{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"organization":["Natural Resource Governance Institute"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":868,"relation":"eq"},"page":27,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=natural-resource-governance-institute&page=27","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=natural-resource-governance-institute&page=28","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"NRGI-000403","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000403","title":"Generating Government Revenue from the Sale of Oil and Gas: New Data and the Case for Improved Commodity Trading Transparency","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/generating-government-revenue-from-sale-of-oils-and-gas_0.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The briefing finds that in-kind payments of physical oil and gas often constitute the majority of payments made by extractive companies to governments, yet national oil companies in many oil-producing countries score poorly on governance and disclosure regarding the sale of these assets.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000403#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In 2016, 32 countries received a significant portion (defined as more than 25 percent) of their revenue from companies covered by payments-to-governments (PtG) laws in the form of physical oil and gas.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000403#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"A vast majority of in-kind payments (USD 28 billion or 85 percent) are received by countries that the 2017 Resource Governance Index (RGI) classifies as having \"weak,\" \"poor\" or \"failing\" governance systems.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000403#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There is a widespread lack of disclosure regarding the identity of buyers and the terms of sales; 44 countries scored \"weak\" or \"failing\" on whether the government or NOC publicly discloses the names of companies that bought the production sold by the NOC.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000403#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Most oil-producing countries lack defined procedures for transferring sales revenue from the NOC to the national treasury, with 33 out of 55 countries in the assessment having no identifiable procedure.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000403#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"While Trafigura voluntarily reports payments to NOCs for the purchase of oil and gas, other major companies with significant trading divisions and seats on the EITI international board, such as BP, Shell, and Total, have not followed this example.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000403#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["petroleum industry","extractive industry","climate finance","transparency"],"geography_discussed":["Switzerland","United Kingdom","Canada","European Union","Norway","Nigeria","Republic of the Congo","Iraq","Ghana","United States","Singapore"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","quantitative analysis","case study"]},{"id":"NRGI-000424","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000424","title":"Төрийн өмчит олборлох компанид зориулсан ил тайлагналын хөтөч","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"guide","language":"ru","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/guide-to-extractive-sector-state-owned-enterprise-disclosures-mgl.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This guide outlines what and how state-owned extractive companies should disclose to the public, emphasizing that transparency is a critical pillar of good governance and accountability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000424#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"A 2017 Resource Governance Index (RGI) assessment of 81 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) found that only nine met the required standards for transparent and accountable governance, scoring 75 or more out of 100.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000424#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Transparency alone does not guarantee good governance, as evidenced by the case of the Brazilian SOE Petrobras, which improved its transparency while remaining embroiled in corruption issues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000424#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"SOEs should disclose a wide range of information across six key areas: sector context, vision/structure/organization, mandates, performance/results, transfers to government/local authorities, and impact.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000424#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"For partially privatized SOEs, it is essential to disclose the identity of non-state beneficial owners, including their names, nationality, country of residence, and any political influence or official positions held.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000424#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Effective disclosure requires adhering to four core principles: accessibility (ensuring information is free and easy to find), reliability (using verified sources and audits), consistency/completeness (using standard metrics over multiple years), and timeliness (publishing annual reports within six months of the fiscal year end).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000424#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","transparency","climate change","environmental impact assessment","petroleum industry","mining"],"geography_discussed":["Norway","Chile","Brazil","Malaysia","India","Argentina","Indonesia","Kazakhstan","Mexico"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","best practice review"]},{"id":"NRGI-000426","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000426","title":"Guide to Extractive Sector State-Owned Enterprise Disclosures","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/guide-to-extractive-sector-state-owned-enterprise-disclosures_0.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document provides a comprehensive framework for extractive sector SOEs to improve transparency through six categories of disclosure. It emphasizes that transparency is an indispensable pillar of good governance, though not sufficient on its own to ensure it.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000426#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In a 2017 Resource Governance Index (RGI) assessment of 81 state-owned enterprises, only 9 achieved a good standard of transparency and accountable governance, defined as scoring above 75 out of 100.