its relationship with Russia around the nuclear relationship and strategic stability, while halting NATO's eastward expansion and refocusing on collective defense.
  • U.S. sanctions policy should be used with more restraint and aligned with realistic objectives, as current 'catch-all' sanctions often fail to change Russian behavior and increase Russia's dependence on China.
  • The U.S. should adopt a more realistic approach to Ukraine and Georgia, acknowledging that NATO membership is not in their future and supporting their security capabilities bilaterally instead.
  • Russia's conventional military capabilities, while dominant in its periphery, are a fraction of the Soviet Union's peak power and are limited by recruitment issues and reliance on Western technology.

Cite the original document

APA
Sokolsky, E. R. R. (2019). Thirty Years of US Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/04/thirty-years-of-us-policy-toward-russia-can-the-vicious-circle-be-broken
Chicago
Sokolsky, Eugene Rumer, Richard. Thirty Years of US Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/04/thirty-years-of-us-policy-toward-russia-can-the-vicious-circle-be-broken.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Sokolsky |first1=Eugene Rumer, Richard |title=Thirty Years of US Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=20 June 2019 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/04/thirty-years-of-us-policy-toward-russia-can-the-vicious-circle-be-broken |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001549)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{sokolsky2019thirty, author = {Sokolsky, Eugene Rumer, Richard}, title = {{Thirty Years of US Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2019}, month = jun, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/04/thirty-years-of-us-policy-toward-russia-can-the-vicious-circle-be-broken}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001549} }

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