{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"organization":["Natural Resource Governance Institute"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":868,"relation":"eq"},"page":23,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=natural-resource-governance-institute&page=23","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=natural-resource-governance-institute&page=24","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"NRGI-000043","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000043","title":"L’Indice de Gouvernance des Ressources Naturelles : Rapport de l’évaluation intermédiaire 2019 pour la Guinée (exploitation minière)","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"fr","date_published":"2019-06-24","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/fr/publications/lindice-de-gouvernance-des-ressources-naturelles-rapport-de-levaluation-intermediaire","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The 2019 interim evaluation shows that Guinea's mining governance score increased by 12 points to 56 out of 100 compared to 2017, driven largely by improvements in value realization and revenue management.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000043#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Guinea's overall mining governance score rose from the 2017 RGI edition by 12 points to reach 56 out of 100, moving the country into the next performance bracket.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000043#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The 'value realization' component reached the highest performance bracket due to improvements in the management of SOGUIPAMI, mining permit granting procedures, and the disclosure of disaggregated sector statistics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000043#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The 'revenue management' component saw a significant increase in its score, rising from 27 to 52.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000043#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There was a substantial improvement in governance practices, reducing the 2017 gap between legal rules (scored 77) and actual practices (scored 45) by 17 points.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000043#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["natural resource management"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","quantitative assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000148","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000148","title":"Resource Governance Index: 2019 Interim Evaluation Report for Guinea (Mining)","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06-24","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/resource-governance-index-2019-interim-evaluation-report-guinea-mining","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The 2019 interim evaluation of Guinea's mining governance shows an overall score increase to 56 out of 100, driven by improvements in value realization and revenue management, although the enabling environment score decreased slightly.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000148#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Guinea's overall Resource Governance Index score increased by 12 points compared to the 2017 edition, reaching 56 out of 100 and moving the country into a higher performance band.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000148#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The value realization component, primarily managed by the Ministry of Mines and Geology, reached the highest performance band due to improvements in disaggregated sector data disclosures, licensing, and the governance of the state-owned enterprise SOGUIPAMI.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000148#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Revenue management scores improved significantly from 27 in 2017 to 52 in 2019; further progress is linked to the implementation of subnational transfers via the National fund for local development (FNDL).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000148#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The gap between the average scores for laws and practices, which was 32 points in 2017 (77 for laws and 45 for practices), decreased by 17 points during the evaluation period due to better practices.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000148#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The score for the enabling environment component experienced a slight decrease.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000148#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["evaluation","performance assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000165","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000165","title":"Big Sellers: Exploring the Scale and Risk of National Oil Company Sales","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06-14","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/big-sellers-exploring-scale-and-risk-national-oil-company-sales","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The briefing analyzes oil sales from 39 national oil companies (NOCs) in 35 countries, revealing that these sales generated over $1.5 trillion in 2016, representing 22 percent of total government revenues for those nations. It highlights a significant governance gap, noting that NOCs transferred only 22 percent of their revenue to national treasuries and that 79 percent of identifiable sales occurred in countries with 'weak' or 'poor' Resource Governance Index scores. The document argues for greater transparency, recommending that both NOCs and buying companies disclose individual sale details, and that governments in commodity trading hubs mandate such disclosures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000165#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Oil and gas sales by national oil companies (NOCs) in 35 countries are economically substantial, generating more than $1.5 trillion in 2016, which accounts for 22 percent of the total government revenues for those countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000165#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There is a significant disconnect between NOC revenues and national budgets, as NOCs in 30 countries transferred only 22 percent of their sales revenue to their respective national treasuries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000165#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The vast majority of NOC oil sales occur in environments with poor governance and low transparency; $1.2 trillion (79 percent) of identifiable sales were in countries rated 'weak' or 'poor' by the 2017 Resource Governance Index, and over 90 percent ($1.4 trillion) were generated by non-EITI countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000165#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["public finance"],"geography_discussed":["Republic of the Congo","Nigeria","Ecuador","Singapore","Switzerland","United Arab Emirates","United Kingdom","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["governance assessment","financial analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000272","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000272","title":"Барьцгүй өсөлт: Эрдэнэс Монголын үнэлгээ","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"executive summary","language":"ru","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/barcguy_osolt_erdenes_mongolyn_unelgee_huraanguy_taylan.