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000426#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Effective SOE disclosure should be organized into six core categories: sector context, mission, structure and organization, role, performance and results, transfers with government entities, and impact.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000426#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Transparency alone does not guarantee good governance, as evidenced by the Brazilian SOE Petrobras, which maintained high transparency levels while involved in a widespread corruption scandal.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000426#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"SOEs should distinguish between commercial activities (such as exploration, production, and refining) and non-commercial mandates (such as issuing licenses, administering subsidies, or providing public infrastructure) to help stakeholders identify potential conflicts of interest.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000426#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"High-quality disclosures must adhere to four key principles: accessibility (being free, user-friendly, and understandable), reliability (using verifiable data and audits), consistency and completeness (using industry-standard measurements over multiple years), and frequency and timeliness (with annual reports published within six months of the fiscal year end).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000426#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","transparency","climate change","environmental impact assessment"],"geography_discussed":["Brazil","Norway","Chile","India","Malaysia","Indonesia","Mexico","Kazakhstan","Argentina"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","literature review","best practice guide"]},{"id":"NRGI-000427","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000427","title":"Guide relatif aux déclarations des entreprises publiques du secteur extractif","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"guide","language":"fr","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/guide-to-extractive-sector-state-owned-enterprises-fr.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This guide outlines six categories of essential disclosures for extractive sector SOEs to enhance accountability, noting that only 9 of 81 SOEs evaluated by the 2017 Natural Resource Governance Index scored well on transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000427#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 2017 Natural Resource Governance Index (NRGI) found that only 9 out of 81 evaluated state-owned enterprises (SOEs) achieved a good score (above 75/100) for transparency and responsible governance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000427#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The guide recommends six categories of disclosure: sectoral context, mission/structure/organization, roles, performance and results, transfers involving the state or subnational entities, and impact.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000427#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"SOEs should disclose their commercial roles, including exploration, reserve development, production, transport, storage, and the sale of raw materials, as well as non-commercial mandates such as licensing and public infrastructure construction.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000427#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Transparency in the extractive sector requires the disclosure of beneficial ownership for non-state shareholders, including names, nationalities, and the identity of politically exposed persons.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000427#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Performance data must be dated, quantified using industry standards, and published regularly, with specific emphasis on the sale of raw materials, which the 2017 NRGI found was largely absent from SOE disclosures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000427#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Financial results should be presented as consolidated and disaggregated statements, preferably audited, including balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow statements detailing movements between the SOE and the state.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000427#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"SOEs are encouraged to publish contracts and licenses, including operational, financial, fiscal, social, and environmental provisions, to increase transparency beyond what is typically provided by state agencies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000427#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Effective disclosure must adhere to principles of accessibility (free and machine-readable), reliability (verifiable sources and audits), consistency, and timeliness, with annual reports published within six months of the fiscal year-end.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000427#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","transparency","mining","petroleum industry","environmental impact assessment"],"geography_discussed":["Norway","Chile","Brazil","India","Indonesia","Malaysia","Mexico","Kazakhstan","Yemen","Argentina"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","best practice guide"]},{"id":"NRGI-000553","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000553","title":"NATURAL RESOURCE FEDERALISM: CONSIDERATIONS FOR MYANMAR","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/natural-resource-federalism-infographic-booklet.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This guide outlines how Myanmar can divide natural resource management responsibilities between national and subnational governments, emphasizing that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for dividing these roles.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000553#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Natural resource federalism involves delegating specific responsibilities for managing natural resources to subnational institutions, specifically the authority to write laws and regulations, implement them, and monitor and enforce rules.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000553#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There are three primary models for dividing responsibilities: split responsibilities (national laws with subnational implementation), shared responsibilities (joint decision-making for licenses), and specific allocations where certain roles (like environmental monitoring) are typically subnational while others (like setting royalty rates) are typically national.