{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"organization":["Peace Research Institute Oslo"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":763,"relation":"eq"},"page":8,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=peace-research-institute-oslo&page=8","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=peace-research-institute-oslo&page=9","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"prio-001198","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001198","title":"Airstrike-Only Military Interventions and Their Civilian Consequences","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/1e1abfaf-4518-416b-ba01-ccf22e7115d0/Airstrike-only Military Interventions and Their Civilian Consequences.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research examines how NATO's airstrike-only intervention during the Kosovo War affected Albanian civilian victimization. Using a novel dataset (Kosovo Airstrike Locator) and the Kosovo Memory Book, the author finds that while the overall introduction of airstrikes coincided with a dramatic increase in civilian deaths, recently struck municipalities actually saw a decrease in expected victimization. However, this direct effect was offset by indirect consequences: the shift in strike strategy to target military units intensified the violence following battles and KLA soldier deaths, and shifted the geography of victimization toward more populous areas and those with lower Albanian population percentages. The author concludes that airstrike-only interventions can intensify conflict and increase civilian vulnerability, suggesting they should not be the primary tool for protecting civilians without a credible ground-force threat.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001198#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The introduction of NATO airstrikes was associated with a significant increase in the overall level of Albanian civilian victimization. In the period immediately preceding the strikes, an average of 12.5 Albanian civilians were killed per day, which rose to nearly 200 per day immediately following the intervention.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001198#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"At a municipal level, the occurrence of airstrikes was significantly associated with a decrease in the expected count of Albanian civilian victimization in the short term. In the late war period, each additional strike-day in a 5-day window decreased the expected count of victims by 17.46%, and in a 7-day window by 16.47%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001198#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The shift in NATO's strike strategy on April 23, 1999, to directly target Yugoslav military units, was associated with an increase in the overall levels of Albanian civilian victimization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001198#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In the late war period, the relationship between a municipality's ethnic composition and victimization shifted: municipalities with a higher percentage of Albanians experienced significantly lower levels of Albanian civilian victimization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001198#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The occurrence of battles and KLA soldier deaths had a stronger positive association with civilian victimization in the late war period than in the early war. For example, a battle at time T was associated with a 315% increase in victimization in the late war, compared to 254% in the early war.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001198#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study found no significant evidence to support the 'logic of retaliation' regarding Yugoslav soldier deaths, meaning that Yugoslav troop losses did not have a statistically significant relationship with increased Albanian civilian victimization in either the early or late war periods.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001198#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Serbia","Albania","North Macedonia","France"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative","spatiotemporal","causal inference"]},{"id":"prio-001245","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001245","title":"Does Gender Equality Matter? The Effect Of Gender Equality On Protest Campaign Success","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/364073cc-fc3c-46df-8f5e-765628d74bb6/Birthe_Einen Master Thesis 2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study finds that higher levels of women's political empowerment are positively associated with the success of nonviolent resistance campaigns and negatively associated with the success of violent campaigns. Using the NAVCO 2.1 dataset and the Women's Political Empowerment Index (WPEI), the author argues that gender equality shapes both the societal norms regarding the legitimacy of violence and the opportunity structures for recruitment. While the results for nonviolent campaigns are robust across various specifications, the findings for violent campaigns are more sensitive to how time dependency is handled. The author concludes that gender-related dynamics are critical structural elements in understanding the outcomes of collective action.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There is a positive significant relationship between women's political empowerment and the likelihood of nonviolent campaign success.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a negative significant relationship between women's political empowerment and the success of violent resistance campaigns.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The effect of women's political empowerment on campaign success differs significantly based on the primary tactic used, as shown by a significant interaction term in the logit model (p < 0.001).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author hypothesises that gender inequality promotes violent campaigns by fostering norms of 'militarised masculinities' and creating a 'male surplus' that eases recruitment for armed groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Gender equality is theorised to increase nonviolent success by promoting norms of mutual respect and expanding the mobilisation pool to include more women.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Women's Political Empowerment Index (WPEI) is a more effective predictor of campaign success than other proxies such as fertility rates, literacy ratios, or infant mortality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Individual subcomponents of the WPEI (civil liberties, civil society participation, and political participation) do not show statistically significant effects on their own, suggesting that empowerment operates as a multidimensional macro-concept.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The model for nonviolent campaign success is robust across different specifications, but the model for violent campaign success is sensitive to the method used to handle time dependency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The inclusion of WPEI improves the predictive power of the models, though out-of-sample generalisability for nonviolent campaigns remains poor (AUC < 0.70).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study found no evidence of selection bias that would invalidate the use of a single-stage logistic regression model for the main analysis.