{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"organization":["Institute for Security Studies"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":1466,"relation":"eq"},"page":27,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=institute-for-security-studies&page=27","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?organization=institute-for-security-studies&page=28","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"issafri-002820","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002820","title":"Counter-terrorism, human rights and the rule of law in West Africa","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-04","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war-24.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines how West African nations, particularly Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, have prioritised military and securitised responses to terrorism over rule-of-law frameworks. This shift has led to widespread human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary detention, often facilitated by emergency legislation and a lack of judicial oversight. The author argues that such approaches may fuel further radicalisation and recommends long-term criminal justice reform, the strengthening of civilian oversight, and the alignment of counter-terrorism efforts with international human rights standards to achieve sustainable peace and development.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002820#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"West African countries facing the highest terrorism threats—Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria—have predominantly adopted a securitised approach to counter-terrorism, which has undermined the rule of law and human rights protections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002820#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Securitised responses have led to the implementation of legislation that normalises emergency measures, including extended pre-trial detention and the use of military tribunals for civilians.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002820#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"State security forces in the region have been accused of severe human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions, torture, and enforced disappearances, often with widespread impunity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002820#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The use of force and securitised measures can create a vicious cycle where state violence contributes to the radicalisation of local communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002820#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Criminal justice systems in West Africa are fragile and struggle with endemic corruption, lack of resources, and political interference, making them unable to effectively handle the complexity of terrorism cases.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002820#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While specialised counter-terrorism units are recommended globally, in West Africa they risk creating a 'parallel' system that diverts resources from and weakens the ordinary civilian judiciary.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002820#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A sustainable solution requires a tripartite approach that links counter-terrorism objectives with the rule of law, human rights, and the broader development agenda.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002820#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Burkina Faso","Ivory Coast","Mali","Niger","Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","human rights assessment","case study"]},{"id":"issafri-001158","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001158","title":"Sudan and South Sudan: Violence trajectories after peace agreements","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-22.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"This report by the Institute for Security Studies analyzes the trajectories of political violence in Sudan and South Sudan following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). Using ACLED and UCDP GED data, it examines whether these agreements resolved, reshaped, or perpetuated violence, concluding that while the CPA ended a long civil war, it left other conflict systems unaddressed and reinforced a pattern of state-led political violence. In South Sudan, the ARCSS is described as having failed due to poor implementation and a 'winner-takes-all' political framework that incentivized continued violent competition for power.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Sudan and South Sudan are among the African countries with the highest number of conflict fatalities between 2011 and 2017, despite the implementation of ambitious peace interventions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan led to a dramatic decline in armed conflict and fatalities, resulting in approximately six years of 'negative peace' before violence revived during South Sudan's independence in July 2011.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The CPA failed to change Sudan's fundamental political order and instead reinforced a system where the government in Khartoum uses force to suppress all political opposition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The exclusion of certain groups from the CPA peace process, particularly in Darfur, is linked to the outbreak of insurgency in that region as actors sought to challenge the concentration of power at the center.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Following the CPA, the conflict in Sudan mutated into lower-intensity fighting via proxies, with an increase in conflict events involving ethnic and communal militias after 2005.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"In South Sudan, the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) suffered from very poor implementation; by the time it collapsed in 2016, only 20 percent of its provisions had been implemented.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The ARCSS reinforced a political order based on violent competition for resources and power, as the provision for a unity government followed by 'winner-takes-all' elections increased incentives for political violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The collapse of the ARCSS led to the spread of political violence across South Sudan, including into Greater Equatoria, and an increase in violence against civilians.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Darfur","Khartoum","Abyei","Southern Kordofan","Blue Nile State","Greater Equatoria","Upper Nile","Jonglei","Unity"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"issafri-001855","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001855","title":"Guinea-Bissau: Priorities for long-term stability","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war22.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the recurring political crises in Guinea-Bissau, specifically the 2015 crisis triggered by the dissolution of Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira's government by President José Mário Vaz. It argues that instability stems from institutional weaknesses, including a lack of constitutional clarity regarding the roles of the president and prime minister in a semi-presidential system. While the March 10, 2019, legislative elections are seen as a step toward legitimacy, the authors contend they are insufficient without the implementation of the Stability Pact and reforms to the constitution, electoral laws, political party regulation, the judiciary, and the security sector. The document also details the role of ECOWAS in mediating the crisis through the Conakry Agreement and the use of targeted sanctions to pressure political actors toward a resolution.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The legislative elections scheduled for 10 March 2019 are expected to clarify the political landscape and enable the formation of a legitimate government, but they alone cannot guarantee long-term stability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 2015 political crisis was driven by both leadership conflicts and systemic institutional failures, particularly the lack of clear delineation in the Constitution between the powers of the president and the prime minister.