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report evaluates Erdenes Mongol, a state-owned holding company managing Mongolia's strategic mining assets. It finds that while the company has recently become profitable due to rising coal prices, it suffers from a lack of clear strategic purpose, poor financial transparency, and high debt. The authors recommend establishing a specific legal framework for state-owned enterprises, refining the company's mandate to prevent uncontrolled expansion into unrelated sectors, and adopting international financial reporting standards to enhance accountability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000272#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Erdenes Mongol has evolved from a 2006 holding company focused on strategic deposits into a conglomerate with interests in diverse sectors including mineral processing, unconventional oil and gas, transport, hotels, restaurants, energy production, and asset management.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000272#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The company's asset value was estimated at approximately 9.36 trillion MNT (3.9 billion USD) at the end of 2017, with 82.5% of this value attributed to the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine. Its major holdings include shares in Oyu Tolgoi (34%), Tavan Tolgoi (65%), Shivee-Ovoo (90%), and Baganuur (75%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000272#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Financial performance has been historically weak; the company reported no profit from 2006 to 2015. Although it recorded a net profit of 41 billion MNT (16.3 million USD) between 2016 and 2018 due to increased coal prices and exports to China, it does not regularly pay dividends to the state treasury, unlike similar state-owned mining companies in China, India, and Indonesia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000272#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The company faces significant financial instability, with total liabilities of 877 billion MNT (361 million USD) as of late 2017 across the parent company and its subsidiaries in Tavan Tolgoi, Shivee-Ovoo, and Baganuur.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000272#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Transparency is insufficient, as most subsidiaries do not publish financial data and available reports lack the detail necessary for professional financial analysis. While some progress was made in 2018 with the publication of semi-annual and annual reports for the parent company and Baganuur, the data does not meet international reporting standards for state-owned enterprises.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000272#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["mining","natural gas"],"geography_discussed":["People's Republic of China","India","Indonesia","Chile","Colombia","Philippines","Zambia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["governance assessment","financial analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000282","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000282","title":"Big Sellers: Exploring the Scale and Risk of National Oil Company Sales","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/big-sellers-exploring-the-scale-and-risks-of-national-oil-company-sales.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The briefing analyzes data from 39 NOCs in 35 countries, finding that oil sales generated over $1.5 trillion in 2016, yet only 22% of total NOC revenues were transferred to national treasuries. It highlights that 79% of these sales occur in countries with 'weak' or 'poor' resource governance scores. The document argues for sale-by-sale disclosure by both NOCs and buying companies to mitigate risks of bribery and mismanagement, noting that over 90% of identifiable NOC oil sales revenue comes from non-EITI countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000282#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"National oil company (NOC) oil, gas, and product sales are economically critical for many states; in 2016, 39 NOCs across 35 countries generated more than $1.5 trillion, which represented 22% of those countries' combined government revenues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000282#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There is a significant gap between the revenue generated by NOCs and the amount transferred to state treasuries. In 2016, 33 NOCs from 30 countries transferred only 22% of their combined total revenue to their national treasuries, retaining or spending $1.2 trillion of the $1.6 trillion generated.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000282#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"A vast majority of NOC oil sales occur in jurisdictions with poor governance. Approximately 79% of identifiable oil sales, totaling $1.2 trillion, took place in countries that received 'weak' or 'poor' scores in the 2017 Resource Governance Index.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000282#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Current transparency frameworks are insufficient because the majority of oil sales happen outside the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Non-EITI countries accounted for over 90% of identifiable NOC oil sales revenue, amounting to $1.4 trillion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000282#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Payments made by commodity traders to purchase oil from NOCs often far exceed the taxes and royalties those governments receive from extractive companies. For example, purchases by Glencore and Trafigura from NOCs were significantly higher than the tax and royalty payments made by BP and Shell.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000282#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Case studies demonstrate that available oil sales data can be used to uncover financial mismanagement and poor contract terms. In the Republic of Congo, data showed the percentage of revenues retained by the NOC (SNPC) rose from 2% in 2011-2012 to 18% in 2013; in Nigeria, analysis of NNPC contracts revealed losses of up to $381 million in a single year from poorly structured oil-for-product swaps.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000282#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Oil-backed loans can severely limit a country's ability to benefit from international market prices. In Ecuador, PetroEcuador's agreements to sell oil to Chinese NOCs at fixed prices to repay loans resulted in the company selling only about 10% of its oil on international markets.