Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review
Summary
This research paper argues that the United States should adopt an 'existential threat policy' for nuclear weapons, restricting their use to scenarios where no viable alternative exists to stop an attack that threatens the existence of the U.S. or its allies.
Key insights
- The author argues that nuclear weapons are ineffective for most security problems, such as deterring terrorism, illegal territorial aggrandizement, human rights violations, or cyber attacks.
- Russia is identified as the primary driver of U.S. nuclear requirements, setting the upper bound of threats that U.S. policy must deter or defeat.
- The document recommends the adoption of an 'existential threat policy' (ETP), where nuclear weapons are considered only when no viable alternative exists to stop an attack that threatens the existence of the United States, its allies, or partners.
- The author contends that a 'no first use' (NFU) declaration would be largely meaningless to Russia and China unless it was accompanied by a reduction in weapons most tied to first strikes, such as silo-based ballistic missiles.
- There is a significant risk of inadvertent escalation due to the 'entanglement' of nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems with those used for conventional military operations, particularly regarding cyber capabilities.
- The document argues that nuclear arsenals should be modified to include the lowest yields necessary to destroy legitimate targets to comply with the law of armed conflict and reduce environmental harm.
- The author warns that large-scale nuclear counterforce attacks could trigger a 'nuclear winter' with catastrophic effects on the global food chain and agricultural productivity.
- North Korea is identified as the threat most likely to lead U.S. decision-makers to consider the first use of nuclear weapons, specifically if the DPRK were to inflict heavy damage on Seoul.
- China's nuclear force modernization is viewed as a means to increase survivability and resilience, potentially to prevent the U.S. from using non-nuclear kinetic weapons or cyber operations to threaten China's deterrent.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Vaddi, G. P. P. (2021). Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/01/proportionate-deterrence-a-model-nuclear-posture-review
- Chicago
- Vaddi, George Perkovich, Pranay. Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/01/proportionate-deterrence-a-model-nuclear-posture-review.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Vaddi |first1=George Perkovich, Pranay |title=Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=21 January 2021 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/01/proportionate-deterrence-a-model-nuclear-posture-review |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001543)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{vaddi2021proportionate, author = {Vaddi, George Perkovich, Pranay}, title = {{Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2021}, month = jan, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/01/proportionate-deterrence-a-model-nuclear-posture-review}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001543} }
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