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Conakry Agreement, intended to end the political impasse, initially increased divisions among political actors due to divergent interpretations and contradictions with the Constitution regarding the appointment of the prime minister.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"ECOWAS sanctions imposed on 4 February 2018 against 19 individuals—including deputies and associates of the president—served as a turning point that pressured political actors to resolve the crisis.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 2019 electoral process faced significant challenges, including a budget of $7.7 million that was not finalised on time and delays in the delivery of voter registration kits from Nigeria, which led to the postponement of the election from November 2018 to March 2019.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Stability Pact adopted on 14 February 2018 is a critical tool for preventing future crises, as it commits 21 political parties to respect election results and implement reforms across the constitution, electoral laws, judiciary, and security sectors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Long-term stability requires specific structural reforms: granting the National Electoral Commission financial autonomy, strengthening the regulation of political parties, reviving the 2015–2019 Justice Reform Programme, and modernising the defence and security sector.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Bissau","Nigeria","Guinea","Brussels"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"issafri-000792","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000792","title":"AU summit 32: Beyond the hype of Africa’s free trade deal","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02-08","source_url":"https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-summit-32-beyond-the-hype-of-africas-free-trade-deal","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) faces a gap between political enthusiasm and technical implementation. While the African Union aims for a formal launch in July 2019, critical components such as tariff schedules, rules of origin, and protocols for trade in goods and services remain unfinished. UNCTAD suggests full liberalisation could increase intra-African exports by 33%, but failure to deliver concrete benefits for investors and traders could undermine the project's legitimacy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The AfCFTA was launched and is being relaunched before essential technical details, including tariff schedules, rules of origin, and regulations for specific services sectors, were agreed upon.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The framework agreement mandates the liberalisation of 90% of trade, with a 10% exemption. To prevent countries from exempting nearly all trade, AU trade ministers agreed in December that excluded products may represent no more than 3% of tariff lines and 10% of the value of imports from other African countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Negotiations on rules of origin are critical to prevent both protectionism and the influx of non-African goods, such as those from China, that are minimally processed on the continent to qualify as African goods.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Full liberalisation of tariffs on trade in goods is estimated by UNCTAD to increase intra-African exports by 33% in value, raise most African countries' GDPs by 1% to 3%, and increase total African employment by 1.2%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["trade policy"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Ethiopia","Kenya","Nigeria","Egypt","People's Republic of China","Addis Ababa","Niamey","Kigali","Cairo"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-000774","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000774","title":"AU summit 32: Egypt takes the wheel at the AU","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02-07","source_url":"https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-summit-32-egypt-takes-the-wheel-at-the-au","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Egypt's 2019 AU chairmanship focuses on economic goals, intra-African trade, and institutional reform, though the author notes a significant gap regarding governance and the need for Egypt to ratify the CFTA.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Egypt outlined six priority areas for its 2019 AU chairmanship: building bridges among Africa’s people, cooperating with partners, economic and regional integration, economic and social development, institutional and financial reform of the AU, and peace and security.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Egypt's chairmanship emphasizes economic development and intra-African trade, with President Sisi stating that Egypt increased its investments in Africa by $1.2 billion in 2018 to reach a total of $10.2 billion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite promoting the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) agreement, Egypt had not yet ratified the agreement at the time of the report.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author identifies a major policy gap in Egypt's priorities: the absence of governance issues, which are described as central to Africa's underdevelopment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Egypt's peace and security priorities include establishing the AU Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Cairo and launching the Aswan Forum for Peace and Sustainable Development.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change"],"geography_discussed":["Addis Ababa","Sharm el-Sheikh","Nigeria","Cairo","Aswan","Libya","Sahel","Sudan","South Sudan","Somalia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-000626","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000626","title":"AU summit 32: Maghreb’s changing politics of migration","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02-04","source_url":"https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-summit-32-maghrebs-changing-politics-of-migration","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes the shift in irregular migration patterns in North Africa, where countries previously serving as transit zones have become points of departure. It argues that economic decline and structural inequality are driving young Maghrebi citizens to migrate, which in turn complicates diplomatic relations and security partnerships between Maghreb states and European nations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000626#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Irregular migration from the Maghreb to Europe has increased significantly, with the number of intercepted migrants rising from 15,961 in 2016 to 38,968 in 2018. Consequently, Maghrebi migrants' share of irregular arrivals in Europe grew from 3% in 2016 to nearly 20% in 2018.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000626#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Migration routes have shifted from using third countries—such as Moroccans traveling via Libya or Algerians via Turkey—to direct departures from home countries. Currently, Tunisians are the primary nationality intercepted by Italy, and Moroccans are the most apprehended by Spain.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000626#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The rise in irregular migration is driven by a worsening regional economy characterized by high youth unemployment and rapid inflation, particularly in Tunisia. Additionally, entrenched structural inequality regarding government services and treatment by security forces fuels pessimism among young people.