{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"organization":["Institute for Strategic Dialogue"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":166,"relation":"eq"},"page":1,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=institute-for-strategic-dialogue","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=institute-for-strategic-dialogue&page=2","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"isdglo-000027","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000027","title":"‘United by chaos:’ Examining the Russian nexus to online networks of nihilistic violence","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026-09-15","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/united-by-chaos-examining-the-russian-nexus-to-online-networks-of-nihilistic-violence/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines 'the Alliance,' a coalition formed in April 2026 within the 'Com Network' that coordinates fragmented groups of nihilistic violence. The Alliance is characterized by an emphasis on offline violence, operational sophistication, and a shared goal of creating 'Chaos.' The author identifies several indicators of possible Russian state sponsorship, including financial incentives for violence, advanced technical infrastructure, and coordinated propaganda. While the broader Com remains an organic youth ecosystem, the Alliance represents a shift toward professionalized, potentially state-linked hybrid warfare using 'disposable agents' for arson and sabotage globally.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000027#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Since April 2026, 'the Alliance' has introduced strategic coordination and operational sophistication to the fragmented Com Network, connecting groups with diverse ideologies around a shared commitment to 'offline violence and the fomenting of chaos worldwide.'","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000027#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Alliance provides advanced practical support for violence, including a dark web forum and a public website hosting guides on 'operational security, cybercrime, poisons, explosives, weapons and methods for conducting violence.'","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000027#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Alliance-linked groups have been associated with significant real-world harm, including dozens of global swatting incidents and arson attacks by 'Group A,' as well as alleged school attack plots in Ukraine and a murder conspiracy in Germany.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000027#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There are multiple indicators of possible Russian state-linked support for the Alliance, specifically the use of financial incentives for violence and proxy-style tasking, which mirrors Russian methods for recruiting 'disposable agents' for foreign sabotage.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000027#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Alliance scales an organizational model previously used by the group MKY, where violence serves as 'proof of commitment' and a mechanism for advancement through a system of 'murder points.'","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000027#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The coalition explicitly embraces 'accelerationism'—the use of violence to hasten societal collapse—and views 'Chaos' as the unifying principle that transcends the different ideologies of its members, such as National Socialism and Satanism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000027#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Russia","Ukraine","Germany","United Kingdom","United States","Texas","Fort Worth","Canada","Dagestan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["hybrid warfare","online radicalization","network analysis","state-sponsored disinformation"]},{"id":"isdglo-000046","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000046","title":"Generation ‘Slop Jihad:’ The decentralized ‘media jihad’ gets sloppy","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026-09-08","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/generation-slop-jihad-the-decentralized-media-jihad-gets-sloppy/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies a shift in jihadist online propaganda toward 'Slop Jihad,' characterized by low-quality generative AI content that prioritizes memetic resonance and the glorification of violence over traditional ideological messaging. This trend is primarily driven by younger supporters and is most prevalent on TikTok, where AI templates like fan-cams and dance videos are used to feature terrorists. The report classifies the producers into three groups: Purist Slop Jihadists, Total Christian Death (TCD) supporters, and Shitposting Slopagandists. These groups often overlap in their veneration of mass-casualty attackers, such as Zahran Hashim, and use AI-generated content to troll victims and 'enemies.'","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000046#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Slop Jihad is defined as low-quality digital content produced in part or in whole by artificial intelligence to serve the 'media jihad,' aiming to wage a 'memetic war of resonance' while promoting and legitimizing terrorist groups and ideologies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000046#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"TikTok is the primary platform for Slop Jihad due to its short-form video format, 'For You Page' algorithm, and existing jihadist support ecosystem; ISD identified 150 Slop Jihad videos from 71 accounts with over 5.4 million views.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000046#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The producers of Slop Jihad content are categorized into three distinct strands: Purist Slop Jihadists (who support IS or al-Qaeda ideologies), Total Christian Death (TCD) supporters (fandoms of attackers who target Christians), and Shitposting 'Slopagandists' (non-ideological users seeking virality and trolling).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000046#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Slop Jihad content focuses more on the glorification of violence than on ideological messaging, often featuring figures like Zahran Hashim, the architect of the 2019 Sri Lankan Easter Day bombings, as well as Osama bin Laden and other mass-casualty attackers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000046#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"isdglo-000022","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000022","title":"Building a strategic response to antisemitism in the UK in a changing threat landscape","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2026-05-13","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/building-a-strategic-response-to-antisemitism-in-the-uk-in-a-changing-threat-landscape/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The policy brief argues that the UK's current response to antisemitism is fractured and overly focused on physical security, failing to address the complex interplay between online ecosystems and offline violence. It calls for a holistic strategy led by the Prime Minister's Office that integrates the Online Safety Act, updated counter-terrorism frameworks focused on behaviors rather than just formal groups, and scaled-up prevention and education efforts to combat the 'national emergency' of rising antisemitism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000022#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The UK Jewish community has experienced a severe escalation in violence, including five arson attacks on synagogues and Jewish buildings, and a stabbing attack in Golders Green. This follows a sustained rise in activity since October 7, 2023, with the Community Security Trust recording 3,700 antisemitic incidents in 2025.