Locked-in or Left Out: Transatlantic Trade Beyond Brussels and Washington
Summary
This research paper examines the challenges of expanding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) beyond the US and EU. It concludes that a combination of technical assessment and qualified majority voting is necessary to prevent bilateral disputes from blocking the accession of third countries.
Key insights
- Relying solely on the domestic ratification of acceding parties is not a politically acceptable solution for TTIP because new accessions would impose economic costs on specific groups within existing member states, such as EU autoworkers potentially affected by Mexico's auto industry.
- A unanimity-based approval process for new members risks politicizing enlargement, as existing partners could use their veto power as leverage in bilateral disputes, similar to how the U.S.-Russia 'reset' influenced Russia's WTO membership.
- The author proposes a hybrid accession mechanism combining a technical assessment by an expert committee with a political decision made via qualified majority vote, which would prevent individual members from blocking beneficial enlargements through bilateral disputes.
- Mutual equivalence is a superior method for eliminating nontariff barriers for third countries compared to mutual recognition, as it allows new entrants to leverage existing preferential trade agreements without the heavy regulatory burden of separate, detailed technical consultations for every existing party.
- The duration of the U.S. Congress's trade promotion authority will effectively determine the window for TTIP enlargement; once this authority expires, adding new countries becomes significantly more difficult as Congress may impose new conditions or amendments.
- TTIP may force emerging nations to accept linkages between trade freedoms and social or environmental standards—such as labor and environmental norms—that they have historically resisted at the WTO.
- To avoid 'forum shopping' and conflicting remedies, the document suggests a hierarchy where regional trade agreements (like NAFTA) take precedence over TTIP for disputes between members of both, and TTIP takes precedence over the WTO.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Ülgen, S. (2014). Locked-in or Left Out: Transatlantic Trade Beyond Brussels and Washington. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2014/06/locked-in-or-left-out-transatlantic-trade-beyond-brussels-and-washington
- Chicago
- Ülgen, Sinan. Locked-in or Left Out: Transatlantic Trade Beyond Brussels and Washington. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2014/06/locked-in-or-left-out-transatlantic-trade-beyond-brussels-and-washington.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Ülgen |first1=Sinan |title=Locked-in or Left Out: Transatlantic Trade Beyond Brussels and Washington |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=3 June 2014 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2014/06/locked-in-or-left-out-transatlantic-trade-beyond-brussels-and-washington |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001529)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{lgen2014lockedin, author = {Ülgen, Sinan}, title = {{Locked-in or Left Out: Transatlantic Trade Beyond Brussels and Washington}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2014}, month = jun, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2014/06/locked-in-or-left-out-transatlantic-trade-beyond-brussels-and-washington}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001529} }
Full text
Collected · Record updated