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The author argues that U.S.-Russian arms control has historically mirrored their political relationship, and the current deep freeze in diplomacy, combined with new military technologies, threatens the collapse of the remaining treaty structure. The paper highlights the risk of returning to an unrestrained arms race similar to the 1950s, where competition shifts from quantitative limits to qualitative superiority.

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  • Arms control between the United States and Russia has historically functioned as a reflection of their broader political relationship, often serving as a tool for managing tensions or a surrogate for the relationship during periods of severe strain.
  • The current breakdown in U.S.-Russian relations, driven by Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, has effectively halted the momentum for new agreements and endangered existing ones.
  • Traditional arms control frameworks are becoming obsolete because they focus on quantitative limits rather than qualitative improvements, such as increased accuracy, low-yield options, and new capabilities in the cyber domain.
  • The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is under severe pressure due to U.S. charges of Russian violations involving ground-launched cruise missiles, while Russia claims the treaty is outdated and fails to constrain new U.S. systems.
  • The New START agreement, signed in 2010 and expiring in 2021, is likely the last bilateral treaty for a long period, as the current political climate makes Senate ratification of any new deal unrealistic.
  • The shift toward 'great power competition' involving China, Russia, and the U.S. suggests a move away from the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) toward a pursuit of strategic superiority and unilateral enhancements.
  • The author recommends that the U.S. avoid withdrawing from the INF Treaty or linking New START's extension to INF compliance, as these moves could alienate European allies and remove critical verification platforms.

Cite the original document

APA
Rumer, E. (2018). A Farewell to Arms Control. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/05/a-farewell-to-arms-control
Chicago
Rumer, Eugene. A Farewell to Arms Control. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/05/a-farewell-to-arms-control.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Rumer |first1=Eugene |title=A Farewell to Arms Control |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=17 April 2018 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/05/a-farewell-to-arms-control |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000386)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{rumer2018farewell, author = {Rumer, Eugene}, title = {{A Farewell to Arms Control}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2018}, month = apr, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/05/a-farewell-to-arms-control}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000386} }

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