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The document argues that the Kremlin's foreign policy toward core Europe is 'stuck on autopilot,' prioritizing short-term tactical advantages and the disruption of Western unity over any genuine effort toward normalization.

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  • The Kremlin continues to pursue a 'zero-sum approach' to foreign policy, treating Germany, France, and the United Kingdom as a nineteenth-century-style steering committee of great powers entitled to decide the fate of Europe.
  • Russia's strategic goals toward core Europe include planting wedges in the transatlantic relationship, undermining the EU and NATO, and leveraging its dominant role in European energy markets.
  • Germany's dependence on Russian natural gas has increased, with Russian gas accounting for 57 percent of imports, a trend exacerbated by the planned phasing out of the Groningen field in the Netherlands by the end of 2022.
  • The United Kingdom's 'light-touch' regulatory framework has allowed Russian elite and corporate interests to gain extensive access to the British economy, real estate market, and political circles, creating national security vulnerabilities.
  • French President Emmanuel Macron attempted to launch a strategic dialogue with Russia to avoid a 'frozen' relationship, but the initiative has produced no concrete signs of progress as of July 2020.
  • Russia has used the Sahel region to stoke anti-French sentiment through inauthentic social-media campaigns and the deployment of Wagner Group mercenaries, particularly in the Central African Republic.
  • The Kremlin's economic resilience during the pandemic was supported by an emergency agreement with OPEC to cut production and a hard-currency reserve totaling nearly $600 billion.
  • The attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny and the crisis in Belarus have significantly eroded the credibility of European policymakers who advocated for maintaining the status quo with Russia.

Cite the original document

APA
Weiss, A. S. (2020). Russia and Europe: Stuck on Autopilot. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/09/russia-and-europe-stuck-on-autopilot
Chicago
Weiss, Andrew S. Russia and Europe: Stuck on Autopilot. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/09/russia-and-europe-stuck-on-autopilot.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Weiss |first1=Andrew S. |title=Russia and Europe: Stuck on Autopilot |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=24 September 2020 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/09/russia-and-europe-stuck-on-autopilot |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000668)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{weiss2020russia, author = {Weiss, Andrew S.}, title = {{Russia and Europe: Stuck on Autopilot}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2020}, month = sep, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/09/russia-and-europe-stuck-on-autopilot}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000668} }

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