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000626#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The increase in citizens migrating irregularly changes the political calculus for Maghreb governments, making security partnerships and the acceptance of returned migrants more politically contentious. Governments are reluctant to be viewed as \"Europe’s migration gatekeepers\" at the expense of their own constituents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000626#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Europe","Tunisia","Morocco","Algeria","Libya","Turkey","Italy","Spain"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["political analysis","socio-economic analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-001510","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001510","title":"Less than the sum of its parts","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2019","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-126.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the EU's strategy of externalising border control to Libya, noting that while migrant apprehensions fell from approximately 119,000 in 2017 to around 23,000 in 2018, this success is tactical and risks long-term stability. The author contends that by providing equipment and training to hybrid forces and armed groups—such as the Coast Guard unit in Zawiya—the EU reinforces the power of unaccountable actors and criminal networks. This approach creates a 'gatekeeper' role for certain commanders and ignores the primary security concerns of Libyan citizens, such as fuel smuggling and impunity. The brief recommends that counter-migration efforts be integrated into a broader, Libyan-owned security sector reform programme that prioritises the rule of law and clear distinctions between military and civilian security roles.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001510#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The EU and its member states have successfully reduced irregular migration from Libya in the short term, with Italian authorities reporting a drop in migrant apprehensions from approximately 119,000 in 2017 to around 23,000 in 2018.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001510#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"European border security efforts in Libya rely on a hybrid security system where formal state institutions are weak and operational power is held by armed groups, some of which are quasi-affiliated with the state.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001510#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"EU support for the Libyan Coast Guard has inadvertently empowered units linked to criminal activity; for example, the Zawiya Coast Guard unit has been flagged by UN investigators for migrant exploitation and fuel smuggling despite being one of the most operationally effective units.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001510#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU's narrow focus on counter-migration creates a disconnect with Libyan national priorities, risking the perception that security aid serves international rather than local needs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001510#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The current donor approach risks creating 'gatekeepers'—specific commanders who gain privileged access to training and equipment because they meet short-term donor needs, rather than because they are most essential to Libyan security.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001510#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The use of military forces for civilian law enforcement missions and the reliance on hybrid forces undermine the development of a professional security sector and perpetuate a culture of impunity for armed groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001510#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["human rights"],"geography_discussed":["European Union","Italy","Zawiya","Tunisia","Morocco"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-001530","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001530","title":"Power and influence: identifying champions of change in SADC","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2019","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb125.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The policy brief examines the disproportionate dominance of South Africa within SADC and proposes a model of 'regional champions'—member states taking lead roles in specific sectors—to foster more equitable regional integration. It analyses current power dynamics using economic, military, and diplomatic metrics, identifying potential leaders in industrialisation, infrastructure, and security. The author suggests that South Africa can reduce its regional hegemony and the associated accusations of 'bullying' by supporting a more distributed leadership structure based on the comparative advantages of other member states.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001530#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"South Africa maintains a disproportionate level of power and influence in SADC due to its economy, population, military, and technology, though its relative growth has been outstripped by some other member states in recent years.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001530#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Tanzania is projected to have the fastest-growing economy in SADC by 2040, with its GDP expected to increase by 500% from 2015 levels, and it possesses the fastest-growing manufacturing sector in absolute terms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001530#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While South Africa dominates manufacturing, other states have championed specific RISDP priorities: Zimbabwe has driven the industrialisation agenda since 2014, and Mauritius has excelled in promoting regional economic integration and private sector involvement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001530#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In terms of infrastructure and energy, Namibia has prioritised infrastructure development during its 2018/2019 SADC chair tenure, specifically through the Walvis Bay port upgrade, while Mozambique is identified as a potential lead for the regional gas mechanism due to its large reserves.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001530#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Peace and security leadership is distributed; South Africa has the greatest military power, but Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia, and Malawi are the primary SADC contributors to UN peacekeeping operations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001530#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document proposes replacing or reforming the rotational Double Troika system with a 'champions' model—similar to the African Union's approach—where countries are assigned lead roles in priority areas for three-year terms to increase ownership and implementation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001530#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["infrastructure","economic development","natural gas","electricity generation"],"geography_discussed":["Angola","Tanzania","Zimbabwe","Namibia","Mauritius","Zambia","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Botswana","Malawi","Seychelles"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","geopolitical assessment","economic forecasting"]},{"id":"issafri-002613","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002613","title":"Surviving Boko Haram: why children under five matter","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2019","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-129.PDF","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document highlights a critical lack of accurate health and mortality data for children under five in areas affected by Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon. It identifies severe malnutrition, interrupted vaccination schedules, and psychological trauma as primary consequences of the conflict. The author argues that current counter-terrorism strategies often ignore or actively undermine child development, and recommends funding targeted research, empowering local community-based organisations, and ensuring the rights of children are upheld during security operations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002613#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Boko Haram insurgency has caused widespread malnutrition and exposure to physical and psychological illnesses among children under five in Nigeria and Cameroon.