{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"organization":["Institute for Security Studies"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":1466,"relation":"eq"},"page":29,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=institute-for-security-studies&page=29","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=institute-for-security-studies&page=30","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"issafri-001619","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001619","title":"Sustaining peace in practice","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief114-2.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the transitions from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone, arguing that while both countries have shown resilience, UN transitions often fail to address the root causes of conflict. It highlights the importance of local ownership, the role of regional organizations like ECOWAS, and the need for sustained capacity building for civil society and governance reforms to ensure long-term stability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001619#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The UN's transition processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone are criticized for failing to resolve the underlying drivers of conflict or reduce reliance on foreign aid.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001619#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Liberian Peacebuilding Plan is cited as a model for UN transitions due to its strategic approach, stakeholder consensus, and focus on national ownership, though its long-term success depends on short-term achievements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001619#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Liberia, critical unresolved issues include a lack of transparency in government spending, unimplemented Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommendations, and the need for constitutional and land reforms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001619#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Sierra Leone faces significant challenges to sustaining peace, including high levels of corruption, a shrinking space for civil society, and political instability surrounding the March 2018 elections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001619#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional organizations, particularly ECOWAS, are essential for long-term peace through capacity development in governance and infrastructure, yet they are underutilized by international donors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001619#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document recommends scaling down high-level government salaries in Liberia and Sierra Leone to reduce corruption incentives and move away from expensive, donor-dependent state systems.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001619#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["The Gambia","Botswana","Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","policy analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002630","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002630","title":"Arresting corruption in Africa: Role of the youth","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb119.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the pervasive impact of corruption on African youth, who are identified as both primary victims and increasingly as perpetrators. It highlights how corruption fuels instability, conflict, and migration, while arguing that current youth engagement in anti-corruption efforts is superficial. The brief recommends structural changes, including amending the AU Advisory Board on Corruption's membership and implementing access to information laws, to ensure youth are active partners in designing and driving anti-corruption initiatives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002630#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Corruption severely undermines development, governance, and democracy in Africa, with young people—defined by the African Youth Charter as those aged 15 to 35—being the most exposed as students, voters, workers, and customers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002630#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a causal link between corruption and state instability; it can trigger large-scale organised violence through the illegitimate use of public resources and impede post-conflict peacebuilding by weakening the legitimacy of public institutions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002630#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"African youth are increasingly tolerating and condoning corruption, with some viewing government positions as an easy way to make money. In East Africa, surveys show 58% of youth in Tanzania believe the method of making money is irrelevant if one avoids jail, 55% in Uganda admire those who make money 'by hook or by crook', and 30% in Kenya believe corruption is profitable.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002630#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Institutionalised corruption acts as a push factor for the dangerous migration of young people from and within Africa, and these migrants often face further demands for bribes along their routes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002630#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Current youth participation in anti-corruption efforts is described as limited and superficial, often consisting of one-off discussions that do not influence core structural policy decisions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002630#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The AU Advisory Board on Corruption (AU-ABC) lacks youth representation; none of its 10 members fall within the AU's youth age bracket of 15 to 35.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002630#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["governance","human rights","climate migration"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Zimbabwe","Kenya","Tanzania","Uganda","Democratic Republic of the Congo","South Sudan","Central African Republic","Nigeria","Mauritius","Tunisia","Botswana","Senegal","Morocco"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","socio-economic assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-002631","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002631","title":"Global Compact for Migration: Enhancing African migration governance","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb120.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) provides a framework to counter biased narratives that depict African migration as primarily a crisis of people fleeing to Europe, whereas over 80% of African migration is intra-continental. It emphasizes the need for integrated data systems to inform policy, though it notes challenges such as differing legal systems and the sensitivity of security data. The author recommends that African states develop national implementation roadmaps using a 'whole-of-government' approach, citing Kenya's National Coordination Mechanism as a best practice.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002631#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The GCM is critical for correcting the biased mainstream narrative that African migration is primarily composed of desperate people attempting to reach Europe, when in reality, more than 80% of African migration is intra-continental.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002631#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Establishing integrated information and data exchange systems between African countries is hindered by diverse languages, legal systems, and varying levels of socio-economic and technological development, as well as the tendency of security services to treat migration data as intelligence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002631#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"African countries lack sufficient systems to capture data on all migrant categories, and data on irregular migrants is particularly rare.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002631#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The political will for African governments to implement the GCM depends on whether they are convinced of the compact's dividends, particularly in areas of economic, peace, and security benefits.