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The research finds that when accounting for district-level factors and using matching techniques to create valid counterfactuals, electoral handouts have little to no statistically significant effect on voter turnout or vote choices in Benin and other studied African democracies. The authors argue that the 'vote-buying' transaction is often incomplete due to low monitoring of secret ballots and the prevalence of multiple parties offering handouts to the same voters, which weakens the quid-pro-quo nature of the exchange.

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  • In the 2011 presidential election in Benin, cash handouts had little to no statistically significant effect on either voter turnout or vote shares once district-level factors and matching techniques were applied.
  • Cross-validation using Afrobarometer Round 3 data from Kenya, Uganda, Mali, and Botswana confirms that the effect of handouts on mobilization and vote choice is largely diminished when using matched data and district fixed effects.
  • The presence of multiple parties offering handouts to the same individual weakens the transactional nature of vote-buying. In Benin's 2011 election, approximately 52% of those offered electoral incentives received offers from more than one party.
  • While unmatched data may suggest a positive correlation between handouts and turnout, this is often a result of district-level traits rather than the handouts themselves.
  • The authors' theoretical framework suggests that in environments with low monitoring, the cost for a party to successfully 'purchase' a vote becomes prohibitively high, especially when competing with other parties.
  • Analysis of single versus multiple offers in Benin indicates that those targeted by only one party are less likely to favor the opposition party (UN) compared to those targeted by multiple parties, suggesting opposing effects that may cancel each other out in aggregate data.

Cite the original document

APA
Guardado, J., & Wantchekon, L. (2017). Do electoral handouts affect voting behavior? Afrobarometer. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/afropaperno171_electoral_handouts_and_voting_behavior.pdf
Chicago
Guardado, Jenny, and Leonard Wantchekon. Do electoral handouts affect voting behavior? Afrobarometer, 2017. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/afropaperno171_electoral_handouts_and_voting_behavior.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Guardado |first1=Jenny |last2=Wantchekon |first2=Leonard |title=Do electoral handouts affect voting behavior? |publisher=Afrobarometer |date=March 2017 |url=https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/afropaperno171_electoral_handouts_and_voting_behavior.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document afbarom-000522)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{guardado2017electoral, author = {Guardado, Jenny and Wantchekon, Leonard}, title = {{Do electoral handouts affect voting behavior?}}, institution = {Afrobarometer}, year = {2017}, month = mar, url = {https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/afropaperno171_electoral_handouts_and_voting_behavior.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document afbarom-000522} }

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