GHANA’S IMF PROGRAM -­‐ THE RISK OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION WITHOUT STRONG FISCAL POLICY RULES

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The document argues that Ghana's IMF program relies on administrative measures and volatile oil revenues, which are insufficient to ensure long-term fiscal discipline without the introduction of legally binding fiscal and debt rules.

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  • Ghana has a history of inefficient public spending where high budget execution rates have not led to increased gross capital formation, with the bulk of budgets committed to employee compensation, goods, services, and interest payments.
  • Excessive public domestic debt has crowded out private capital formation, increasing the cost of credit and undermining the credibility of the Bank of Ghana's inflation-targeting regime.
  • The Government of Ghana's management of petroleum revenues is pro-cyclical, as the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) is based on a 7-year moving average of crude oil prices, which projects higher spending during boom periods.
  • The IMF program's fiscal consolidation measures—including a Special Petroleum Tax of 17.5%, VAT on financial services, and limits on the wage bill—are largely administrative and may be ignored once the program ends in 2017.
  • Fiscal targets are under serious threat due to the volatility of crude oil prices and the inadequacy of the Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF) buffer, which was set at a low cap of $250 million in 2012.
  • To achieve sustainable consolidation, the author proposes that Ghana shift to counter-cyclical spending, implement a legal framework for budget balance and debt rules, and set the GSF cap at no less than 50% of the ABFA.

Cite the original document

APA
Adam, M. A. (n.d.). GHANA’S IMF PROGRAM -­‐ THE RISK OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION WITHOUT STRONG FISCAL POLICY RULES. Africa Centre for Energy Policy. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ReviewofGhanaIMFProgram.pdf
Chicago
Adam, Mohammed Amin. GHANA’S IMF PROGRAM -­‐ THE RISK OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION WITHOUT STRONG FISCAL POLICY RULES. Africa Centre for Energy Policy, n.d. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ReviewofGhanaIMFProgram.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Adam |first1=Mohammed Amin |title=GHANA’S IMF PROGRAM -­‐ THE RISK OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION WITHOUT STRONG FISCAL POLICY RULES |publisher=Africa Centre for Energy Policy |url=https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ReviewofGhanaIMFProgram.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document acep-000164)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{adamndghanas, author = {Adam, Mohammed Amin}, title = {{GHANA’S IMF PROGRAM -­‐ THE RISK OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION WITHOUT STRONG FISCAL POLICY RULES}}, institution = {Africa Centre for Energy Policy}, url = {https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ReviewofGhanaIMFProgram.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document acep-000164} }

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