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002631#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Kenya's National Coordination Mechanism (NCM), part of an IGAD initiative, serves as a best practice for a holistic and consultative process to review national migration policy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002631#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Kenya","Europe","United States","Hungary","Austria","Morocco"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","recommendations"]},{"id":"issafri-002668","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002668","title":"Promises and challenges of Ethiopia’s refugee policy reform","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief118.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Ethiopia is piloting the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) to move away from a camp-based refugee model toward socio-economic integration. While the reform promises expanded access to work permits, education, and civil documentation, it faces significant hurdles including low industrial wages, coordination gaps between government agencies, and ethnic tensions in regions like Gambella. The document recommends a conflict-sensitive approach, a national minimum wage, and increased start-up capital for refugee entrepreneurs to ensure sustainable self-reliance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002668#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) aims to shift Ethiopia's refugee policy from a camp-based model to one that expands socio-economic opportunities, including wage-earning employment, education, and local integration for refugees in protracted situations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002668#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ethiopia has made specific pledges under the CRRF to provide work permits, earmark 30% of jobs in new industrial parks for refugees, grant access to irrigable land, and expand the Out-of-Camp Policy (OCP) to 10% of all refugees.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002668#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The effectiveness of industrial parks in fostering self-reliance is threatened by extremely low wages; for example, workers in Hawassa and Bole Lemi parks earn approximately 900 birr (US$32) per month, which may be less than the humanitarian aid refugees currently receive.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002668#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Implementation of the CRRF faces severe conflict sensitivities in the Gambella regional state, where the influx of ethnic-Nuer refugees has created tensions with the Anuak population over land, resources, and demographic balance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002668#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant gap in public outreach and coordination; host community consultations have been insufficient, and the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) lacks experience in managing development-focused initiatives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002668#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The CRRF provides the Ethiopian government with increased access to international finance, including a US$202 million pledge from the World Bank, €20 million from the EU, and £80 million from DFID.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002668#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Gambela Region","Somali regional state","South Sudan","Somalia","Eritrea","Benishangul-Gumuz Region","Italy","Canada"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","implementation analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002730","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002730","title":"SACQ","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sacq66.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the systemic failures of the South African criminal justice system through the lens of decolonisation. It argues that current bail practices—specifically the insistence on verified addresses and cash payments—effectively criminalise poverty and maintain colonial-era structures of domination. The report also documents severe human rights violations at the Lindela Repatriation Centre, where undocumented migrants are treated as 'bare life' in a 'state of exception'. Through interviews and legal analysis, the text highlights a gap between constitutional ideals and the lived experiences of activists and migrants, suggesting that true decolonisation requires a fundamental rethinking of the purpose of prisons rather than mere institutional reform.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002730#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The practice of requiring a verified residential address for bail is widespread and unfairly prejudices the poor and homeless, often leading to pre-trial incarceration periods that exceed eventual sentences.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002730#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The South African bail system often functions as a 'penalty for poverty' because judicial officers frequently fail to conduct mandatory inquiries into an accused person's ability to pay cash bail, leading to the detention of the indigent while the wealthy remain free.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002730#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Undocumented migrants at the Lindela Repatriation Centre experience systemic human rights violations, including physical torture, sexual abuse of women by staff, and appalling living conditions where detainees are treated as 'animals'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002730#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Lindela Repatriation Centre operates as a 'state of exception' where the law is suspended for undocumented migrants, who are treated as 'bare life' and subjected to 'xenophobic biopower'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002730#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Corruption is prevalent at the Lindela Repatriation Centre, with reports of staff and Home Affairs officials taking bribes to grant freedom to detainees.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002730#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Community activists, student activists, and migrants often rationalise their experiences of injustice in ways that unintentionally reinforce the legitimacy and hegemony of the legal system.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002730#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Decolonising the South African prison system requires more than institutional 'tinkering'; it necessitates a complete rethinking of the purpose of incarceration and a shift toward restorative justice based on African value systems.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002730#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Lindela Repatriation Centre","Cape Town","Gauteng"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["socio-legal analysis","qualitative content analysis","human rights assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-000984","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000984","title":"South Africa’s prospects under Cyril Ramaphosa","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-12-20","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-01-12-hsf-report-ramaphosa.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes the aftermath of the ANC's 54th national conference, where Cyril Ramaphosa narrowly defeated Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. It argues that while Ramaphosa's victory averted a major crisis, the party remains deeply divided between 'reformists' and 'traditionalists,' placing South Africa in a 'muddling along' scenario. Key challenges include the potential recall of Jacob Zuma, avoiding a credit rating downgrade by Moody's, and managing the Tripartite Alliance. The author predicts the ANC will retain national power in 2019 but may lose its majority in Gauteng province, with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) emerging as a potential kingmaker there.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000984#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The ANC remains sharply divided following the 54th national conference, with the National Executive Committee (NEC) split between reformist and traditionalist factions, leading to a 'muddling along' scenario for the country.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000984#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The recall of Jacob Zuma is viewed as a critical necessity to prevent further deterioration of South Africa's long-term local currency debt ratings and to limit the gains of opposition parties in the 2019 elections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000984#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic growth targets, including a 5% target by 2023, are contingent on avoiding a junk status downgrade by Moody's; otherwise, growth is forecasted to average only 2.5% from 2018 to 2034.