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001245#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["India","Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative","logistic regression","cross-national","time-series"]},{"id":"prio-001275","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001275","title":"Dual-Use AI Technology in China, the US and the EU","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6c0dc6db-c6b3-44a4-b775-126ff97588b4/Carrozza Marsh Reichberg - Dual-Use AI Technology in China the US and the EU - Strategic Implications for the Balance of Power PRIO Paper 2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines how AI, as a dual-use technology, is being integrated into military capabilities and regulated through export controls in China, the US, and the EU. It highlights China's 'military-civil fusion' strategy and the US's efforts to maintain technological leadership, while the EU focuses on ethical standards and 'trustworthy AI'. The authors argue that the intangibility of software makes trade controls difficult and that the competition for AI dominance creates a 'dual-use security dilemma' that could destabilize strategic relations and nuclear deterrence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001275#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Regulating dual-use AI is uniquely challenging because software is intangible, making it easy to transfer across borders and difficult for customs officials to monitor or verify.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001275#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"China employs a 'military-civil fusion' strategy to integrate private sector innovation into military programs, aiming to achieve 'brain supremacy' on the battlefield.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001275#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The US strategy focuses on protecting its technological leadership and restricting the flow of data and talent to competitors, specifically China and Russia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001275#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU prioritizes a 'human-centric' approach to AI, emphasizing the creation of 'trustworthy AI' based on ethical standards, transparency, and fairness.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001275#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The competition for dual-use AI may lead to a 'dual-use security dilemma,' where civilian technological progress is perceived as a military threat, increasing mistrust and the risk of miscalculation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001275#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"AI applications could destabilize nuclear deterrence by enhancing capabilities in remote sensing, missile defense, and autonomous nuclear weapon delivery.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001275#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"China's top-down approach to AI development faces internal inefficiencies, including overinvestment in areas without market demand and a shortage of experienced algorithm developers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001275#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russia's development of military AI is heavily dependent on importing dual-use technology, particularly advanced semiconductors, due to a lack of domestic infrastructure and skilled scientists.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001275#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Russia","Norway","Ukraine"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","strategic assessment"]},{"id":"prio-001420","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001420","title":"Returning to School or Dropping Out after the COVID-19 Closure?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/a9a7d7b6-6f9a-4679-ac63-2eb620c70cef/Gjerlow et al - Returning to School or Dropping Out after the COVID-19 Closure PRIO Policy Brief 19-2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Based on a July 2022 survey of approximately 1,200 households in Cox’s Bazar, the report finds that while public school attendance in the Bangladeshi host community increased after the pandemic, there was a dramatic 30% drop in attendance at NGO learning centres for female Rohingya youths over age 12. The decline for refugee girls is attributed to family obligations, marriage, and a deteriorating security situation in the camps, whereas male refugee dropouts are more frequently linked to the need for income-generating work.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001420#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Public school attendance among children in the Bangladeshi host community increased significantly after reopening; attendance for children aged 8 to 12 rose from 30–60% before March 2020 to more than 90% in June 2022.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001420#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Female Rohingya youths over the age of 12 experienced a 30% drop in attendance at NGO learning centres compared to pre-pandemic levels, with less than 20% attending such centres in June 2022.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001420#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The primary reasons cited for female refugee youths not receiving education include family obligations, age (cited by 30%), and marriage (cited by 10%), while security concerns were cited by 20% of female youths and not mentioned for males.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001420#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Male refugee youths are more likely to drop out due to economic necessity; 25% of respondents cited the need to work for income as the reason for a male youth's lack of education, compared to 8% for female youths.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001420#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There was an increase in the use of private informal tutoring outside the home between March 2020 and June 2022, rising to 15% for refugee children and 11% for host-community children.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001420#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Teknaf Upazila","Ukhiya","Myanmar"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["survey","comparative analysis","OLS regression"]},{"id":"prio-001514","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001514","title":"External Voting among Central European Migrants Living in Western Europe","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/0bbb4a4d-a8cf-4cc3-b519-51157813c87d/Kotnarowski et al - External Voting among Central European Migrants Living in Western Europe PRIO Paper 2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research analyzes external voting data from parliamentary and presidential elections for migrants from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Romania living in 17 European host countries. It employs the Pedersen index to measure the discrepancy between diaspora and domestic voting results and uses V-dem Party database dimensions to assess ideological differences. The findings generally indicate that diaspora voters are more liberal, less populist, and more economically right-wing than domestic voters, though their voting trends often mirror the dynamics of their countries of origin. The report also notes that the size and influence of these voting blocs are increasing, with the Bulgarian diaspora having the highest relative impact on national election results.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The level of discrepancy between diaspora and domestic voting results varies by country: Czech diasporas show a clear trend of voting increasingly differently from voters in their country of origin, while Lithuanian diasporas became more similar to domestic voters in the 2020 elections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Bulgarian, Latvian, and Polish diasporas experienced an initial period of convergence with domestic voting results, followed by a period of increasing discrepancy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Romanian diaspora voting results increasingly differed from domestic results between 2008 and 2016, but became slightly more similar in the 2016-2020 period.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Across most analyzed countries, diaspora voters generally support more liberal and less populist parties than domestic voters, a trend most evident in recent years.