{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"organization":["Institute for Strategic Dialogue"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":166,"relation":"eq"},"page":2,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=institute-for-strategic-dialogue&page=2","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=institute-for-strategic-dialogue&page=3","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"isdglo-000133","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000133","title":"Policy Digest #19","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2025-04-23","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Policy-Digest-19.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document details regulatory actions, litigation, and legislative updates across several countries focusing on AI, data privacy, and online safety. It also reviews four reports on algorithmic recommender systems, highlighting risks such as the amplification of harmful content and the prioritisation of short-term engagement over long-term user value.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000133#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Australian eSafety Commissioner published a report on 6 March 2025 detailing how service providers, including Google, Meta, WhatsApp, Reddit, Telegram, and X, address terrorist and violent extremist material and activity (TVE) based on responses to transparency notices issued in March 2024.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000133#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The European Union is implementing several AI-related initiatives, including the launch of the Apply AI Strategy consultation on 9 April 2025, the enforcement of a scientific expert panel on AI as of 30 March 2025, and the publication of a third draft of the General-Purpose Artificial Intelligence Code of Practice on 11 March 2025.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000133#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In the United Kingdom, the illegal content duties of the Online Safety Act took effect on 17 March 2025, requiring platforms to remove illegal content and conduct risk assessments. Additionally, Ofcom fined Fenix International Limited (owner of OnlyFans) GBP 1.05 million on 27 March 2025 for misrepresenting its age verification technology.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000133#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The United States is pursuing several digital policy actions, including the TAKE IT DOWN Act to criminalize non-consensual intimate deepfakes, an FTC public inquiry into platform censorship practices, and a presidential memorandum from 21 February 2025 investigating foreign digital services taxes and fines on American companies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000133#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"An ISD investigation into YouTube's recommendation algorithm found that while age and gender appear to have low weighting in recommendations, this can lead to younger users being exposed to harmful content, including videos on self-harm and suicide.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000133#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of risk assessment reports under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) suggests that platforms often treat algorithmic recommender systems as mitigation measures rather than acknowledging them as design-related risks that can amplify harmful content.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000133#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Knight Georgetown Institute's Expert Working Group argues that platforms prioritise short-term engagement metrics (clicks and likes) for advertising revenue, which can lead to societal polarisation and the spread of low-quality information.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000133#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["California"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["regulatory monitoring","policy review","literature summary"]},{"id":"isdglo-000032","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000032","title":"Generative AI and the German Far Right: Narratives, Tactics and Digital Strategies","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2025-02-18","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/publication/generative-ai-and-the-german-far-right-narratives-tactics-and-digital-strategies/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes the use of generative AI by the German far right to create tailored social media content, including AI-generated influencers and imagery depicting migrant crimes. It highlights the role of the AfD and far-right community groups in spreading these narratives and notes a significant failure in the enforcement of the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA), as most reported AI-generated far-right content remained unlabeled or unremoved.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000032#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Generative AI is being used by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), far-right music channels, and Facebook community groups to spread far-right beliefs. Content originates from the AfD's main account, state-level branches, and individual politicians, and is subsequently shared by unaffiliated individuals across Facebook, Instagram, X, and TikTok.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000032#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"AI-generated content focuses on narratives attacking refugees, immigrants, LGBTQ+ individuals, climate activists, and opposition parties. Specifically, content promoting 'remigration'—the mass deportation of ethnic minorities regardless of status—has seen high engagement. AI is also used to create fake imagery of migrant crimes, idealize Germany, and power three female 'influencer' profiles designed to build parasocial relationships with audiences.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000032#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant lack of enforcement regarding the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) and limitations in the AI Act. A month after reporting, none of the AI-generated far-right posts identified by ISD were removed or labeled by platforms, and only 4 percent were labeled as AI-generated at the time of writing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000032#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["European Union"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["investigation"]},{"id":"isdglo-000009","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000009","title":"An overview of Israeli far-right extremism","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2025-01-10","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/an-overview-of-israeli-far-right-extremism/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the landscape of Israeli far-right extremism, identifying Kahanism as a foundational Jewish supremacist ideology that informs contemporary 'neo-Kahanist' political parties and violent groups. It details the activities of settler extremists, such as the Hilltop Youth, and the role of far-right parties like Otzma Yehudit and Noam within the current governing coalition. The report highlights a post-October 7 surge in anti-Palestinian sentiment, increased settler violence in the West Bank, and the ideological convergence between Israeli far-right extremists and global anti-migrant and anti-Muslim movements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000009#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Contemporary Israeli far-right extremism is heavily influenced by Kahanism, a Jewish supremacist ideology founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane. This ideology advocates for a state governed by an ultra-conservative interpretation of Jewish law, the expulsion of Palestinians and non-Jews, and the use of the state to achieve revenge.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000009#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'Hilltop Youth' represent the vanguard of violent settler extremism, establishing outposts in the West Bank to intimidate Palestinians and claim territory. Despite their involvement in killings and attempts to overthrow the state, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have recruited from this movement since 2020.