On the power of and lack of democratic control on the CETA committees (and why this should worry us)
Summary
The document examines the governance structure of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, focusing on the 'living agreement' model. It highlights that CETA committees, including the Joint Committee and thirteen specialised committees, possess the authority to adopt legally binding decisions and amend the treaty's substance without direct oversight from national or EU parliaments. The author expresses particular concern over Article 8.10(3), which allows the Joint Committee to extend 'Fair and Equitable Treatment' (FET) obligations, potentially exposing states to increased financial risks via the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. The paper concludes that the lack of transparency and the absence of formal parliamentary approval for committee decisions undermine democratic governance.
Key insights
- CETA is designed as a "living agreement," meaning it contains institutional provisions that allow for changes to state obligations after the treaty has been signed and ratified.
- Chapter 26 of CETA establishes a Joint Committee and thirteen specialised committees with the authority to adopt legally binding decisions and amend the treaty itself.
- Under Article 8.10(3), the CETA Joint Committee can extend 'Fair and Equitable Treatment' (FET) obligations, which are frequently used by investors in ISDS claims to challenge environmental and health regulations.
- The CETA committees operate with significant autonomy and limited transparency, including the power to modify their own rules of procedure and declare information confidential.
- There is a lack of formal democratic oversight, as decisions made by the CETA Joint Committee become binding immediately without requiring subsequent approval from the EU Parliament or national parliaments.
- The CETA model is being used as a template for other EU trade negotiations, such as those currently ongoing with Indonesia.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Ilge, B. (2022). On the power of and lack of democratic control on the CETA committees (and why this should worry us). Both ENDS. https://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/document/220707-final-draft-on_CETA_committees_final.pdf
- Chicago
- Ilge, Burghard. On the power of and lack of democratic control on the CETA committees (and why this should worry us). Both ENDS, 2022. https://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/document/220707-final-draft-on_CETA_committees_final.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Ilge |first1=Burghard |title=On the power of and lack of democratic control on the CETA committees (and why this should worry us) |publisher=Both ENDS |date=July 2022 |url=https://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/document/220707-final-draft-on_CETA_committees_final.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document bothends-000412)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{ilge2022power, author = {Ilge, Burghard}, title = {{On the power of and lack of democratic control on the CETA committees (and why this should worry us)}}, institution = {Both ENDS}, year = {2022}, month = jul, url = {https://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/document/220707-final-draft-on_CETA_committees_final.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document bothends-000412} }
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