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002613#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Efforts to understand and respond to the crisis are hindered by insecurity, the inaccessibility of affected regions, and poor coordination of information.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002613#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant gap between counter-terrorism operations and child development goals, with some security practices actively harming children, such as the detention of children under five in Nigeria's Giwa barracks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002613#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Insecurity has severely disrupted healthcare access, leading to a 24.8% reduction in vaccination coverage in Nigeria and a 2016 polio outbreak despite the country being declared polio-free in 2015.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002613#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Malnutrition is pervasive in the affected regions; in north-east Nigeria, UNICEF reported at least 900,000 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition in 2018, while chronic malnutrition affects 40% of children in Cameroon's Far North.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002613#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The conflict's impact on child health creates a long-term risk of socioeconomic underdevelopment, which can in turn increase susceptibility to radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002613#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change"],"geography_discussed":["Borno State","Adamawa State","Yobe State","Far North","Mayo-Sava","Mayo Tsanaga","Logone-et-Chari","Chad Basin"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","humanitarian assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-002615","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002615","title":"Complementarity: The Global Compact on Refugees and 1969 OAU Refugee Convention","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2019","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-135.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) complements the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention by providing modern mechanisms for burden-sharing and regional cooperation. It highlights the challenges facing the Convention, including a rise in forced returns (refoulement) and the pressure of hosting 7.4 million refugees and 17.8 million internally displaced persons in Africa. The brief suggests that the GCR's Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) can reinvigorate African solidarity and promote durable solutions through a 'whole of society' approach involving the private sector and international financial institutions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002615#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention's expanded definition of a refugee has significantly influenced African laws and policies and enabled the use of the prima facie approach to refugee status determination in countries such as Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, and Togo.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002615#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa faced significant displacement challenges by the end of 2018, hosting 7.4 million refugees and 17.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), with the latter number being more than double the refugee population.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002615#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The GCR supports the OAU Convention's goal of African solidarity and international cooperation (Article II(4)) by introducing a 'whole of society' approach and financial mechanisms, such as the World Bank's IDA18 regional sub-window which provided US$2 billion from 2017–2020 for refugees and host communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002615#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional and sub-regional mechanisms, such as the IGAD-led Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia (2017), exemplify how the GCR's emphasis on regional approaches complements the OAU Convention.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002615#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The principles of non-refoulement and voluntary repatriation have been undermined by protracted conflict and funding shortages; in 2018, UNHCR met only 55% of its funding needs, particularly affecting protracted situations in Burundi, DRC, Somalia, and South Sudan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002615#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Recent efforts to evacuate vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers from Libya to Niger and Rwanda demonstrate the spirit of African solidarity and the practical application of the GCR's burden-sharing goals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002615#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Ethiopia","Libya","Niger","Rwanda","Somalia","Tanzania","Kenya","Cameroon","Nigeria","Uganda"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","legal analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-001157","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001157","title":"Nobody came to ask us","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-20.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report presents findings from interviews with 106 South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and Uganda, highlighting a widespread feeling of exclusion from the peace process. Key issues include a lack of trustworthy information, deep frustration with political leadership, and sharp divisions over the number of states in South Sudan. While all respondents desire to return home, many remain cautious, citing the need for proven stability and security before repatriation is safe.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Refugees reported a significant lack of accurate and trustworthy information regarding the peace process, often relying on second-hand accounts, word-of-mouth, and the internet via smartphones.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is widespread frustration with South Sudanese political leadership, with many refugees viewing the leaders as being concerned with personal interests rather than national ones and advocating for new leadership through elections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The issue of the number of states in South Sudan is a major point of contention and division among refugees, with views often split along regional lines, ranging from support for a three-region federal model to the 32-state plan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While all interviewed refugees expressed a strong desire to return to South Sudan, many are cautious and believe several years of monitoring the peace agreement's implementation are necessary before it is safe to do so.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Refugees expressed pessimism toward the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as a mediator, citing perceived biases, the pursuit of member states' own interests, and a failure to address the root causes of the conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite the inclusion of some refugee observers in the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF), most interviewed refugees felt they lacked a genuine voice and that the selection process for representatives lacked transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Perceptions of political representation varied by location: refugees in Gambella showed strong allegiance to the SPLM-IO, while those in Adjumani were more fragmented and often felt unrepresented by any of the parties in Khartoum.