{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"geography":["nigeria"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":1072,"relation":"eq"},"page":27,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?geography=nigeria&page=27","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?geography=nigeria&page=28","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"fsdafri-000170","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/fsdafri-000170","title":"The potential of the cell captive structure for sub-Saharan Africa","publisher":{"name":"FSD Africa","organization":"fsd-africa"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-08","source_url":"https://fsdafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/FSDA-and-Cenfri_The-potential-of-the-cell-captives-structure-for-sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report explores how cell captive insurance structures can address structural constraints in sub-Saharan African (SSA) insurance markets, such as fragmentation, lack of innovation, and limited capacity for specialised risks. It identifies four primary use cases—specialised risk management, retail innovation, market participation, and offshore financial centre development—and provides a decision framework for regulators to design appropriate legal and supervisory structures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000170#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Cell captive insurance allows a central licensed insurer (the sponsor or promoter) to create ring-fenced cells for other organisations (cell owners) to insure their own assets or the risks of their clients. This enables corporates to access captive insurance benefits without the need to establish their own licensed insurance subsidiary.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000170#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Cell captives can bridge protection gaps for specialised corporate risks in markets where local insurers lack the capital, skills, or capacity to offer tailored cover. This is particularly relevant in sectors like oil and gas in Ghana, where local content requirements may otherwise create efficiency costs or coverage gaps.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000170#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Third-party cell captive structures drive retail innovation by allowing non-insurance entities (such as MNOs or retailers) to design products and share in underwriting profits without needing a full insurance licence. South Africa is a global pioneer in this model, where it is frequently used by insurtech ventures to bypass legacy insurer systems.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000170#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The structure serves as an 'incubation' or graduation pathway for new market entrants, allowing them to build capital and experience before applying for a full insurance licence. In South Africa, this has been used as a formalisation pathway for previously informal entities, such as burial societies and funeral parlour groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000170#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"For emerging offshore financial centres like Mauritius and the Seychelles, cell captives can attract multinational companies and generate revenue beyond domestic demand. However, success depends on a sophisticated regulatory framework that can compete with established global domiciles like Guernsey.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000170#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"There are three primary regulatory models for asset separation: Protected Cell Companies (PCC), where the PCC is a single legal entity with statutory ring-fencing; Incorporated Cell Companies (ICC), where each cell is a separate legal entity; and Shareholder Participation Agreements (SPA), which rely on contractual ring-fencing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000170#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"South African regulators prefer the SPA structure because they believe statutory ring-fencing of third-party business would contradict the nature of insurance and risk pooling, and that policyholders rely on the reputation and size of the insurer rather than the cell owner.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000170#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Capital requirements for cell captives are determined by funding needs and statutory rules. In South Africa, a minimum capital requirement of ZAR 1 million (approximately USD 70,000) was instituted for all cells in 2018 to ensure cell owners have 'skin in the game'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000170#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Mauritius","Namibia","Seychelles","Ghana","Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["Policy Analysis","Market Assessment","Regulatory Framework Design"]},{"id":"iisd-000543","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-000543","title":"Raising Ambition Through Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform: Greenhouse gas emissions results modelling from 26 countries","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2019-07-07","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/publications/raising-ambition-through-fossil-fuel-subsidy-reform","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This working paper models the impact of removing fossil fuel subsidies across 26 countries and reviews 60 research papers to estimate global greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. It finds that subsidy removal alone leads to a national average emission reduction of 6 per cent, which increases to 13.2 per cent when combined with a modest energy tax and investments in renewables and energy efficiency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000543#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Modelling of 26 countries indicates that removing fossil fuel subsidies results in a simple national average of 6 per cent greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions from 2018 until 2025 compared to business as usual. This reduction increases to an average of 13.2 per cent by 2030 if an additional 10 per cent energy tax is implemented from 2025 until 2030 and 30 per cent of the resulting savings and revenues are invested in energy efficiency and renewable energy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000543#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Across the 26 countries analyzed, the cumulative fiscal savings from fossil fuel subsidy reform (FFSR) by 2030 are estimated at USD 2.56 trillion, with total cumulative GHG emissions abated of 4.8 GtCO2e. On average, governments save USD 93 for every tonne of CO2e removed through FFSR.