Precept 3. Institutional organization and award of contracts Technical Guide

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The document outlines best practices for the legal, institutional, and contractual management of extractive sectors, arguing that transparent, competitive licensing and clear institutional roles are essential to prevent corruption and maximize state revenue.

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  • Governments can adopt three legislative approaches: Comprehensive (fixing most provisions in law to limit discretion), Framework (a hybrid covering central issues but leaving details to contracts), and Contractual (placing all provisions in negotiated contracts, which is common in early-stage development but may facilitate corruption).
  • There are three primary contract types in the extractives sector: Concessions (investor holds exclusive mining rights and title to produced resources), Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs, where a state agency owns mining rights and shares production with the investor), and Risk Service Agreements (investor is a contractor for specific tasks and owns no extraction rights).
  • Competitive auctions are the preferred method for allocating rights when investor interest is high, as they offset the information disadvantage of developing countries and reduce opportunities for official favoritism and abuse.
  • The availability of technical data is critical for attracting investment; for example, in Papua New Guinea, the digitization of historical exploration data led to a five-fold increase in license applications in the covered areas.
  • Effective sector management requires a clear delineation of roles between the sector ministry (policy and licensing), the regulatory agency (technical oversight and standards), and the National Resource Company (NRC), to avoid 'regulatory capture' where the NRC exerts undue influence over other agencies.
  • Barter deals, where licenses are exchanged for infrastructure, are common in deals between China and African countries; while potentially useful in post-conflict states, they often suffer from a lack of transparency and limited competition.

Cite the original document

APA
Natural Resource Governance Institute (n.d.). Precept 3. Institutional organization and award of contracts Technical Guide. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/precept3-institutional-structure-licensing.pdf
Chicago
Natural Resource Governance Institute. Precept 3. Institutional organization and award of contracts Technical Guide. n.d. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/precept3-institutional-structure-licensing.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Natural Resource Governance Institute |title=Precept 3. Institutional organization and award of contracts Technical Guide |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/precept3-institutional-structure-licensing.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000722)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{naturalresourcegovernanceinstitutendprecept, author = {{Natural Resource Governance Institute}}, title = {{Precept 3. Institutional organization and award of contracts Technical Guide}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/precept3-institutional-structure-licensing.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000722} }

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