A Realist Case for Conditioning the US-India Nuclear Deal
Summary
The author contends that the U.S.-India nuclear deal, as proposed by the Bush Administration, risks undermining the global nonproliferation regime by rewarding a state that possesses nuclear weapons. This 'inflationary signal' could encourage other nations, such as Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Japan, and South Korea, to pursue nuclear hedging or acquisition. The paper argues that the deal weakens the authority of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and suggests that the U.S. should instead pursue a regional moratorium on fissile material production involving China, India, and Pakistan to ensure strategic stability in Asia.
Key insights
- The proposed U.S.-India nuclear deal sends an 'inflationary signal' to the global marketplace by removing penalties for states that acquire nuclear weapons, which may encourage other countries to pursue similar capabilities.
- The deal may lead countries like Iran to believe the U.S. will eventually accommodate their nuclear ambitions, and could prompt friendly nations such as Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, and Egypt to develop 'hedging capabilities' regarding fissile material production.
- The deal undermines the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by treating them as insignificant or afterthoughts rather than ensuring the deal conforms to their standards and safeguards.
- The author argues that the U.S. should seek a regional agreement to limit fissile material production among China, India, and Pakistan to prevent a dangerous nuclear arms competition in Asia.
- The U.S. policy of developing capabilities to pre-emptively destroy China's nuclear forces may inadvertently drive China to expand its arsenal, which in turn pressures India to increase its own nuclear production.
- There is a risk that the U.S. will signal it will continue to supply nuclear fuel and technology to India even if India decides to resume nuclear explosive testing, which would alarm other nations committed to the nonproliferation regime.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Perkovich, G. (2006). A Realist Case for Conditioning the US-India Nuclear Deal. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2006/05/a-realist-case-for-conditioning-the-us-india-nuclear-deal
- Chicago
- Perkovich, George. A Realist Case for Conditioning the US-India Nuclear Deal. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2006/05/a-realist-case-for-conditioning-the-us-india-nuclear-deal.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Perkovich |first1=George |title=A Realist Case for Conditioning the US-India Nuclear Deal |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=15 May 2006 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2006/05/a-realist-case-for-conditioning-the-us-india-nuclear-deal |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000085)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{perkovich2006realist, author = {Perkovich, George}, title = {{A Realist Case for Conditioning the US-India Nuclear Deal}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2006}, month = may, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2006/05/a-realist-case-for-conditioning-the-us-india-nuclear-deal}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000085} }
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