MINERÍA Y MARCOS INSTITUCIONALES EN LA REGIÓN ANDINA
Summary
This report analyzes how the commodity supercycle influenced governance in the Andean region, finding that governments are now engaging in a 'race to the bottom' by deregulating environmental and social standards to attract investment following the price collapse.
Key insights
- The 'supercycle' of high demand and prices for minerals and hydrocarbons, which lasted from the early 2000s until approximately 2014, provided fiscal abundance that allowed political and business elites to tolerate reforms in decentralization and environmental management as long as investment remained high.
- Following the end of the supercycle, Andean countries are experiencing a 'race to the bottom,' characterized by policies that weaken environmental standards, social participation, and fiscal pressures to maintain attractiveness for extractive investment.
- In Peru, the government implemented 'reactivation' measures including the acceleration of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) approvals and the reduction of the powers of the environmental oversight body (OEFA).
- In Bolivia, recent measures have expanded hydrocarbon exploration into protected natural areas and reduced the scope of indigenous consultation to a simplified administrative process.
- In Colombia, the state has centralized decision-making and weakened territorial autonomy through the 2001 Mining Code and the 2011 General Royalty System, which reduced the direct allocation of royalties to local territories.
- Chile remains the most centralized state among the five analyzed, with limited institutional reforms linked to the supercycle, although there are growing regional demands for autonomy and resources from copper-producing areas.
- The report argues that the 'myth' that mining and hydrocarbons automatically lead to regional wellbeing is contradicted by evidence showing that extractive regions in Peru often grow less than non-extractive regions and experience increased income inequality due to the current mining royalty (canon) distribution scheme.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Ballón, E., Molina, R., Viale, C., & Monge, C. (2017). MINERÍA Y MARCOS INSTITUCIONALES EN LA REGIÓN ANDINA. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/giz-reporte-version-10.pdf
- Chicago
- Ballón, Eduardo, Raúl Molina, Claudia Viale, and Carlos Monge. MINERÍA Y MARCOS INSTITUCIONALES EN LA REGIÓN ANDINA. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2017. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/giz-reporte-version-10.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Ballón |first1=Eduardo |last2=Molina |first2=Raúl |last3=Viale |first3=Claudia |last4=Monge |first4=Carlos |title=MINERÍA Y MARCOS INSTITUCIONALES EN LA REGIÓN ANDINA |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=March 2017 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/giz-reporte-version-10.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000412)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{balln2017minera, author = {Ballón, Eduardo and Molina, Raúl and Viale, Claudia and Monge, Carlos}, title = {{MINERÍA Y MARCOS INSTITUCIONALES EN LA REGIÓN ANDINA}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2017}, month = mar, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/giz-reporte-version-10.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000412} }
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