Friends with Benefits: Russian-Chinese Relations after the Ukraine Crisis

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Following the annexation of Crimea and subsequent Western sanctions, Russia pivoted its economy toward China to secure energy markets, credit, and technology. While this rapprochement has accelerated high-level political ties and specific military and energy deals, the results are mixed due to Chinese financial institutions' reluctance to ignore Western sanctions and a global decline in commodity prices. The relationship is characterized by an emerging asymmetrical interdependence where Russia, as the needier partner, provides natural resources and military technology in exchange for an economic lifeline, potentially granting China greater influence in Eurasia and enhancing its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific.

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  • Russia's strategic pivot to China after the 2014 Ukraine crisis was driven by a need to mitigate its "near-total dependence on Western markets for its hydrocarbon exports, capital, and technology" and to find a strong external partner to withstand Western pressure.
  • The economic results of the pivot have been mixed; while some projects accelerated, bilateral trade collapsed by 28.6 percent in 2015, falling from $95.3 billion in 2014 to $68 billion, partly due to the Russian economic decline and lower commodity prices.
  • In the energy sector, the 'Power of Siberia' pipeline was agreed upon to pump 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually until 2030, though the project faces challenges including a refused $25 billion loan from China and potential unprofitability if oil prices remain low.
  • Russian oil exports to China increased significantly, with Russia occasionally surpassing Saudi Arabia as China's lead supplier, supported by prepayment schemes and the use of the Kozmino port.
  • Despite political rhetoric, most Chinese commercial banks remain reluctant to provide credit to sanctioned Russian entities to avoid jeopardizing relations with regulators in the U.S. and Europe, though political banks like the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China continue to fund strategic projects such as Yamal LNG.
  • Russia and China are developing a parallel financial infrastructure to immunize trade from Western sanctions, including the use of renminbi-denominated oil contracts, currency-swap agreements, and the potential issuance of renminbi-denominated government bonds.
  • Russia has reversed its long-standing ban on selling advanced weaponry to China, concluding deals for S-400 Triumph air defense systems and Su-35 fighter jets, which may shift the military balance in Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.
  • Russia is increasingly replacing Western technology with Chinese alternatives in infrastructure and IT, including a $400 million contract for a high-speed rail line between Moscow and Kazan and the procurement of servers from the Chinese company Inspur for state institutions.
  • In Central Asia, Russia and China have attempted to coordinate the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, aiming for a division of labor where China drives economic development and Russia remains the primary security provider.
  • The relationship is evolving into an 'asymmetrical interdependence' where Russia is the junior partner, potentially accepting Chinese ownership of strategic natural resources and becoming more accommodating on commercial terms in exchange for an economic lifeline.

Cite the original document

APA
Gabuev, A. (2016). Friends with Benefits: Russian-Chinese Relations after the Ukraine Crisis. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-the-ukraine-crisis
Chicago
Gabuev, Alexander. Friends with Benefits: Russian-Chinese Relations after the Ukraine Crisis. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-the-ukraine-crisis.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Gabuev |first1=Alexander |title=Friends with Benefits: Russian-Chinese Relations after the Ukraine Crisis |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=29 June 2016 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-the-ukraine-crisis |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000127)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{gabuev2016friends, author = {Gabuev, Alexander}, title = {{Friends with Benefits: Russian-Chinese Relations after the Ukraine Crisis}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2016}, month = jun, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-the-ukraine-crisis}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000127} }

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