LICENSING COMPLIANCE IN GHANA’S UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR

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The report finds that Ghana's upstream petroleum licensing process lacks transparency and competitive bidding, relying instead on a 'first-come-first-served' policy that increases the risk of corruption and the award of contracts to inexperienced companies.

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  • Ghana does not utilize an open and competitive bidding process for awarding oil blocks, instead employing a "first-come-first-served" or "open door" policy that relies heavily on Ministerial discretion.
  • Several companies awarded oil blocks lack sufficient technical and financial capacity; for example, CAMAC Energy reported having no previous operating history in Africa prior to 2010 and faced potential cessation of operations due to insufficient cash flow.
  • In the award of the Deep-water block to AGM Petroleum, the government prioritized national sovereignty over technical competence, ignoring a more experienced applicant (Statoil) because it would not explore areas near the Ivorian boundary due to an ongoing dispute at the International Tribunal on the Law of the Seas (ITLOS).
  • Parliamentary ratification of petroleum agreements is often treated as "window dressing" because Parliament frequently waives standing orders to rush approvals and fails to conduct independent due diligence on beneficial ownership, financing, and company experience.
  • The award of the Expanded Shallow Water Tano Block to CAMAC Energy violated Ghanaian law by reducing the area of the Tano 2A Block previously awarded to Pan Andean, despite a government letter confirming the validity of Pan Andean's agreement.
  • Recent petroleum agreements have failed to comply with local content regulations (LI2204) requiring a minimum 5% equity for indigenous Ghanaian firms; for instance, the Brittania-U and UB Resources agreements resulted in effective concession equity of 4% and 4.35% respectively.
  • The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Bill 2014 creates significant governance risks by granting the Minister extensive discretionary powers to bypass competitive tenders and review agreement terms without parliamentary approval.

Cite the original document

APA
Africa Centre for Energy Policy (n.d.). LICENSING COMPLIANCE IN GHANA’S UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/LICENSINGCOMPLIANCE.pdf
Chicago
Africa Centre for Energy Policy. LICENSING COMPLIANCE IN GHANA’S UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR. n.d. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/LICENSINGCOMPLIANCE.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Africa Centre for Energy Policy |title=LICENSING COMPLIANCE IN GHANA’S UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR |url=https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/LICENSINGCOMPLIANCE.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document acep-000139)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{africacentreforenergypolicyndlicensing, author = {{Africa Centre for Energy Policy}}, title = {{LICENSING COMPLIANCE IN GHANA’S UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR}}, institution = {Africa Centre for Energy Policy}, url = {https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/LICENSINGCOMPLIANCE.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document acep-000139} }

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