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"On cultural dimensions, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Polish diasporas consistently vote for more progressive parties than domestic voters, whereas Bulgarian diasporas have become more culturally conservative than domestic voters since 2017.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Most analyzed diasporas prefer economically right-wing parties and limited welfare measures, with the exception of Bulgarian diaspora voters after 2017, who supported left-wing and welfare-oriented parties more than domestic voters.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Diaspora voters are significantly less likely to support clientelistic parties compared to voters in their country of origin.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Attitudes toward immigration are split: Bulgarian and Latvian diasporas are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties, while Czech, Lithuanian, Polish, and Romanian diasporas are more likely to vote for pro-immigrant parties than domestic voters.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The relative impact of the diaspora vote on national results is highest for Bulgaria (3.85% of all voters in 2021) and lowest for the Czech Republic (0.12% in 2017).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The size of voting diasporas has increased over time across all host countries, driven by increased migration and a higher number of electoral commissions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001514#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Austria","Belgium","Germany","Denmark","Spain","Finland","France","United Kingdom","Greece","Ireland","Italy","Netherlands","Portugal","Sweden","Norway","Iceland","Switzerland"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["comparative analysis","quantitative analysis","electoral analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001566","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001566","title":"Migration and development dynamics in Redeyef, Tunisia","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"case study","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/48e448ae-8782-419d-baa1-20eb4aa4c559/Migration and development dynamics in Redeyef Tunisia.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines Redeyef, a marginalised Tunisian mining town where economic decline and corruption have made migration a primary strategy for hope. While most young adults aspire to migrate and many have ties abroad, regular pathways are increasingly difficult, leading to a rise in risky irregular migration. Despite strong transnational ties, remittances are limited to a minority of households and have not significantly contributed to the town's collective development.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001566#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Redeyef is characterized by economic stagnation and corruption, largely linked to the decline of the Compagnie de Phosphate de Gafsa (CPG). Job cuts in 2008 triggered protests, and a subsequent government attempt to create 10,000 positions in gardening and environmental protection is viewed as a failed scheme of 'ghost jobs' for the well-connected. Consequently, 80% of survey respondents identify corruption as a serious problem, and 83% of young adults believe the town is changing in 'mostly bad ways'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001566#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Migration is viewed as a critical strategy for escaping local stagnation, though regular pathways are increasingly inaccessible. While 72% of young adults would migrate to a richer country if they had the necessary papers, 88% believe it is 'difficult or very difficult' for someone from Redeyef to do so. This has led to an increase in irregular migration, despite severe risks: 17% of young adults know someone who died en route, and 49% know someone who was deported or forcibly returned in the last five years.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001566#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite strong social ties to the diaspora—with 77% of young adults having family or friends abroad—the economic impact of migration on Redeyef's development is limited. Only 35% of households with migrant ties receive remittances, and for less than 1% of households are these remittances the primary income source. Collective remittances are rare, and migrants are generally perceived as supporting their own families rather than contributing to the town's overall development.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001566#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate migration","economic development"],"geography_discussed":["France","Germany","Nantes","Enfidha","Nabeul","Sousse"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","survey"]},{"id":"prio-001598","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001598","title":"Nature as Patronage? Exploring The Effects of Democratization and Support Coalition Identity on Forest Loss","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/7f42acbe-ff1a-4eba-899d-7c0805fc6d55/Nature as Patronage Exploring The Effects of Democratization and Support Coalition Identity on Forest Loss.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study examines the relationship between political institutions, support coalition identity, and deforestation. Using satellite data and expert-coded regime data, the author finds that while democratization is generally associated with forest loss, this effect is moderated by the support base: democracies with rural supporters are associated with reforestation. Conversely, regimes relying on urban supporters are linked to higher-than-average forest loss globally and in the tropics, potentially reflecting the consumption demands of urbanizing populations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001598#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Democratization is generally associated with higher rates of forest loss, but this effect is heterogeneously moderated by the identity of the regime's support coalition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001598#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Democratic regimes that rely on rural supporters are associated with an average increase in forest cover globally, indicating reforestation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001598#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regimes that rely on support from urban groups are associated with higher-than-average forest loss across both global forests and tropical forests.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001598#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Neither democratization nor its interaction with various support coalitions had a statistically significant effect on forest change within the tropical forest sub-sample.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001598#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regimes dominated by urban business elites are associated with higher-than-average forest loss, with some evidence suggesting a sequential effect where deforestation peaks a few years after these elites enter the coalition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001598#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic size (per capita GDP) is positively associated with forest regrowth globally, supporting the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis, although economic growth is associated with deforestation in tropical forests.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001598#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The geographical location of the support coalition (rural vs. urban) is a less salient predictor of forest cover change than the identity of the support groups themselves.