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The Tema LNG Import Terminal project, led by Helios Investment Partners and supported by various development finance institutions, has failed to become operational despite expectations to start in 2020. The document argues that the project was born from procurement irregularities and bid-rigging, creating significant financial liabilities for the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). ACEP and IMANI estimate that GNPC could pay between $790 million and $1.357 billion annually for gas the country does not need, as Ghana already has sufficient domestic gas and is flaring associated gas from the Jubilee and TEN fields. Furthermore, the project's governance is criticized for weak ESG processes and 'moral green-washing' by DFIs who prioritized the shift from heavy fuel oil to gas while ignoring domestic supply realities and corruption risks. As of November 2022, the terminal remains non-functional, with the necessary Floating Storage Unit (Vasant) missing from the port of Tema.

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  • The Tema LNG project has failed to start operations despite an expected start date of 2020, and as of November 2022, it remains offline with no gas shipments delivered.
  • The project creates a severe financial risk for the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), with potential annual payments between $790 million and $1.357 billion for unnecessary gas.
  • Ghana does not currently require imported LNG because it has sufficient domestic supplies and is actively flaring or reinjecting associated gas from the Jubilee and TEN fields.
  • The project's inception was marked by procurement irregularities, bid-rigging, and the circumvention of due process to favor the Tema LNG Consortium over other proposals.
  • Development finance institutions (DFIs) and multilateral development banks provided significant funding—including $31 million from the Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund—while ignoring domestic gas expansion risks and governance concerns.
  • The project's infrastructure is incomplete; while the Floating Regasification Unit (Torman) arrived in January 2021, the Floating Storage Unit (Vasant) was not at the port of Tema as of September 2022.

Cite the original document

APA
Africa Centre for Energy Policy (n.d.). Tema LNG Import Terminal Case Study Brief. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Tema-LNG-Import-Terminal-Case-Study.pdf
Chicago
Africa Centre for Energy Policy. Tema LNG Import Terminal Case Study Brief. n.d. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Tema-LNG-Import-Terminal-Case-Study.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Africa Centre for Energy Policy |title=Tema LNG Import Terminal Case Study Brief |url=https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Tema-LNG-Import-Terminal-Case-Study.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document acep-000170)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{africacentreforenergypolicyndtema, author = {{Africa Centre for Energy Policy}}, title = {{Tema LNG Import Terminal Case Study Brief}}, institution = {Africa Centre for Energy Policy}, url = {https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Tema-LNG-Import-Terminal-Case-Study.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document acep-000170} }

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