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000282#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance","public finance"],"geography_discussed":["Brazil","Venezuela","Angola","Algeria","Nigeria","Republic of the Congo","Ecuador","United Kingdom","Switzerland","United States","Singapore","United Arab Emirates","Chad","Ghana","Cameroon"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["financial analysis","governance assessment","case study"]},{"id":"NRGI-000353","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000353","title":"Эрдэнэс Монгол ба төрийн өмчийн компанийн тухай хуулиуд","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"ru","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/em_and_soe_laws_briefing_190611_06.12_mon.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document highlights a lack of clear legal definitions for Erdenes Mongol's functions and governance, which has led the company to expand into diverse sectors beyond mining, such as hotels and energy, without sufficient resources. This lack of oversight has resulted in significant financial losses, with some subsidiaries contributing to a debt of over $350 million. The authors recommend implementing a dedicated SOE law—drawing on international examples from countries like New Zealand and Vietnam—to define strategic planning, auditing requirements, and state liabilities to protect taxpayers and ensure economic growth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000353#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Erdenes Mongol lacks a comprehensive legal definition of its functions, financial management, and governance, leading it to expand into unrelated sectors including hotels, restaurants, road construction, and energy production.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000353#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Poor financial management and a lack of international accounting standards have resulted in significant losses, with Erdenes Mongol accumulating over $350 million in debt from its subsidiaries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000353#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The current financial instability of Erdenes Mongol poses a risk to the national budget, as the state may be forced to use taxpayer money to cover debts or assume risks from private partners.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000353#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["mining","natural gas","petroleum","public finance"],"geography_discussed":["Argentina","Denmark","Hungary","Sweden","Canada","Costa Rica","Greece","Afghanistan","People's Republic of China","Finland","South Korea","Mexico","Namibia","New Zealand","Vietnam","Quebec"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","legal assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000357","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000357","title":"Erdenes Mongol and State-Owned Enterprise Laws","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/erdenes-mongol-and-state-owned-enterprise-laws.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This briefing recommends that Mongolia adopt a specific law for Erdenes Mongol or a general state-owned enterprise law to prevent financial losses and improve governance of the state-owned holding company.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000357#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Erdenes Mongol lacks a clearly defined mandate, financial management, and governance framework in law, which has resulted in ad hoc decision-making regarding asset purchases and the creation of joint ventures and subsidiaries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000357#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Due to the absence of a robust legislative framework, Erdenes Mongol has expanded into diverse sectors beyond mining, including hotels, restaurants, power generation, and roads, raising questions about its capacity to manage such varied projects.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000357#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Many of Erdenes Mongol's subsidiaries and joint ventures are unprofitable, with the company owing more than USD 350 million to creditors from known subsidiaries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000357#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The document recommends that a new law for Erdenes Mongol or SOEs should include specific elements such as mandate and definition, strategic plans, dividend policy, state liability, and auditing requirements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000357#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["mining"],"geography_discussed":["Argentina","Denmark","Hungary","Sweden","Canada","Costa Rica","Greece","People's Republic of China","Finland","Korea","Mexico","Namibia","New Zealand","Vietnam","Quebec"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","comparative study"]},{"id":"NRGI-000358","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000358","title":"БАРЬЦГҮЙ ӨСӨЛТ","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"ru","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/erdenes-mongol-mongolian.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines Erdenes Mongol, a state-owned holding company established in 2006 to manage Mongolia's strategic mineral deposits. It finds that the company has expanded into a diverse conglomerate across sectors like energy and transport without a clear strategic framework, leading to poor governance and limited transparency. Financially, the company relies heavily on the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, with many subsidiaries operating unprofitably and failing to pay dividends to the state. The authors recommend establishing a specific law for state-owned enterprises, implementing a clear dividend policy, and adopting international financial reporting standards to ensure the public benefits from the country's natural resources.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000358#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Erdenes Mongol has evolved from a specialized mining holding company into a diverse conglomerate involved in sectors including unconventional oil and gas, transport, energy production, steel, and asset management.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000358#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The company's asset value is heavily concentrated in the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, which accounted for 82.5% of Erdenes Mongol's total assets as of the end of 2017.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000358#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance","transparency","natural resource management"],"geography_discussed":["Tavan Tolgoi","Oyu Tolgoi mine","Baganuur Coal Mine","Shivee-Ovoo Coal Mine","People's Republic of China","India","Indonesia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["governance assessment","financial analysis","policy recommendation"]},{"id":"NRGI-000359","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000359","title":"Эрдэнэс Монгол компани юу хийдэг вэ? Ашигтай ажилладаг уу?","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"executive summary","language":"ru","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/erdenes_mongol_ownership_and_profits_190611_06.12_mon.