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000009#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Far-right parties have moved from the political periphery to the center of power, with the 'Religious Zionism' alliance (comprising Otzma Yehudit, the National Religious – Religious Zionist party, and Noam) winning 10.8 percent of the vote in 2022 and securing 14 Knesset seats.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000009#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Key political figures in the current government have histories of extremism; Itamar Ben Gvir was convicted of incitement to racism and supporting a terrorist organization in 2007, while Bezalel Smotrich was detained in 2005 for terrorist offences related to the Gaza disengagement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000009#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Extremist groups such as Lehava and La Familia engage in targeted violence and hate speech. Lehava focuses on preventing 'assimilation' between Jewish women and Arabs, while La Familia, originating as a football fan club, has been involved in the kidnap and murder of a Palestinian teenager.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000009#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Following the October 7, 2023 attacks, there has been a significant increase in far-right activity, including the normalisation of anti-Palestinian rhetoric and a surge in settler violence. Between October 2023 and September 2024, over 1,600 Palestinians were displaced by settler extremist violence, with at least 21 killed and 650 injured.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000009#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Israeli far-right extremism is increasingly interconnected with global far-right movements. Ideological cross-fertilisation is occurring between Jewish extremist groups and anti-migrant, anti-Muslim organisations such as the English Defence League (EDL) in the UK and the Soldiers of Odin Canada.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000009#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Gaza Strip","United States","United Kingdom","Canada"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["briefing"]},{"id":"isdglo-000059","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000059","title":"Addressing Illegal Harms on Small and Emerging Platforms: Regulatory Challenges and Gaps","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Addressing-Illegal-Harms-on-Small-and-Emerging-Platforms_Regulatory-Challenges-and-Gaps.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that current online safety regulations, such as the EU's Digital Services Act and the UK's Online Safety Act, often prioritise larger platforms based on user numbers, leaving a gap where illegal harms are concentrated on smaller, high-risk services. It highlights the adaptive nature of terrorist networks that migrate between platforms to evade detection and notes that regulators often lack the real-time primary data needed for effective enforcement. The brief recommends a shift toward ecosystem-level interventions, improved data-sharing with non-governmental organisations, and the creation of risk-based prioritisation frameworks that do not rely solely on user thresholds.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000059#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Illegal harms are frequently concentrated on a broad ecosystem of smaller or emerging platforms, some of which are ideologically opposed to regulation or lack the capacity to respond to threats, despite regulations like the EU DSA and UK OSA prioritising larger platforms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000059#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Terrorist and extremist networks are highly adaptive, using multiple platforms simultaneously and migrating between them to circumvent regulatory actions and account removals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000059#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Current regulatory frameworks in the EU, UK, and Australia often rely on user-number thresholds to assign obligations, which may fail to capture small but high-risk platforms that provide safe havens for malicious actors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000059#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regulators face significant challenges in enforcing rules on emerging technologies like the Fediverse due to decentralised architectures that make it unclear who is accountable for removing content.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000059#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Strict enforcement of the UK Online Safety Act has led some platforms, including Bitchute, Gab, and Kiwi Farms, to withdraw from the UK market via geoblocking.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000059#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'whack-a-mole' problem persists, where improvements on one platform lead to a deterioration elsewhere as criminal actors migrate; for example, some white supremacist extremists migrated from Telegram to SimpleX in late 2024.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000059#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A mapping of the top 20 platforms used by IS and Al-Qaeda between April 2024 and April 2025 shows a diverse jurisdictional spread, including the US, UAE, Switzerland, and France, with some services being self-hosted by the groups themselves.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000059#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United States","France","Germany","Canada"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","regulatory assessment","threat mapping"]},{"id":"isdglo-000071","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000071","title":"Behind the Curtain: Unveiling Pro-Kremlin Ecosystems in Europe","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Behind-the-curtain-Unveiling-pro-Kremlin-ecosystems-in-Europe.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies a highly interlinked ecosystem on Telegram where pro-Kremlin narratives permeate conspiracy and radical communities in Europe. It finds that while pro-Kremlin and conspiracy groups are strongly connected across France, Germany, and Italy, the level of interaction with far-right groups varies by country, being stronger in France and Germany than in Italy. The study highlights the role of Russian state-affiliated channels and influencers, such as Alina Lipp, in bridging ideological divides and amplifying disinformation, particularly regarding the Russia-Ukraine war and COVID-19.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000071#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Pro-Kremlin and conspiracy communities across France, Germany, and Italy are highly interlinked, with 77% of conspiracy channels interacting with the pro-Kremlin community studied.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000071#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Interaction between pro-Kremlin and far-right groups is more pronounced in France and Germany than in Italy, where the far-right community is more isolated and primarily engages with other far-right factions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000071#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russian state-affiliated channels are highly influential across the three countries; of the 20 most influential channels, 10 were pro-Kremlin, including the Russian Ministry of Defence in English, RIA, and Ukraina.ru.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000071#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Certain pro-Kremlin figures have successfully bridged political divides; for example, Alina Lipp's channel was among the most shared by both the German far-right and the far-left.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000071#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Pro-Kremlin narratives have permeated radical and conspiracy communities, specifically through claims that exaggerate Western responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine war, unfounded allegations of US biolabs in Ukraine, and the assertion that Ukraine is ruled by a neo-Nazi regime.