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001598#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["deforestation","reforestation","climate change","carbon sink","urbanization"],"geography_discussed":["Indonesia","Kenya","Brazil","Mexico","Morocco","Ethiopia","People's Republic of China"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative","panel data analysis","two-way fixed effects","Mahalanobis distance matching"]},{"id":"prio-001619","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001619","title":"The UN Security Council and Women’s Full, Equal and Meaningful Participation","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/dc34d77c-7f71-40a2-9448-76c4054eedc7/Obermeier and Olsson - The UN Security Council and Womens Full Equal and Meaningful Participation GPS Policy Brief 1-2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The brief examines gender representation among individuals invited to brief the UN Security Council between 2015 and 2021. While the period remained male-dominated overall, the proportion of male briefers fell from 77% in 2015 to 52% in 2021. Women are more frequently represented when briefing as members of civil society organizations (CSOs) or government institutions, whereas men dominate the UN system and other multilateral organizations. The authors note a positive trend in the consultation of women's CSOs, which have moved from being primarily invited to thematic Women, Peace and Security (WPS) debates to briefing on a wider array of country-specific issues, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Libya, and Mali.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001619#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Between 2015 and 2021, the UN Security Council's invited briefers were predominantly male, though the gender gap narrowed significantly over the period. Male briefers accounted for 70% of all recorded briefers, but their proportion decreased from 77% in 2015 to 52% in 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001619#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a distinct gender divide based on the organizational affiliation of the briefers. Men primarily represent the UN system and other multilateral organizations, while women are more frequently found representing government institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001619#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UN system is the most dominant source of briefers, accounting for 63% of all individuals. Within this group, there is a strong male imbalance, with 78% being men and 22% being women.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001619#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Women's CSOs have seen an increase in both the frequency of their invitations and the diversity of the topics they address. In 2015, women's CSOs were invited to brief five times, mostly for WPS meetings; by 2021, they were invited 16 times, covering 12 different topics including 10 country-specific meetings such as Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Libya, and Mali.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001619#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The representation of women varies significantly by meeting topic. Women were consulted more frequently than men on eight specific topics, including Haiti, the Middle East, and Women, Peace and Security (WPS)—the latter of which had no male briefers. Conversely, men dominated deliberations on Sanctions, Mali, and Israel/Palestine.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001619#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["gender equality"],"geography_discussed":["Afghanistan","Iraq","Somalia","Ireland","Kenya","Mexico","Norway","South Africa","Spain","Sweden","Colombia","South Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Libya","Mali"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","policy assessment"]},{"id":"prio-001627","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001627","title":"Does Unemployment Drive Political Violence and Protest?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/fa4a62d0-d389-410c-b82c-e3a416b335dc/Paasonen - Does Unemployment Drive Political Violence and Protest Focusing on the case of Middle Eastern and North African youth - Conflict Trends 1-2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document challenges the common assumption that unemployment, particularly among youth, increases the likelihood of political violence and protests. By reviewing global research and analyzing survey data from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the author finds that unemployed individuals are not more likely to support political violence or participate in demonstrations than those who are employed. Instead, the brief identifies other work-related factors—such as ambiguous employment status, part-time work, and job dissatisfaction—as stronger predictors of political activity. The author suggests that the unemployed may be less active due to a lack of resources, social stigmatization, or low interest in politics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001627#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Existing global research on the link between unemployment and political violence is inconsistent and lacks strong empirical support, with some studies suggesting unemployment does not act as a mechanistic causal factor in violent conflicts in developing countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001627#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of Afrobarometer survey data from five North African countries indicates that unemployed individuals are actually less supportive of political violence than those who are employed.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001627#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Data from the Sahwa youth survey in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Lebanon shows that unemployed youth are not more likely to participate in demonstrations compared to employed youth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001627#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Young people with 'ambiguous employment status'—those who report being unemployed or students but later disclose performing some work, often in the informal sector—are significantly more active protesters than those clearly employed or unemployed.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001627#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Specific employment characteristics are stronger drivers of protest than general unemployment; those working part-time (less than 30 hours a week) and those dissatisfied with their work demonstrate more frequently.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001627#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document proposes several reasons why the unemployed may not protest, including a lack of necessary resources (money, social connections, or political skills), social stigmatization leading to passivity, and a low interest in politics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001627#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Algeria","Egypt","Morocco","Sudan","Tunisia","Lebanon"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy brief","empirical analysis","literature review"]},{"id":"prio-001631","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001631","title":"Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2021","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/988284ec-ec0d-4d9b-ba30-006b223ce98e/Palik et al - Conflict Trends A Global Overview 1946-2021 PRIO Paper 2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes global conflict dynamics, noting that state-based conflicts reached historic highs in 2019 and 2020. It highlights the significant role of the Islamic State (IS) in driving conflict numbers and the rise of non-state conflicts, particularly in the Americas and Africa. The document also tracks the declining success rates of non-violent resistance campaigns and the prevalence of conflict-related sexual violence, which is most frequently recorded in Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"State-based conflicts reached record highs in 2019 and 2020, with 56 conflicts recorded in each year. In 2021, 54 state-based conflicts were recorded across 35 countries, resulting in nearly 85,000 battle-related deaths.