petroleumcontractmonitorreport-7ca257af6b8afa91.pdf

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The report finds that most companies holding non-producing petroleum agreements in Ghana have failed to meet their minimum work and financial obligations. This failure is attributed to a lack of company capacity, a non-competitive 'first come first served' award process, and government non-enforcement of contract terms. While some companies cited an International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) moratorium on disputed areas as a reason for inactivity, companies outside these areas also failed to deliver. The report highlights weaknesses in parliamentary oversight and recommends the immediate implementation of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 to ensure competitive bidding.

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  • The majority of companies with non-producing petroleum agreements in Ghana have failed to meet their contractual work obligations, a situation the report attributes to the government's failure to enforce contract terms.
  • While some companies used a preliminary ruling by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) regarding a disputed area between Ghana and Ivory Coast to justify inactivity, companies in non-disputed areas also failed to meet their obligations.
  • Investment in exploration has been critically low; of the $750 million that should have been invested by companies whose initial periods expired, the report estimates that less than 2% of the required minimum expenditure was actually spent.
  • The 'first come first served' administrative process used to award blocks for nine years after the 2007 discovery led to the selection of inexperienced companies lacking the financial and technical capacity to develop the blocks.
  • Parliamentary oversight of petroleum agreements is weak, characterized by a lack of public participation, insufficient due diligence on company capacity, and the rushing of contracts through ratification by waiving standing orders.
  • There is significant outstanding debt to the state, with the Auditor General estimating $1.5 million in unpaid surface rentals as of end-2016, while ACEP estimates total penalties for non-payment at approximately $40 million.

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APA
Africa Centre for Energy Policy (n.d.). petroleumcontractmonitorreport-7ca257af6b8afa91.pdf. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/PetroleumContractMonitorReport.pdf
Chicago
Africa Centre for Energy Policy. petroleumcontractmonitorreport-7ca257af6b8afa91.pdf. n.d. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/PetroleumContractMonitorReport.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Africa Centre for Energy Policy |title=petroleumcontractmonitorreport-7ca257af6b8afa91.pdf |url=https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/PetroleumContractMonitorReport.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document acep-000146)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{africacentreforenergypolicyndpetroleumcontractmonitorreport7ca257af6b8afa91pdf, author = {{Africa Centre for Energy Policy}}, title = {{petroleumcontractmonitorreport-7ca257af6b8afa91.pdf}}, institution = {Africa Centre for Energy Policy}, url = {https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/PetroleumContractMonitorReport.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document acep-000146} }

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