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000984#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"For the 2019 elections, the ANC is projected to retain its national majority with approximately 53% of the vote, but it faces a high risk of losing its majority in Gauteng, where the EFF could become a kingmaker.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000984#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The ANC decided to pursue the expropriation of land without compensation by amending section 25 of the constitution, provided it does not harm food security or the economy, and intends to reduce the authority of traditional leaders over communal land.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000984#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Africa's foreign policy is expected to remain focused on South-South solidarity and anti-imperialism, though Ramaphosa may introduce a more nuanced approach to trade and investment to unlock capital from the EU.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000984#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["nuclear power","economic growth","trade policy"],"geography_discussed":["Gauteng","Western Cape","Free State","KwaZulu-Natal","European Union","People's Republic of China"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["political risk analysis","economic forecasting"]},{"id":"issafri-000398","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000398","title":"Creating conditions conducive to stability in Guinea-Bissau","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2017-12-13","source_url":"https://issafrica.org/iss-today/creating-conditions-conducive-to-stability-in-guinea-bissau","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The document assesses the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau following the failure to implement the Conakry Agreement. It argues that the appointment of Prime Minister Umaro Sissoco Embaló, contrary to the agreement, has aggravated tensions and created a stalemate in the National Assembly. The authors contend that organizing the 2018 legislative elections without resolving this crisis is risky, as it could further polarize the political class and lead to contested results. They recommend a new round of inclusive consultations led by a firm ECOWAS, the establishment of a technocratic government, and the implementation of constitutional and electoral reforms before any elections take place.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000398#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The primary obstacle to implementing the Conakry Agreement is the appointment of Prime Minister Umaro Sissoco Embaló instead of Augusto Olivais, a decision that deviated from the agreed terms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000398#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Holding legislative elections in 2018 before resolving the political crisis is likely to increase political polarization and lead to the contesting of election results.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000398#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The opposition, specifically the Collective of Democratic Opposition Parties of Guinea-Bissau (comprising 18 parties), rejects any elections organized by the Sissoco government, which they view as illegitimate.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000398#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The political stalemate in the National Assembly threatens the National Electoral Commission (NEC) because the NEC relies on the Assembly for its budget and the appointment of its leadership.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000398#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Guinea-Bissau's chronic instability is driven by weaknesses in its institutional architecture, specifically vague constitutional provisions regarding the semi-presidential system.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000398#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a broad consensus among political and civil society actors on the need to revise the constitution and the electoral framework, including changes suggested by a post-2014 NEC report.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000398#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors propose a transition to a government composed of competent, apolitical technocrats and suggest potentially coupling the legislative and presidential elections in 2019 to allow more time for priority reforms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000398#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Bissau","Conakry","Monrovia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"issafri-002058","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002058","title":"DÉBY’S CHAD","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-12-15-peaceworks-chad-brief.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes the longevity of President Idriss Déby's regime in Chad, highlighting his use of 'armed diplomacy' and military interventions in Mali, CAR, and against Boko Haram to secure international political capital and support from France and the US. It details a domestic system based on ethnic patronage, rigged elections, and repression, while warning that the lack of a clear succession plan, combined with a severe economic crisis driven by falling oil prices and corruption, threatens future stability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"President Idriss Déby has maintained power for twenty-seven years through a combination of controlling the armed forces, revising the constitution, rigging elections, and using a divide-and-rule strategy to co-opt or repress opponents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Chad has utilized 'armed diplomacy,' leveraging its military capabilities in regional interventions to gain global political capital and ensure that international partners overlook its democratic deficiencies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The regime relies heavily on ethnic patronage, concentrating political, military, and economic power within the Beri ethnic group, specifically the Bideyat subgroup and the president's own Kolyala clan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Chad's economy has been severely destabilized by a collapse in global oil prices, which saw oil revenues decline by 90 percent between 2011 and 2015, exacerbating poverty and triggering social unrest.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report identifies a critical risk of instability due to the absence of a formal succession plan for the aging and reportedly ill president, with potential scenarios including a dynasty, a return of exiled rivals, or a southern president.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Chad's military interventions in the Central African Republic (CAR) have been controversial and destabilizing, involving the support of various rebel factions and allegations of violence against civilians.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Chad plays a leading role in the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram, though the group has responded with retaliatory attacks inside Chad, including suicide bombings in N'Djamena.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The relationship between Chad and Sudan has shifted from a proxy war (2005-2010) to a sustained rapprochement, where both governments now cooperate to marginalize their respective rebel groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"France and the United States prioritize Chad as a counterterrorism partner in the Sahel, often ignoring the regime's human rights abuses to maintain military cooperation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002058#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Central African Republic","Sudan","Libya","Mali","Nigeria","France","United States","Niger"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["political analysis","security assessment","economic analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002248","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002248","title":"Impact of EU funding dynamics on AMISOM","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear16.