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The document finds that while Ghana has established a comprehensive legal framework for transfer pricing since 2012, implementation in the extractive sector is hindered by poor inter-agency coordination, limited technical expertise, and a lack of comparable data.

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  • Ghana introduced transfer pricing regulations in 2012 based on OECD guidelines, but there is a potential legal conflict between the regulations, which require arm's length pricing for individual transactions, and the Income Tax Law, which only requires it for the calculation of total chargeable income.
  • The Minerals Act 2006 and the Petroleum Income Tax Law 1987 do not explicitly reference the arm's length principle, which has led some petroleum companies to claim that transfer pricing regulations do not apply to them.
  • The Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) lacks the technical engineering and geological expertise required to independently verify the value of specialized mining equipment and the fineness of exported gold, leaving the state vulnerable to under-invoicing.
  • Internal coordination within the GRA is weak, specifically between the Transfer Pricing Unit and the Mining and Petroleum Desks, which prevents the effective identification of risks along the extractive value chain.
  • Inter-agency coordination is fragmented; the Minerals Revenue Taskforce has not met since 2014 due to a lack of funds, and there is no systematic information-sharing platform between the GRA and the Minerals and Petroleum Commissions.
  • The GRA's policy of rotating auditors every two years prevents staff from developing the deep technical industry knowledge necessary to challenge the pricing claims of multinational extractive companies.
  • The government has deliberately avoided Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) due to concerns over limited negotiation capacity and the risk of being locked into unfavorable long-term deals.
  • Civil society, particularly through the Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (GHEITI), has been instrumental in driving policy reforms, such as increasing corporate income tax rates and fixing royalty rates.
  • There are allegations that the government has ignored potential transfer mispricing in high-value projects, such as a US $40 million cost inflation in the construction of the Jubilee fields gas processing plant by a Chinese firm.

Cite the original document

APA
Readhead, A. (2016). Transfer Pricing in the Extractive Sector in Ghana. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_ghana_transfer-pricing-study.pdf
Chicago
Readhead, Alexandra. Transfer Pricing in the Extractive Sector in Ghana. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2016. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_ghana_transfer-pricing-study.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Readhead |first1=Alexandra |title=Transfer Pricing in the Extractive Sector in Ghana |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=March 2016 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_ghana_transfer-pricing-study.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000619)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{readhead2016transfer, author = {Readhead, Alexandra}, title = {{Transfer Pricing in the Extractive Sector in Ghana}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2016}, month = mar, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_ghana_transfer-pricing-study.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000619} }

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