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000022#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A new group called Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (HAYI) has claimed responsibility for recent arson and stabbing attacks, and is suspected to be a cover for Iran or its proxies. The UK government's terrorism advisor has described the current state of antisemitism as a 'national emergency'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000022#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Online Safety Act (OSA) is identified as a central pillar for countering antisemitism, but it requires stricter enforcement by Ofcom to change platform incentives. There is a specific need to address 'legal but harmful' content and the role of recommender algorithms, as children have been served content glorifying the IRGC within 90 minutes of account creation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000022#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Current counter-terrorism frameworks are deemed outdated because they focus on banning formal groups, whereas modern threats often emerge from decentralised online networks and state-backed militias. The brief recommends shifting toward a violence prevention system focused on behaviours rather than narrow ideological definitions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000022#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant imbalance between funding for protection and prevention; new protection measures following attacks in Manchester and Golders Green received seven times the funding allocated to prevention measures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000022#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document argues for a comprehensive cross-government strategy led by the Prime Minister's Office to integrate digital regulation, violence prevention, hate crime strategies, and social cohesion efforts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000022#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Golders Green","London","Iran","London Borough of Barnet"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","threat assessment"]},{"id":"isdglo-000006","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000006","title":"The impact of the war with Iran on antisemitic discourse","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2026-04-22","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/the-impact-of-the-war-with-iran-on-antisemitic-discourse/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes a 68 percent increase in antisemitic social media content following military strikes on Iran in February 2026. It identifies a shift toward narratives of Jewish political control and backlash against Israel, noting that this online escalation coincided with at least eight offline antisemitic attacks in March 2026 across five countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000006#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Following the 28 February 2026 US and Israeli strikes on Iran, there was a 68 percent increase in online antisemitic content, rising from 34,060 posts the previous week to at least 57,133 posts in the week immediately following the outbreak of war.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000006#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The narrative of 'backlash to Israel and Zionism' saw the most significant proportional growth, increasing from approximately 15 percent of the antisemitic dataset before the war to about 28 percent afterward.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000006#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The most voluminous narrative both before and after the strikes involved tropes of Jewish political control, including claims that Western governments serve a 'manipulative Jewish elite' and the use of the white nationalist term 'ZOG' (Zionist occupied government).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000006#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There was a significant increase in interpersonal antisemitic hate speech, characterized by slurs and insults directed at Jewish social media users and commentators, including the use of the term 'zogbot'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000006#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The escalation in online rhetoric correlated with a rise in offline violence; in March 2026, at least eight antisemitic attacks were recorded across five countries, including targets such as synagogues and Jewish institutions in the US, Canada, Belgium, and the UK.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000006#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While narratives like classic antisemitism, white nationalist content, and media control claims increased in absolute volume, their overall share of the conversation decreased as they were eclipsed by political influence and Israel-backlash narratives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000006#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Certain historical conspiracy theories, such as those involving a secret alliance between Jews and Freemasons or 'Khazarian' claims, saw a slight decrease in absolute volume as users focused on more modern political influence claims.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000006#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Iran","United States","Canada","Belgium","United Kingdom","Israel"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["social media analysis","narrative segmentation","quantitative analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000060","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000060","title":"Addressing the Intersection of Misogyny, Targeted Hate and Violent Extremism","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":"2026-04","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Addressing-the-intersection-of-misogyny-targeted-hate-and-violent-extremism.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The toolkit establishes a 'Harms Taxonomy' to classify the continuum from online misogyny to violent extremism, identifying online harassment, sexual extortion, and online impersonation as the categories most likely to intersect with extremist activity. It advocates for a public health-based, gender-transformative approach to prevention rather than pure securitization. The document analyzes legal frameworks in Canada, Jordan, and Kenya, noting gaps such as the lack of standalone TFGBV laws in Canada and concerns over vague cybercrime laws in Jordan and Kenya. It provides sectoral guidance for government, civil society, and platforms to ensure coordinated, rights-respecting responses to gendered harms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000060#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Misogyny relates to violent extremism in four primary ways: as a standalone form of extremism (male supremacism), as a core component underpinning other extremist movements (far-right, far-left, and jihadist), as a risk factor for adopting extreme beliefs, and as a warning sign of broader violent behavior.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000060#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The toolkit's Harms Taxonomy identifies five 'TFGBV super-types': Online Harassment, Online Impersonation, Intimate Image Abuse, Sexual Extortion, and Account Access Control. Among these, online harassment, sexual extortion, and online impersonation are identified as the most likely to intersect with violent extremism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000060#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document argues for a public health-based approach to prevention, focusing on strengthening protective factors and gender-transformative interventions that reshape harmful masculinities, to avoid the risks of 'over-securitizing' gender-based violence as a national security problem.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000060#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Canada, TFGBV is primarily addressed through the Criminal Code rather than a standalone online safety framework. While the proposed Protecting Victims Act (December 2025) aims to strengthen penalties for non-consensual sexual deepfakes and coercive control, gaps remain regarding specific sub-harms like doxxing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000060#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Jordan's Cybercrime Law No. 17 of 2023 criminalizes impersonation, sexual extortion, and account access control, but human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, warn that vague terms like \"spreading fake news\" may be used to criminalize peaceful dissent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000060#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Kenya addresses TFGBV through the Penal Code and the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (CMCA). While the 2025 CMCA amendments expanded authority to restrict prohibited content, the Penal Code still criminalizes same-sex sexual activity and lacks protections for LGBTQI+ individuals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000060#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The European Union's Directive (EU) 2024/1385 and the Terrorist Content Online (TCO) Regulation provide a model for integrating gender-specific legal frameworks with rapid removal obligations for extremist content, including misogynistic material that promotes terrorist violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000060#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UK's Online Safety Act (OSA) and Ofcom's guidance emphasize systemic measures to combat coordinated abuse. The case of the Maniac Murder Cult (MMC) demonstrates how sexual extortion, which may appear as TFGBV, can be a tactic within a proscribed terrorist ecosystem.