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000553#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"For Myanmar to successfully implement natural resource federalism, policy-makers should clearly define roles, ensure governments have the capacity and resources to fulfill them, maintain minimum social and environmental standards, create dialogue platforms, include non-state actors, and promote transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000553#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["petroleum","natural gas","mining","extractive industry"],"geography_discussed":["Mongolia","India","Philippines","Australia","Malaysia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","comparative analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000570","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000570","title":"NRGI Civil Society Assessment","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi-civil-society-assessment_0.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The NRGI Civil Society Assessment evaluates how NRGI supports civil society to drive reform in natural resource governance. It finds that while NRGI successfully improves the technical capacity of partners—particularly in research and training—these gains have primarily translated into transparency-related policy wins. The report highlights a gap in civil society's ability to hold governments accountable and a lack of confidence in using big data. It emphasizes that policy impact is heavily dependent on political will and the selection of the 'right' partner for specific goals, while noting that women report less impact from NRGI's support than men.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000570#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"NRGI employs diverse engagement models with civil society, ranging from implementing programs through partners and working jointly on policy analysis to supporting parallel programming and acting as a bridge between stakeholders. The choice of approach involves a trade-off between the degree of NRGI control and the level of local ownership.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000570#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Civil society actors who work closely with NRGI report significant improvements in their ability to train others, conduct research, and connect with regional peers. This impact is nearly double for those in direct collaboration compared to those who only interact with NRGI's reports or social media.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000570#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There is a notable gender gap in the perceived impact of NRGI's work, with women reporting less improvement across almost all factors compared to men, although the statistical significance of this gap varies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000570#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"While NRGI has fostered significant gains in transparency—particularly through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—civil society has been less effective at promoting broader resource governance policy reforms or holding governments accountable.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000570#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Civil society's confidence and ability to use and analyze big data for monitoring governments and companies remains low, with only 9 percent of survey respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that their country's civil society possesses this capability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000570#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"NRGI's effectiveness in protecting civic space is viewed as critical by partners, especially in closed environments, but the organization's own public approach is described as inconsistent, often relying on international forums rather than systematic public advocacy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000570#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The report identifies that achieving policy outcomes depends on matching the objective with the 'right' partner, noting that technical experts may be less effective at building the mass public support and political will necessary for transformative change.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000570#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","transparency","climate finance","capacity building"],"geography_discussed":["Myanmar","Colombia","Azerbaijan","Tunisia","Mexico","Ghana","Libya","Iraq","Guinea","Indonesia","Bojonegoro","Philippines","Uganda","Peru","Tanzania"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["program evaluation","impact assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000731","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000731","title":"Premature Funds: How Overenthusiasm and Bad Advice Can Leave Countries Poorer","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/premature-funds.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The briefing warns that establishing sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in countries with high debt, modest resource revenues, or uncertain production can be counterproductive. It identifies four primary risks: the irrationality of saving while borrowing at higher interest rates, the lack of necessity when revenues are too small to cause macroeconomic instability, the danger of basing funds on overestimated or non-existent revenue flows, and the diversion of scarce resources away from urgent domestic development needs. The authors suggest that improving budget management and enacting strong fiscal rules are more effective priorities for poor governance environments than creating new funds.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000731#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Establishing sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) while maintaining high levels of public debt can lead to a net financial loss if the interest paid on borrowed money exceeds the returns earned from the fund's investments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000731#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Ghana and Mongolia serve as examples of countries that have suffered net losses by saving in SWFs while borrowing at high rates; Ghana's funds yielded around 1 percent annually while its latest Eurobond issuance cost more than 9 percent, and Mongolia's debt interest payments in 2016 exceeded its total health care spending.