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes the ramifications of the EU's January 2016 decision to reduce AMISOM peacekeeper allowances by 20%, from US$1,028 to US$822 per month. This move triggered a rift between the African Union (AU), troop-contributing countries (TCCs), and donors, while accelerating the development of a concrete exit strategy for the mission. The EU's decision was driven by donor fatigue, shifting priorities toward the Sahel region, and internal regulations regarding the use of the African Peace Facility. TCCs, particularly Uganda and Kenya, initially threatened withdrawal, though national security interests and the desire for regional stability largely prevailed. The report highlights a critical gap between donor expectations for AMISOM to 'do more' against al-Shabaab and the TCCs' claims of severe under-resourcing and a lack of local Somali security capacity to hold liberated territory.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In January 2016, the European Union implemented a 20% reduction in monthly peacekeeper allowances for AMISOM, lowering the rate from US$1,028 to US$822.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU's decision to cap funding was influenced by 'donor fatigue' and a shift in priorities toward other African crises, such as the G5 Sahel mission and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The funding rift accelerated the creation of a formal exit strategy, with a tentative plan for a drawdown starting in October 2018 and a full pullout by 2020.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Troop-contributing countries (TCCs)—Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda—reacted negatively to the cap, with Uganda initially stating it would abandon the mission by December 2017.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ethiopia conducted several troop withdrawals from towns in Bakool, Hiiraan, and Galgaduud between October 2016 and March 2017, which resulted in al-Shabaab immediately retaking those areas.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant disconnect between donors, who perceive AMISOM as stagnant, and TCCs, who argue that a lack of force multipliers and equipment, such as attack helicopters and serviceable armoured personnel carriers, hinders progress.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The stability of Somalia is heavily dependent on the development of the Somali National Army (SNA), but progress is stalled by clan-based structures, uncoordinated training, and irregular payments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU's use of the African Peace Facility (APF) for peacekeeping is contentious because the funds originate from the European Development Fund, which is intended for development initiatives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Burundi's participation in AMISOM was uniquely strained when EU sanctions over President Pierre Nkurunziza's third term prevented direct payments to the government, leading to a near-withdrawal in January 2017.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002248#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["European Union","Burundi","Djibouti","Ethiopia","Kenya","Uganda","Sahel"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","financial analysis","security assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-002438","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002438","title":"The anti-human smuggling business and Libya’s political end game","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/nar2.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report argues that the decline in migrant arrivals from Libya in late 2017 resulted from the co-option of smuggling militias by international donors, primarily Italy. This 'anti-smuggling business' allows militia leaders to launder their reputations to avoid international sanctions and position themselves for a future political settlement. However, the authors contend that this strategy creates instability, as seen in the violent conflict in Sabratha, and risks worsening the abuse of migrants. The report advocates for a 'stability first' approach focused on genuine disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) rather than indiscriminate partnerships with armed groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002438#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The dramatic reduction in migrant arrivals in the Central Mediterranean during the second half of 2017 is attributed to the co-option of militias previously involved in human smuggling, encouraged by Italy's 'cash-for-migration-control' strategy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002438#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Militia leaders are transitioning from smuggling to anti-smuggling activities to 'launder' their reputations and avoid liabilities such as International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments or asset seizures as Libya approaches a potential political settlement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002438#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Italy's strategy involved a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA) in February 2017, providing training, equipment, and development aid in exchange for improved border security and migration control.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002438#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The co-option of specific militias has triggered violent local conflicts, exemplified by the battle for Sabratha in September and October 2017, where the al-Wadi Battalion fought the Anas al-Dabbashi Battalion, resulting in over 40 deaths and the displacement of more than 15,000 people.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002438#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The human smuggling industry in Libya is deeply interdependent with other illicit trades, particularly fuel smuggling, which remains the most lucrative financial backbone of the west coast's illicit economy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002438#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report argues that co-opting militias is not equivalent to genuine disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), as it legitimises warlords while allowing them to retain their organisational structures and stakes in the illicit economy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002438#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors suggest that the focus on stemming migration flows may inadvertently increase the abuse of migrants, as smugglers may find alternative ways to monetise migrants through forced labour and extortion in detention centres.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002438#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report recommends a 'stability first' doctrine where the UN leads the political process and international actors focus on security sector reform and the fight against fuel smuggling to gain domestic legitimacy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002438#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Italy","Sabratha","Zawiya","Zuwara","Niger","Turkey"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","security assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-001042","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001042","title":"Looking for a home","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report by the Institute for Security Studies examines the African Union's (AU) use of mediation as a conflict-prevention tool. It analyzes the institutional gaps, the tension between formal and informal approaches, and the need for a more structured, long-term strategy to address the root causes of conflict in Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001042#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The African Union lacks a standardized definition of mediation, leading to a reliance on informal approaches to avoid political sensitivities and bypass the need for formal mandates from disputing parties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001042#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"AU mediation is primarily operational, focusing on immediate causes of conflict, while structural prevention—which addresses root causes like governance and economic development—remains largely at the policy level without practical implementation steps.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001042#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The AU utilizes four distinct categories of mediators: Special Envoys, High Representatives of the Chairperson, Special Representatives of the Chairperson, and High Level Ad Hoc Committees, though their roles and mandates are often interchangeable.