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Female respondents specifically highlighted a lack of gender inclusivity in the peace talks, arguing that the process is dominated by men who do not understand the specific suffering of women.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Gambela Region","Adjumani District","Sudan","Kenya"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["perception survey","policy analysis","field research"]},{"id":"issafri-001766","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001766","title":"Western Cape After School Game Changer","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar20-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The After School Game Changer (ASGC) is a strategic coordination model in the Western Cape, South Africa, designed to prevent youth violence by enhancing the quality and accessibility of afterschool care. Rather than a single program, it acts as a mechanism to align government departments, NGOs, and the City of Cape Town to provide academic, sporting, and cultural activities for learners in low- and no-fee schools. The report argues that the ASGC functions as a violence prevention tool by disrupting risky behaviors through the social ecological model, focusing on individual, relationship, and community-level interventions. Key achievements include increasing the number of registered learners to 134,380 in 2017/18, though the report notes a lack of budget transparency and a need for better reporting on how the intervention specifically addresses violence risk factors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001766#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The ASGC is not a standalone afterschool program but a strategic coordination model designed to support civil society and government partners in providing safe and stimulating afterschool care.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001766#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The initiative targets learners aged nine to 25, specifically those from no-fee or low-fee schools, with a goal of reducing risky and violent behaviors and improving safety and life skills.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001766#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The ASGC operates as a violence prevention intervention by applying the social ecological model to disrupt risky behaviors at the individual level through relationship and community-level interventions, such as providing safe spaces during vulnerable after-school hours.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001766#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The program has seen significant growth in participation, with registered learners increasing from 49,000 in 2015/16 to 134,380 in 2017/18, and the percentage of those attending regularly and consistently rising from 36% to 56% over the same period.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001766#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The ASGC utilizes four core components of practice: Edu-collaborate (an online platform for identifying services), a customized suite of training programs for practitioners and managers, a library of resources, and networking platforms like the Community of Practice.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001766#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Grade 4 Academic Support Programme is a specific intervention within the ASGC that uses unemployed youth (18-25) as tutors to help Grade 4 learners in 16 schools across the Cape Winelands, Metro East, and Metro North districts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001766#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The total approximate cost of the ASGC for the 2018/19 financial year was R215 million, including infrastructure costs, though approximately R130 million of the reported R160 million direct cost is not clearly reflected in budget votes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001766#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The success of the ASGC's coordination is attributed to high-level political buy-in, adequate resourcing, and a skilled core team of four staff members who are mandated to experiment and remain flexible.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001766#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["public–private partnership"],"geography_discussed":["City of Cape Town","Cape Winelands District Municipality","Metro East","Metro North","Atlantis","Gugulethu","Nyanga","Paarl East","Hout Bay","Kraaifontein"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","policy assessment","program evaluation"]},{"id":"issafri-002225","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002225","title":"Compound fractures","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-21-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the fragmented political and security environment in South Sudan as it attempts to implement the R-ARCSS. It details the proliferation of armed opposition groups, the concentration of power within the government, and the challenges facing the IGAD-led mediation process, including the influence of bilateral interests from regional powers like Sudan and Uganda.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed in September 2018, but its implementation faces a difficult environment because the country's political and security sectors have become increasingly fragmented and incoherent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Government forces have achieved a military advantage on the battlefield through various offensives, but this has resulted in the alienation of civilians and a loss of confidence from international allies, specifically the United States.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Numerous armed opposition groups have emerged due to the spread of conflict, falling government revenues, and the hope of gaining power through peace processes. These groups are typically led by military officers or politicians who defected or were removed from the government or the SPLM-IO.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) successfully brokered the agreement, but the mediation process was hindered by the zero-sum mentality of the warring parties and the pursuit of bilateral interests by regional leaders.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The conflict has had a devastating human and economic toll, with an estimated 382,000 deaths (approximately 3% of the population), the displacement of 4.2 million people, and a peak inflation rate exceeding 800% in October 2016.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Political power within the government is increasingly concentrated among a small group, specifically those from the Rek subgroup of Dinka, a trend described as the 'Gogrialization of government'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The SPLM-IO remains the largest armed opposition group and maintains strong grassroots support, particularly as a symbol for the Nuer nation, despite internal divisions and military losses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The conflict expanded into Greater Equatoria after July 2016, leading to the rise of regional movements like the National Salvation Front (NAS) as communities sought to protect themselves from a state they perceive as Dinka- and Nuer-dominated.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) was formed in 2018 by ten opposition groups to create a unified front in the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF), though the alliance is tenuous and members often lack common goals beyond opposing the government.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional interference, particularly from Sudan and Uganda, has raised concerns that South Sudan could become an 'informal protectorate' of these neighbors, with Sudan specifically seeking security roles in oilfields.