Nuclear Power in India: Promise
Summary
India's nuclear program has historically failed to meet capacity targets, currently providing only 3% of total electricity. To meet future energy demands for 'Viksit Bharat' (Developed India) and net-zero goals, the author argues India must move beyond Homi Bhabha's thorium-based three-stage plan, open the sector to private investment, and reform the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010 to attract international suppliers.
Key insights
- India's nuclear power capacity has consistently fallen short of official projections; while Homi Bhabha predicted 8,000 MW by 1980, the current installed capacity is only 7,425 MW, contributing approximately 3% of total electricity production.
- To achieve the 'Viksit Bharat' goal of becoming a developed country by 2047 and reaching net zero emissions by 2070, India will require a massive increase in baseload power. An IIM Ahmedabad study suggests that even a balanced energy strategy would require 95 GW of installed nuclear capacity by 2050, a significant increase from the current 7.4 GW.
- The author argues that Homi Bhabha's three-stage nuclear program, which aims for energy independence via thorium, is technologically and economically impractical due to the extreme difficulties in extracting U-233 from thorium and the availability of cheaper imported uranium following the 2005 U.S.-India nuclear deal.
- The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has struggled with high upfront costs, lack of design standardization, and reliance on 'internal and extra-budgetary resources' (IEBR), leading to interest payments that often exceed project component costs.
- The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) of 2010 acts as a major deterrent to foreign private suppliers because it allows operators to seek compensation from suppliers for defects, contradicting international norms of channeling liability solely to the operator.
- Russia has successfully bypassed liability concerns through a specific contractual agreement (Article 13) that grants Moscow full immunity, a model the author suggests the U.S. and France should insist upon if legislative amendment of the CLNDA is politically unfeasible.
- The author proposes three systemic transformations: an ideational shift away from the three-stage plan, an institutional shift toward public-private partnerships (including SMRs), and a legal shift to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 to allow private ownership and ensure the independence of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).
Cite the original document
- APA
- Tellis, A. J. (2024). Nuclear Power in India: Promise. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/nuclear-power-india-promise
- Chicago
- Tellis, Ashley J. Nuclear Power in India: Promise. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/nuclear-power-india-promise.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Tellis |first1=Ashley J. |title=Nuclear Power in India: Promise |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=7 October 2024 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/nuclear-power-india-promise |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001128)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{tellis2024nuclear, author = {Tellis, Ashley J.}, title = {{Nuclear Power in India: Promise}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2024}, month = oct, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/nuclear-power-india-promise}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001128} }
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