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001042#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Internal coordination is hindered by 'turf battles' and blurred lines of responsibility between different AU divisions, specifically the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning (CPEW) and the Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CMPCRD) divisions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001042#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The AU faces coordination challenges with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) due to differing interpretations of the principle of subsidiarity, leading to conflicting mediation approaches in countries such as Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau, and Burundi.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001042#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The Mediation Support Unit (MSU), established in 2016 to provide systematic technical and logistical support, remained unstaffed and without defined practical approaches as of November 2017 due to internal bureaucratic debates.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001042#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"AU mediation funding is unpredictable due to a heavy reliance on voluntary bilateral donors; a proposed 0.2% levy on imports from outside Africa to revitalize the AU Peace Fund could provide more sustainable funding for preventive diplomacy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001042#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"To improve effectiveness, the AU must move away from 'quick-fix' solutions and increase inclusivity by bringing women and civil society organizations to the negotiation table to address long-term structural causes of conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001042#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Burundi","South Sudan","Sudan","Somalia","Comoros","Central African Republic","Ghana","Ivory Coast","Libya","Mozambique","Zimbabwe","The Gambia","Liberia","Guinea-Bissau","Madagascar","Burkina Faso","Democratic Republic of the Congo"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["institutional assessment","policy analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-001085","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001085","title":"Gathering storm clouds","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/car11.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the 'gathering storm clouds' of political and economic uncertainty in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) region. It argues that a combination of commodity price collapses, neo-patrimonial governance, and rapid population growth is creating a volatile environment. The analysis highlights a critical gap between population growth and the provision of basic services, alongside a history of 'pseudo-democratic' regimes that resist genuine political transition. The authors warn that without strategic diversification of economies and significant investment in human capital, the region's large youth population could become a catalyst for further instability and violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001085#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The CEMAC region is characterized by neo-patrimonial governance systems that prioritize the survival of a small political elite over collective human development, resulting in some of the lowest governance scores in Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001085#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic instability in the region is driven by a heavy reliance on primary commodities, particularly energy, which exposes these states to the 'resource curse' and vulnerability to price shocks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001085#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Rapid population growth is forecast to outpace the delivery of basic services, leading to an increase in the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty and without access to water or sanitation by 2040.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001085#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The region faces a significant 'youth bulge', with a working-age population forecast to grow by 25.6 million by 2040; without investment in education and jobs, this demographic is viewed as a potential driver of instability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001085#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Political transitions in the region are highly unpredictable and often violent, as regimes have adopted the outward appearance of democracy while maintaining authoritarian control.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001085#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Security is threatened by both internal political violence and cross-border non-state armed groups, including Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and various militias in the Central African Republic.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001085#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite being a productive agricultural region, CEMAC remains dependent on food imports, a vulnerability that is expected to increase by 2040 due to population growth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001085#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["agricultural productivity","food security","climate change","blue economy","biodiversity"],"geography_discussed":["West African Economic and Monetary Union","Chad Basin","Gulf of Guinea","Libya","South Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["long-term forecasting","comparative regional analysis","socio-economic assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-001765","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001765","title":"Back to the Future","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar12.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report by the Institute for Security Studies analyses the 2013 Zimbabwean general election to challenge the 'legitimating narrative' that President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF won due to an expanded social base and popular policies. The author argues that the victory was instead secured through the capture of state institutions, systemic electoral fraud, and the use of violence and intimidation, suggesting that the electoral terrain for the 2018 polls remains fundamentally undemocratic.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001765#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The report argues that ZANU-PF's electoral victories are not the result of increased popularity but are secured through the 'conflation of party and government' and the subsequent control of all state institutions. This allows the party to abuse state resources, monopolise electronic media, and use the criminal justice system to suppress opposition rallies and intimidate supporters.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001765#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The author challenges the 'legitimating narrative'—promoted by ZANU-PF and some academics—which claims the 2013 landslide victory was due to 'people friendly' policies and an expanded social base. The report asserts this claim lacks empirical backing and serves as a quest for legitimacy ahead of the 2018 elections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001765#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The 'indigenisation and economic empowerment' policy, used as a central campaign pillar in 2013, is described as a facade. The report claims the government and companies 'pretended' to indigenise, with no tangible benefits for most voters and the policy instead being used for 'racketeering by regulation' and extortion of foreign companies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001765#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The report disputes the claim that ZANU-PF expanded its support among artisanal gold miners and vendors. It notes that the government previously jailed approximately 25,000 panners and dealers under Operation Chikorokoza Chapera and used the sector for political disciplining and rent-seeking.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001765#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Analysis of opinion polls suggests substantial electoral fraud in 2013. While Afrobarometer data predicted a close race (a 6 percentage point lead for ZANU-PF), the actual result was a massive 27 percentage point lead for Mugabe. The discrepancy was most extreme in Masvingo, where the predicted lead for the MDC-T turned into a 43 percentage point lead for ZANU-PF.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001765#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The report identifies a glaring statistical anomaly: Robert Mugabe obtained approximately 1.03 million more votes in 2013 than in March 2008, while Morgan Tsvangirai's vote remained virtually unchanged. The author argues this increase cannot be explained by new voter registrations alone, as roughly 407,281 votes remain unexplained.