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The conflict in Yemen saw a massive escalation in fatalities, with battle-related deaths increasing from 2,300 in 2020 to more than 23,000 in 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The expansion of the Islamic State (IS) has been a primary driver of the increase in state-based conflicts. In 2021, there were 15 conflicts involving IS, and between 2015 and 2021, IS-related conflicts represented 26% to 33% of all conflicts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state conflicts have stabilized at higher levels than before 2012. In 2021, 76 non-state conflicts were recorded, resulting in 25,247 battle-related deaths, an increase of over 2,000 from the previous year.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state conflict in the Americas is primarily characterized by fighting between highly organized actors, specifically drug cartel violence in Mexico, whereas non-state conflict in Africa features a higher number of communal conflicts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"One-sided violence fatalities increased from 8,596 in 2020 to 10,003 in 2021. While non-state actors commit the largest share of this violence, there has been an increase in government-perpetrated one-sided violence since 2014.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-violent resistance campaigns were more prevalent than violent ones between 1989 and 2019, but their success rate has declined since 2010. In the last decade, six of ten years saw failure rates of 60% or higher.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is most frequently recorded in Africa, where 18% of all active conflict-actor-years between 1989 and 2019 experienced it. State actors are the most frequent perpetrators, responsible for more than half of all reported 'massive' levels of sexual violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Afghanistan","Yemen","Syria","Ethiopia","Mexico","Africa","Asia","Middle East","Americas","Europe","Tanzania"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","trend analysis","regional comparison"]},{"id":"prio-001724","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001724","title":"Are We Seeing a Global Geopolitical Realignment?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/e811ebe4-7520-4aa3-8fa4-9e4657a0acef/Sandnes - Are We Seeing a Global Geopolitical Realignment PRIO Policy Brief 16-2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The analysis of UN votes, regional organization statements, and public diplomatic interactions from February 20 to June 19, 2022, indicates that no global pro-Russia or pro-authoritarian bloc has emerged. Instead, most states in the Global South prefer to remain non-aligned, although there is evidence of diplomatic competition for influence between Russia and Western powers, particularly in Asia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001724#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The majority of states in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean prefer to remain non-aligned and avoid taking sides in the conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001724#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is no evidence of a new global pro-Russia or pro-authoritarian bloc; the few states that consistently voted with Russia in the UN General Assembly (Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, and Syria) already had longstanding ties to Russia prior to the 2022 invasion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001724#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Diplomatic competition for influence between Russia and the US or European partners is evident in the Global South, with this competition appearing more pronounced in Asia than in Africa based on public diplomatic interactions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001724#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional organizations showed varying levels of antipathy toward Russia; while seven explicitly named Russia as the aggressor, no Asian regional organization did so.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001724#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The shift of Mali from European to Russian security partnerships is considered an exceptional case rather than a representative global trend.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001724#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of 79 states that did not consistently condemn Russia in UN votes shows they are disproportionately non-democratic, with 49% being non-democracies compared to a global average of 39%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001724#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Africa","Asia","Latin America","Caribbean","Mali","Ukraine","Russia","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["geopolitical analysis","diplomatic network analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001728","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001728","title":"Law after July 22, 2011: Survivors, Memory and Reconstruction","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/a28d72c7-b931-47d3-8503-caa3c6943fbb/Sandvik et al - Law after July 22 2011 Survivors Memory and Reconstruction PRIO Paper 2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The paper examines the 'socio-legal ripple effects' of the July 22, 2011 attacks in Norway, arguing that the state primarily utilized ordinary legal institutions and welfare schemes rather than ad-hoc mechanisms to manage the aftermath. It analyzes how this reliance on ordinary law shaped the allocation of financial resources, the definition of 'victim' identity, and the judicialization of conflicts surrounding national memorials and the demolition of the Y-block in the Government Quarter.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001728#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Norwegian state responded to the extraordinary events of July 22 by primarily employing ordinary institutions, rules, and welfare state processes rather than creating specialized or ad-hoc schemes common in other countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001728#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While the state used ordinary schemes, the events of July 22 did trigger specific regulatory changes, such as raising the maximum criminal injuries compensation limit from 40 to 60 times the National Insurance basic amount (G) in spring 2012, a change applied retroactively to incidents after January 1, 2011.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001728#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The use of ordinary legal frameworks created a tension where the bureaucracy's discretionary power determined compensation levels through 'pilot cases,' leading some survivors to feel their individual stories were ignored in favor of standardized groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001728#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The law acted as a gatekeeper for victim identity, with the Norwegian Supreme Court upholding a strict interpretation of 'objective criteria' that initially excluded individuals who provided help on the shore side of Utøya from being classified as victims.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001728#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Memorialization processes became judicialized through bureaucratic procedures and legal mobilization, exemplified by local residents in the municipality of Hole using the Norwegian Neighboring Properties Act to contest the location of the national memorial.