Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain
Summary
The testimony asserts that while Russia experienced economic growth under President Putin, this was driven by high energy prices rather than autocratic governance. The author details the erosion of democratic checks through the takeover of national television networks, the undermining of regional autonomy via the appointment of governors, and the marginalization of independent political parties and NGOs. The document concludes that the Bush Administration's assumptions about Putin's pragmatism and the temporary nature of his anti-democratic moves were incorrect, necessitating a shift in U.S. policy to foster democratic renewal.
Key insights
- President Putin has systematically dismantled democratic checks and balances in Russia, specifically by seizing control of all major national television networks, including ORT, RTR, and NTV, and pressuring the sale of REN TV to Kremlin-friendly owners.
- The Russian government undermined federalism by establishing seven supra-regional districts led by former generals and KGB officers to subjugate regional executives, and by replacing the election of governors with presidential appointments in September 2004.
- Independent political competition has been marginalized through the dominance of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia, which controls two-thirds of parliament, and the disqualification or registration denial of opposition figures like Vladimir Ryzhkov and Mikhail Kasyanov.
- Civil society has been suppressed through new laws allowing the state to harass or close NGOs, the disruption of public assemblies by police, and the expulsion of foreign organizations such as the Peace Corps and the closure of the OSCE office in Chechnya.
- Russia's economic growth, averaging over 6.5% over seven years, was primarily fueled by the 1998 ruble devaluation and rising global energy prices rather than Putin's autocratic reforms.
- Growing autocracy has negatively impacted the economy by enabling the state to arbitrarily redistribute valuable assets, such as the seizure of Yukos assets for Rosneft and pressure on Sibneft and Royal Dutch Shell to sell to Gazprom.
- Despite perceptions of stability, the Russian state has not become more effective in providing basic security; terrorist attacks have increased, the second Chechen war continues, and the murder rate rose from an average of 30,200 (1995–99) to 32,200 (2000–04).
- The Bush Administration operated on three erroneous assumptions: that Putin's anti-democratic actions were temporary, that he was a rational pragmatist, and that a close personal relationship between the two presidents could be leveraged for influence.
Cite the original document
- APA
- McFaul, M. (2007). Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2007/05/russia-rebuilding-the-iron-curtain
- Chicago
- McFaul, Michael. Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2007/05/russia-rebuilding-the-iron-curtain.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite press release |last1=McFaul |first1=Michael |title=Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=17 May 2007 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2007/05/russia-rebuilding-the-iron-curtain |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000868)}}
- BibTeX
- @misc{mcfaul2007russia, author = {McFaul, Michael}, title = {{Russia: Rebuilding the Iron Curtain}}, publisher = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2007}, month = may, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2007/05/russia-rebuilding-the-iron-curtain}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000868} }
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