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000060#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["European Union","United Kingdom"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","legal review","framework development"]},{"id":"isdglo-000005","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000005","title":"Irish unity, Palestine and Soleimani: Analysis of an Iranian information operation targeting Ireland","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2026-03-31","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/irish-unity-palestine-and-soleimani-analysis-of-an-iranian-information-operation-targeting-ireland/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document details an Iranian-linked information operation, Storm-2035, that deployed four X accounts impersonating Northern Irish residents between August 2024 and February 2026. These accounts used AI-generated content and 'hashtag hijacking' to promote Irish reunification and narratives supportive of the Iranian regime and Palestine. Despite low engagement, the operation demonstrates Ireland's vulnerability to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), particularly as it prepares for the EU presidency in 2026.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000005#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Four X accounts attributed to the Iranian-linked operation Storm-2035 impersonated individuals from Belfast, Northern Ireland, starting in August 2024. These accounts claimed to be students, graduates, or advocates for a united Ireland, but profile data revealed they accessed the platform via VPNs in the Netherlands and were connected via Android apps in Iran or \"Western Asia\".","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000005#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The operation utilised generative AI, specifically ChatGPT, to create content in English and Spanish. The accounts employed 'hashtag hijacking'—using popular but unrelated tags like #YaliCapkini (a Turkish drama)—to amplify their reach beyond their small follower bases.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000005#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The accounts demonstrated high levels of coordination, posting near-identical content on specific dates. This included coordinated praise for assassinated Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani and support for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well as criticism of the US for sanctioning the International Criminal Court.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000005#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Between 16 August 2024 and 4 February 2026, the accounts published 5,405 posts. Approximately 25% of the content focused on Ireland and Irish reunification, while nearly 50% focused on international topics concerning Palestine, Israel, and Iran.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000005#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The operation co-opted legitimate Irish political figures and groups to gain credibility, frequently reposting content from Sinn Féin leaders Mary Lou McDonald and Michelle O’Neill, as well as the hip hop group Kneecap.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000005#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite the effort, the operation had minimal impact, with each account gaining only around a hundred followers and achieving very low engagement on most posts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000005#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The operation's scope extended beyond Ireland; after January 2026, the accounts began supporting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, suggesting they were part of a broader international network. Some accounts later rebranded as Scottish independence activists based in Edinburgh.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000005#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Iran","Palestine","Israel","United States","United Kingdom","Belfast","Netherlands","Edinburgh","Venezuela","Cork"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","narrative analysis","network analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000014","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000014","title":"Axis of amplification: Regime media, proxies and Western supporters respond to Iranian protests","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2026-02-27","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/axis-of-amplification-regime-media-proxies-and-western-supporters-respond-to-iranian-protests/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes how the Iranian regime and its allies used an 'axis of amplification' to frame nationwide protests as foreign-backed riots. It details the roles of state actors, regional proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis, and Western far-right and far-left accounts in spreading disinformation, promoting antisemitic tropes, and accusing the US and Israel of orchestrating the unrest to justify state repression.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000014#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Iranian state actors systematically delegitimized nationwide protests by framing them as violent 'riots' instigated by foreign agents, specifically the US and Israel. State-affiliated English-language posts used the term 'riots' approximately six times more frequently than 'protests'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000014#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Iranian government initially attempted to suppress international awareness of the unrest, with English-language state accounts remaining largely silent until January 8, the date of a nationwide internet shutdown and the start of a major crackdown.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000014#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Iran's regional proxies provided varied responses: Kata’ib Hezbollah threatened full-scale war against the US, the Houthis alleged the US manufactured crises via sanctions and 'criminal gangs', and Hezbollah attributed the protests' economic causes to US sanctions while blaming violence on 'foreign agents'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000014#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russian state media, particularly RT, amplified the 'foreign-backed riots' narrative and characterized the protests as an application of 'colour revolution' methods, while China positioned itself as an arbiter for peace and used the events to criticize US foreign policy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000014#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Western far-right and conspiracy theorist accounts promoted the narrative that Israel was manipulating the US into a war with Iran by fabricating reports of state repression, often employing overt antisemitism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000014#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Western far-left and conspiracy theorist accounts echoed the regime's narratives by framing the protests as a 'US-Israeli terrorist attack' and attacking left-wing critics of the regime as being 'imperialist' or 'Zionist'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000014#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United States","Israel","Russia","People's Republic of China","Iraq","Lebanon","Yemen","Minneapolis","United Kingdom"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"isdglo-000040","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000040","title":"No time to lose: Liberal democracies can win the cognitive and hybrid war against authoritarians","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2026-02-12","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/no-time-to-lose-liberal-democracies-can-win-the-cognitive-and-hybrid-war-against-authoritarians/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The briefing asserts that authoritarian regimes, specifically Russia, China, and Iran, are using hybrid warfare to undermine trust in democratic institutions and divide liberal societies. It argues that current government responses are too siloed and reactive, failing to deliver results. To counter this, the author proposes three strategic pillars: establishing a comprehensive counter-hybrid doctrine that includes asymmetric and offensive capabilities, reorganizing government structures to enable holistic coordination and multi-stakeholder coalitions, and prioritizing strategic communications to outcompete authoritarian narratives both domestically and internationally.