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000731#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"SWFs may be unnecessary and potentially harmful in countries where resource revenues are small relative to the economy, as they can undermine public accountability and divert resources from essential public services without providing significant macroeconomic benefits.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000731#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Some countries establish funds based on optimistic projections or seismic surveys before any actual production begins, which risks creating institutions that serve as special interests with overhead costs without delivering revenue.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000731#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The document suggests that using a separate account within the existing budget process is a more transparent and effective vehicle for domestic spending than creating a separate SWF, which is often prone to corruption and patronage.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000731#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["fiscal policy","economic development"],"geography_discussed":["Norway","Timor-Leste","Chile","Kuwait","United States","Texas","Alaska","Ghana","Mongolia","Guyana","Lebanon","Canada","Northwest Territories","Uganda","Zimbabwe","Tanzania","Mexico","Cyprus","Mauritania","São Tomé and Príncipe","Afghanistan","Mozambique","Myanmar","Sierra Leone","Senegal","Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000805","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000805","title":"State-Owned Economic Enterprise Reform in Myanmar: The Case of Natural Resource Enterprises","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/state-owned-economic-enterprise-reform-in-myanmar-policy-options.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies systemic failures in Myanmar's State-Owned Economic Enterprise (SEE) governance, specifically regarding the mismanagement of 'Other Account' (OA) balances and perverse revenue retention rules. It argues that overly conservative rules have cost the government over USD 2 billion in purchasing power. The authors propose a comprehensive reform package including the reallocation of idle OA balances toward infrastructure or debt repayment, the introduction of statutory revenue-sharing formulas to incentivize profitability, and the establishment of independent boards of directors. Additionally, the report calls for legislative amendments to the Auditor General of the Union Law and the Financial Institutions Law to eliminate secrecy and enhance parliamentary and MOPF oversight.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000805#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Myanmar's SEEs and the Union government lost more than USD 2 billion in purchasing power over three years due to conservative 'Other Account' (OA) management, specifically requirements to convert foreign earnings into kyat and prohibitions on interest-accruing assets.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000805#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"As of January 2017, MMK 11.9 trillion was held idle in Other Accounts, with MMK 11.5 trillion in SEE OAs. The report estimates that at least 45 percent of MOGE’s and 65 percent of MGE’s OA balances could be reallocated to the Union without impairing operations, potentially providing over MMK 2.8 trillion in immediate financing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000805#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Current revenue retention rules create perverse incentives: profitable rent-collecting SEEs like MOGE and MGE accumulate excessive OA balances, while the Union budget covers the costs of loss-making SEEs, such as No. 3 Heavy Industry Enterprise, removing incentives for efficiency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000805#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Financial reporting by SEEs to the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF) is unreliable, containing calculation errors, atypical cost categories, and unexplained entries such as \"other income\" in MOGE's forms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000805#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The Financial Institutions Law (2016) hinders oversight by prohibiting audit authorities from accessing bank accounts and records, a provision used to keep OA balances and other government financial activities secret.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000805#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The Myanmar Investment Law (2016) provides tax exemptions and holidays that cost the Union billions of dollars in annual revenue and complicate the auditing of both SEEs and private natural resource companies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000805#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["fiscal policy","petroleum industry","mining","tax incentive"],"geography_discussed":["Texas","Alaska","Wyoming","Chile","Peru","Saudi Arabia","Qatar","Kazakhstan","Mexico","Mongolia","Trinidad and Tobago","Venezuela","Brazil","South Korea","Ghana","Kuwait","Vietnam","Norway","Malaysia","Russia","Bhutan","Singapore","People's Republic of China","India","Indonesia","Philippines","Thailand"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","institutional analysis","financial analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000808","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000808","title":"State-Owned Economic Enterprise Reform in Myanmar: The Case of Natural Resource Enterprises","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/state-owned-economic-enterprise-reform-in-myanmar_0.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report finds that Myanmar's state-owned economic enterprises suffer from a lack of accountability and inefficient revenue retention rules, leading to the accumulation of MMK 11.45 trillion in idle 'Other Accounts' as of January 2017.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"As of January 2017, Myanmar's state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs) had accumulated MMK 11.45 trillion (approximately USD 8.6 billion) in 'Other Accounts' (OAs), which are not subject to the same rules as other government funds.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The current revenue retention system, where SEEs retain 55 percent of net profits, undermines efficiency by maintaining loss-making SEEs' dependence on the Union budget, removing incentives for profit-making SEEs to control capital costs, and allowing the hoarding of excess cash.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) holds the highest share of cash relative to total assets of any national oil company globally, with at least seven years' worth of precautionary savings at current spending levels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Myanmar Gems Enterprise (MGE) possesses extreme liquidity, with enough cash in its Other Accounts to cover current spending levels for 172 years.