Uganda’s Oil Refinery: Gauging the Government’s Stake

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The planned Ugandan oil refinery, designed to process 60,000 barrels per day, is projected to be reasonably profitable with a 13 percent internal rate of return in a baseline scenario. However, the government's plan to take a 40 percent stake through the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC) poses financial risks; even with borrowing, the government would need to divert approximately $330 million in present value from the national budget for loan repayments in the 2030s. This financial burden could increase if cost overruns or lower global oil prices occur. The authors suggest that the government could attract more private investment and reduce its own risk by addressing the reasons for the previous consortium's fundraising failure, reducing cost overrun risks, and providing tax incentives.

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  • The planned oil refinery is projected to be reasonably profitable, with a baseline internal rate of return (IRR) of 13 percent.
  • A 40 percent government equity stake in the refinery, based on a $4.5 billion construction cost and 70 percent debt financing, would require a contribution of approximately $540 million (about $440 million in present value terms).
  • To cover the costs of its equity stake through borrowing, the government would need to allocate roughly $330 million in present value from the national budget for loan repayments during the 2030s.
  • The financial cost to the government for its stake is subject to downside risks, specifically construction cost overruns, feedstock volume, global oil prices, product prices, and regional exports.
  • The government can attract more external investors and lower its own equity requirement by ensuring deregulated product prices, reducing cost overrun risks, and offering tax incentives.

Cite the original document

APA
Scurfield, P. B. T. (2024). Uganda’s Oil Refinery: Gauging the Government’s Stake. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/uganda-oil-refinery-gauging-governments-stake
Chicago
Scurfield, Paul Bagabo, Thomas. Uganda’s Oil Refinery: Gauging the Government’s Stake. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2024. https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/uganda-oil-refinery-gauging-governments-stake.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Scurfield |first1=Paul Bagabo, Thomas |title=Uganda’s Oil Refinery: Gauging the Government’s Stake |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=15 January 2024 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/uganda-oil-refinery-gauging-governments-stake |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000093)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{scurfield2024ugandas, author = {Scurfield, Paul Bagabo, Thomas}, title = {{Uganda’s Oil Refinery: Gauging the Government’s Stake}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2024}, month = jan, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/uganda-oil-refinery-gauging-governments-stake}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000093} }

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