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000040#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Authoritarian regimes, including Russia, China, and Iran, have significantly increased their use of hybrid warfare over the last decade. In the EU, these attacks since February 2022 have ranged from cyber and information operations to kinetic actions such as sabotage, arson, and targeted killings.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000040#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The primary objective of hybrid attacks—including deepfakes, ransomware, and drone incursions—is to manipulate citizens' psyches to erode trust in democratic governance, political parties, and international institutions like NATO and the EU.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000040#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Democracies are vulnerable to cognitive warfare due to an overreliance on digital infrastructure dominated by companies from the United States and China, which allows authoritarians to exploit algorithmic systems and AI data voids to cause epistemic corrosion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000040#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Current defensive strategies in democracies are criticized as being too tactical and siloed across different departments, failing to raise the costs for adversaries or systematically prevent the impacts of hybrid threats.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000040#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document recommends a new counter-hybrid doctrine that includes a willingness to use flexible, asymmetric responses and the development of offensive capabilities to neutralize sources of warfare in authoritarian countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000040#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To improve coordination, the author suggests appointing a lead agency or policy coordinator for hybrid threats and establishing a 'Hybrid Warfare War Room' involving the military-industrial complex, banks, think tanks, and academic institutions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000040#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Democracies are urged to improve strategic communications by consistently attributing hybrid operations to specific actors, highlighting the human costs of these attacks, and empowering civil society messengers like mayors and faith-based leaders.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000040#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["European Union","Russia","People's Republic of China","Iran","Ukraine","United States","Germany","France","United Kingdom","Poland","Canada","Australia","Japan","Denmark"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy recommendation","strategic assessment"]},{"id":"isdglo-000018","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000018","title":"Link by link: Hundreds of webpages cite pro-Russia Pravda network","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026-02-02","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/link-by-link-hundreds-of-webpages-cite-pro-russia-pravda-network/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) found that hundreds of English-language websites, including major news outlets and academic institutions, link to the pro-Russia Pravda network. Over 80% of reviewed citations treat the network as a credible source, often failing to contextualize it as a Russia-aligned information operation. This pattern of linking increases the network's perceived legitimacy and its likelihood of appearing in search engine results. To combat this, ISD developed a browser extension for Chrome and Edge that alerts users when they visit Pravda network sites.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000018#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Between July 2024 and July 2025, ISD identified 919 sites that linked to the Pravda network, with a focused analysis of 303 English-language sites. The majority of these were 'commentary' sites (over 75%), while nearly 20% were news outlets, fact-checkers, academic institutions, or non-profits.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000018#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A significant majority of reviewed citations treat the Pravda network as a reliable source of information, with 81% categorized as 'legitimizing' and only 3% providing proper context regarding its role as a Russia-aligned operation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000018#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"High-traffic websites with over one million monthly visits have cited the Pravda network as a reliable source, including outlets such as The Atlantic, Politico, Forbes, and the Denver Gazette. Other high-traffic sites like The Washington Post, Newsweek, and Fortune provided 'decontextualized' links that acknowledged Russian origins but not the information operation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000018#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Pravda network's content is most frequently cited in relation to Russia and Ukraine, with 40% of linking webpages mentioning these in their headlines. Additionally, 15% of linking pages focused on US domestic or foreign policy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000018#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The act of linking to the Pravda network, even when the content is refuted, provides the operation with greater reach and perceived credibility, as search engines may interpret these links as signals of trust and relevance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000018#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Pravda network employs a high-volume strategy, having published over 5.8 million articles across 87 sites since 2014, primarily by republishing content from pro-Russia Telegram channels and state media.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000018#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Russia","Ukraine","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"isdglo-000034","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000034","title":"Five-year overview of the online and offline anti-LGBTQ+ landscape","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026-02-02","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/investigation-five-year-overview-of-the-online-and-offline-anti-lgbtq-landscape/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report documents a surge in anti-LGBTQ+ hate crimes, book bans, and restrictive legislation in Western countries, noting a convergence of extremist ideologies. It highlights how tech platforms exacerbate these harms through the rollback of protections, the overmoderation of LGBTQ+ content via AI and safety legislation, and the rise of coordinated harassment campaigns like 'transvestigation'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000034#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Anti-LGBTQ+ hate crimes have increased in the US, UK, and Europe, with transgender and gender nonconforming individuals being particularly targeted. In the US, over 20 percent of hate crimes were motivated by anti-LGBTQ+ bias for three consecutive years as of 2024. In the UK, ISD calculated that between 2020 and 2025, anti-trans hate crimes rose by 50 percent and sexual orientation crimes rose by 18.1 percent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000034#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant increase in legislative and government actions targeting LGBTQ+ rights. The ACLU tracked 616 anti-LGBTQ+ bills in the US as of October 2025, with restrictions on student and educator rights being the most common. In Europe, setbacks include the 2025 banning of pride events in Hungary and Russian legislation from 2024 designating the LGBTQ+ movement as an extremist organisation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000034#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Book bans targeting LGBTQ+ content have risen sharply, particularly in the US, where 10,046 books were banned in 2023-2024, with 39 percent featuring LGBTQ+ characters. In the UK, a 2024 study found that 53 percent of surveyed librarians had been asked to remove books, with most censorship attempts targeting LGBTQ+ content.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000034#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Violence against LGBTQ+ individuals is driven by a diverse spectrum of extremist ideologies, including Islamist extremists, neo-Nazis, and Christian far-right actors. Examples include a 2022 neo-Nazi shooting at a queer bar in Colorado and a 2022 shooting by an IS-pledged attacker at bars in Oslo.