Summary

AI-generated

This summary is written by a language model reading the source document. It is not the publisher's words and is not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment

This parliamentary briefing argues that well-designed, transparent fiscal regimes are essential for states to capture a fair share of extractive revenues while maintaining investment incentives. It highlights that legislators must address loopholes like thin capitalization and abusive transfer pricing to prevent revenue loss.

Key insights

AI-generated

These insights are written by a language model reading the source document. They are not the publisher's words and are not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment
  • Effective fiscal regimes should balance the need to capture a fair share of revenues for the state with the necessity of providing adequate incentives for private investment, ensuring rules are stable to avoid pressure for renegotiation.
  • Fiscal regimes should be progressive, utilizing mechanisms to tax 'windfalls'—financial returns exceeding what is required for profitability—to increase state returns during periods of high commodity prices.
  • Establishing fiscal regimes through general laws rather than individual contracts increases transparency and accountability, as contracts are more prone to secrecy and opportunities for corruption or manipulation.
  • Common fiscal loopholes include abusive transfer pricing, where companies shift taxable income by manipulating prices with related parties, and thin capitalization, where excessive debt is used to inflate interest deductions and reduce taxable income.
  • In Myanmar, oil and gas operations typically involve a 12.5 percent royalty, with government shares of production ranging from 60 to 90 percent for profit oil or gas depending on the block type and volume.
  • Myanmar's mining royalties vary by mineral; gemstones (sapphire, ruby, diamond, and jade) are taxed at 20 percent under the 1995 Gemstone Law, while precious metallic minerals range from 4-5 percent and industrial minerals from 1-3 percent.
  • Parliamentarians can improve oversight by requesting the disclosure of all contracts, asking for revenue projections based on detailed assumptions, and ensuring coherence between mining, tax, and investment promotion laws.

Cite the original document

APA
Natural Resource Governance Institute (2015). Getting a Good Deal from Oil, Gas and Mining. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_fiscal-regimes_briefing_eng_20150811.pdf
Chicago
Natural Resource Governance Institute. Getting a Good Deal from Oil, Gas and Mining. 2015. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_fiscal-regimes_briefing_eng_20150811.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Natural Resource Governance Institute |title=Getting a Good Deal from Oil, Gas and Mining |date=April 2015 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_fiscal-regimes_briefing_eng_20150811.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000614)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{naturalresourcegovernanceinstitute2015getting, author = {{Natural Resource Governance Institute}}, title = {{Getting a Good Deal from Oil, Gas and Mining}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2015}, month = apr, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_fiscal-regimes_briefing_eng_20150811.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000614} }

Full text

Collected · Record updated