How Tanzania Can Secure a Good Deal for its Offshore Gas

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The document argues that current low LNG price forecasts and restrictive new laws make investment in Tanzania's offshore gas project unlikely unless the government adopts more progressive taxation, maintains reasonable domestic market obligations, and provides greater legal certainty for investors.

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  • There is a significant gap between the LNG prices required for investor returns and current market forecasts. Investors typically require a long-term price of USD 11 per mmBtu, whereas the IMF and World Bank forecast prices between $7-8 per mmBtu.
  • Implementing the stricter fiscal terms found in the 2013 Model Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) and recent legislation would likely deter investment by raising the project's break-even price to an improbable $17 per mmBtu.
  • While increasing the domestic market obligation (DMO) could benefit Tanzanians, a high volume of gas supplied to a small domestic market at low prices would reduce company returns and government tax revenues.
  • The government faces a risk of tax avoidance through the manipulation of tolling fees (liquefaction charges), as companies may set high fees to shift profits from heavily taxed upstream operations to lightly taxed midstream operations.
  • Delays in project commencement have a high opportunity cost for the state; a one-year delay in the project's start is estimated to reduce government revenues by $900 million in present value terms.
  • Legal uncertainty created by new laws—specifically the prohibition of international arbitration and the vague criteria for renegotiating 'unconscionable' contracts—threatens investor confidence.

Cite the original document

APA
Scurfield, T., & Manley, D. (2019). How Tanzania Can Secure a Good Deal for its Offshore Gas. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/how-tanzania-can-secure-a-good-deal-for-its-offshore-gas.pdf
Chicago
Scurfield, Thomas, and David Manley. How Tanzania Can Secure a Good Deal for its Offshore Gas. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2019. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/how-tanzania-can-secure-a-good-deal-for-its-offshore-gas.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Scurfield |first1=Thomas |last2=Manley |first2=David |title=How Tanzania Can Secure a Good Deal for its Offshore Gas |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=September 2019 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/how-tanzania-can-secure-a-good-deal-for-its-offshore-gas.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000433)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{scurfield2019how, author = {Scurfield, Thomas and Manley, David}, title = {{How Tanzania Can Secure a Good Deal for its Offshore Gas}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2019}, month = sep, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/how-tanzania-can-secure-a-good-deal-for-its-offshore-gas.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000433} }

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