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000034#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Tech platforms are increasingly failing to protect LGBTQ+ users through both under-moderation of hate and over-moderation of identity. Meta updated its Hateful Content policy in January 2025 to allow narratives claiming homosexuality and transgender identity are mental illnesses. Simultaneously, AI-driven moderation and legislation like the UK's Online Safety Act and the US's FOSTA have led to the erasure of LGBTQ+ online spaces and the misclassification of queer content as 'adult' or 'explicit'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000034#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'transvestigator' phenomenon involves coordinated efforts to falsely prove public figures are transgender, often overlapping with far-right conspiracy theories. Targets have included Brigitte Macron, Jacinda Ardern, Michelle Obama, and Kamala Harris, disproportionately affecting women in public roles, especially nonwhite women.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000034#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["human rights"],"geography_discussed":["Hungary","Georgia","Russia","Brazil","Germany","Norway","Slovakia","France","Austria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["trend analysis","policy review","threat assessment"]},{"id":"isdglo-000047","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000047","title":"From Bucharest to Prague: The spread of the ‘Romanian Scenario’ conspiracy theory in Czechia’s elections","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2026-02-02","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/from-bucharest-to-prague-the-spread-of-the-romanian-scenario-conspiracy-theory-in-czechias-elections/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes how the 'Romanian scenario'—a conspiracy theory alleging that the EU, intelligence services, and courts can rig elections—was used by far-right and far-left political actors, alternative media, and Russian-affiliated channels to undermine trust in Czechia's 2025 parliamentary elections. The narrative evolved from the actual annulment of a Romanian election round in December 2024 into a broader claim of institutional manipulation, often linking the EU's Rapid Response System (RRS) to 'censorship'. The study identifies a transnational pattern, noting similar narratives in Poland and Croatia, and highlights the role of pro-Kremlin propaganda in amplifying these claims to foster democratic distrust.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000047#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 'Romanian scenario' is a conspiracy theory that evolved from the December 2024 annulment of the first round of Romania's presidential election into a broader claim that the EU, Czech intelligence, and government planned to manipulate the 2025 Czech elections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000047#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The narrative was propagated by a diverse group of actors, including far-right (SPD) and far-left (Stačilo!) parties, former President Miloš Zeman, and Russian-affiliated media such as the Telegram channel neČT24, which is considered a successor to Sputnik.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000047#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Specific institutional mechanisms and events were reframed as evidence of the 'Romanian scenario', including the EU's Rapid Response System (RRS), which was portrayed as a 'censorship tool', and a Constitutional Court decision regarding party coalitions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000047#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'Romanian scenario' exhibits transnational characteristics, appearing in Russian-language Telegram channels and influencing election narratives in Poland (May 2025) and Croatia (December 2024).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000047#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Attempts by the Czech intelligence service and the Centre for Research of Online Risks to identify coordinated TikTok networks interfering in the election were reframed by conspiracy theorists as 'false flag' operations to justify annulling results.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000047#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Romania","Poland","Croatia","European Union"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["qualitative analysis","social media monitoring"]},{"id":"isdglo-000074","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000074","title":"Bridging Policy and Research under the DSA: A Structured Research Agenda for Identifying Systemic Risks","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Bridging-policy-and-research-under-the-DSA.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report addresses the definitional ambiguity of 'systemic risks' in the Digital Services Act (DSA) by proposing a structured research agenda. This framework operationalises risk assessment through six dimensions: severity (scale, scope, and remediability) and likelihood (platform characteristics, historical patterns, and contextual factors). Using asymmetric amplification of political content during elections as a case study, the authors demonstrate how a plurality of observational and experimental methods is necessary to generate the evidence required for regulatory decisions. The report concludes that current data access constraints, including limited API functionality and restrictive Virtual Computing Environments, hinder the ability of researchers to fulfill their legally recognised role under the DSA.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000074#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Digital Services Act (DSA) leaves the definition of 'systemic risks' deliberately ambiguous, which creates uncertainty for researchers regarding priority gaps and for regulators in implementing diverse empirical findings.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000074#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Researchers have a dual role under the DSA: a 'control function' to reduce platform opacity through data access and an 'agenda-setting function' to uncover risks that platforms may have overlooked.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000074#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The proposed research agenda operationalises the severity of a risk across three dimensions: scale (intensity of impact), scope (breadth of impact across communities or geographies), and remediability (feasibility of correcting negative effects).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000074#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Likelihood of systemic risks is assessed through three complementary dimensions: platform characteristics, historical patterns, and contextual factors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000074#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Asymmetric amplification—the unequal distribution of political content caused by algorithmic ranking—is associated with risks such as societal polarisation, distorted public perception, and the erosion of democratic discourse.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000074#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"No single research method is sufficient to assess systemic risks; a combination of observational approaches (for scale and patterns) and experimental approaches (for causal mechanisms and remediability) is required.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000074#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Current data access via APIs is insufficient for systemic risk assessment, as they frequently lack critical datapoints such as impressions, unique viewers, demographic breakdowns, and internal moderation response times.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000074#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report notes that data access provided through the Virtual Computing Environment (VCE) was too limited to be used for the intended research purposes of the project.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000074#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Germany","Brandenburg","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","methodological framework","case study"]},{"id":"isdglo-000111","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000111","title":"Mapping Digital Hate: A Landscape Review of Online Hate Speech in Jordan","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Jordan_Mapping-digital-hate.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies three primary typologies of online hate speech in Jordan: gender-based abuse, religious hate speech (primarily targeting Shia communities), and exclusionary nationalist discourse. It highlights how regional conflicts in Gaza and Syria act as trigger events for spikes in hostility and notes that users exploit 'Arabizi' to bypass inadequate Arabic-language moderation. The study also criticizes the 2023 Cybercrime Law for lacking precise definitions, leading to potential over-criminalization of expression.