Diagnosing Corruption in the Extractive Sector: A Tool for Research and Action

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This guide outlines a methodology for identifying corruption in extractive sector revenue management, highlighting that sovereign wealth funds, subnational transfers, and resource-backed loans are particularly vulnerable to misappropriation and bribery.

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  • Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are susceptible to various forms of corruption, including excessive remuneration for managers, conflicts of interest in asset management decisions, bribery by financial service providers, and the use of funds for money laundering or outright embezzlement.
  • Corruption in subnational revenue allocations often manifests as the purposive design of sharing rules to benefit or deprive specific regions for political reasons, the arbitrary withholding of funds, or the diversion of revenues before they reach subnational authorities.
  • Resource-backed loans present corruption risks including the selection of lenders based on bribery or nepotism, loan terms that allow lenders to make undue profits via kickbacks to officials, and the misappropriation of loan proceeds for projects owned by political elites.
  • Key risk factors that increase vulnerability to corruption include a lack of transparency regarding SWF finances and subnational transfers, weak parliamentary oversight, the absence of independent external audits, and non-competitive procedures for selecting financial service providers.
  • Effective anticorruption measures include establishing a treasury single account structure to reduce the number of state bank accounts, requiring all resource-backed loans to be reflected in the national budget, and ensuring simple, transparently followed formulas for subnational transfers.
  • Past cases illustrate specific corruption risks: in Angola, the Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA) faced allegations of self-dealing and conflicts of interest involving a port project; in Libya, Société Générale bribed officials to secure business from the Libyan Investment Authority; and in the Republic of Congo, Gunvor was found guilty of bribing officials regarding prepayment agreements.

Cite the original document

APA
Natural Resource Governance Institute (2021). Diagnosing Corruption in the Extractive Sector: A Tool for Research and Action. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/step_4_research_guide_revenue_management.pdf
Chicago
Natural Resource Governance Institute. Diagnosing Corruption in the Extractive Sector: A Tool for Research and Action. 2021. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/step_4_research_guide_revenue_management.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Natural Resource Governance Institute |title=Diagnosing Corruption in the Extractive Sector: A Tool for Research and Action |date=August 2021 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/step_4_research_guide_revenue_management.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000812)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{naturalresourcegovernanceinstitute2021diagnosing, author = {{Natural Resource Governance Institute}}, title = {{Diagnosing Corruption in the Extractive Sector: A Tool for Research and Action}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2021}, month = aug, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/step_4_research_guide_revenue_management.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000812} }

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