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001728#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The reconstruction of the Government Quarter has been characterized by a 'comprehensive securitization' and significant legal conflict over the demolition of the Y-block, which conservationists argued was decided by a fiscal 'concept study' rather than a professional cultural heritage assessment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001728#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Legal mobilization against the demolition of the Y-block was ultimately unsuccessful after the Norwegian parliament (Storting) voted down a proposal to postpone the demolition, and the Oslo District Court rejected the request for a temporary injunction.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001728#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Oslo","Utøya","Hole","Trondheim"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["socio-legal analysis","research agenda"]},{"id":"prio-001759","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001759","title":"The Impact of the Ukraine War on Donor Priorities","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/d088a585-38e3-41ca-9999-dd291e9c8303/Strom-Sedgwick and Tank - The Impact of the Ukraine War on Donor Priorities PRIO Policy Brief 17-2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that the war in Ukraine is causing a diversion of development aid from the Global South. This occurs through three primary mechanisms: the use of the OECD '12-month-rule' to count domestic refugee-hosting costs as ODA, the reallocation of national budgets toward increased military and defence spending, and the anticipation of massive post-war reconstruction costs in Ukraine. The authors warn that this shift undermines the quality and extent of aid, potentially leaving root causes of instability in vulnerable regions unaddressed.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001759#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"OECD-DAC donors are redirecting Official Development Assistance (ODA) intended for long-term development in the Global South to fund the domestic costs of hosting Ukrainian refugees, utilizing the OECD '12-month-rule'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001759#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Sweden initially planned to divert approximately $1 billion (18% of its annual aid budget) for refugee costs, though this was later revised to 11% following criticism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001759#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Increased national defence and military spending in response to the war is limiting the funds available for development assistance, as aid budgets are often the first to be cut to compensate for military increases.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001759#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Germany's response to the war included a pledge to increase defence spending to 2% of economic output, which led to a proposed 12% cut in development aid, although this cut was later scaled down.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001759#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Post-war reconstruction costs for Ukraine are expected to be a significant long-term drain on donor resources, with estimates ranging from $220 billion to $540 billion, or at least $349 billion according to a joint World Bank, European Commission, and Ukrainian government report.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001759#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The trend of providing ODA through loans rather than grants, combined with rising inflation, is exacerbating the debt crisis for recipient states, potentially forcing them to prioritize debt repayment over development investments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001759#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance","Sustainable Development Goals"],"geography_discussed":["Ukraine","Germany","United Kingdom","France","Sweden","Sudan","Norway"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","budgetary analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001755","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001755","title":"Norway’s Policy on Emerging Military Technologies","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2021-11","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/2a1ec4eb-868a-4cd8-a796-89810d7b707f/Stai and Martins - Norways Policy on Emerging Military Technologies PRIO Policy Brief 11-2021.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document assesses Norway's cautious and ambiguous approach to regulating lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) and military AI. It highlights the tension between Norway's NATO commitments and the need for arms control diplomacy in the face of technological advancements by Russia and China. The brief identifies significant legal and ethical challenges, such as the lack of accountability for AI-driven actions and the risks associated with dual-use technologies, while noting that definitional ambiguities and the consensus-based structure of the UN CCW have hindered international regulatory progress.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001755#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Norway's current policy on military AI and lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) is characterized as ambiguous and overly cautious, as the country has not taken a definitive stand in international forums regarding their regulation or prohibition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001755#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Norway's reluctance to lead international regulation efforts is influenced by its NATO membership, where some allies oppose effective regulation of AI-based weapons, and by ongoing security concerns regarding Russia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001755#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"International regulatory progress is stalled by definitional disagreements over what constitutes 'autonomy' and the structural requirement for consensus within the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001755#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The use of autonomous weapons creates a legal and ethical vacuum regarding accountability under international humanitarian law, as it is unclear who is responsible for actions taken by AI systems.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001755#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a growing risk associated with 'dual-use' technologies, where civilian R&D is adapted for military use, necessitating stricter export controls to prevent technology from reaching countries with human rights abuses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001755#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Norwegian government has resisted total exclusion of LAWS manufacturers from the Government Pension Fund, arguing that the lack of a clear definition for LAWS would lead to the exclusion of systems the country may wish to develop.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001755#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russia and China are actively investing in disruptive military technologies; Russia focuses on AI for information warfare to offset conventional inferiority, while China pursues a military-civil integration policy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001755#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["People's Republic of China","Russia","Geneva","Saudi Arabia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","diplomatic assessment"]},{"id":"prio-001293","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001293","title":"Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support (MAPS) Dataset Technical Appendix","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2021-09","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/b89cd9d4-be7c-400d-b567-d7391855b34e/Colombia MAPS wave 1 Technical Appendix.