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000111#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Regional conflicts in Gaza and Syria act as trigger events that cause immediate spikes in sectarian and nationalist hate speech in Jordan, reflecting deeper anxieties regarding national survival, sovereignty, and resource scarcity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000111#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Gender-based abuse is a pervasive structural feature of Jordan's online environment, with 15% of X comments and 5% of Instagram comments targeting women containing threats, incitement to violence, sexualized bullying, and dehumanizing language.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000111#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Religious hate speech in Jordan is disproportionately concentrated against Shia communities, who were the target of 63% of harmful religious content on X, followed by the Druze (12%), Alawites, Baha’is and Sufis (7%), and Christians (5%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000111#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Exclusionary nationalist discourse targets Jordanians across tribal and Jordanian-Palestinian lines, with approximately 10% of related content on X being derogatory or exclusionary.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000111#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Users deliberately employ 'Arabizi'—a hybrid of Arabic using Latin characters and numerals—to evade automated content moderation systems, exploiting a systemic underinvestment by platforms in Arabic-language tools.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000111#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 2023 Cybercrime Law in Jordan is characterized by a lack of precise legal definitions for terms like 'sedition' and 'hate speech,' which the report argues leads to interpretive ambiguity and the over-criminalization of expression, as evidenced by 3,170 prosecutions in 2024.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000111#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Gaza Strip","Syria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"isdglo-000113","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000113","title":"Lessons from Extremism Prevention for Countering Hybrid Threats","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2026","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Lessons-in-Extremism-Prevention-for-Countering-Hybrid-Threats-A-Framework-for-Policy-Response.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research paper argues that hybrid threats—combining hostile state operations with extremist violence—require a 'whole-of-society' prevention approach. It suggests adopting a 'public health' model of prevention, categorised into primary (building resilience), secondary (targeted vulnerability efforts), and tertiary (minimising acute harm) interventions. The authors emphasize the need to break down government silos between domestic and foreign security, avoid the over-securitisation of communities, and integrate gender and intersectional analysis into threat assessments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000113#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There is an increasing convergence between hostile state hybrid threats and extremist violence, particularly in the recruitment of young people via platforms like Telegram and Snapchat. In the UK, minors aged 17 and under represented nearly 20% of terrorism-offence arrests in 2023, while in the EU, over 29% of those arrested for terrorism offences in 2024 were minors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000113#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Hostile states like Russia and Iran utilize 'violence-as-a-service' by leveraging criminal networks and 'ghost proxies' to maintain plausible deniability. For instance, the 'Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right' functioned as a ghost proxy for IRGC-backed activities, and Russia has used approximately 1,100 Ukrainians as proxies for sabotage and arson since February 2022, with 240 of these being minors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000113#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Effective responses to hybrid threats require a 'whole-of-government' approach that bridges the gap between domestic and foreign security agencies. The document highlights Germany's model, where the domestic intelligence service's mission is framed as the 'protection of the constitution and its democratic values' rather than just public safety.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000113#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The paper advocates for a 'public health' model of prevention divided into three tiers: primary prevention (e.g., digital citizenship education and 'inoculation' against propaganda), secondary prevention (e.g., evidence-driven strategic communications and alternative narratives), and tertiary prevention (e.g., disrupting financing via blockchain analytics and legal designations).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000113#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To avoid 'community securitisation'—which can fuel mistrust and radicalisation—governments should move away from relying on unrepresentative 'community leaders' and instead engage with a diverse range of voices, particularly within diaspora communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000113#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Gender and intersectionality are identified as critical analytical tools for understanding hybrid threats. The document notes that hostile actors exploit narratives around masculinity, loss of status, and identity, and that specific groups—such as queer members of diaspora communities or racialised journalists—experience these threats differently.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000113#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["United Kingdom","Germany","Russia","Iran","Canada","United States","Latvia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy framework","case study","comparative analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000030","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000030","title":"How violence in southern Syria fuelled anti-Druze hate and online misinformation","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2025-11-28","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/how-violence-in-southern-syria-fuelled-anti-druze-hate-and-online-misinformation/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the correlation between real-world violence in Suweyda and the surge of anti-Druze hate speech on social media, highlighting the role of international accounts and AI-generated misinformation in inciting further conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000030#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Violence in Suweyda in July 2025 led to a surge in online hate speech and rhetoric targeting the Druze community, with spikes in activity correlating to events such as the ceasefire agreement and Israeli strikes in Syria.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000030#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of the top 100 reshared posts on X revealed that 68% contained hate or anti-Druze narratives, frequently portraying the community as 'foreign agents', traitors, 'non-Muslims', or non-indigenous, with some posts using dehumanizing language comparing them to animals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000030#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Anti-Druze online discourse was significantly driven by international accounts; users geolocated in Saudi Arabia (24%) and the United States (7%) combined for more than double the mentions of those geolocated in Syria (15%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000030#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Misinformation, including decontextualized footage from other conflicts and AI-generated content, played a key role in inciting real-world violence. One example included an AI-generated video of Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri falsely apologizing and calling for gunmen to surrender.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000030#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The conflict in Suweyda resulted in over 2,000 deaths, including at least 817 executions, and displaced approximately 192,000 people.