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Erdenes Mongol is a state-owned holding company that has expanded from its initial focus on major mining projects—including Oyu Tolgoi, Tavan Tolgoi, Baganuur, and Shivee-Ovoo—into a diverse portfolio covering energy, finance, and hospitality. While the parent company reported no profits from 2006 to 2015, it saw a significant increase in net profit between 2016 and 2018, driven by rising coal prices and increased exports to China. Despite the substantial state contributions from its subsidiaries, the parent company has not received dividends from them.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000359#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Erdenes Mongol began with four primary mining projects: Oyu Tolgoi copper, and the Tavan Tolgoi, Baganuur, and Shivee-Ovoo coal mines. In 2017, these four mines contributed 317 billion tugriks (131 million USD) to the state budget through taxes, royalties, and other payments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000359#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The company has diversified its investments into at least 15 subsidiaries and several minority stakes across sectors including oil, natural gas, fuel production, metal processing, hotels, road repair, steel, energy, and finance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000359#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Specific strategic investments include Mon-Atom (100% ownership) for uranium, Erdenes Alt Resource (100% ownership) for gold and silver, Erdenes Steel (50% ownership) for steel and coke, and Erdenes Methane (100% ownership) for unconventional oil and gas, with a goal to become a regional producer of eco-friendly energy via coalbed methane.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000359#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The parent company reported no profits from its founding in 2006 until 2015. However, it reported net profits of 51.5 million tugriks (24 thousand USD) in 2016, 20 billion tugriks (8.3 million USD) in 2017, and 21 billion tugriks (8 million USD) in 2018, attributed to higher coal prices and increased transport volumes to China.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000359#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Despite Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi, Baganuur, and Shivee-Ovoo generating a combined net income of 302 billion tugriks (125 million USD) for the state in 2017, they did not distribute dividends to the parent company.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000359#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["natural gas"],"geography_discussed":["People's Republic of China","Ulaanbaatar"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["financial assessment","ownership analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000872","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000872","title":"What Does Erdenes Mongol Do and Is It Profitable?","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/what-does-erdenes-mongol-do-and-is-it-profitable.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The briefing finds that while Erdenes Mongol has diversified its investments across multiple sectors, the parent company generated no profits from 2006 to 2015 and has since seen only meagre returns.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000872#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Erdenes Mongol has expanded its portfolio beyond its initial four mining projects (Oyu Tolgoi, Tavan Tolgoi, Baganuur, and Shivee Ovoo) to include at least 15 subsidiaries and minority stakes in at least five other entities across sectors such as oil and gas, fuel production, metal refining, hospitality, road maintenance, steel production, power generation, and finance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000872#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The parent company of Erdenes Mongol reported no profits from its establishment in 2006 until 2015. Between 2016 and 2018, it reported net incomes of MNT 51.5 million (USD 24 thousand), MNT 20 billion (USD 8.3 million), and MNT 21 billion (USD 8 million) respectively, largely due to coal shipments to China and toll fees from the Gashuun Sukhait road.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000872#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Despite a combined net income of MNT 302 billion (USD 125 million) in 2017 for three controlled subsidiaries (Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi, Baganuur, and Shivee Ovoo), these entities have not paid dividends to the parent company.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000872#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["mining","coal","petroleum industry"],"geography_discussed":["People's Republic of China"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["financial analysis","case study"]},{"id":"NRGI-000874","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000874","title":"Wild Growth: An Assessment of Erdenes Mongol","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"executive summary","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wild-growth-an-assessment-of-erdenes-mongol.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that Erdenes Mongol has historically struggled with profitability and transparency, requiring government support despite managing multi-billion dollar assets like the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000874#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Erdenes Mongol's assets were valued at approximately MNT 9.36 trillion (USD 3.9 billion) at the end of 2017, with 82.5 percent of this value attributed to shares in the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000874#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The company has historically been unprofitable, reporting no profits from its founding in 2006 until 2015, though it declared profits of MNT 41 billion (USD 16.3 million) between 2016 and 2018 due to higher coal prices and shipments to China.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000874#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Erdenes Mongol lacks a clearly defined mandate and a strict legislative framework, leading to organic growth into diverse sectors such as hospitality, power generation, and steel, which may create budget liabilities and sources of patronage.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000874#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Financial transparency is insufficient; most subsidiaries do not publish financial information, and available data is not disaggregated enough for proper financial analysis, making it nearly impossible for the public or parliament to measure project performance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000874#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Unlike regional state-owned mining companies in China, India, and Indonesia, Erdenes Mongol and its subsidiaries do not pay regular dividends to the Mongolian treasury.