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001765#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The report highlights a history of extreme state violence used to maintain control, including the Gukurahundi ethnic cleansing (1983-1987) where an estimated 20,000 civilians were killed, and the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina, which evicted approximately 700,000 people from their homes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001765#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The author concludes that Zimbabwe is an 'electoral authoritarian regime' where outcomes are predetermined by the capture of state institutions. He predicts that the electoral terrain for 2018 will be little different from 2013 unless there is dramatic institutional reform.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001765#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Matabeleland","Midlands Province","Masvingo Province","Manicaland Province","Harare","Bulawayo","Mount Pleasant","Mbare Township"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["political_analysis","electoral_analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002378","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002378","title":"Violent extremism in Kenya","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono197.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that while Kenyan women are rarely direct perpetrators of violent acts, they provide critical 'invisible infrastructure' for al-Shabaab through recruiting, intelligence gathering, and logistics. Involvement is driven by a complex interplay of poverty, socio-political marginalisation, and personal relationships. The study highlights severe impacts on women, including sexual violence in camps and psychological trauma from terror attacks and heavy-handed counter-terrorism (CT) operations. Current P/CVE responses are criticised for being gender-neutral and overly securitised, leading to mistrust between the state and affected communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Women in Kenya primarily occupy non-combative, supportive roles for violent extremist organisations, acting as an 'invisible infrastructure' by recruiting, gathering intelligence, facilitating funding, and providing food, shelter, and medical care.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is limited evidence of women acting as direct perpetrators of violent extremism in Kenya, with many respondents viewing such acts as 'mambo ya vijana' (issues of male youth).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic hardship is a primary driver of women's involvement, with al-Shabaab exploiting poverty and unemployment by promising jobs and money to vulnerable individuals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Personal relationships, including kinship and romantic ties, are significant predictors of involvement; women often join extremist groups to follow husbands or partners to Somalia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Women and girls in al-Shabaab camps face severe human rights violations, including forced marriage, physical abuse, and systemic sexual violence, with some returnees reporting contracting HIV.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Kenyan government's 'hard security' approach to counter-terrorism has fostered deep mistrust and resentment in affected communities, which may inadvertently increase radicalisation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Women in affected communities report being profiled, harassed, and subjected to invasive searches by security forces, particularly those wearing the buibui.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Violent extremism causes severe psychological trauma and social fragmentation, leading to the breakdown of family units and increased tension between Muslim and non-Muslim community members.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Current P/CVE policies and the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism are largely gender-neutral and fail to address the specific needs, roles, and vulnerabilities of women.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant disconnect and lack of coordination between government agencies, international donors, and civil society organisations in implementing P/CVE efforts, leading to the duplication of work and 'research fatigue' among women.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002378#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Somalia","Mombasa","Garissa","Lamu County","Nairobi","Eastleigh","Majengo","Busia County","Kwale County"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["empirical study","qualitative research","policy analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002819","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002819","title":"Building the future: Infrastructure in Nigeria until 2040","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war-21.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Nigeria faces a severe deficit in basic physical infrastructure, particularly in sanitation, water, electricity, and roads, which hinders economic growth and human development. Benchmarked against lower middle-income peers, Nigeria lags significantly, and current trajectories suggest it will miss several Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. The report models several interventions, finding that increasing access to improved sanitation and clean water provides the highest returns for poverty reduction and health outcomes. However, achieving these targets requires overcoming significant challenges in government capacity, funding, and a heavy reliance on oil revenues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Nigeria's infrastructure deficit is a primary obstacle to its economic growth and human development, with the country ranking 132 out of 138 in the World Economic Forum's 2016-17 Global Competitiveness Index.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Access to improved sanitation is the most severe area of deficit; only about 30% of the population had access in 2016, compared to over 50% among global lower middle-income peers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Nigeria's road network is characterized by low density and a lack of paving, with only 16% of roads paved in 2016, while the average for global lower middle-income countries is 50%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While 58% of Nigerians had electricity access in 2016, the supply is unreliable due to a gap between generation capacity and demand, leading 86% of companies to rely on standby generators.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"On its current development trajectory, Nigeria is forecast to miss the Sustainable Development Goal of universal access to safe water by 2030, with over 90 million people expected to lack access by 2040.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Among modeled interventions, increasing access to improved sanitation has the most significant positive impact on GDP growth, poverty reduction, and health outcomes, including a 14% reduction in infant mortality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A combined 'Broad Infrastructure Push' paired with family planning (reducing fertility from 5.4 to 3.3 births) could reduce the number of people in extreme poverty by nearly 14 million by 2040.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Nigeria's infrastructure investment between 2007 and 2017 averaged 3.6% of GDP, which is lower than the African average of 4.3% for the same period.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Funding is a critical challenge as government revenue remains heavily dependent on oil and vulnerable to international market volatility.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002819#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["economic growth","poverty reduction","public–private partnership","hydropower","Sustainable Development Goals"],"geography_discussed":["Lagos","Abuja","India","Indonesia","Pakistan","Africa"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["forecasting","benchmarking","scenario analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002124","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002124","title":"Fertility, growth and the future of aid in sub-Saharan Africa","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-10","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/aitwr-6-2.