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000030#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Saudi Arabia","United States","Israel","Damascus"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["social media monitoring","fact-checking review"]},{"id":"isdglo-000087","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000087","title":"Fostering Healthy Masculinities: Building Resilience Against Online Misogyny","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2025-11","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/DPL-Fostering-Healthy-Masculinities-Building-Resilience-Against-Online-Misogyny.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that online misogyny is a global challenge that fuels gender-based violence (GBV) and technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) while simultaneously harming boys and young men by promoting hypermasculinity and emotional restriction. It identifies algorithmic amplification, influencer economies, and regulatory gaps as key drivers. The brief recommends a coordinated strategy combining 'Safety by Design' in platform architecture, gender-transformative education, community-based interventions in sports and faith spaces, and sustainable funding for long-term behavioural change.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Online misogyny creates a feedback loop that normalises male dominance and control, while exposing boys to digital environments that endorse hypermasculinity and discourage emotional openness or help-seeking.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Misogyny serves as a critical gateway to radicalisation and violent extremism, often overlapping with far-right, religious fundamentalist, and conspiratorial movements through a shared language of grievance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A monetised ecosystem of 'alpha male' influencers exploits boys' insecurities regarding dating and finances to sell unregulated health products, high-risk investment schemes, and 'looksmaxxing' procedures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Safety by Design is presented as a proactive alternative to reactive moderation, where protections are embedded into product lifecycles; examples include AI-powered toxicity filters like Minerva on FACEIT, which reduced toxic messages by 20% in one month.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Educational interventions are most effective when they move beyond risk avoidance toward a three-tiered digital citizenship framework consisting of skills, literacy, and active citizenship.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Community-based and hybrid interventions, particularly those embedded in trusted settings like sports clubs and faith spaces, show greater credibility and sustained behavioural change than one-off initiatives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Gaming ecosystems are high-risk environments where extremist actors use voice chats and forums to radicalise young players, but they also offer opportunities for pro-social design and 'gamifying' civility.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant global gap in the underrepresentation of women in the technology and AI sectors, which increases the risk that these systems will perpetuate gender stereotypes and harmful biases.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regulatory frameworks like the EU Digital Services Act, the UK Online Safety Act, and Australia's Online Safety Act are shifting toward systemic risk assessment, though enforcement and cross-border alignment remain uneven.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000087#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Australia","United Kingdom","European Union","Kenya","India","Philippines","South Africa","Brazil","Mexico","Sweden","Ethiopia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy brief","landscape review","multi-stakeholder analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000029","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000029","title":"Emerging cross-border dynamics in Ireland’s anti-migrant mobilisation","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2025-07-09","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/emerging-cross-border-dynamics-in-irelands-anti-migrant-mobilisation/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Anti-migrant mobilisation in Ireland has shifted from localised protests to a structured, cross-border movement. This evolution is marked by tactical collaboration between Republic-based nationalist activists and Northern Irish Loyalist networks, overriding historical sectarian divisions. The movement is further amplified by British far-right groups, North American influencers, and Russian-aligned propaganda outlets, which integrate local incidents into global 'Great Replacement' narratives and transnational far-right discourse.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000029#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Anti-migrant activity in Ireland has transitioned from scattered, localised protests in late 2022 to a more organised phase in 2025, characterised by street protests, targeted violence, and coordinated online amplification.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000029#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant shift in the political landscape as ethnonationalist groups in the Republic of Ireland and Loyalist communities in Northern Ireland collaborate, suggesting that shared anti-migrant grievances are overriding historical sectarian and ideological divisions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000029#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Evidence of physical cross-border coordination includes representatives from the 'Coolock Says No' group travelling to Belfast in August 2024, and Northern Irish Loyalists, including former UVF member Mark Sinclair, attending protests in Dublin and Limerick in 2025.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000029#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'Great Replacement' narrative is central to mobilising offline activity on both sides of the border, with protesters framing immigration as an existential threat to their respective communities and Western civilisation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000029#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Domestic mobilisation is amplified by a transnational network, including British far-right figures like Mark Collett and Nick Griffin, and high-profile individuals such as Conor McGregor, who uses his platform to frame immigration as a demographic threat.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000029#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russian-aligned propaganda, such as the account Pravda Ireland, promotes polarising content and 'narrative laundering' to reinforce anti-migrant grievances and sow distrust in public institutions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000029#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite the convergence, some internal friction remains; certain far-right influencers in the Republic of Ireland oppose collaboration with Loyalists because they believe it undermines the goal of island reunification.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000029#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Dublin","Ballymena","Limerick","Belfast","Britain","Southport","Kirkby","Cork","County Donegal","Derry","World"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["social movement analysis","disinformation analysis","cross-border coordination study"]},{"id":"isdglo-000002","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000002","title":"Twenty years on: Assessing the UK Islamist terrorism landscape since 7/7","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2025-07-02","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/twenty-years-on-assessing-the-uk-islamist-terrorism-landscape-since-7-7/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Twenty years after the 7/7 bombings, Islamist extremism remains a significant security threat in the UK, though it has shifted from top-down, group-organised attacks to grassroots, self-initiated actions by loosely connected individuals. The landscape is now characterised by a mix of traditional ideologies and hybridised forms of extremism amplified by social media. While some global movements have transitioned toward nationalist local governance, others, particularly in Africa, are expanding. A critical emerging trend is the radicalisation of minors, with a significant portion of recent terrorism convictions involving children and a rise in Prevent referrals for youth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000002#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Islamist extremism continues to be a primary security concern for UK intelligence, with MI5 reporting that approximately 75 percent of its workload is related to this threat.