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000874#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["mining","coal"],"geography_discussed":["People's Republic of China","India","Indonesia","Chile","Colombia","Philippines","Zambia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","corporate assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000875","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000875","title":"WILD GROWTH","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wild-growth-an-assessment-of-erdenes-mongol-full-report.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that Erdenes Mongol has evolved into a complex, politicized conglomerate with limited transparency and low profitability, failing to pay regular dividends to the Mongolian treasury despite owning some of the country's largest mineral deposits.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000875#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Erdenes Mongol has expanded from its original mandate of managing strategic mines into a complex conglomerate with interests in unconventional oil and gas, roads, hospitality, power generation, steel, and asset management.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000875#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The company's governance is heavily politicized, characterized by high turnover of senior management and board members that typically correlates with national elections; the average tenure of a CEO is 1.7 years.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000875#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Financial transparency is insufficient, as most subsidiaries do not publish financial information and the group does not comply with international accounting or state-owned enterprise disclosure standards.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000875#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Despite owning highly valuable assets, Erdenes Mongol and its subsidiaries have not paid regular dividends to the Mongolian treasury, unlike comparable regional state-owned mining companies in China, India, and Indonesia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000875#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The company's asset valuation is heavily skewed toward the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, which accounted for 82.5 percent of its valued assets (approximately MNT 7.7 trillion) as of the end of 2017.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000875#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Many subsidiaries are unprofitable or struggle with liquidity; for example, Shivee Ovoo and Baganuur sell coal to power plants at regulated prices below market value, leading to accumulated debts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000875#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The group faces significant future financial risks due to high leverage and the potential for subsidiaries to become government budget liabilities if they cannot meet debt obligations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000875#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The company's mandate remains unclear and lacks a strict legislative framework, leading to ad hoc decision-making regarding the establishment of new subsidiaries and joint ventures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000875#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["mining","coal","renewable energy"],"geography_discussed":["People's Republic of China","Indonesia","India","Chile","Zambia","Colombia","Philippines"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","case study","financial analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000431","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000431","title":"How and Why the Myanmar Government Should Publish Petroleum and Mining Contracts","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2019-05","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/how-and-why-the-myanmar-government-should-publish-petroleum-and-mining-contracts.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document advocates for the Myanmar government to begin disclosing extractive industry contracts, noting that while global norms are shifting toward transparency—highlighted by new EITI requirements—Myanmar has made little progress. It outlines the benefits of disclosure, such as better deal negotiation and improved revenue collection, and provides a roadmap for implementation through legal reforms and new licensing processes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000431#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) board has established a requirement for all member governments to disclose contracts signed with oil, gas, and mining companies starting in January 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000431#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Myanmar has not yet published any petroleum or mining contracts, despite support for such reforms from civil society and several major investors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000431#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Contract disclosure can lead to more sustainable deals and reduce the risk of costly shutdowns or renegotiations, as seen in the case of the Letpadaung copper mine where community protests led to a 2012 suspension and subsequent contract revisions that increased government stakes and community investments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000431#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Lack of contract transparency hinders the effectiveness of Myanmar government officials, specifically within the Internal Revenue Department, who may lack the fiscal terms needed to calculate corporate income tax obligations and thus lose revenue.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000431#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Several major investors active in Myanmar support contract transparency, including Total, which advocates for the public disclosure of petroleum contracts and licenses, and PanAust, which supports making material contract terms public when legally permitted.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000431#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Confidentiality clauses in Myanmar's extractive contracts generally do not prevent the government from disclosing terms; for example, the model exploration agreement in the mining sector allows disclosure as required by regulatory authority or laws.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000431#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The Myanmar government has several immediate opportunities in 2019 to implement disclosure, including the draft petroleum law, upcoming onshore and offshore licensing rounds, and the development of a mineral and gemstone cadastre.