Doubling down National oil companies as instruments of risk and reward

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The research paper examines the risk-reward trade-offs of national oil companies, finding that while they can increase a state's share of long-term industry rewards, they often suffer from lower commercial efficiency than private firms and are highly vulnerable to corruption.

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  • National oil companies (NOCs) generally exhibit lower commercial performance than private-sector international oil companies (IOCs). Between 2002 and 2004, NOCs averaged US$1,000 in revenue per employee compared to US$2,865 for major IOCs and US$1,629 for other IOCs.
  • NOCs face significant commercial and financial risks, most notably geological risk; between 2011 and 2015, only 8% of wells drilled in 'frontier' countries yielded a commercially viable play, meaning the public purse bears the cost of exploration failure when an NOC is used.
  • Potential rewards of an NOC include larger long-term revenues once the company develops scale and competence, greater state control over the pace of sector development, the creation of domestic expertise, and the promotion of local content and economic spillovers.
  • Effective risk mitigation requires clearly defining the NOC's roles to avoid blurred lines of authority, instituting transparent revenue transfer systems, and implementing strong corporate governance tools such as independent audits and merit-based hiring.
  • Periods of low oil prices can be an opportunity for NOCs to implement durable systemic reforms, such as reducing personnel budgets and eliminating non-core investments, provided these are not reversed by patronage when prices rise again.

Cite the original document

APA
Heller, P. R. (2017). Doubling down National oil companies as instruments of risk and reward. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wp2017-81.pdf
Chicago
Heller, Patrick R.P. Doubling down National oil companies as instruments of risk and reward. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2017. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wp2017-81.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Heller |first1=Patrick R.P. |title=Doubling down National oil companies as instruments of risk and reward |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=April 2017 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wp2017-81.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000876)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{heller2017doubling, author = {Heller, Patrick R.P.}, title = {{Doubling down National oil companies as instruments of risk and reward}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2017}, month = apr, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wp2017-81.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000876} }

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