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000071#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Russia-Ukraine war was a dominant topic across all categories, with a significant shared subtheme focusing on Western and NATO responsibility for the conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000071#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Italy, Eurasianism and Dugin-affiliated channels act as a 'glue' between the pro-Kremlin and far-right communities, reflecting Aleksandr Dugin's appeal to both groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000071#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The COVID-19 pandemic served as a catalyst for the growth of disinformation communities, which later became receptive amplifiers for pro-Kremlin propaganda during the war in Ukraine.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000071#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Ukraine","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["network analysis","semantic mapping","thematic analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000077","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000077","title":"The CCOA Toolkit","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/CCOA-Toolkit-Mainstreaming-Digital-Human-Rights.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The CCOA Toolkit is a comprehensive guide for combating online antisemitism, focusing on the method of 'deconstruction' to dismantle harmful stereotypes. It analyzes how social media algorithms and business models amplify hate, identifies various forms of antisemitism—including anti-Judaism, Nazi ideology, and secondary antisemitism—and provides educational activities to build critical digital literacy. The document also examines the legal landscape, specifically the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA), and advocates for a public health approach to prevention and trauma-sensitive content moderation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000077#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The toolkit employs 'deconstruction' as its primary educational approach, which involves critically analyzing the socio-historical and cultural forces behind antisemitism to reveal the power dynamics and contradictions within dominant narratives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000077#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Online antisemitism is characterized by a 'mainstreaming of extremism,' where harmful ideologies move from niche forums to mainstream platforms, facilitated by social media algorithms that amplify fringe voices to larger audiences.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000077#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Social media platforms contribute to the normalisation of antisemitism through algorithms that create filter bubbles, reinforcing existing prejudices and promoting emotionally provocative or hateful content to increase user engagement and revenue.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000077#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document identifies several distinct forms of antisemitism: anti-Judaism (rooted in early Christianity), modern racist antisemitism (Nazi ideology), secondary antisemitism (Holocaust denial or distortion), and Israel-related antisemitism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000077#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Automated content moderation systems often fail to detect implicit or coded antisemitism, as they struggle with context and are frequently outpaced by the evolution of antisemitic codewords, emojis, and GIFs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000077#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) provides a process-oriented regulatory framework to hold platforms accountable for systemic risks, though its effectiveness is challenged by varying national legal frameworks and the profit-driven business models of tech companies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000077#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The toolkit advocates for a 'public health approach' to countering antisemitism, which prioritizes long-term prevention, early intervention, and addressing root causes over a purely security-focused response.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000077#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Antisemitism frequently intersects with other forms of group-focused enmity, such as anti-Muslim racism, misogyny, and anti-LGBTQ+ hate, often sharing tactics like scapegoating and dehumanization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000077#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation","intersectionality"],"geography_discussed":["Poland","Germany","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["educational guide","policy analysis","theoretical framework"]},{"id":"isdglo-000086","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000086","title":"Assessing and Mitigating Conflict-Related Online Risks","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/DPL-Assessing-Mitigating-Conflict-Related-Online-Risks.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the spillover of conflict-related online risks—such as disinformation, hate speech, and technology-facilitated gender-based violence—into domestic environments. It argues that while the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) and UK's Online Safety Act (OSA) were not primarily designed for conflict settings, their systemic risk assessments and crisis protocols can be leveraged to hold platforms accountable. The brief highlights critical gaps, including the erasure of war crime evidence due to over-moderation and the role of engagement-driven algorithms in amplifying harmful content. It recommends structured cross-border cooperation, the development of evidence-preservation protocols, and a shift toward outcome-based metrics in platform risk reporting.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000086#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Conflict-related online risks frequently transcend borders, impacting diaspora and minority communities in countries far from the actual fighting and fueling domestic polarization and offline tensions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000086#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Generative AI is increasingly used in wartime information operations to distort public perception, as seen during the June 2025 Iran-Israel war and the 2025 India-Pakistan confrontation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000086#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Over-moderation by platforms creates a significant accountability gap by erasing digital evidence of war crimes and human rights abuses, which is often the same content that triggers automated takedowns.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000086#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Platform design and business models, specifically engagement-based recommender systems and advertising, can financially reward and amplify divisive or misleading conflict narratives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000086#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) provides tools such as the Article 36 Crisis Response Mechanism, which allows the Commission to require Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines (VLOPSEs) to take proportionate measures during extraordinary circumstances like armed conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000086#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UK's Online Safety Act (OSA) lacks a formal crisis response mechanism similar to the DSA, leaving platforms unprepared to respond swiftly to rapidly evolving threats, such as the 2024 Southport riots.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000086#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"An analysis of VLOPSE risk assessment reports under the DSA reveals a transparency gap; most platforms provide vague process descriptions and output metrics (e.g., number of removals) rather than outcome-based indicators of effectiveness.