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The research paper analyzes Chinese strategic calculations concerning the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran. It argues that China views nonproliferation as a tool used by the United States to contain China's growth and justify regional military expansion. Consequently, Beijing adopts a 'reactive' mode, acting as a mediator to prevent destabilizing U.S. military strikes while balancing its own economic interests, such as energy security from Iran and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The author suggests that U.S. policymakers should move away from crisis-based responses and instead engage in a transactional exchange of priorities based on China's specific interest hierarchy.

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  • China's approach to nonproliferation is driven more by its relationship with the United States than by the proliferation events themselves. Beijing often views nonproliferation efforts as a pretext for Washington to engage in provocative acts that compromise China's security and contain its growth.
  • Beijing seeks a strategic balance: it wants to prevent the United States from taking extreme, destabilizing actions (such as military strikes) that would harm Chinese interests, while simultaneously benefiting from keeping the U.S. preoccupied with these crises.
  • China distinguishes between 'arms control', 'nonproliferation', and 'counterproliferation'. It is particularly uncomfortable with 'counterproliferation'—which involves interdiction or force—viewing such measures as capricious and a violation of sovereignty.
  • In the case of North Korea, China prioritizes regional peace and stability over total denuclearization. Beijing views the North Korean nuclear program as a reaction to hostile U.S. policies and a lack of security guarantees.
  • China's involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue is heavily influenced by energy security. Beijing seeks to maintain its role as a stable oil importer and views U.S.-led sanctions as potential threats to its fuel supplies, though it may use U.S. isolation of Iran to gain better market leverage.
  • China positions itself as an impartial intermediary or 'bridge' between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. This role allows Beijing to elevate its international stature and shape outcomes without fully aligning with the U.S. agenda.
  • The U.S. 'pivot' or 'rebalancing' to the Asia-Pacific is perceived in China as an effort to use the North Korean nuclear issue as an excuse to expand military deployments, arms sales, and missile defense in the region.
  • The author recommends that the U.S. engage in a transactional exchange of priorities to gain Chinese cooperation. For example, China might support stricter measures on Iran in exchange for fuel supply guarantees, or cooperate on North Korea in exchange for information on U.S. ballistic missile defense.

Cite the original document

APA
Saalman, L. (2013). Balancing Chinese Interests on North Korea and Iran. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/04/balancing-chinese-interests-on-north-korea-and-iran
Chicago
Saalman, Lora. Balancing Chinese Interests on North Korea and Iran. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/04/balancing-chinese-interests-on-north-korea-and-iran.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Saalman |first1=Lora |title=Balancing Chinese Interests on North Korea and Iran |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=1 April 2013 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/04/balancing-chinese-interests-on-north-korea-and-iran |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001141)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{saalman2013balancing, author = {Saalman, Lora}, title = {{Balancing Chinese Interests on North Korea and Iran}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2013}, month = apr, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/04/balancing-chinese-interests-on-north-korea-and-iran}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001141} }

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