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This research paper analyzes China's relationship with the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty, concluding that while China cannot join the treaty due to its nuclear posture, it can still support the treaty's spirit through no-first-use policies and disarmament verification research.

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  • China will not join or endorse the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty (NWPT) because it possesses and stockpiles nuclear weapons and maintains a policy of retaliation after a nuclear strike, which contradicts the treaty's core prohibitions and its rule against reservations.
  • The NWPT is unlikely to negatively impact China's nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) patrols in the South China Sea because the treaty's prohibition on 'stationing' does not explicitly include 'transit' through exclusive economic zones (EEZs).
  • China's unconditional and sole purpose no-first-use (NFU) policy aligns with the NWPT's prohibition on the threat of use of nuclear weapons, providing an opportunity for China to promote NFU among other nuclear weapon states.
  • The NWPT serves as a political argument against domestic voices in China advocating for an escalated nuclear posture or a 'launch on warning' posture, as it reflects overwhelming international support for minimizing the role of nuclear weapons.
  • China can support the spirit of the NWPT by reiterating its moratorium on nuclear testing and continuing its support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the CTBTO, acting as a bridge-builder for skeptical nuclear weapon states.
  • China has the capacity to fill a gap in multilateral disarmament verification research, specifically regarding 'zero-knowledge protocols' for warhead verification, by partnering with non-nuclear weapon states.
  • China could provide technical, educational, and financial assistance for environmental remediation and victim assistance in Pakistan and Kazakhstan, where cancer rates remain high due to former nuclear test sites.

Cite the original document

APA
Wang, T. Z. R. (2017). China and the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2017/09/china-and-the-nuclear-weapons-prohibition-treaty
Chicago
Wang, Tong Zhao, Raymond. China and the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2017/09/china-and-the-nuclear-weapons-prohibition-treaty.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Wang |first1=Tong Zhao, Raymond |title=China and the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=21 September 2017 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2017/09/china-and-the-nuclear-weapons-prohibition-treaty |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000056)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{wang2017china, author = {Wang, Tong Zhao, Raymond}, title = {{China and the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2017}, month = sep, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2017/09/china-and-the-nuclear-weapons-prohibition-treaty}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000056} }

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