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India's nuclear program has historically failed to meet capacity targets, currently providing only 3% of total electricity. To meet future energy demands for 'Viksit Bharat' (Developed India) and net-zero goals, the author argues India must move beyond Homi Bhabha's thorium-based three-stage plan, open the sector to private investment, and reform the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010 to attract international suppliers.

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  • India's nuclear power capacity has consistently fallen short of official projections; while Homi Bhabha predicted 8,000 MW by 1980, the current installed capacity is only 7,425 MW, contributing approximately 3% of total electricity production.
  • To achieve the 'Viksit Bharat' goal of becoming a developed country by 2047 and reaching net zero emissions by 2070, India will require a massive increase in baseload power. An IIM Ahmedabad study suggests that even a balanced energy strategy would require 95 GW of installed nuclear capacity by 2050, a significant increase from the current 7.4 GW.
  • The author argues that Homi Bhabha's three-stage nuclear program, which aims for energy independence via thorium, is technologically and economically impractical due to the extreme difficulties in extracting U-233 from thorium and the availability of cheaper imported uranium following the 2005 U.S.-India nuclear deal.
  • The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has struggled with high upfront costs, lack of design standardization, and reliance on 'internal and extra-budgetary resources' (IEBR), leading to interest payments that often exceed project component costs.
  • The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) of 2010 acts as a major deterrent to foreign private suppliers because it allows operators to seek compensation from suppliers for defects, contradicting international norms of channeling liability solely to the operator.
  • Russia has successfully bypassed liability concerns through a specific contractual agreement (Article 13) that grants Moscow full immunity, a model the author suggests the U.S. and France should insist upon if legislative amendment of the CLNDA is politically unfeasible.
  • The author proposes three systemic transformations: an ideational shift away from the three-stage plan, an institutional shift toward public-private partnerships (including SMRs), and a legal shift to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 to allow private ownership and ensure the independence of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).

Cite the original document

APA
Tellis, A. J. (2024). Nuclear Power in India: Promise. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/nuclear-power-india-promise
Chicago
Tellis, Ashley J. Nuclear Power in India: Promise. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/nuclear-power-india-promise.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Tellis |first1=Ashley J. |title=Nuclear Power in India: Promise |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=7 October 2024 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/nuclear-power-india-promise |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001128)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{tellis2024nuclear, author = {Tellis, Ashley J.}, title = {{Nuclear Power in India: Promise}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2024}, month = oct, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/nuclear-power-india-promise}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001128} }

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