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000086#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Platforms often fail to provide adequate local-language moderation in conflict zones, relying on poorly trained AI tools, as evidenced by Meta's delayed response to ethnic violence in Ethiopia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000086#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Myanmar","Ethiopia","Ukraine","Israel","Iran","India","Pakistan","Eritrea","Colombia","Ecuador","Peru","Syria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","regulatory review","case study"]},{"id":"isdglo-000092","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000092","title":"ELECTION REPORT Assessment of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in the 2025 Polish Presidential Election","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/FDEI-Polish-Election-Country-Report-2025.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies a persistent FIMI landscape in Poland, characterized by Russian and Belarusian operations targeting Ukrainian refugees, the EU, and democratic institutions. It highlights the use of coordinated inauthentic behavior, AI-generated content, and content laundering to amplify polarizing narratives. While public resilience and civil society interventions limited the impact, the report notes significant platform failures—particularly on X, Meta, and TikTok—and a regulatory vacuum due to the absence of a permanent Digital Services Coordinator in Poland.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The FIMI landscape in Poland is driven by several persistent vulnerabilities, including the country's geopolitical opposition to Russia, the weaponization of the Belarusian border crisis, and deep-seated domestic political polarization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Three primary meta-narratives were used to destabilize the election: anti-Ukrainian narratives (the largest category), anti-EU narratives aimed at eroding trust in European institutions, and anti-establishment narratives designed to delegitimize democratic governance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Sophisticated coordinated operations, including Doppelganger, Operation Overload, the Pravda Network, and Radio Belarus, disseminated misleading content and promoted ideologically aligned candidates.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Domestic political actors, particularly from the far-right and conservative-nationalist spectrum, engaged in unfair conduct, including the use of fake personas for self-promotion and the spread of false information about election procedures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Major social media platforms exhibited systemic risks: X lacked adequate account creation checks, Meta had weak 'Know Your Customer' (KYC) checks for ads, and TikTok showed inconsistent enforcement of political campaigning policies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report identifies a critical regulatory gap in Poland due to the absence of a permanent Digital Services Coordinator (DSC), which hinders the effective implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"FIMI operations utilized advanced manipulative techniques, such as AI-generated text and 'cheap fakes' (deceptively edited images), to create synthetic realities and erode trust in digital evidence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Content laundering was used to bypass EU sanctions, with websites like Lega Artis and the Pravda Network republishing machine-translated content from sanctioned Russian state media.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The impact of FIMI was constrained by public resilience, active civil society responses, and the limited operational sophistication of some campaigns, though the threat landscape remained consistent with previous elections in 2017 and 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000092#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Russia","Belarus","Ukraine","European Union","Germany","Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["threat assessment","policy evaluation","monitoring report"]},{"id":"isdglo-000122","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000122","title":"Online Domestic Extremism in Canada","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Nov-Feb-25-Domestic-Extremism-in-Canada.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) identified 545 domestic extremist accounts in Canada, analyzing 413,288 posts across platforms like X and Telegram. The study found that while the volume of hate speech decreased by 34% from the previous period, anti-migrant and antisemitic content remained prevalent. Violent speech peaked in January 2025, coinciding with Justin Trudeau's resignation and Donald Trump's rhetoric regarding Canada. Key narratives included misogyny, conspiracy theories surrounding Romana Didulo, and anti-government sentiment. The report also highlights a 'Revolutionary Movementarianism' strategy aimed at blending public political activism with the secret build-up of paramilitary structures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000122#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"ISD identified 545 domestic extremist accounts and channels in Canada across 8 platforms. Between November 2024 and February 2025, data was gathered from 269 of these accounts, which produced 413,288 posts. The most active platforms for these posts were X (252,297 posts) and Telegram (146,064 posts).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000122#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The extremist landscape is divided into several sub-ideologies. Ethnonationalists (86 accounts) and white supremacists (82 accounts) had the highest number of accounts and posts. However, anti-Muslim extremists and ethnonationalists achieved the highest levels of engagement, with anti-Muslim extremists showing a significantly more engaged followership relative to their account count.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000122#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Hate speech accounted for 2.3% (9,512 posts) of the total content, representing a 34% decrease from the previous reporting period. The most targeted groups were migrants (26.1%), Jewish people (22.4%), and the LGBTQ community (22.3%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000122#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Violent speech, including threats and incitement, was found in 0.4% (1,500 posts) of the data. A peak occurred on January 7, 2025, linked to Justin Trudeau's resignation and Donald Trump's comments about Canada becoming the 51st US state, with some posts calling for the military invasion of Canada and the hanging of politicians.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000122#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report identifies a strategic concept called 'Revolutionary Movementarianism.' This approach seeks to overcome the binary between 'Siege' tactics (lone-wolf/small cell terrorism) and legal political activism by influencing public discourse while secretly establishing paramilitary infrastructure to avoid state suppression.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000122#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Dominant narratives among Canadian extremists include misogynistic 'manosphere' themes, conspiracy theories regarding Romana Didulo (the self-declared 'Queen of Canada'), and strong opposition to Justin Trudeau and Mark Carney. Other recurring topics include pro-Russian views on the Ukraine war and 'white identity' concerns regarding demographic displacement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000122#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The most frequently linked media sources by these communities are Rebel News, Life Site News, and True North. The website of Romana Didulo also emerged as a top source, exclusively linked to by anti-government extremists.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000122#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United States","Ontario","Alberta","Quebec","Ottawa","Toronto","United Kingdom","Ukraine","Russia","Israel","Palestine","People's Republic of China"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["social media analysis","quantitative analysis","qualitative analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000127","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000127","title":"Online Domestic Extremism in Canada Data Briefing – December 2024 to February 2025","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Online-Domestic-Extremism-in-Canada.