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000431#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","petroleum","mining","climate finance"],"geography_discussed":["Mexico","Mongolia","Afghanistan","Cameroon","Sierra Leone"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","governance assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000497","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000497","title":"Les mécanismes d’appui au développement local dans la législation minière en Guinée","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"fr","date_published":"2019-05","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/les-mecanismes-dappui-au-developpemen-dans-la-legislation-miniere-en-guinee.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report analyzes the mechanisms for transferring mining revenues to local communities in Guinea, finding that while local mining revenues were only 61 billion GNF in 2016, they could exceed 400 billion GNF by 2020 due to the full implementation of the FNDL and FODEL.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000497#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In 2016, local mining revenues totaled 61 billion GNF (approximately 6.7 million USD), representing 2% of public revenues from the extractive sector and 0.5% of Guinea's national budget.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000497#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Local mining revenues are projected to increase significantly starting in 2019, potentially exceeding 400 billion GNF in 2020, driven by the full implementation of the National Local Development Fund (FNDL) and the Local Economic Development Fund (FODEL).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000497#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"In 2016, quasi-fiscal mechanisms—specifically voluntary and mandatory social payments—accounted for 43.6 billion GNF, representing 72% of all local mining revenues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000497#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The 'transfert infranational' mechanism, which allocates 15% of six specific mining taxes to all local authorities via the FNDL, was not operational in 2016; had it been, local mining revenues would have reached 158 billion GNF.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000497#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The Local Development Contribution (CDL) for the FODEL is set at 0.5% of turnover for bauxite and iron, and 1% for other minerals, with funds distributed among mining-hosting, impacted, and other local authorities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000497#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Mining companies are legally required to prioritize Guinean companies for contracts and follow specific employment quotas, such as reserving non-qualified jobs 100% for Guineans across all phases.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000497#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There is a significant lack of transparency and traceability regarding the use of mining revenues at the local level, with evidence of failures in public procurement and a lack of inclusive local development planning.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000497#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Local authorities face a high risk of dependency on mining revenues; for example, in the rural commune of Banora, mining fiscal mechanisms could represent over 84% of its 2020 budget.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000497#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["mining","extractive industry","climate finance","economic diversity"],"geography_discussed":["Boké Region","Banora","Dinguiraye Prefecture","Kindia","Siguiri","Boffa Prefecture","Fria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","quantitative analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000184","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000184","title":"Massive and Misunderstood: Data-Driven Insights into National Oil Companies","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-04-25","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/massive-and-misunderstood-data-driven-insights-national-oil-companies","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"National oil companies (NOCs) dominate global oil and gas production, with some reporting combined assets of $3.1 trillion in 2017. However, many suffer from poor transparency and high debt levels, sometimes reaching 20 percent of their country's GDP, which can drain public finances. At least 25 countries are 'NOC-dependent,' relying on these companies for over 20 percent of government revenues. To address the lack of comparative data, the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) created a database of 71 NOCs across 61 countries to improve oversight and performance assessment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000184#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"National oil companies (NOCs) are the primary producers of global oil and gas, pumping approximately 85 million barrels of oil equivalent daily. In 2017, those that disclosed their assets reported a combined total of $3.1 trillion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000184#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"At least 25 countries are classified as 'NOC-dependent,' meaning the national oil company provides more than 20 percent of all government revenues, making national fiscal health dependent on the NOC's management and spending quality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000184#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Many NOCs possess significant debt, in some cases amounting to 10 or 20 percent of their national GDP, leading to multi-billion-dollar government bailouts that strain public finances.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000184#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Transparency among NOCs is generally low, with 62 percent scoring as 'weak,' 'poor,' or 'failing' on the Resource Governance Index regarding public transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000184#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel industry","energy transition","public finance","transparency"],"geography_discussed":["Saudi Arabia","Mexico","Venezuela","Iran"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["data analysis"]},{"id":"NRGI-000520","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000520","title":"Massive and Misunderstood","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-04","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/massive_and_misunderstood_data_driven_insights_into_national_oil_companies.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report analyzes 71 national oil companies and finds that they are massive, often opaque entities that dominate domestic production and can pose significant fiscal risks to their home countries through high debt and low revenue transfers to governments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000520#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"National oil companies (NOCs) are dominant global producers, pumping an estimated 85 million barrels of oil equivalent per day and controlling up to 90 percent of global reserves.