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Sudan","Uganda","Democratic Republic of the Congo","South Africa","Ethiopia","Kenya","Tanzania","Juba"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"issafri-002681","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002681","title":"Peace & Security Council Report","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-109-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the 2019 outlook for the African Union's Peace and Security Council, highlighting the potential return of major powers like South Africa and Ethiopia to the council. It critiques the slow implementation of AU reforms, specifically regarding financial self-sufficiency and the reduction of the AU Commission. The document details a volatile 2019 electoral calendar across 11+ countries and warns of escalating instability in Gabon, Cameroon, and the Sahel. Additionally, it discusses the progress of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the tensions surrounding AU-EU negotiations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 2019 elections for the 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) may see the return of South Africa, Ethiopia, and Algeria, which could provide clarity on 'strengthening the PSC'. South Africa's potential concurrent membership on the UN Security Council could improve coordination and information flow between New York and Addis Ababa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"AU institutional reforms are progressing slowly, particularly regarding financial independence. By mid-November 2018, only 50% of member states had paid their dues, and only about half of members were implementing the 0.2% import levy intended to make the AU financially self-sufficient.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The AU has approved reducing the number of commissions from eight to six, including a merger of the peace and security and political affairs departments to better address structural drivers of conflict. This new structure is expected to be in place by 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Gabon is facing institutional instability due to a controversial constitutional amendment introduced by the Constitutional Court to address the 'temporary unavailability' of President Ali Bongo. The report argues that the AU must use sanctions or other tools to prevent the erosion of democratic rules in Gabon.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The year 2019 is expected to be highly volatile with at least 11 presidential seats up for grabs. Concerns are raised about the lack of a level playing field, as incumbents often use constitutional amendments, electoral law changes, and repression to maintain power.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Security threats are evolving, with terror group activities in the Sahel tripling between September 2017 and September 2018. There is a risk of violent extremism spreading to coastal West African countries, including Ghana, Togo, and Benin.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) had 49 signatories and 12 ratifications as of the report date, with an expectation that it would enter into force by March 2019 once 10 more countries ratify. The agreement aims to eliminate tariffs and promote the free movement of people.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance","trade policy"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Ethiopia","Algeria","Gabon","Cameroon","Nigeria","Senegal","Somalia","South Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Central African Republic"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","political risk assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-001754","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001754","title":"Freedom of movement in Southern Africa","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-17.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the gap between the official goal of freedom of movement in Southern Africa and the reality of securitised border management. It identifies key barriers including a lack of political will, unreliable data, and the prioritisation of national sovereignty over regional integration. The authors argue that migration should be viewed as a developmental opportunity rather than a security threat, noting that remittances contribute an average of 3.7% to SADC countries' GDP. South Africa is highlighted as a primary destination for migrants but a major obstacle to regional integration due to its restrictive 'detain and deport' policies and anti-immigrant rhetoric.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001754#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Socio-economic disparities and instability within SADC member states are primary obstacles to a collective migration management approach.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001754#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant disconnect between official policy and actual practice; while many SADC citizens can travel visa-free for up to 90 days, long-term migration remains difficult due to restrictive documentation requirements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001754#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Migration governance in the region is heavily securitised, with governments treating migrants as threats to national security and the economy rather than as developmental assets.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001754#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A critical lack of reliable, disaggregated data on migration leads to policy decisions based on misconceptions and political scapegoating rather than empirical evidence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001754#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Political leaders often prioritise short-term populist gains and nationalist rhetoric over the long-term developmental benefits of a regional migration framework.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001754#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Africa, as the region's largest economy and primary migrant destination, often hinders regional integration through restrictive policies and a 'self-risks based' approach.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001754#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Migration provides substantial economic benefits to the region, with remittances averaging 3.7% of GDP for SADC countries, and significantly higher for nations like Comoros (21%), Lesotho (15%), and Zimbabwe (11%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001754#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 2005 Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons has not entered into force because only four member states—Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and eSwatini—have ratified it.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001754#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change","human rights"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Botswana","Mozambique","Eswatini","Comoros","Lesotho","Zimbabwe"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","qualitative research"]},{"id":"issafri-002150","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002150","title":"Africa and climate change","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar14.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report highlights that while Africa has contributed minimally to global warming, it is disproportionately vulnerable due to high levels of extreme poverty and low state capacity. It projects that without significant intervention, the number of people in extreme poverty will rise until 2040, peaking at 590 million. The document argues that prioritizing human development—specifically education, healthcare, and water infrastructure—is essential to increasing adaptive capacity. It contrasts the 'Current Path' with a 'Green Road' scenario where inclusive, sustainable growth effectively eliminates extreme poverty by mid-century and significantly reduces the population lacking access to improved water.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels is projected to be reached by 2050, and potentially as early as 2030.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa is particularly vulnerable to climate change as it is the hottest continent and houses over half of the world's extremely poor population.