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The MAPS survey's first wave collected data from 12,052 respondents across 16 regions in Colombia known as PDETs. The data collection was split into two segments: Segment 1 (January 2019) in Arauca and Tolima, and Segment 2 (October-November 2019) across the remaining 14 regions. The survey utilized a multi-stage sampling process focusing on municipal capitals (cabeceras) and condensed rural settlements (centros poblados), while excluding rural dispersed populations. To ensure representativity, the authors developed unified sample weights (FEX CALIB TOTAL) and post-stratification weights (FEX CALIB POST) to harmonize the different sampling schemes used by the two survey firms involved.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001293#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The first wave of the MAPS survey reached a total of 12,052 respondents across 16 regions designated as Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDETs), consisting of 170 municipalities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001293#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Data collection was conducted in two distinct timeframes and segments: Segment 1 took place in January 2019 in Arauca and Tolima with 1,717 respondents, and Segment 2 took place in October-November 2019 across 14 PDETs with 10,335 respondents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001293#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The sampling methodology excluded 'rural dispersed population', instead targeting 'cabecera' (municipal capitals) and 'centros poblados' (condensed settlements of at least 20 structures).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001293#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Because the two segments used different sampling and weighting schemes, the authors recommend using specific unified weights (FEX CALIB TOTAL and FEX CALIB POST) when analyzing the data as a whole.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001293#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Arauca Department","Tolima Department","Bogotá"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"prio-001229","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001229","title":"Gender and Power Sharing","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2021-06-08","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6f9f12b5-8f11-4c1f-93f4-6b1f0fcea4e6/Backgrounder 7 Azba and Tank 2021 _ Gender and Power Sharing.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the intersection of power-sharing institutions and gender equality, noting that while power-sharing is a common tool for peacebuilding, it is often 'gender blind'. It argues that consociational models focusing on ethno-national identity can risk embedding patriarchal attitudes or sacrificing women's claims for equality to maintain communal unity. However, the authors suggest that because power-sharing already utilizes group proportions and quotas, it provides a 'natural environment' for securing gender-based quotas. The briefing highlights that power-sharing agreements are seven times more likely to have gender quotas than those without such provisions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001229#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Power-sharing frameworks are frequently 'gender blind', often ignoring gender aspects and failing to theorize the gendered implications of these arrangements in conflict regulation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001229#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Consociational power-sharing models, which prioritize elite cooperation among ethno-nationalist groups, can lead to the marginalization of women's interests and the reinforcement of patriarchal norms. In some cases, opposing power-sharing partners may agree on the 'conservative retrenchment of womens rights', particularly regarding reproductive services, or sacrifice equality claims to preserve 'communal unity'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001229#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Zimbabwe","Kenya","Bosnia and Herzegovina","Burundi","Cambodia","Lebanon","Nepal","Sierra Leone","South Africa","Chile","Northern Ireland","Colombia","Somalia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"prio-001799","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001799","title":"The Illusion of Inclusion: Assessing the Effects and Gendered Implications of Power Sharing","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2021-06","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/c7b34695-362f-46a9-947a-56be63d1a13f/The Illusion of Inclusion Assessing the Effects and Gendered Implications of Power Sharing.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study finds that while inclusive power-sharing arrangements positively affect the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, they do not statistically increase women's empowerment in civil society, including their political participation, civil liberties, and civil society engagement. Using a country-year fixed effects model for 180 countries, the author argues that such institutions often provide an 'illusion of inclusion' by focusing on elite-level representation while failing to address grassroots gender inequalities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001799#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Inclusive power-sharing arrangements have a statistically significant positive effect on the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001799#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is no statistical evidence that inclusive power-sharing arrangements increase women's empowerment in civil society, specifically regarding political participation, civil liberties, or civil society engagement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001799#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"High levels of battle-related deaths and civil conflict are associated with lower levels of female inclusion and women's empowerment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001799#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The implementation of inclusive power-sharing after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 did not show a statistically significant additional effect on women's inclusion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001799#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic factors, specifically GDP per capita and petroleum production per capita, did not show a statistically significant relationship with female inclusion or women's empowerment in the fixed effects models.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001799#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author argues that power-sharing models often prioritize ethno-national identities, which can lead to the 'exclusion amid inclusion' dilemma where women and other non-elite groups are marginalized.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001799#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Lebanon","Burundi","Bosnia and Herzegovina","Kenya","Zimbabwe","South Africa","Colombia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","fixed effects regression","cross-national time-series analysis"]},{"id":"prio-000495","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-000495","title":"Green Energy Development and Transition: Have we seen this film before? – Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2021-05-04","source_url":"https://www.prio.org/comments/777","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The authors contend that the transition to renewable energy technologies, such as wind turbines and solar panels, relies on destructive mineral extraction that mirrors the harmful patterns of the fossil fuel era. Through initiatives like the WINDPLAN and Green Curses and Violent Conflicts projects, the researchers examine socio-environmental conflicts and protests against renewable projects in Norway, Uganda, Chile, and Bolivia. They argue that energy justice must move beyond simply increasing energy access to addressing the imbalances and contestations caused by the green transition's global value chain.