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"MOGE's financial burden is inflated by contracts requiring it to pay all commercial tax, special goods taxes, and duties on the total value of natural gas sales, effectively paying taxes on behalf of its foreign joint venture partners; this cost exceeded MMK 200 billion in 2015/16.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"MOGE's onshore production is significantly less efficient than its offshore operations, generating only 7 percent of its revenues while accounting for up to 29 percent of its costs in 2015/16.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The requirement to convert foreign currency earnings into kyat and hold them in non-interest-bearing accounts has caused SEEs to lose more than USD 2 billion in purchasing power over three years due to currency depreciation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Oversight of SEEs is severely limited by bureaucratic fragmentation and a lack of statutory clarity; for example, the Office of the Auditor General's full audit findings are often only accessible to the SEE Managing Director.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"MOGE and MGE rank very low globally in transparency and accountability according to the 2017 Resource Governance Index, with MGE ranking 21st out of 22 state-owned mining companies in transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Reallocating excess savings from MOGE and MGE alone could provide more than MMK 2.8 trillion in financing for the Union budget without jeopardizing their ability to cover legitimate expenses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000808#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["petroleum industry","extractive industry"],"geography_discussed":["Ghana","Mexico","Malaysia","Thailand","Vietnam","Norway","Colombia","Indonesia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","case study","benchmarking"]},{"id":"NRGI-000809","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000809","title":"State-Owned Economic Enterprise Reform in Myanmar: The Case of Natural Resource Enterprises","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"executive summary","language":"en","date_published":"2018-01","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/state-owned-economic-enterprise_reform-in-myanmar-summary.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This executive summary argues that Myanmar's state-owned economic enterprises are inefficient and hoard excessive cash, noting that reallocating excess savings from MOGE and MGE alone could provide over MMK 2.8 trillion for the Union budget.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000809#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Myanmar's state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs) are often inefficient, with high costs and weak revenue growth. For example, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) pays commercial and special goods taxes on the total value of natural gas sales despite owning only 15 to 20.45 percent of offshore fields, costing the enterprise over MMK 200 billion in 2015/16.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000809#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The current revenue retention system, which allows SEEs to keep 55 percent of profits in 'Other Accounts', undermines efficiency by removing incentives for loss-making SEEs to become profitable and allowing profit-making SEEs to hoard cash. As of January 2017, SEEs had accumulated MMK 11.45 trillion (USD 8.6 billion) in these accounts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000809#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Natural resource SEEs are among the largest hoarders of cash due to passive income from joint ventures. MOGE has at least 7 years' worth of precautionary savings, while Myanmar Gems Enterprise (MGE) has 172 years' worth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000809#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The document estimates that SEEs lost more than USD 2 billion in purchasing power over three years because Other Account balances must be held in the depreciating kyat and cannot be invested in interest-accruing foreign assets.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000809#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"To improve SEE performance, the government needs to update the 1989 SEE Law, establish clear numerical and time-bound performance targets, strengthen oversight via the Ministry of Planning and Finance, and increase financial transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000809#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["petroleum industry","mining","transparency"],"geography_discussed":["Timor-Leste","Malaysia","Vietnam","Thailand","Indonesia","Mexico","Colombia","Qatar","Ghana","Chile","India"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000366","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000366","title":"fact-sheet-environmental-management-myanmar-language-b56948c270c862b6.pdf","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fact-sheet-environmental-management-myanmar-language.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document describes Myanmar's environmental governance, noting that while the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation is responsible for environmental standards, many regulations remain unimplemented due to a lack of implementation mechanisms. It highlights the environmental risks associated with mining and the need for clearer institutional responsibilities and better public participation in environmental impact assessments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000366#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation is tasked with providing environmental standards, but many established regulations are not implemented because there are no mechanisms to carry them out.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000366#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Mining activities in Myanmar cause significant environmental damage, including the degradation of forests, wildlife, and water resources, necessitating urgent environmental management reforms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000366#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["environmental impact assessment","mining","environmental law"],"geography_discussed":["Thailand","Malaysia","Indonesia","Philippines"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["institutional analysis","policy review"]},{"id":"NRGI-000367","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000367","title":"fact-sheet-licensing-exploration-and-production-myanmar-language-2a0564bf25b2f3af.pdf","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fact-sheet-licensing-exploration-and-production-myanmar-language.