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report argues that sub-Saharan Africa's inability to reduce poverty is rooted in rapid population growth and high demographic dependency ratios. While aid has provided modest positive impacts on growth and significant improvements in health and education indicators, it remains palliative unless it can sustain inclusive economic growth. The author presents three aid scenarios to 2030 (Current Path, More Aid, and Less Aid) and a fourth scenario focusing on reduced fertility. The analysis concludes that matching Ethiopia's fertility decline would have a significantly more positive impact on poverty rates by 2030 and 2040 than a substantial increase in aid.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Rapid population growth is identified as the primary reason sub-Saharan Africa has been unable to reduce poverty and improve livelihoods, despite receiving significant aid and experiencing recent strong growth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While aid has not consistently triggered macro-level poverty reduction, it has contributed to significant improvements in social indicators, such as reducing the gap in infant mortality between sub-Saharan Africa and the global average from 61 deaths in 1985 to 32 deaths by 2015.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Aid provides a critical fiscal boost to low-income African countries; without it, government revenues in the 27 low-income countries in Africa would be 10% of GDP instead of 21%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Current research suggests aid has a modest positive effect on economic growth, with an average internal rate of return of approximately 10%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The aid landscape has become fragmented and incoherent due to the proliferation of new donors and diverse instruments, which increases the reporting burden on recipients and makes aid more fungible.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a divergence in how different income groups benefit from external flows: low-income countries remain heavily aid-dependent, while middle-income countries increasingly benefit from foreign direct investment (FDI).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report identifies 16 highly aid-dependent countries in sub-Saharan Africa (where aid exceeds 10% of GNI), including Liberia (60%) and Somalia (22%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Comparing aid scenarios to 2030, the 'More Aid' scenario would result in 13 million fewer people living in extreme poverty compared to the 'Less Aid' scenario.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A 'Reduced Fertility' scenario, matching Ethiopia's trajectory, is forecast to be more effective at reducing poverty than the 'More Aid' scenario, with 7 million fewer people in extreme poverty by 2030 and 22 million fewer by 2040.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'demographic window' for economic growth—where 0-14 year-olds are less than 30% and those 65+ are less than 15% of the population—is largely closed in sub-Saharan Africa, where the median age is 19.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002124#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["poverty reduction","economic growth"],"geography_discussed":["Ethiopia","South Korea","Mozambique","Zambia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["forecasting","scenario analysis","macroeconomic analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002247","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002247","title":"High stakes for Somaliland’s presidential elections","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-10","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear15.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes the high stakes of the 2017 Somaliland presidential elections, noting that while the country has a strong democratic record, it faces significant institutional decay and increasing corruption. It highlights the role of clan alliances in determining the outcome between the Kulmiye and Waddani parties and discusses the security risks posed by territorial disputes with Puntland and the rise of al-Shabaab in the region.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002247#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Somaliland's electoral timeline has suffered significant delays, with the November 2017 presidential elections originally scheduled for June 2015. Consequently, all national elected figures have overstayed their constitutional term limits, including members of the Lower House who have served 14 years without election and Guurti members who have not undergone selection since 1997.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002247#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The National Electoral Commission (NEC) implemented a new iris-capture biometric voter registration system to prevent fraud and multiple registration, a first for Africa. This process resulted in 873,331 registered voters, a decrease from the 1,069,914 recorded in 2010, which suggests the new safeguards were effective.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002247#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Clan allegiances remain a primary determinant of electoral outcomes despite the three-party system. The contest is largely seen as a race between the ruling Kulmiye party, supported by a Habar Jeclo-Habar Awal alliance, and the opposition Waddani party, which is attempting to disrupt that alliance by courting the Habar Jeclo and Arab clans.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002247#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Silanyo administration has been criticized for increased corruption, tribalism, and a lack of transparency regarding international agreements. Specifically, the military base and port deals with the UAE were passed through Parliament in a manner decried as unconstitutional, with allegations that cash transfers influenced the votes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002247#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Somaliland's political institutions are experiencing serious decay. The Guurti (Upper House) has seen its role as a neutral arbiter degraded due to a lack of selection processes for over 20 years and the practice of hereditary succession, where approximately 90% of seats have passed to the sons of original members.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002247#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The territorial dispute with Puntland creates security risks for the electoral process in the east. While voter registration expanded to 21 of 23 districts, Puntland has a history of disrupting voting, and violence has occurred during registration and card distribution, including the killing of two people in Las Anod.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002247#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is growing concern over the rise of al-Shabaab and Islamic State-aligned militants in neighboring Puntland. While violence has remained localized, the group's increased capacity for direct confrontation—exemplified by the attack on the Af Urur military base—poses a potential spillover risk to Somaliland.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002247#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UAE deals for the Berbera port and military base have brought unprecedented investment, including a $442 million lease for the port and $250 million for airport and highway development. These agreements have increased the stakes of the election, as the incoming administration will oversee their implementation and potential future earnings.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002247#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Puntland","Somalia","Hargeisa","Berbera","Turkey","Djibouti","Ethiopia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"issafri-002120","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002120","title":"Will limits on free expression prevent terrorism?","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-09","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/aitwr-2.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report argues that limiting free expression and expanding surveillance to combat terrorism is counterproductive, as it erodes democratic values and may exacerbate radicalisation. While traditional media can spread fear through sensationalism, it rarely confers legitimacy on extremist ideologies. Similarly, while the internet facilitates the reinforcement of extremist views, it is not the primary source of radicalisation. The author recommends international norms for internet governance, stricter oversight of surveillance tools, and a shift toward addressing the underlying drivers of extremism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002120#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Traditional media coverage of terrorism generally fails to spread extremist ideology or provide legitimacy to the cause, as the focus remains on the violence of the act rather than the motives, often leading the public to view perpetrators as mentally unstable.