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies 545 domestic extremist accounts in Canada, analyzing over 413,000 posts. It finds that ethnonationalists and white supremacists are the most prolific, while anti-Muslim extremists achieve the highest engagement. Hate speech decreased by 34% from the previous period, with migrants and Jewish people being the primary targets. The document also introduces a new analysis of violent speech, noting peaks coinciding with political events like Justin Trudeau's resignation and Donald Trump's rhetoric regarding Canada.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000127#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Between December 2024 and February 2025, ISD analyzed 413,288 posts from 269 active domestic extremist accounts across five platforms: X (252,297 posts), Telegram (146,064), Facebook (11,590), Instagram (2,349), and YouTube (988).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000127#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ethnonationalists and white supremacists were the most prolific groups in terms of account numbers and post volume, while anti-Muslim extremists and ethnonationalists saw the highest levels of engagement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000127#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Hate speech accounted for 2.3% (9,512 posts) of the total content, representing a 34% decrease from the previous reporting period. The most targeted groups were migrants (26.1%), Jewish people (22.4%), and the LGBTQ community (22.3%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000127#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Violent speech, including threats and incitement, was identified in 1,500 posts (0.4%). A peak occurred on January 7, 2025, featuring calls for the military invasion of Canada and the hanging of politicians for high treason.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000127#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Extremist activity and specific narratives spiked in response to political events, including Justin Trudeau's resignation on January 6 and Donald Trump's comments about making Canada the '51st state' of the US.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000127#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Dominant narratives among Canadian extremists include misogyny and 'manosphere' themes, conspiracy theories regarding Romana Didulo and vaccines, pro-Russian views on the Ukraine-Russia war, and opposition to 'woke' politics and the Liberal Party.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000127#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Rebel News was the most linked-to media outlet by Canadian domestic extremists, followed by Life Site News and True North.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000127#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["United States","Ontario","Alberta","Quebec","Ottawa","Toronto","United Kingdom","Ukraine","Russia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","qualitative analysis","semantic mapping","natural language processing"]},{"id":"isdglo-000160","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000160","title":"Generative AI and the German Far Right","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/The-use-of-generative-AI-by-the-German-Far-Right.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes 883 posts featuring AI-generated content (AIGC) from German far-right accounts, finding that generative AI is used as a cost-effective complement to existing digital strategies. Key actors include the AfD, 'Neue Rechte' outlets, and AI-generated 'influencers'. The content primarily focuses on anti-migrant narratives, attacks on the 'traffic light' coalition government, and the glorification of an idealized German identity. The study highlights a significant lack of platform compliance with the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and the AI Act regarding the labeling and removal of misleading AIGC.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000160#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"ISD identified 883 posts containing AI-generated content (AIGC) from 92 German far-right accounts between April 2023 and November 2024, with the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party serving as a key source.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000160#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The most prevalent AI-generated narratives include the glorification of 'blond and blue-eyed Germans', calls for 'remigration' (mass deportation of ethnic minorities), and the association of migrants with crime and welfare exploitation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000160#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Generative AI is used to target the German political establishment, specifically mocking members of the 'traffic light' coalition (SPD, Greens, FDP) and the CDU through the exaggeration of physical features, apparel, and surroundings.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000160#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Far-right actors have created AI-generated 'influencers'—such as 'Larissa Wagner', 'sophias_world', and 'Lara, die blonde Rebellin'—to build parasocial relationships and promote ethnonationalist narratives through the image of the 'ideal' German woman.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000160#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"AI-generated music and videos are used to foster a sense of identity and belonging, including content that depicts Muslim immigrants as threats or training to commit violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000160#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Far-right actors employ specific digital tactics to amplify AIGC, such as the '#Vernetzungstweet' on X and Instagram to expand follower bases, and the use of alternative accounts to circumvent the AfD's TikTok ban.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000160#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a widespread failure by social media platforms to comply with the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and AI Act regarding the labeling of AIGC; only 4% of posts were labeled as AI-generated at the time of writing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000160#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Reporting 192 posts to platforms (Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok) resulted in no removals or restrictions based on platform policies as of December 16, 2024, indicating a lack of effective enforcement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000160#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["European Union"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["qualitative analysis","quantitative analysis","policy assessment"]},{"id":"isdglo-000168","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000168","title":"Votes and Vitriol: Online Abuse Targeting Women Candidates in the 2024 French Legislative Elections","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Votes-and-Vitriol.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that women candidates in the 2024 French legislative elections, particularly those from left-wing parties, faced widespread online gender-based violence (OGBV) and gendered disinformation on TikTok. This abuse often intersected with racism, classism, and religious discrimination. The analysis highlights TikTok's failure to effectively moderate this content, arguing that the platform's automated tools are insufficient and that its lack of action contradicts obligations under the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA). The report notes that such harassment can lead candidates to reduce their online activity, thereby undermining democratic participation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000168#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Women candidates in the 2024 French legislative campaign experienced widespread online gender-based violence (OGBV) and gendered disinformation, including sexual harassment, misogynistic slurs, and calls for violence. This abuse frequently targeted their appearance, perceived competence, and personal characteristics such as 'race,' class, and religion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000168#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Left-wing women candidates were disproportionately targeted by hatred compared to far-right candidates. Attacks were often exacerbated by their political stances on gender-based violence and the Israel-Hamas conflict, with much of the abuse originating from supporters of far-right parties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000168#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"TikTok's moderation efforts are deemed insufficient, with automated tools failing to protect candidates. In the case of Sandrine Rousseau, TikTok applied a 'bullying prevention' label to a video, but the label served as an informative tool rather than a mechanism to remove the harmful comments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000168#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The prevalence of OGBV on TikTok is argued to be in contradiction with the platform's legal obligations under Articles 34 and 35 of the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA), which require the mitigation of systemic risks during elections and the tackling of gender-based violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000168#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Online harassment has a chilling effect on political participation; five of the nine candidates analyzed either reduced their engagement or stopped posting on TikTok during or after the campaign, though abuse continued on their profiles.