Negotiating Tanzania’s Gas Future: What Matters for Investment and Government Revenues?

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This briefing finds that Tanzania's offshore LNG project is unlikely to proceed under current economic conditions, as it would require a long-term LNG price of at least $14 per mmBtu to meet a typical investor hurdle rate of 13 percent.

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  • Under current long-term LNG price forecasts of $8 per mmBtu in east Asia, it is unlikely that companies will invest in the project, as the estimated after-tax internal rate of return (IRR) would be only 5 percent.
  • To achieve an after-tax IRR that meets the assumed hurdle rate of 13 percent, the project would require a long-term LNG price of at least $14 per mmBtu over its lifetime.
  • If the government imposes the stricter fiscal terms of the 2013 Model Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), the break-even long-term LNG price required for investment to proceed would rise to at least $21 per mmBtu.
  • The government would likely benefit more from an integrated value chain structure in terms of a higher average effective tax rate (AETR), but practicalities and the role of the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) suggest a partially segmented structure is more likely.
  • The tolling fee established in the HGA significantly impacts returns; for example, a ceiling of 15 percent on the LNG plant return would increase the after-tax IRR to 14 percent but reduce the undiscounted AETR to 52 percent, compared to 13 percent IRR and 56 percent AETR at an 8 percent ceiling.
  • A domestic market obligation (DMO) larger than the 10 percent currently agreed in the PSAs would likely reduce government revenues and make investment less probable, especially if the domestic gas price is low.
  • The authors suggest that a progressive fiscal instrument, such as a resource rent tax, could balance the need to attract investment during low-price periods while capturing higher revenues during periods of high profitability.

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APA
Scurfield, T., & Manley, D. (2017). Negotiating Tanzania’s Gas Future: What Matters for Investment and Government Revenues? Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/negotiating-tanzania-gas-future.pdf
Chicago
Scurfield, Thomas, and David Manley. Negotiating Tanzania’s Gas Future: What Matters for Investment and Government Revenues? Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2017. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/negotiating-tanzania-gas-future.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Scurfield |first1=Thomas |last2=Manley |first2=David |title=Negotiating Tanzania’s Gas Future: What Matters for Investment and Government Revenues? |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=September 2017 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/negotiating-tanzania-gas-future.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000556)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{scurfield2017negotiating, author = {Scurfield, Thomas and Manley, David}, title = {{Negotiating Tanzania’s Gas Future: What Matters for Investment and Government Revenues?}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2017}, month = sep, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/negotiating-tanzania-gas-future.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000556} }

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