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document outlines the regulatory landscape for oil and gas licensing in Myanmar, noting that while laws exist for onshore and offshore activities, the process lacks transparency and clear guidelines. It emphasizes the need for a systematic approach to licensing that includes environmental and social safeguards, public consultation, and clear criteria for selecting companies. The text contrasts Myanmar's current state with international practices, noting that the country lacks a transparent system for awarding licenses and monitoring compliance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000367#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Myanmar's oil and gas licensing is governed by several laws, including the Myanmar Oil Law (1994, revised 2015) and the Myanmar Gas Law (1995, revised 2016), as well as the 2016 Investment Law.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000367#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The licensing process in Myanmar is characterized by a lack of transparency, with no clearly defined operational methods and no system for the public to monitor whether licenses are awarded fairly or if laws are being followed.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000367#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["Environmental and Social Safeguards","transparency"],"geography_discussed":["Norway","Russia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000369","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000369","title":"fact-sheet-revenue-collection-myanmar-language-f8b6960a073bfb08.pdf","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"cy","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fact-sheet-revenue-collection-myanmar-language.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document describes how Myanmar's natural resource revenues are collected and managed, noting that while the central government typically sets rates and collects revenue, there are variations in how different resources (such as minerals and forests) are handled. It highlights that in 2015-2016, natural resources contributed 18% of government revenue and 48% of foreign exchange earnings, but warns that poor financial management and lack of transparency hinder the benefits to the population. The text also discusses the potential benefits of subnational revenue management, such as increased local accountability and economic development, while noting risks like corruption and conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000369#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Natural resources are a critical component of Myanmar's economy, providing 18% of government revenue and 48% of foreign exchange earnings during the 2015-2016 period.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000369#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The central government is primarily responsible for determining revenue rates and collecting funds, although some subnational entities collect certain internal revenues and royalties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000369#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Myanmar faces significant losses in potential resource wealth due to poor financial management, lack of transparency in revenue collection, and inefficient national-level collection processes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000369#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","fiscal assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000373","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000373","title":"obm0 o,HZmw zuf'&,fpepf - jrefrmEdkifiHtwGuf xnfhoGif;pOf;pm;oifhonfh tcsufrsmf","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/federalism-summary-myanmar.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report outlines how Myanmar can apply natural resource federalism to balance power between the center and states, arguing that clear, legally defined responsibilities are essential to avoid conflict and ensure transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000373#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Myanmar's natural resource management is currently characterized by a lack of clarity in responsibilities, with overlapping roles between the center, military, and ethnic armed organizations, which can lead to conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000373#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The 2008 Constitution allows state and regional governments to manage some natural resources, but in practice, the central government retains most authority, and the lack of clear responsibility often leads to inaction or inefficiency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000373#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Natural resource federalism involves deciding which level of government—central, state, or local—is responsible for specific functions such as licensing, environmental regulation, and revenue collection.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000373#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The report recommends establishing a system of 'single-window' or unified standards for regulations to prevent confusion and corruption, particularly for investors and local communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000373#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Transparency and accountability must be enhanced by allowing non-governmental actors, such as NGOs and community groups, to participate in the monitoring and management of natural resources.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000373#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","mining","petroleum industry","environmental regulation","governance","climate justice"],"geography_discussed":["Mongolia","Philippines","Australia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","comparative study"]},{"id":"NRGI-000425","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000425","title":"o,HZmw wl;azmfa&;u@rS EdkifiHydkifvkyfief;rsm; yGifhvif;jrifoma&; vrf;nTefcsuf","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/guide-to-extractive-sector-state-owned-enterprise-disclosures-myanmar-language.