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000520#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"At least 25 countries are 'NOC-dependent,' meaning their national oil company collects revenues equivalent to 20 percent or more of all government revenues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000520#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Most NOCs transfer a relatively small portion of their gross revenues to their governments, with a median transfer of 23 percent in 2013, which dropped to 17 percent by 2015.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000520#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"NOC debt can represent a substantial risk to national economic sustainability; 18 companies in the sample had long-term liabilities exceeding 5 percent of their home country's GDP, with Venezuela's PDVSA exceeding 20 percent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000520#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"NOCs exhibited an asymmetrical response to oil price volatility between 2011 and 2017, directing large shares of boom-time windfalls to their own expenditures while passing the downside impact of price crashes to their governments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000520#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Public transparency among NOCs is generally poor, with 62 percent of 52 NOCs studied in the Resource Governance Index exhibiting 'weak,' 'poor' or 'failing' performance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000520#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The report proposes a typology of three NOC roles: 'cash cows' (prioritizing fiscal transfers), 'profit seekers' (prioritizing commercial success and efficiency), and 'state supplements' (prioritizing public services and employment).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000520#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There is a correlation between a company's listing on a public stock exchange and its commercial performance; listed NOCs tend to generate higher production-per-employee than unlisted ones.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000520#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel industry","climate finance","energy transition"],"geography_discussed":["Saudi Arabia","Mexico","Venezuela","Iran","Malaysia","People's Republic of China","Kuwait","Kazakhstan","Namibia","Brazil","Colombia","Thailand","Chad"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","policy analysis","benchmarking"]},{"id":"NRGI-000549","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000549","title":"The National Oil Company Database","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-04","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_oil_company_database.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report launches a comprehensive database of 71 national oil companies, finding that these entities produce 55 percent of the world's oil and gas but often suffer from weak transparency and high debt levels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000549#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"National oil companies (NOCs) are dominant global producers, accounting for approximately 55 percent of the world's oil and gas production, which is estimated at 85 million barrels of oil equivalent per day.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000549#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"At least 25 countries are considered \"NOC-dependent,\" meaning their national oil company collects revenues equivalent to 20 percent or more of all government revenues. In Nigeria, the NNPC collected oil and gas sales revenue between 45 percent and 74 percent of general government revenue.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000549#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"NOCs often maintain high debt levels that pose risks to national economic sustainability; 18 companies in the sample have long-term liabilities exceeding 5 percent of their home country's GDP, with Venezuela's PDVSA and Angola's Sonangol exceeding 20 percent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000549#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"There is a significant transparency gap in NOC reporting, with nearly two-thirds of companies exhibiting \"weak,\" \"poor,\" or \"failing\" performance on public transparency according to the Resource Governance Index. Reporting is particularly weak regarding expenditures and employment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000549#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"NOCs demonstrated an asymmetric relationship between revenues and government transfers between 2011 and 2017: during the boom period (2011-2014), transfers remained relatively flat while expenditures rose, but when prices crashed, transfers to governments dropped more sharply than revenues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000549#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The collective assets of the top ten NOCs that reported figures in 2017 exceeded $2.51 trillion, surpassing the total assets of the world's ten largest international oil companies, which were $1.95 trillion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000549#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel industry","extractive industry","transparency"],"geography_discussed":["Saudi Arabia","Mexico","Venezuela","Iran","Nigeria","Angola","Brazil","Ghana","Indonesia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","benchmarking"]},{"id":"NRGI-000100","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000100","title":"Losing Luster: Addressing Tax Evasion in Myanmar’s Jade and Gemstone Industry","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"executive summary","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02-11","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/my/publications/losing-luster-addressing-tax-evasion-myanmars-jade-and-gemstone-industry","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies a systemic failure in Myanmar's jade and gemstone sector where government revenues capture only a small fraction of the industry's multi-billion dollar value. It highlights that while official channels are overtaxed, a vast majority of production is unregistered or undervalued, facilitated by bribes and corruption. To remedy this, the document proposes shifting to production-based taxes, implementing open bidding for concessions, and strengthening oversight through auditing and increased monitoring.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000100#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Myanmar's jade and gemstone industry generates tens of billions of dollars annually, but government revenue capture is minimal because the state overtaxes a small portion of official trade while the majority of production is underreported or undervalued.