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000168#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["qualitative analysis","case study"]},{"id":"isdglo-000020","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000020","title":"The prospect of post-election conspiracy-motivated violence","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2024-11-01","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/the-prospect-of-post-election-conspiracy-motivated-violence-2/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights"],"summary":{"text":"The document warns that figures like Michael Flynn and Ivan Raiklin are promoting conspiracy theories and fantasies of 'retribution' against political enemies, which may drive some supporters to commit violent acts if the government does not enact such measures following an election loss. Social media analysis of X users following these figures shows a steady increase in posts containing violent and revenge-oriented keywords, spiking after the July 2024 assassination attempt on Trump. The briefing notes that while QAnon followers were often told to 'trust the plan,' the current rhetoric may leave supporters feeling obligated to take matters into their own hands.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000020#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Prominent supporters of Donald Trump, specifically retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn and activist Ivan Raiklin, are using extreme rhetoric to promote the idea of retributive violence against perceived political enemies and the 'deep state'. Raiklin has created a target list of journalists, politicians, and public officials, and has expressed a desire to kill Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg via drone strike.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000020#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of X (formerly Twitter) data indicates that followers of Flynn and Raiklin are increasingly engaging with violent rhetoric. On average, accounts following these figures produced over 720,000 posts per month containing keywords associated with retributive violence and revenge fantasies, with this volume exceeding one million posts per month since July 2024.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000020#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document argues that if Donald Trump loses the election, the current rhetoric may create a different psychological driver for violence than seen with QAnon. While QAnon adherents were told to 'trust the plan' and wait for military action, current messages may lead supporters to believe they must personally carry out the violence they believe is imminent against their enemies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000020#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The FBI and DHS have previously identified conspiracy-driven extremist movements as unique risks to public safety. The FBI specifically noted that 'anti-government, identity based, and fringe' theories can legitimize violent action and drive individuals to commit criminal acts, including murders and attacks on government facilities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000020#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"isdglo-000010","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000010","title":"Russian propaganda exploits US hurricane response to undermine FEMA and Ukraine support","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2024-10-24","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/russian-propaganda-exploits-us-hurricane-response-to-undermine-fema-and-ukraine-support/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document identifies a Russian propaganda campaign that exploited the aftermath of hurricanes Milton and Helene to foster domestic discontent in the US. Russian state-affiliated outlets, including RT and Sputnik, amplified narratives claiming the Biden administration diverted disaster relief funds to Ukraine and migrants. The analysis highlights a strategy of amplifying existing divisive US domestic discourse and the use of AI-generated imagery to portray devastation. The report notes that these campaigns spread largely unchecked on social media platforms, particularly X, to erode trust in democratic institutions and reduce support for Ukraine.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000010#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Russian state-affiliated media promoted three primary narratives following hurricanes Milton and Helene: that the Biden administration prioritized Ukraine over US citizens, that the administration is generally incompetent in disaster relief, and that FEMA is unable to provide aid due to spending on immigrants.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000010#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Rather than creating original disinformation, Russian actors primarily amplify existing false or misleading claims from US domestic sources and public figures, such as Elon Musk and Donald Trump, to give the content a 'veneer of credibility'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000010#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russian disinformation campaigns have spread with minimal moderation on social media, specifically on X, where posts often lack state affiliation labels or fact-checks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000010#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"RIA Novosti used its Russian-language Telegram channel to spread AI-generated images depicting fake devastation at Florida's Disney World caused by Hurricane Milton, which were likely sourced from a low-traction X account.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000010#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Russia","Ukraine","Florida"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["disinformation analysis","media monitoring"]},{"id":"isdglo-000008","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000008","title":"Hurricane Helene brews up storm of online falsehoods and threats","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2024-10-08","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/hurricane-helene-brews-up-storm-of-online-falsehoods-and-threats/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes how conspiracy groups and extremist actors exploited the aftermath of Hurricane Helene to spread falsehoods about FEMA, target public officials with antisemitic abuse, and incite violence. It highlights the convergence of climate denialism, election conspiracies, and hate speech, while criticizing the failure of X's moderation and Community Notes to curb the spread of harmful content.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000008#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Misinformation regarding Hurricane Helene spread rapidly on X, with 33 posts containing claims debunked by the US government and the White House accumulating over 160 million views by October 7, 2024.