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000002#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The nature of UK terrorism has evolved from sophisticated, group-led attacks in the early 2000s to grassroots actions by individuals who are often driven by a combination of ideology, personal grievances, and vulnerabilities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000002#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Global Islamist movements have diverged into two primary models: a rejectionist global Jihadist model and an ascendant nationalist model focused on local governance, as seen with the Taliban, Houthis, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000002#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'Axis of Resistance'—including Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis—engages in activities in the UK that blur the line between violent extremism and state-sponsored threats, with 20 Iranian-linked plots foiled since 2022.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000002#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Social media has 'democratised' the terrorist ecosystem, allowing for the use of AI-generated imagery, short-form 'edit videos' on TikTok, and the fusion of extreme-right aesthetics with Islamist ideologies to attract younger audiences.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000002#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a concerning trend of youth radicalisation in the UK; 13 percent of terrorism investigations involved minors as of October 2024, and 40 percent of the 55 children convicted of terrorism offences since 2016 were linked to Islamism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000002#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa has transitioned from a peripheral concern to a growing 'epicentre and incubator' of Islamist terrorism, with al-Qaeda and IS affiliates expanding their control and causing mass civilian casualties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000002#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["World","Syria","Iraq","Tunisia","Egypt","Afghanistan","Iran","Israel","Palestine","Lebanon","Africa"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["trend analysis","security assessment"]},{"id":"isdglo-000007","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000007","title":"“Get them out, keep them out”: How social media fuelled violent attacks against migrants in Northern Ireland","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2025-06-20","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/get-them-out-keep-them-out-how-social-media-fuelled-violent-attacks-against-migrants-in-northern-ireland/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"In June 2025, Northern Ireland experienced eight nights of violent unrest, centered in Ballymena, targeting Roma and Romanian migrants following an alleged sexual assault. Social media platforms, particularly Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube, were used to spread hate speech, doxx the locations of families seeking shelter, and livestream violence for profit. The report argues that platforms failed to mitigate these risks in real-time, potentially violating the UK's Online Safety Act (OSA), and calls for a coordinated government response to bridge online and offline risk monitoring.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000007#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Violent unrest in Northern Ireland in June 2025, primarily centered in Ballymena, was triggered by the charging of two Romanian teenagers for an alleged sexual assault. A coalition of Northern Irish Loyalists, anti-migrant nationalists from the Republic of Ireland, and international far-right actors used social media to incite hatred and violence specifically against Roma and Romanian communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000007#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Facebook was used extensively for the coordination of violence and doxxing. The 'Ballymena Reaction Group' page encouraged attacks on Roma homes, provided instructions on how to identify them, and shared the addresses of individuals. This online activity directly preceded physical attacks, including the burning of the Larne Leisure Centre after the location of displaced families was shared online.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000007#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"TikTok and YouTube were used to broadcast the riots via livestreams, which reached hundreds of thousands of views. Some users monetized this violence through TikTok's 'Gifts' feature, while YouTube broadcasts by former members of the Ulster Volunteer Force promoted hate against migrants and Muslims.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000007#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report asserts that social media platforms failed to meet their legal obligations under the UK's Online Safety Act (OSA), specifically sections 9, 10, 26, and 27, which require platforms to assess, mitigate, and swiftly remove illegal content that incites violence. The author notes that content was often removed only days after the violence had already occurred.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000007#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United Kingdom","Ireland","Dublin","Southport","Belfast","Larne","Great Britain","Romania"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","incident report"]},{"id":"isdglo-000045","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000045","title":"Stolen voices: Russia-aligned operation manipulates audio and images to impersonate experts","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2025-05-06","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/stolen-voices-russia-aligned-operation-manipulates-audio-and-images-to-impersonate-experts/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Operation Overload is a high-volume Russian influence campaign that impersonates over 80 organisations, including media outlets and universities, to sow division in democratic nations. In early 2025, it targeted 10 countries—primarily Germany, France, and Ukraine—using AI-cloned voices and forged logos to spread narratives against Ukraine and destabilise domestic politics. While most content had limited organic reach, one video claiming USAID paid celebrities to visit Ukraine garnered over 4.2 million views. The operation relies on bot networks and commercial services to amplify its content and frequently tags research organisations to distract them with debunking requests.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000045#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Between January and March 2025, Operation Overload impersonated more than 80 different organisations across 135 pieces of content, with over 75% of these being media outlets, universities, or law enforcement agencies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000045#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The operation targeted 10 countries, with a primary focus on Germany, France, and Ukraine, using 10 different languages to undermine NATO support for Ukraine and disrupt domestic politics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000045#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The campaign utilised AI technology to clone the voices of experts, with academics being targeted for voice replication approximately four times more often than individuals from other sectors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000045#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Most content saw limited organic engagement and relied on bot networks, except for one viral video claiming USAID funded celebrity trips to Ukraine, which received over 4.2 million views.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000045#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Germany, the operation attempted to suppress turnout for the February 23 election by spreading fake terror threats attributed to intelligence agencies including the BND, CIA, MI6, and Mossad.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000045#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The operation used the branding of 28 different media outlets, with Deutsche Welle (DW) being the most imitated, appearing in 15 different videos.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000045#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Operation Overload employs commercial services to facilitate its activities, including purchasing X accounts from a company called WebMasterMarket.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000045#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Germany","France","Ukraine","Canada","Denmark","Italy","Poland","Spain","United Kingdom","United States","California"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["investigation","monitoring"]}]}