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002120#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Sensationalist reporting by traditional media creates a false projection of terrorist power and amplifies public fear, which pressures governments to implement aggressive, securitised responses that shrink civil liberties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002120#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The internet and social media act as tools to reinforce pre-existing extremist beliefs rather than serving as the primary source of radicalisation, which is more deeply rooted in issues of oppression and marginalisation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002120#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The expansion of surveillance powers under the guise of counter-terrorism has led to widespread abuse, including the monitoring of peaceful protesters and the use of tools by oppressive regimes to suppress political opposition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002120#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Mass surveillance and the fear of being monitored lead to self-censorship among the general public and journalists, which stifles the free thought and open discourse necessary for a functioning democracy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002120#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Freedom of expression and a free media can actively counter violent extremism by promoting tolerance, facilitating peaceful dispute resolution, and exposing the hypocrisy of extremist narratives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002120#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["human rights"],"geography_discussed":["Tunisia","United States","Russia","Turkey","Egypt","Canada","Mexico","United Kingdom","Argentina"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","sociological analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002121","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002121","title":"How human rights and the rule of law can address terrorism","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-09","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/aitwr-3.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The report contends that securitised counter-terrorism efforts often violate human rights, perpetuating cycles of violence. It advocates for a shift toward criminal justice frameworks rooted in democratic values, emphasizing that functionality and accountability must be developed in tandem to avoid increasing risks to rights. The author calls for evidence-based methodologies, the meaningful inclusion of civil society in policymaking, and caution regarding 'Preventing Violent Extremism' (PVE) initiatives that may criminalise lawful behavior or ignore structural governance issues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002121#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Current global counter-terrorism strategies rely heavily on militarised force, which often results in human rights abuses and fails to provide long-term solutions, potentially facilitating further violent extremism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002121#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Sustainable solutions require a shift toward criminal justice-based approaches that ensure suspects are processed through public proceedings with due process, though this requires national regimes to possess both political will and operational capacity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002121#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a critical need to balance the strengthening of criminal justice capacity with accountability; increasing the technical ability of agencies to prosecute without equal focus on oversight increases the risk of rights violations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002121#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Capacity-building efforts in counter-terrorism often suffer from methodological weaknesses, such as a reliance on one-off training by external experts and a lack of attention to institutional culture or local ownership.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002121#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The lack of universally accepted definitions for 'terrorism' and 'violent extremism' creates significant risks, as vague terms can be abused to criminalise lawful actions or target political opponents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002121#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) initiatives often focus too narrowly on community-level interventions and youth, neglecting the structural governance problems that contribute to extremism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002121#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Civil society organisations (CSOs) are frequently undervalued as mere implementers of state goals rather than essential political partners in the design and oversight of counter-terrorism policy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002121#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Kenya","Uganda","South Africa","Nigeria","Australia","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"issafri-002122","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002122","title":"How ethnic and religious discrimination drive violent extremism","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-09","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/aitwr-4.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report argues that discriminatory state practices, often driven by a focus on state security over human security, are counterproductive to countering violent extremism. It examines how 'othering' specific religious or ethnic groups—particularly Muslims and certain African ethnic communities—creates grievances that extremist groups exploit for recruitment. The authors advocate for a 'whole of society' approach that prioritises the rule of law, human rights, and socio-economic drivers over identity-based risk assessments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002122#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"State responses to terrorism often fail because they employ strategies that alienate the communities they intend to help through religious or ethnic discrimination, prioritising state security over human security.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002122#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'othering' of Muslims by law enforcement and security agencies—including surveillance of mosques and the use of 'risk community' labels—erodes communal trust, which is essential for effective counter-terrorism measures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002122#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Extrajudicial abuse, torture, and humiliation by state security forces serve as powerful recruitment tools for violent extremist groups, who use these actions in propaganda to justify their cause.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002122#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ethnic marginalisation, often a legacy of colonial and post-independence governance, creates socio-economic grievances—such as unemployment and lack of services—that drive individuals toward violent extremism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002122#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Identity factors like religion and ethnicity are often less significant drivers of radicalisation than socio-economic, political, or individual frustrations, yet states continue to rely on them for risk assessment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002122#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Effective preventing violent extremism (PVE) requires a 'whole of society' approach involving civil society and local communities to ensure transparency, ownership, and adherence to human rights.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002122#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["human rights","civil society"],"geography_discussed":["Kenya","Nigeria","Myanmar","United States","United Kingdom","Australia","Denmark","Rwanda","Egypt","France","Netherlands","Uganda","Somalia","Iraq"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","human rights assessment"]}]}