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This guide outlines a framework for extractive state-owned enterprises to improve transparency by disclosing detailed information across six key areas, including sector context, corporate structure, and financial results. It argues that transparency is a critical component of good governance and essential for stakeholder accountability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000425#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Transparency for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the extractive sector is essential because these entities often have significant economic, social, and political influence due to their involvement in mining, oil, and gas activities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000425#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The guide identifies six core categories of information that SOEs should disclose: sector context, mission/structure/organization, role, performance and results, payments to or from the government, and overall impact.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000425#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Effective disclosure requires that information be accessible, reliable, consistent, complete, and timely, utilizing open data formats and searchable websites to ensure all stakeholders can monitor the SOE.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000425#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"SOEs should disclose their legal and institutional context, including the laws and regulations that govern them, as well as the key industry players and partners they interact with.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000425#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Financial transparency must include audited financial statements, detailed balance sheets, income statements, and disclosures of related party transactions to prevent corruption and mismanagement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000425#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The guide emphasizes the need to disclose the social and environmental impacts of extractive activities, including human rights records, environmental protection measures, and local content strategies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000425#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","transparency","climate finance","mining","petroleum industry"],"geography_discussed":["Norway","Malaysia","India","Indonesia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","case study","literature review"]},{"id":"NRGI-000544","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000544","title":"Multifaceted Governance and Conflict Risks in Myanmar's Ruby Industry Myanmar Language Edition","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/multifaceted-governance-and-conflict-risks-in-myanmars-ruby-industry-myanmar-language.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report analyzes the multifaceted governance of Myanmar's ruby industry, finding that the sector is heavily influenced by military-linked companies and ethnic armed organizations, which creates significant risks of conflict and lack of transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000544#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The ruby industry in Myanmar is characterized by a lack of transparency and accountability, with the state-owned Myanmar Gems Enterprise (MGE) managing licensing and extraction, while military-linked companies often operate without clear oversight.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000544#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Military-linked companies, specifically those associated with the military-owned MEHL and MEC, dominate the ruby sector, controlling numerous mining permits in key areas like Mogok and Mogok-adjacent regions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000544#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Ethnic armed organizations, such as the SSPP/SSA-N and PNO, maintain significant influence over ruby mining areas, often using these resources to fund their activities or as leverage in ceasefire agreements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000544#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The ruby trade is heavily reliant on international markets, with Thailand and China being the primary buyers of Myanmar rubies, often through informal or opaque channels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000544#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","transparency"],"geography_discussed":["Mogok","Thailand","People's Republic of China"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","case study"]},{"id":"NRGI-000807","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000807","title":"jrefrmYEdkifiHawmfydkif pD;yGm;a&;vkyfief;rsm; jyKjyifajymif;vJa&;","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/state-owned-economic-enterprise-reform-in-myanmar-summary-myanmar-language.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report by the Natural Resource Governance Institute argues that Myanmar's state-owned enterprises, particularly in the oil and gas sector, suffer from a lack of transparency and accountability due to the use of 'Other Accounts' to bypass government oversight.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000807#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"State-owned economic enterprises (SOEs) in Myanmar hold approximately 50% of the country's assets and are prevalent across all sectors of the economy, including the natural resource sector.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000807#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) manages 15% to 20.45% of the shares in most oil and gas fields, but is responsible for 100% of the operational activities, including the management of contractors and subcontractors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000807#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["petroleum industry","public finance","transparency","mining"],"geography_discussed":["Timor-Leste","United States","Malaysia","Vietnam","Thailand","Indonesia","Mexico","Colombia","Gabon","Ghana","Chile","India"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000149","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000149","title":"Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Revenues: Insights from New Company Disclosures","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2017-12-15","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/nigerias-oil-and-gas-revenues-insights-new-company-disclosures","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The briefing discusses the impact of mandatory payment-to-governments (PtG) disclosure laws in Europe and Canada on transparency in Nigeria's extractive sector. It argues that these disclosures, combined with other data sources, enable better public debate on natural resource management and provides specific recommendations for NEITI, NNPC, and global governments to improve transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000149#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Mandatory payment disclosure laws in Europe and Canada now require companies listed or incorporated there to provide project-level data on payments to government entities, categorized into seven types including taxes and royalties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000149#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The briefing recommends several transparency improvements: NEITI should release reports faster, all companies in Nigeria should report voluntarily, and the NNPC should commit to commodities trading transparency and improve the detail of its monthly financial and operations reports.