Managing Montreux: Turkey and the Russia-Ukraine War in the Black Sea

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Turkey has utilized the Montreux Convention to restrict naval access to the Black Sea, effectively deterring naval escalation while maintaining its role as the region's primary security arbiter. The most important finding is that Turkey's 'regional ownership' strategy prevents a broad NATO naval presence to avoid provoking Russia, forcing Western allies to work through Ankara.

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  • Turkey's application of the Montreux Convention since February 2022 has tilted the military balance of power, helping Ukraine survive initial Russian naval attacks on Odesa and other ports.
  • Turkey follows a 'regional ownership' principle, insisting that Black Sea security be led by littoral states (Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria) and discouraging a broader NATO naval presence.
  • Through 'Montreux Plus' verbal agreements in February 2022, Turkey prevented the return of Russian warships to the Black Sea in exchange for non-littoral NATO countries agreeing not to enter the sea.
  • Turkey maintains that restrictions on the straits will persist until a durable truce or actual settlement is reached; a simple ceasefire is insufficient to lift these measures.
  • Turkey has blocked the passage of British-donated mine hunters to Ukraine, citing Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, and instead leads its own demining efforts with Bulgaria and Romania.
  • Turkey pursues a 'managed rivalry' with Russia, combining strategic cooperation in the Black Sea with booming economic ties and energy cooperation, while remaining 'pro-Ukraine but not anti-Russia'.
  • Ukraine has expressed frustration over Turkey's tolerance of Russian 'shadow fleet' vessels transiting the straits, some of which carry seized grain or oil.

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APA
de Waal, T. (2026). Managing Montreux: Turkey and the Russia-Ukraine War in the Black Sea. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2026/07/managing-montreux-turkey-and-the-russia-ukraine-war-in-the-black-sea
Chicago
de Waal, Thomas. Managing Montreux: Turkey and the Russia-Ukraine War in the Black Sea. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2026. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2026/07/managing-montreux-turkey-and-the-russia-ukraine-war-in-the-black-sea.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=de Waal |first1=Thomas |title=Managing Montreux: Turkey and the Russia-Ukraine War in the Black Sea |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=1 July 2026 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2026/07/managing-montreux-turkey-and-the-russia-ukraine-war-in-the-black-sea |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001442)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{dewaal2026managing, author = {de Waal, Thomas}, title = {{Managing Montreux: Turkey and the Russia-Ukraine War in the Black Sea}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2026}, month = jul, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2026/07/managing-montreux-turkey-and-the-russia-ukraine-war-in-the-black-sea}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001442} }

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