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The document outlines how fiscal terms in extractive industries divide financial benefits and risks between states and private companies. It details common fiscal instruments—such as royalties, bonuses, and production sharing—and provides best practices for designing regimes that balance investor attraction with national revenue needs. Additionally, it identifies common loopholes like transfer pricing and ring-fencing that can undermine state revenue generation.

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  • Fiscal terms in extractive industries must be designed to address four specific sector characteristics: the finite nature of resources, the requirement for high upfront investment, significant project risks (geological, price, technical, and political), and the potential for these revenues to dominate a country's public finances.
  • Governments utilize several primary fiscal instruments to capture revenue, including one-time bonuses, royalties (either ad valorem or per unit), corporate income taxes, windfall profits taxes, government equity stakes, and production sharing agreements where the state receives a share of physical petroleum.
  • Best practices for fiscal regimes include establishing terms through publicly accessible laws and regulations to reduce corruption, incorporating progressive elements that increase the government's share as profitability rises, and aligning the timing of revenue flows with national development plans.
  • Several common loopholes can be used to reduce a company's fiscal obligations, including transfer pricing (manipulating internal sales prices), high debt-to-equity ratios to increase tax-deductible interest, and the use of losses from one project to offset profits from another, which can be mitigated through ring-fencing.
  • Stabilization clauses, which protect investors from subsequent legal changes to the fiscal regime, should be narrowly drafted to cover only major revenue streams and must not freeze labor or environmental rules to preserve state sovereignty.

Cite the original document

APA
Natural Resource Governance Institute (2010). Oil, Gas, and Mining Fiscal Terms. https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/oil-gas-and-mining-fiscal-terms
Chicago
Natural Resource Governance Institute. Oil, Gas, and Mining Fiscal Terms. 2010. https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/oil-gas-and-mining-fiscal-terms.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Natural Resource Governance Institute |title=Oil, Gas, and Mining Fiscal Terms |date=1 January 2010 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/oil-gas-and-mining-fiscal-terms |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000090)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{naturalresourcegovernanceinstitute2010oil, author = {{Natural Resource Governance Institute}}, title = {{Oil, Gas, and Mining Fiscal Terms}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2010}, month = jan, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/oil-gas-and-mining-fiscal-terms}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000090} }

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