China's Response to Türkiye's Volatile Authoritarianism
Summary
The paper argues that while Türkiye is theoretically an ideal BRI partner, domestic centralization and financial volatility have led to a decrease in Chinese investments. In the transportation sector, China has shifted from large-scale construction to a 'purchase first, operate and update later' model, as seen with the Kumport acquisition, while avoiding high-risk railway projects. In the renewable energy sector, Chinese firms, unable to penetrate the pro-government crony networks that dominate large-scale YEKA bids, have adapted by refocusing their business on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The authors conclude that China's engagement in Türkiye is characterized by mutual adaptation and a strategic shift toward lower-visibility investments to mitigate political and financial risks.
Key insights
- Türkiye is a minor recipient of BRI funding, with total investments amounting to $4 billion as of summer 2022, representing only 1.3 percent of total global BRI investments.
- Domestic political changes, specifically the 2016 transition to a presidential system and the resulting centralization and informalization of the state, have contributed to a decrease in Chinese investments in the energy and transportation sectors.
- In the transportation sector, China adapted to Turkish demands by moving away from 'build-operate-transfer' models toward a 'purchase first, operate and update later' approach, exemplified by the $940 million acquisition of a 65 percent share in Kumport.
- Chinese investment in Turkish railways has largely stalled due to high risk assessments, including the volatility of Türkiye's domestic politics, low expected profits from other projects like Kumport, and a drastic decrease in Turkish treasury reserves.
- In the renewable energy sector, Chinese companies failed to win large-scale YEKA bids because they lacked the necessary crony relations with the pro-AKP business elite, who leveraged political connections to secure contracts.
- Having been shut out of large-scale energy projects, Chinese firms adapted by shifting their focus to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and using special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) to provide financial support.
- To bypass anti-dumping duties imposed by the Turkish state on Chinese products—lobbied for by pro-government big capital—Turkish SMEs now import Chinese renewable energy products via Malaysia.
- Regional crises, such as the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have periodically renewed Chinese interest in Türkiye's 'Middle Corridor' as an alternative to sea freight and the Russian 'Northern Corridor'.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Göçer, C. E. D. (2023). China's Response to Türkiye's Volatile Authoritarianism. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/05/chinas-response-to-turkiyes-volatile-authoritarianism
- Chicago
- Göçer, Ceren Ergenc, Derya. China's Response to Türkiye's Volatile Authoritarianism. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/05/chinas-response-to-turkiyes-volatile-authoritarianism.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Göçer |first1=Ceren Ergenc, Derya |title=China's Response to Türkiye's Volatile Authoritarianism |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=5 May 2023 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/05/chinas-response-to-turkiyes-volatile-authoritarianism |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000772)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{ger2023chinas, author = {Göçer, Ceren Ergenc, Derya}, title = {{China's Response to Türkiye's Volatile Authoritarianism}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2023}, month = may, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/05/chinas-response-to-turkiyes-volatile-authoritarianism}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000772} }
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