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000149#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","transparency","natural resource management"],"geography_discussed":["Europe","Canada"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000559","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000559","title":"Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Revenues: Insights From New Company Disclosures","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2017-12","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nigeria-oil-revenue.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The briefing demonstrates that mandatory company disclosures provide timely, project-level data that can reveal revenue gaps and pricing anomalies in Nigeria's oil and gas sector, though it highlights significant discrepancies in how joint venture payments are reported.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000559#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Between 2014 and 2017, seven consolidated oil and gas companies disclosed a total of USD 14.6 billion in payments to Nigerian government entities, with Shell being the largest contributor, paying USD 3.6 billion in 2016.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000559#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Production entitlements are the primary revenue stream for the Nigerian government from these companies, accounting for USD 3.4 billion (49 percent) of total payments in 2016.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000559#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There are significant discrepancies in how joint venture (JV) partners report payments; for the Bonga Field (OML 118) in 2016, Shell's disclosure as operator for taxes and royalties (USD 380 million) differs by USD 284 million from the amount estimated based on Total S.A.'s 12.5 percent equity share disclosure.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000559#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Pricing anomalies exist in in-kind payments; for example, Shell's 2016 BOE unit value for the SPDC East project was USD 15.68, significantly lower than the USD 54.68 reported for PSC 1993 (OPL 209).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000559#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is the largest recipient of payments, receiving USD 3.6 billion in 2016, primarily due to its role in receiving all in-kind production entitlements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000559#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Data from PtG reports can be used to verify if companies are meeting statutory obligations, such as the 3 percent annual budget levy required by the Niger Delta Development Commission Establishment Act, which totaled USD 346 million from disclosing companies in 2016.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000559#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Companies based in jurisdictions without mandatory disclosure laws, such as the United States, create transparency gaps; for instance, ExxonMobil is not required to report, but estimates suggest it paid USD 39 million for the Usan project (OML 138) and between USD 212 and 223 million for the Bonga project (OML 118) in 2016.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000559#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","tax incentive"],"geography_discussed":["Canada","European Union","Norway"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","quantitative analysis","case study"]},{"id":"NRGI-000127","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000127","title":"Douze signaux d’alerte: Risques de corruption,dans l’octroi de permis et l’attribution de contrats dans le secteur extractif","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"fr","date_published":"2017-11-28","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/fr/publications/douze-signaux-dalerte-risques-de-corruptiondans-loctroi-de-permis-et-lattribution-de","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report presents 12 red flags for corruption in the extractive sector's permit and contract processes, derived from an analysis of over 100 cases across 49 resource-producing countries. It identifies various stakeholders—including government officials, parliamentarians, judicial authorities, industry executives, financial institutions, and civil society—who can use these signals to improve adjudication processes, conduct due diligence, and structure investigations into suspicious procurement activities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000127#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 12 corruption red flags were developed by analyzing more than 100 concrete examples of permit granting and contract awarding in the oil, gas, and mining sectors that were subject to corruption allegations, covering 49 resource-producing countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000127#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The red flags are intended for a wide range of actors to prevent or detect corruption, including officials designing adjudication processes, regulators, parliamentarians, anti-corruption commissions, EITI multi-stakeholder groups, and courts of auditors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000127#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The list serves as a tool for non-governmental actors, such as judicial authorities for structuring investigations, industry executives for anti-corruption due diligence, financial institutions for project funding risk assessment, and journalists or NGOs for questioning the legality of contracts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000127#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","petroleum","natural gas","mining","governance"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["risk assessment"]}]}