Assessing Mineral Licensing in a Decentralized Context: The Case of Indonesia

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The document finds that Indonesia's decentralization of mineral licensing since 2001 has led to systemic governance failures, including overlapping claims and increased corruption, due to a lack of uniform cadastral rules and limited subnational capacity.

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  • Decentralized mineral licensing in Indonesia has resulted in several governance problems, including a weak investment climate, pollution, increased corruption, illegal mining, and inadequate revenue collection.
  • The lack of a centralized cadastre or unified coordinates in Indonesia makes it more expensive for companies to identify promising areas and encourages smaller local operations over larger ones, with over 10,000 licenses issued primarily to small and medium-sized domestic firms.
  • Conflicting attributions of authority between national and local governments in Indonesia create high risks for security of tenure; for instance, fewer than half of the 10,000 licenses issued in the last decade hold 'clean and clear' status from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.
  • Subnational governments in Indonesia often lack the technical, financial, and administrative capacity to enforce rules; in the Kukar district, the 2011 budget allowed for inspections of less than 25 percent of the 285 coal mining operations.
  • While administrative and fiscal decentralization occurred in Indonesia, political decentralization has not, allowing local rent-seekers and political elites to control illegal mining activities, such as in the Bangka district.
  • Successful decentralized models, such as Argentina's, utilize a legal pact to establish uniform cadastral rules and a national database, which helped increase the number of foreign mining companies from 4 in 1989 to over 80 in 2009.

Cite the original document

APA
Venugopal, V. (2014). Assessing Mineral Licensing in a Decentralized Context: The Case of Indonesia. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub_assessingminerallicensing_20160809.pdf
Chicago
Venugopal, Varsha. Assessing Mineral Licensing in a Decentralized Context: The Case of Indonesia. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2014. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub_assessingminerallicensing_20160809.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Venugopal |first1=Varsha |title=Assessing Mineral Licensing in a Decentralized Context: The Case of Indonesia |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=October 2014 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub_assessingminerallicensing_20160809.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000746)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{venugopal2014assessing, author = {Venugopal, Varsha}, title = {{Assessing Mineral Licensing in a Decentralized Context: The Case of Indonesia}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2014}, month = oct, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub_assessingminerallicensing_20160809.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000746} }

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