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Sahel and tropical Western Africa are identified as 'climate change hotspots,' with the Sahel projected to see temperature increases 50% higher than the global average.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"On the 'Current Path,' Africa's extremely poor population is projected to peak at 590 million by 2040 before declining to 390 million by 2063.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Western Africa is expected to have the highest number of highly vulnerable people, with Nigeria alone accounting for two-thirds of the region's extremely poor population.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Approximately 290 million people in Africa lack access to improved drinking water; this number is projected to grow for 5 to 10 years in all regions except Northern Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"State capacity in sub-Saharan Africa is limited, with government revenues averaging around one-fifth of GDP, compared to 30% in Northern Africa and 35% in OECD countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'Green Road' scenario suggests that prioritizing inclusive development and human capital could reduce the extreme poverty rate to 12% by 2030 and effectively eliminate it by mid-century.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Overpopulation is identified as a key stressor for water availability in Africa, sometimes causing more harm than climate change itself.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa's share of global CO2 emissions is small at 4%, but emissions are projected to grow with population and urbanization, with sub-Saharan Africa expected to release more CO2 per year than Latin America and the Caribbean by 2060.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002150#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change adaptation","climate change mitigation","water security","disaster risk reduction","natural resource management","renewable energy","greenhouse gas emissions","food security","sea level rise","urbanization"],"geography_discussed":["Sahel","North Africa","Western Africa","East Africa","Central Africa","Southern Africa","Nigeria","Tunisia","Egypt","Somalia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["projective modelling","scenario analysis","vulnerability assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-002735","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002735","title":"The art of creating money","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SAR-18-2.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report argues that Zimbabwe's economic decline is rooted in the conflation of the state with the ZANU-PF party, leading to state capture, patronage, and corruption. It highlights how government profligacy, excessive borrowing through Treasury Bills, and a protectionist import substitution strategy have fueled inflation and foreign exchange shortages. Despite President Emmerson Mnangagwa's 'open for business' rhetoric, the report finds that investment claims are often unsubstantiated and that the government continues to prioritize prestige projects and party loyalty over market-based principles. The author recommends a transition to a market-oriented, export-led economy with an independent central bank and secure property rights.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002735#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Inflation is primarily driven by an increase in the money supply resulting from the issuance of Treasury Bills to fund budget deficits and state-owned enterprise debt. By August 2018, Treasury Bills issued totaled US$7.6 billion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002735#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The government's overdraft with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) reached US$2.3 billion by the end of August 2018, which is three times the statutory limit.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002735#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Zimbabwe's protectionist import substitution policy, which uses tariffs and import bans to protect local industry, has actually worsened foreign exchange shortages because low local productivity maintains the demand for hard currency on the parallel market.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002735#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite claims of attracting US$16 billion in investment, Zimbabwe has consistently received less than US$500 million in actual Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between 2012 and 2016.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002735#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The government's commitment to legal protections for investors is undermined by its failure to honor international court rulings, such as those from the ICSID regarding compensation for seized farms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002735#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Fiscal deficits are exacerbated by excessive spending on agricultural subsidies, such as the Command Agriculture programme, and a bloated public wage bill that consumes 90% of tax revenues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002735#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The trade gap for goods and services is widening and was expected to reach US$2.15 billion in 2018, contributing to severe foreign exchange shortages.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002735#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Domestic debt surged from US$442 million in 2013 to US$10.5 billion by February 2018, and total debt could exceed 200% of GDP if compensation for seized farms is included.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002735#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["fiscal policy","agricultural subsidy","inflation","trade policy"],"geography_discussed":["Namibia","Zambia","Botswana","South Africa"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["economic appraisal","policy analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-001087","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001087","title":"The reintegration enigma","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-10","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/car13.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the phenomenon of Boko Haram members deserting the group in the Lake Chad Basin, identifying push factors such as military losses by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and internal factional rivalry between Shekau and al-Barnawi. It argues that current interventions—limited to detention, judicial processing, and narrow de-radicalisation—are insufficient. The author advocates for a 'third generation' of context-sensitive DDRR that integrates security and development, emphasizing the need for gender- and age-sensitive eligibility criteria to include women and children. The report also highlights the necessity of demobilising community vigilante groups and improving state-community relations to undermine recruitment. It recommends that the Lake Chad Basin Commission lead a regional strategic framework supported by the African Union to harmonise DDRR approaches across Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001087#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Military successes by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and internal conflict between the Shekau and al-Barnawi factions have driven waves of Boko Haram members to desert.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001087#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Individual push factors for desertion include disillusionment over unfulfilled economic promises and the fear of death in combat.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001087#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Current interventions are too narrow, focusing heavily on de-radicalisation, which is problematic because not all deserters are radicalised and the level of radicalisation is difficult to measure.