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000543#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"A literature review of 60 papers on negative and positive carbon pricing shows that global GHG emission reductions from fossil fuel subsidy removal range between 1 and 10 per cent by 2030 and between 6.4 and 8.2 per cent by 2050. Combining the removal of subsidies with appropriate taxation could reduce global emissions by 28 per cent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000543#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The paper suggests that governments should view fossil fuel subsidies as a negative carbon price and integrate the co-benefits of GHG emission reductions from subsidy reform and taxation into second-generation Nationally Determined Contributions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000543#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel subsidies","greenhouse gas emissions","carbon pricing","nationally determined contributions","energy transition"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["modelling","literature review"]},{"id":"saiia-000853","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/saiia-000853","title":"The ‘Kagame Reforms’ of the AU: Will they stick?","publisher":{"name":"South African Institute of International Affairs","organization":"south-african-institute-of-international-affairs"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2019-07","source_url":"https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Occasional-Paper-299-Gruzd-Turianskyi.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This research paper assesses the progress and challenges of the institutional reform process of the African Union (AU) led by Rwanda's President Paul Kagame. Based on the 2017 'Kagame Report', the reforms aim to address inefficient bureaucracy, funding shortages, and overlapping mandates. The paper analyzes specific achievements, such as the reduction of AU commissioners and the restructuring of NEPAD and the APRM, while highlighting significant resistance from member states—particularly within SADC—and the ongoing struggle for financial autonomy through the Kigali Financing Decision.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000853#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 'Kagame Report' presented in 2017 proposed 19 recommendations (later expanded to 21) across six reform areas to address the AU's inefficient bureaucracy, funding shortages, and overlapping institutional mandates. These areas include focusing on fewer priority areas, clarifying the division of labour between AU structures, improving the efficiency of the AU Commission, strengthening sanctions, improving decision-making and implementation, and ensuring equitable regional and gender representation in recruitment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000853#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The AU has achieved several structural changes, including reducing the number of AU commissioners from eight to six by 2021 and combining the Department of Political Affairs and the Peace and Security Council under one commissioner. Additionally, the AU has moved toward holding only one Ordinary Summit per year starting in 2019 and established a troika arrangement for the chairpersonship to ensure continuity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000853#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The Kigali Financing Decision, specifically the 'Kaberuka Plan', seeks to reduce the AU's heavy reliance on external donors—who funded 60%–90% of the AU Commission and peace operations over the last decade—by implementing a 0.2% levy on eligible exports of member states. However, implementation has been slow; as of February 2018, only 12 member states had started implementing the levy, with others like South Africa and Egypt citing constitutional or WTO conflicts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000853#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is being transformed into the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) to resolve coordination challenges and competition for resources with the AU Commission. While the AU Assembly approved the establishment of AUDA as a technical body with its own legal personality, the retention of the 'NEPAD' brand is viewed as a compromise to satisfy founding members like Algeria and South Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000853#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has had its mandate expanded to oversee the monitoring and evaluation of the AU's Agenda 2063 and the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. While this repositioning allows the APRM to consolidate reporting for member states and provides it with predictable funding from the AU Commission budget, the mechanism continues to face challenges regarding political commitment and administrative weaknesses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000853#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"There is significant political resistance to the reforms, particularly from SADC member states and South Africa, who have criticized Paul Kagame's 'authoritarian' style and the use of non-formal retreats to drive the process. Some member states express concern that the reforms aim to transform the AU Commission into a 'supra-national' organization, which they perceive as a threat to state sovereignty.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000853#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Rwanda","South Africa","Egypt","Algeria","Morocco","Nigeria","Niger","Mauritania","Cape Verde","Chad","Guinea","Senegal","SADC"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["institutional_reform","governance_assessment","financial_analysis"]},{"id":"wri-000724","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/wri-000724","title":"Bonn Negotiations Can Set a Strong Foundation for Higher Ambition. Here's How.","publisher":{"name":"World Resources Institute","organization":"world-resources-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06-14","source_url":"https://www.wri.org/insights/bonn-negotiations-can-set-strong-foundation-higher-ambition-heres-how","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The June 2019 Bonn negotiations aim to build a foundation for higher climate ambition ahead of the UN Climate Action Summit. Key priorities include refining the Paris Rulebook's tools and rules to prevent double-counting of emissions, integrating IPCC science into national commitments (NDCs), and addressing the funding and operational effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, and the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000724#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The June negotiations in Bonn serve as a foundation for the UN Climate Action Summit in New York in September 2019, where world leaders are expected to present plans for enhancing their nationally determined contributions (NDCs).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000724#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Formal negotiating tracks in Bonn focus on establishing tools and rules to maintain the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement, specifically regarding market-based mechanisms to avoid \"double-counting of emissions,\" as well as standardizing reporting formats for climate efforts and finance flows.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000724#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The negotiations emphasize the role of science, specifically the 1.5 IPCC report, to inform NDC reviews and the potential for the UNFCCC Secretariat to create a synthesis report of NDCs before COP26.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000724#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Financial discussions in Bonn include tracking support for recipient countries and progress toward the goal of mobilizing $100 billion annually by 2020. The document highlights the importance of the Green Climate Fund's first replenishment and the need for reliable funding for the Adaptation Fund via carbon trading mechanisms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000724#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Negotiators are tasked with determining the future of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), established in 2013, to coordinate support for \"loss and damage\" in vulnerable developing countries, including defining the review process and securing funding.