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000100#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Data from the Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative suggests that between 59% and 74% of jade by volume went unregistered in fiscal years 2014/15 and 2015/16, and registered production was undervalued to the extent that royalties were paid on less than 1% of the likely value.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000100#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Corruption and informal taxation undermine the sector, with companies allegedly using bribes to secure permits, which encourages officials to grant permits for areas that exceed the government's ability to supervise.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000100#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry","fiscal policy","mining"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","fiscal assessment"]},{"id":"NRGI-000514","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000514","title":"Losing Luster: Addressing Tax Evasion in Myanmar’s Jade and Gemstone Industry","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/losing-luster-addressing-myanmar-tax-evasion.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that Myanmar's jade and gemstone industry suffers from systemic tax evasion due to flawed fiscal frameworks and corruption, with government revenues capturing only a small fraction—estimated between 2% and 16%—of the sector's total value.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Government revenue from the jade and gemstone sector is extremely low relative to the industry's value; in FY 2014/15, taxes collected represented between 2.3% and 16.1% of the sector's value, and in FY 2015/16, this fell to between 0.9% and 9.1%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The government relies on over-taxing a small portion of production sold at semi-annual emporiums, where ad valorem tax rates in FY 2014/15 and 2015/16 exceeded 30% for private companies and 70% for joint ventures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"A significant volume of jade production remains unregistered; EITI data suggests that between 59% and 74% of jade by volume may have gone unregistered during FY 2014/15 and 2015/16.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The valuation process for royalties is flawed, with companies often declaring and paying royalties on less than 1% of the likely value of production, partly because valuation bodies may determine values based only on weight and assume the lowest possible quality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The permitting process is vulnerable to corruption, with many companies allegedly securing permits through bribes, leading to a negative correlation where companies with the largest permitted areas often pay the least in taxes per acre.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Informal payments to business partners, regulators, and armed groups—including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which reportedly collects permit fees and a 10% royalty—may match or exceed official government revenue payments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The Myanmar Gems Enterprise (MGE) faces a conflict of interest because it acts as both a joint venture partner and the primary regulator responsible for assessing and collecting revenues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Corporate income tax collection is minimal due to historical exemptions and a lack of auditing capacity, with companies in FY 2015/16 paying a collective total of only MMK 6.1 billion (USD 4.3 million).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The report recommends simplifying the fiscal regime by eliminating all revenue streams except permit fees, production royalties, and corporate income tax to avoid double or triple taxation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"To improve valuation accuracy, the report suggests adopting an open bidding process for concessions and requiring multiple independent valuations, while barring the Myanmar Gems and Jade Entrepreneurs Association (MGJEA) from adjudicating permitting or valuation processes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000514#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["extractive industry"],"geography_discussed":["People's Republic of China","Thailand","India","Mozambique","Kachin State","Sagaing Region","Mandalay","Shan State","Naypyidaw"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","quantitative modelling"]},{"id":"NRGI-000147","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/NRGI-000147","title":"Contrataciones abiertas para los derechos de petróleo, gas y minería: arrojar luz sobre las buenas practices","publisher":{"name":"Natural Resource Governance Institute","organization":"natural-resource-governance-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"es","date_published":"2019-01-09","source_url":"https://resourcegovernance.org/es/publications/contrataciones-abiertas-para-los-derechos-de-petroleo-gas-y-mineria-arrojar-luz-sobre","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report, produced by NRGI and the Open Contracting Partnership, outlines 16 best practices to address the lack of systematic guidance on transparency in the extractive sectors. These practices cover the entire lifecycle of resource rights, from general system communication and planning to the awarding of licenses, contract disclosure, and ongoing execution monitoring. The findings are intended for regulators, oversight bodies, and transparency advocates, including those working with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Open Government Partnership (OGP).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000147#summary","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The report identifies 16 global best practices for transparency in the extractive sectors, categorized into five stages: general overview, planning, allocation and awarding, the contract itself, and execution.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000147#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"The identified best practices for the 'Planning' stage include disclosing information on areas open for contracting, reconciling surface and subsurface rights, and publicly explaining the choice of allocation methods.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000147#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-11-05"},{"text":"Best practices for the 'Execution' phase focus on the disclosure of investments, production, reserves, revenues, profits, and the monitoring of contract compliance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"NRGI-000147#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-11-05"}],"climate_tags":["petroleum","natural gas","mining","extractive industry","transparency","governance"],"geography_discussed":["Mexico"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["best practices analysis"]}]}