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000008#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A significant portion of the misinformation on X included overt antisemitism, with 30% of analyzed posts targeting public officials such as the Mayor of Asheville and the FEMA Director of Public Affairs, totaling 17.1 million views.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000008#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"False narratives about FEMA's aid processes led to credible threats of violence, including calls for militias to confront the agency and threats to shoot emergency responders.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000008#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a documented crossover between networks promoting climate denialism and those spreading other extremist conspiracies, including anti-migrant narratives, electoral fraud claims, and antisemitism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000008#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Widespread falsehoods claimed that FEMA aid is a loan allowing the government to seize private property, despite FEMA's official statement that it cannot seize land or property.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000008#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"US Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene promoted the false claim that Democrats can control the weather, a post that received over 41.5 million views.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000008#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document identifies a failure in X's moderation systems, noting that most high-traction false narratives lacked Community Notes and that the platform lacks policies to remove false content causing imminent real-world harm during crises.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000008#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["hurricane"],"geography_discussed":["North Carolina","Asheville","Springfield","Ohio","Ukraine","Israel"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["social media analysis","disinformation tracking"]},{"id":"isdglo-000021","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000021","title":"Platforms fail to label and remove AI-generated and manipulated election content","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2024-09-19","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/platforms-fail-to-label-and-remove-ai-generated-and-manipulated-election-content/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights"],"summary":{"text":"The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) found that platforms including Meta, TikTok, YouTube, and X are failing to honor public commitments to mitigate deceptive AI-generated content (AIGC). Despite the availability of forensic debunks, 154 instances of election-related AIGC were identified that remained unlabeled or unremoved, garnering 51 million impressions. The report highlights specific examples involving Taylor Swift, Kamala Harris, and Joe Biden, and argues that the lack of systematic detection and policy enforcement allows repeat offenders to spread misinformation and undermines public trust.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000021#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"ISD identified 154 instances of election-related AI-generated content (AIGC) or edited media that platforms failed to properly label or remove, resulting in 51 million impressions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000021#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Specific high-reach examples of deceptive content include AI-generated images of Taylor Swift supporting Donald Trump (17.2 million views on X and TikTok) and an AI-cloned voice of Joe Biden using profanities (over 28 million views on X alone).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000021#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Platforms are failing to mitigate 'cheapfakes'—simplistically edited photos—such as a sexually suggestive image of Kamala Harris that appeared across all analyzed platforms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000021#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There appears to be no systematic internal detection of AIGC within platform moderation processes, as widely debunked content remains unlabeled even when easily found via external tools like Google's reverse image search.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000021#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The lack of enforcement allows repeat offenders to evade account-level penalties; one account on X received over 11 million views for election-related AIGC without facing action.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000021#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"isdglo-000004","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000004","title":"TikTok series: Policy recommendations","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2024-09-13","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/tiktok-series-policy-recommendations/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) identifies systemic failures in TikTok's moderation of hate speech and extremism, noting that 30% of a sampled white supremacist dataset contained multiple policy violations. The report recommends enhancing Trust and Safety resourcing, updating moderator training to recognize nuanced 'dog-whistles', and overhauling the auto-suggest feature which currently suggests workarounds for accessing violative content. Additionally, ISD calls for expanded Research API access for civil society organizations beyond the US and Europe to improve platform transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000004#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"TikTok exhibits systemic failures in moderating both nuanced and overt policy violations; in an assessment of white supremacist content, 30% of the total sample contained two or more policy violations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000004#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The platform's auto-suggest function is identified as a major safety risk because it proactively suggests ways for users to find violative content or communities promoting extremist narratives, operating independently of video moderation strategies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000004#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"TikTok's hashtag and search blocking systems are insufficient and easily bypassed by misspellings, which allows users to discover networks of accounts spreading anti-migrant and white supremacist content through 'dog whistles' and coded language.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000004#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a critical need for specialized moderator training and dedicated issue-based moderation queues to handle the complexity of hate speech, as general moderators often lack the contextual knowledge to identify subtle derogatory language regarding migration.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000004#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"TikTok's Research API is currently too restrictive, as it is limited to non-profit academic institutions in the US and Europe, which hinders the ability of civil society organizations to monitor the platform.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000004#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Europe","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy recommendation","platform analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000023","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000023","title":"TikTok series: Methodology","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2024-09-13","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/tiktok-series-methodology/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights"],"summary":{"text":"The report details the manual data collection and coding processes used to identify hate speech and extremist content on TikTok. Because ISD lacked API access, researchers used English keywords, misspelled terms to bypass moderation, and 'snowball sampling' of follower networks to identify 212 videos for analysis. The methodology includes specific definitions for 'far right', 'white supremacy', and 'extremism', and a coding framework to assess whether content violates seven specific TikTok Community Guidelines, including those regarding hate speech, misinformation, and violent organizations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000023#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Due to a lack of access to the TikTok API, the research was conducted manually using qualitative methods, including the use of English language keywords and intentional misspellings to find content designed to evade moderation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000023#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"ISD employed a 'snowball sampling' technique to expand its dataset by identifying new accounts based on the follower networks and bio characteristics of previously identified ideology-supporting accounts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000023#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The data collection process lasted approximately one month and resulted in a final sample of 212 videos for detailed analysis.