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001087#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a need for gender- and age-sensitive DDRR programming to account for women and children, including those born to Boko Haram spouses, to maintain family integrity and reduce stigma.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001087#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Community vigilante groups, while providing security, may contest state authority or be complicit in human rights violations, necessitating their own demobilisation track.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001087#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The lack of a coordinated regional approach has led to discrepancies in how deserters are treated across different countries, with Niger being the only one currently using a systematic sorting process.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001087#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Improving the utility and legitimacy of the state in peripheral areas is essential to undermine Boko Haram's recruitment strategy and build trust with communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001087#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change","food insecurity"],"geography_discussed":["Diffa Region","Mali","Senegal"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","security assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-002250","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002250","title":"Ethiopia’s refugee response","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-10","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear19.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines Ethiopia's shift toward the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which aims to move from camp-based assistance to socio-economic integration. Key initiatives include providing work permits, expanding the Out of Camp Policy, and creating jobs in industrial parks. However, the report identifies significant hurdles, including low national wages, ethnic tensions in regions like Gambella, and insufficient consultation with host communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002250#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) marks a significant policy shift in Ethiopia, aiming to enhance refugee self-reliance through wage-earning employment, local integration, and the expansion of the Out of Camp Policy (OCP).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002250#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ethiopia is integrating the CRRF with its Growth and Transformation Plan-II (GTP-II) to link humanitarian aid with national development, specifically targeting industrialisation and job creation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002250#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Industrial parks are a central component of the integration strategy, with plans for $500 million in construction funded by the European Investment Bank and DFID, intending to allocate 30% of the resulting 100,000 jobs to refugees.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002250#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Low wages in Ethiopia pose a major risk to the CRRF's success, as current industrial park salaries (approximately 900 Birr or US$32 per month) may be less attractive than the humanitarian aid refugees currently receive.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002250#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Local integration efforts face severe challenges in the Gambella and Somali regional states due to ethnic tensions, clan dynamics, and competition over land and resources.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002250#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report identifies a lack of sufficient consultation with host communities, noting that outreach has been limited to national-level events and mass media rather than deep community engagement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002250#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Administration for Refugee & Returnee Affairs (ARRA), while leading the process, faces coordination challenges because its original mandate focused on emergency response and security rather than development.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002250#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Gambela Region","Somali regional state","Tigray Region","Afar Region","Benishangul-Gumuz Region","Italy","Canada"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","socio-economic analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002629","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002629","title":"Aligning South Africa’s migration policies with its African vision","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2018-10","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb117.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document identifies a significant gap between South Africa's stated goal of harnessing the strategic potential of African migration and its implementation of restrictive policies. While the Department of Home Affairs has proposed progressive measures like SADC visas and regularisation schemes, these have stalled. Instead, the government is fast-tracking the Border Management Authority Bill and the Refugees Amendment Act of 2017, and pursuing the construction of expensive asylum processing centres. The author argues that these measures are based on unsubstantiated claims that low-skilled migrants and asylum seekers pose security risks, and that they distract from endemic administrative corruption and management failures within the Department of Home Affairs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002629#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There is a contradiction between South Africa's foreign policy goals and its migration management, where the state expresses a desire for an African-centred approach but prioritises restrictive measures that negatively affect migrants from neighbouring countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002629#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Department of Home Affairs has proposed progressive interventions, such as SADC visa options for economic migrants and regularisation schemes for nationals of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, and Lesotho, but implementation of these measures has stalled.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002629#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The government is prioritising the creation of asylum processing centres on land borders, which the author describes as de facto detention centres. These centres are estimated to cost between R266 million and R298 million each to build, excluding operational costs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002629#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Department of Home Affairs claims that the asylum system is primarily abused by economic migrants, but the document argues this is not supported by the data; for example, in 2015, only 62,000 people applied for asylum out of 1.44 million people who remained in the country.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002629#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document asserts that there is no evidence that migrants pose an elevated national security risk, and that the government's 'risk-based approach'—which includes the militarisation of borders via the Border Management Authority Bill—is a distraction from actual threats.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002629#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Administrative failures and corruption within the Department of Home Affairs are being ignored or blamed on migrants; some estimates suggest as many as 85% of staff members participate in corrupt practices.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002629#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["human rights"],"geography_discussed":["Zimbabwe","Mozambique","Malawi","Botswana","Namibia","Eswatini","Lesotho"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","human rights assessment"]}]}