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000495#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Green energy development relies on the destructive extraction of non-renewable materials and minerals, with the volume of damaging land use-change and extraction increasing rather than decreasing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000495#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is evidence that renewable energy development replicates historical patterns of capitalist development and fossil fuel industries, leading to socio-environmental conflicts and protests globally.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000495#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Specific examples of contestation against renewable energy include opposition to wind turbines in Norway, hydro-electric dams in Uganda, and lithium mining in Chile and Bolivia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000495#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors advocate for a definition of energy justice that extends beyond combating energy poverty to address the imbalances and impacts occurring within the global value chain of green energy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000495#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["energy transition","energy justice","mining","wind turbine"],"geography_discussed":["Africa","South America","Norway","Europe","Uganda","Chile","Bolivia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["critical analysis","socio-political assessment"]},{"id":"prio-001647","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001647","title":"What Affects the Distribution of Protests against Coronavirus Measures?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2021-05","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/fb283695-b5fd-42fc-8019-c467fc4c04e1/Pfaff Neumayer and Plumper - What Affects the Distribution of Protests against Coronavirus Measures - Conflict Trends 5-2021.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the drivers of protests against pandemic restrictions across Europe, Germany, and the US. It finds that protest intensity is influenced by the perceived asynchronicity between mortality rates and policy stringency, levels of trust in government, and political polarization. In Europe, higher trust and lower civil liberties correlate with fewer protests. In Germany, districts with lower support for mainstream parties saw more protests, particularly in the East. In the US, protest intensity was higher in Democratic-governed states, driven both by stricter measures and political polarization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In European countries, the frequency of protests against pandemic policies is negatively correlated with trust in government and public administration, and positively correlated with the level of protection for civil liberties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Protests are more likely to occur when there is a perceived mismatch, or asynchronicity, between the severity of the pandemic (mortality rates) and the stringency of the containment measures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Germany, protest intensity was higher in districts with lower support for mainstream parties, though this effect was not observed in Eastern German districts where support for mainstream parties is consistently low.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Eastern German districts exhibited a disproportionately high level of protest activity relative to their population size, accounting for 34.6 percent of all German protests despite representing only 19.3 percent of the population.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In the United States, protest intensity was higher in states governed by the Democratic Party compared to those governed by the Republican Party, a result attributed to both the implementation of stricter measures and political polarization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic inequality is identified as a factor that increases protest intensity within the polarized political environment of the United States.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Norway","Finland","Estonia","France","Spain","Italy","Belgium"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["empirical analysis","cross-country comparison","sub-national analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001228","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001228","title":"Women’s Participation in Politics","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2021-04-19","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/883fdbc1-1594-49e7-9244-f98f967a316f/Backgrounder 6 Ahmad and Tank 2021 _ Womens Participation in Politics.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that women's political representation is vital for the durability of peace, as it can lead to increased social welfare spending and improved perceptions of governance. It highlights that while global representation in national parliaments slightly increased to 25.5% by January 2021, women still face systemic barriers including poverty, patriarchal stereotypes, and violence. The briefing suggests that international bodies should implement gender quotas, establish participation benchmarks for 'free and fair' elections, and ensure women's rights are guaranteed in peace agreements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001228#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"As of 1 January 2021, the global share of women in national parliaments saw a slight increase from 24.9% to 25.5%, although there was a simultaneous increase in the number of countries with no women in government.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001228#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Increasing women's political participation can enhance the durability of peace through two primary mechanisms: prioritizing social welfare spending over military spending and improving public perceptions of elite credibility and governance quality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001228#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In post-conflict states where local actors oppose women's political participation based on religious or cultural norms, international bodies face a conflict between supporting women's rights and maintaining state stability to avoid a return to conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001228#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Women encounter several systemic obstacles to entering political office, including poverty, limited education, patriarchal gender stereotypes, violence against women in politics, lack of financing, media prejudice, and a gendered digital divide that creates unsafe online spaces.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001228#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To strengthen participation, the document recommends that international bodies adopt gender quotas, develop minimum participation benchmarks for elections to be considered 'free and fair', and ensure women's rights are explicitly guaranteed in peace agreements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001228#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Afghanistan, gender quotas were adopted in the legislature following the 2001 US-led invasion; currently, women hold 67 out of 248 seats in the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001228#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Afghanistan","Argentina","Chile","Iraq","Rwanda","Colombia","Mexico","Zambia","Somalia","Indonesia","India","Nepal","Pakistan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]}]}