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000023#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Videos were analyzed using a codebook from the 2021 Hatescape report to evaluate over 10 elements per video and account, including interaction metrics and the presence of hatred.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000023#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The research assessed content against seven specific TikTok Community Guidelines: Violent Behaviors and Criminal Activities, Hate Speech and Hateful Behaviors, Misinformation, Violent and Hateful Organizations and Individuals, Sexual Exploitation and Gender-Based Violence, Harassment and Bullying, and Firearms and Dangerous Weapons.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000023#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"isdglo-000036","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000036","title":"How The Specter of AI Has Distracted from The Reality of The Gaza Conflict","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2024-09-01","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/how-the-specter-of-ai-has-distracted-from-the-reality-of-the-gaza-conflict/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"Analysis by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) indicates that the 'specter' of AI is being used to dismiss authentic imagery of the Gaza conflict, deepening confirmation biases and creating a climate of skepticism that facilitates disinformation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000036#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Discussions regarding both actual and imagined AI-generated content (AIGC) are acting as a distraction from the physical realities of the conflict. Content referencing AI in the context of Gaza saw impressions on X grow from over 528 million in the first month of the conflict to 736 million by September 2024.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000036#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a disproportionate trend of users making 'broad accusations of AIGC,' where they claim all or most media from a specific group or ideology is AI-generated. In discussions of AI that did not mention a specific piece of content, 52.9% included such broad accusations. This includes dismissing authentic footage of casualties in the Neusirat refugee camp as AI-generated to support the 'Pallywood' narrative, as well as dismissing evidence of October 7 atrocities as 'AI generated propaganda images'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000036#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Social media users frequently rely on flawed methods to verify content, such as analyzing the color of blood or using free AI detection tools, which often lead to false conclusions. In an October sample, 62% of posts mentioning a specific authentic image or video falsely claimed the content was AI-generated.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000036#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The use of self-disclosed AIGC to express support for specific viewpoints increased from 5% of the sample in October 2023 to 14.8% in September 2024. This proliferation risks deceiving viewers if disclosures are removed during reposting and can perpetuate harmful stereotypes, such as a video depicting a Palestinian child evolving into a Hamas fighter.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000036#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Israel","Palestine"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"isdglo-000013","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000013","title":"EU Digital Services Act","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":"2024-08-13","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-explainer/eu-digital-services-act/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The EU Digital Services Act (DSA), fully in force as of 17 February 2024, establishes a systemic online safety framework for digital intermediary services. It imposes tiered obligations based on societal impact, with the most stringent requirements applied to Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines (VLOPs and VLOSEs)—those with 45 million or more monthly EU users. These entities must conduct annual risk assessments and implement mitigation measures against systemic risks, including illegal content and negative effects on civic discourse. The DSA introduces transparency mandates for advertising and recommender systems, and establishes a crisis response mechanism for threats to public security or health. Enforcement is shared between the European Commission and national Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs), with potential fines reaching 6 percent of annual turnover.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000013#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Digital Services Act (DSA) is the first systemic online safety law globally to take a comprehensive approach to online services and risks, aiming to protect fundamental rights while creating a trusted online environment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000013#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs), defined as those with an average of 45 million or more monthly users in the EU, face the strictest obligations due to their potential to cause systemic societal risks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000013#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"VLOPs and VLOSEs must perform annual risk assessments and implement mitigation measures regarding systemic risks, which include the dissemination of illegal content and negative impacts on electoral processes, public security, and fundamental rights.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000013#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The DSA mandates transparency for online advertising, requiring platforms to identify ads and provide information on funding and targeting; VLOPs and VLOSEs must maintain a publicly accessible, searchable ad repository.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000013#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While the DSA does not define 'illegal content' itself, it requires platforms to act quickly on orders to remove such content and mandates that hosting services provide user-reporting mechanisms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000013#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The law includes a crisis response mechanism allowing the European Commission to require VLOPs and VLOSEs to assess and limit their contribution to serious threats to public security or health, such as terrorism or pandemics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000013#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Enforcement is handled by the European Commission for VLOPs/VLOSEs and by national Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) for other services, with non-compliance potentially resulting in fines of up to 6 percent of annual turnover.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000013#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The DSA requires VLOPs and VLOSEs to report on human resources allocated for content moderation across all 24 official EU languages, though it may still leave minority and diaspora communities vulnerable.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000013#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Germany","Netherlands","Ireland"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","regulatory guide"]}]}