INTRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRICE MITIGATION FUND IN GHANA – SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PETROLEUM SUBSIDY FINANCING FROM GOVERNMENT TO CONSUMERS
Summary
The document analyzes Ghana's plan to introduce a Petroleum Price Mitigation Fund to protect against crude oil price hikes. While noting that such a fund reduces government fiscal risk and increases pricing predictability, the author warns that it shifts the subsidy burden to consumers. The paper evaluates three operational models—moving average, trigger, and max-min rules—recommending the max-min rule for its transparency and stability. It further argues that the government should consider a social mitigation approach to benefit the poor and expand mass transport rather than primarily protecting wealthier consumers, and suggests abolishing redundant levies to offset the cost to consumers.
Key insights
- A price mitigation fund serves to protect the government from fiscal risks associated with subsidizing petroleum products during periods of substantial or frequent international crude oil price increases. It also aims to provide transparency and predictability for consumers regarding price changes.
- The introduction of the fund shifts the financial responsibility for consumption subsidies from the government to the consumers, who must pay a mitigation levy via pump prices or forgo windfalls. This is presented as a more sustainable financing method for Ghana given its current fiscal challenges.
- Among three potential operational rules—moving average, trigger, and max-min—the author recommends the max-min rule for Ghana. This rule sets fixed maximum and minimum prices, which the author argues is easier to implement, more transparent, and protects consumers from frequent price risks.
- The author argues that a price mitigation fund may primarily benefit the wealthy and increase mileage, thereby harming the environment, because there is no guarantee that fund deployment will lead to lower transport fares. The author suggests that a 'social mitigation fund'—similar to one used in 2005 to finance metro mass buses—would better protect the poor and reduce carbon emissions.
- To prevent the fund from over-burdening consumers who already pay eleven other taxes, levies, and margins, the author suggests the government abolish unjustifiable levies, such as the Exploration and TOR Debt Recovery levies, and transfer existing budgetary allocations for petroleum subsidies (e.g., GHC50 million in the 2015 Budget) into the Mitigation Fund.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Adam, M. A. (n.d.). INTRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRICE MITIGATION FUND IN GHANA – SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PETROLEUM SUBSIDY FINANCING FROM GOVERNMENT TO CONSUMERS. Africa Centre for Energy Policy. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Price-Mitigation-Fund-Article-1.pdf
- Chicago
- Adam, Mohammed Amin. INTRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRICE MITIGATION FUND IN GHANA – SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PETROLEUM SUBSIDY FINANCING FROM GOVERNMENT TO CONSUMERS. Africa Centre for Energy Policy, n.d. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Price-Mitigation-Fund-Article-1.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Adam |first1=Mohammed Amin |title=INTRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRICE MITIGATION FUND IN GHANA – SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PETROLEUM SUBSIDY FINANCING FROM GOVERNMENT TO CONSUMERS |publisher=Africa Centre for Energy Policy |url=https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Price-Mitigation-Fund-Article-1.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document acep-000153)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{adamndintroduction, author = {Adam, Mohammed Amin}, title = {{INTRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM PRICE MITIGATION FUND IN GHANA – SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PETROLEUM SUBSIDY FINANCING FROM GOVERNMENT TO CONSUMERS}}, institution = {Africa Centre for Energy Policy}, url = {https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Price-Mitigation-Fund-Article-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document acep-000153} }
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