Considerations for Indonesia’s New Government: Structuring Petroleum-Sector Institutions

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The document argues that Indonesia must clearly delineate roles between its Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), the state-owned enterprise (SOE) Pertamina, and any regulatory bodies to restore investor confidence and manage declining reserves. It proposes four institutional models ranging from split responsibilities to full concentration of power in Pertamina, while emphasizing that competitiveness in project access and rigorous public accountability mechanisms are essential for the sector's efficiency.

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  • The 2012 Constitutional Court decision invalidated the independent regulator BP Migas because it failed to meet state responsibilities under Article 33 of the constitution, leading to institutional confusion that has dampened investor confidence.
  • The authors propose four models for allocating regulatory responsibilities: Model 1 splits roles between the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) and Pertamina; Model 2 uses a bureaucratic regulator outside the ministry; Model 3 creates a new non-operator SOE for regulatory functions (similar to Brazil's Petrosal); and Model 4 concentrates most regulatory power within Pertamina.
  • Concentrating regulatory power in Pertamina (Model 4) is viewed as high-risk because it could lead to rent-seeking and conflict of interest, citing Mexico's experience where such a structure failed during a period of dwindling reserves.
  • The method by which Pertamina gains access to oil project stakes significantly impacts its commercial incentives; the authors suggest a middle-ground approach between total monopoly and full competition to encourage efficiency without risking the SOE's portfolio.
  • To prevent mismanagement and corruption, the government should implement accountability mechanisms including independent and published audits, an advisory board with civil society and academic representation, and strict public reporting on revenue and 'quasi-fiscal expenditures'.

Cite the original document

APA
Heller, P., & Ismalina, P. (2014). Considerations for Indonesia’s New Government: Structuring Petroleum-Sector Institutions. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_institutionalstructure.pdf
Chicago
Heller, Patrick, and Poppy Ismalina. Considerations for Indonesia’s New Government: Structuring Petroleum-Sector Institutions. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2014. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_institutionalstructure.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Heller |first1=Patrick |last2=Ismalina |first2=Poppy |title=Considerations for Indonesia’s New Government: Structuring Petroleum-Sector Institutions |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=October 2014 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_institutionalstructure.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000632)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{heller2014considerations, author = {Heller, Patrick and Ismalina, Poppy}, title = {{Considerations for Indonesia’s New Government: Structuring Petroleum-Sector Institutions}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2014}, month = oct, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_institutionalstructure.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000632} }

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