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The document analyzes the impact of political competition between Ghana's New Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC) on the governance of oil revenues. While the 2011 Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) was developed through broad public consultation, its implementation was undermined by political pressure to spend revenues on infrastructure and public wages to satisfy voters. This led to heavy borrowing against projected revenues and a subsequent fiscal crisis when global oil prices fell in 2014. Despite a 2015 amendment to the PRMA to improve fiscal flexibility and accountability, the study finds that a 'winner-takes-all' political system continues to concentrate power in the ruling party, often prioritizing short-term political gains over long-term fiscal sustainability.

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  • The 2011 Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) was designed following extensive public consultations to avoid the pitfalls seen in neighboring Nigeria and historical mismanagement of minerals in Ghana, establishing a legal basis for revenue management including two savings funds.
  • Political rivalry between the NPP and NDC led to inflated public expectations and a rushed legislative process, where the PRMA was passed before a comprehensive Exploration and Production Act was in place.
  • Ghana experienced a fiscal deficit and high public debt because the government borrowed heavily against projected oil revenues for infrastructure, leaving the budget vulnerable to the global oil price crash of June 2014.
  • The NDC government circumvented PRMA principles by capping the Stabilization Fund to redirect excess funds toward debt repayment, utilizing executive discretion and ambiguity within the law.
  • A 2015 amendment to the PRMA was passed unanimously to address implementation failures, allowing the finance minister to adjust benchmark revenue and earmarking funds for the newly created Ghana Infrastructure and Investment Fund.
  • Despite legal mandates to target four priority sectors, oil revenues (via the Annual Budget Funding Amount) have been spread thinly across numerous projects due to political pressure from voters and local chiefs.
  • The capacity of opposition parties to engage in substantive technical policy debate is hindered by a lack of funding and sector expertise when they are out of power.

Cite the original document

APA
Toroskainen, K., Fusheini, A., & Brouwer, F. (n.d.). Case study: Ghana. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/ghana-case-study.pdf
Chicago
Toroskainen, Kaisa, Adams Fusheini, and Femke Brouwer. Case study: Ghana. Natural Resource Governance Institute, n.d. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/ghana-case-study.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Toroskainen |first1=Kaisa |last2=Fusheini |first2=Adams |last3=Brouwer |first3=Femke |title=Case study: Ghana |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/ghana-case-study.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000407)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{toroskainenndcase, author = {Toroskainen, Kaisa and Fusheini, Adams and Brouwer, Femke}, title = {{Case study: Ghana}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/ghana-case-study.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000407} }

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