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000724#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["New York City","Germany","United Kingdom","South Africa","Brazil","Japan","Russia","Nigeria","Australia","Norway"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"fsdafri-000096","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/fsdafri-000096","title":"Remittances in Nigeria","publisher":{"name":"FSD Africa","organization":"fsd-africa"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://fsdafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Barriers-to-remittances-in-SSA-vol-6-Nigeria.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report by FSD Africa and Cenfri examines the remittance landscape in Nigeria, identifying it as the highest recipient of remittances in Africa. While formal flows are significant, the sector is characterized by high informality, regulatory volatility, and infrastructure gaps that hinder the reduction of transaction costs and the expansion of financial inclusion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Nigeria receives the highest volume of remittance inflows in Africa, totaling USD 24.2 billion in 2018, which represented 5.9% of its GDP in 2017. However, official data likely underestimates these flows, as up to 50% of remittances are estimated to enter through informal channels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Remittance costs vary significantly by corridor; while transfers from the USA and UK are relatively competitive (averaging just over 5% and almost 6% respectively), the Cameroon-Nigeria corridor is exorbitant, with average costs exceeding 11%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Tight foreign exchange controls and managed exchange rate policies by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) drive informality. Large black-market premiums (around 33%) make informal channels more attractive and are cited by stakeholders as the most expensive business driver.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The regulatory environment is characterized by frequent changes and high barriers to entry. MTO licenses require a minimum capital of ₦2 billion and presence in at least seven countries, while outbound transfers are capped at USD 1,000 per quarter per person.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Nigeria possesses a modern National Payment System (NPS) featuring the NIBSS, which facilitates instant payments (NIP) and a centralized biometric identification system (BVN) that uniquely identifies 33.3 million customers to ease onboarding.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Physical and digital access points are insufficient. Nigeria has approximately 17 active financial access points per 100,000 adults, significantly lower than Kenya (181) or Uganda (116). The Shared Agent Network Expansion (SANEF) programme aims to increase the agent force to 500,000.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Financial inclusion remains low and stagnant, with the proportion of financially excluded adults increasing from 39.5% in 2014 to almost 42% in 2016. Mobile money account ownership is particularly low at around 6% of adults.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"KYC requirements, specifically the insistence on proof of address and the Bank Verification Number (BVN), act as barriers to entry. Only 39% of Nigerian adults possess both an ID and proof of address.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Operational costs for formal providers are inflated by cybercrime, poor electricity (only 60% population coverage), and network downtime, which erode consumer trust in digital solutions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Security challenges in the North-East due to the Boko Haram insurgency since 2009 have disrupted services, increased operational costs, and hindered agent recruitment in the Lake Chad basin.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000096#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United States","United Kingdom","Cameroon","Chad Basin"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["Market Analysis","Regulatory Review","Infrastructure Assessment"]},{"id":"iisd-001422","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-001422","title":"Fossil Fuel to Clean Energy Subsidy Swaps","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-06","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/fossil-fuel-clean-energy-subsidy-swap.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) advocates for \"subsidy swaps,\" the process of redirecting government financial support from fossil fuels to clean energy. It argues that while removing fossil fuel subsidies can reduce emissions, a swap is necessary to ensure permanent reductions and provide economic, social, and health benefits. The document analyzes the global context of these shifts and provides case studies from India, Indonesia, Zambia, and Morocco to demonstrate the feasibility of reallocating resources to renewable energy and energy efficiency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Fossil fuel subsidies act as a significant obstacle to transitioning to clean energy systems. While reforming these subsidies can reduce emissions, the report argues that a \"swap\"—reallocating savings to fund the clean energy transition—is required to achieve permanent emission reductions and improve jobs, public health, and gender equality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Global financial flows are already shifting, with renewable energy investments exceeding fossil fuel investments every year since 2008. Additionally, the world has installed more renewable capacity than fossil fuel-based generators annually since 2014. However, the transition is slow, as fossil fuels still met nearly 70 per cent of total energy demand growth in 2018.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Subsidy swaps can expand fiscal space and mitigate the economic risks of stranded assets. Phasing out global fossil fuel subsidies could increase global GDP by 0.2 per cent by 2030. Furthermore, using swap resources to support workers and communities affected by the early shutdown of high-carbon assets can promote a socially just transition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The removal of fossil fuel subsidies, combined with appropriate taxation and a swap to clean energy, can significantly reduce carbon emissions. Research suggests that removing all consumer fossil fuel subsidies could decrease global carbon emissions by 2.32 to 10 per cent by 2030. A study of 20 countries found that swapping 30 per cent of reform savings into energy efficiency and renewables increased emission reductions from 11 to 18 per cent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Clean energy swaps offer substantial social benefits, including job creation and improved public health. The International Labour Organization estimates that limiting climate change to 2°C could result in a net increase of approximately 18 million jobs by 2030. Additionally, transitioning away from coal and kerosene reduces respiratory and cardiovascular diseases caused by air pollution.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Fossil fuel subsidies often have negative gender-disaggregated impacts, particularly for women responsible for fuel collection and exposed to indoor air pollution. In Nigeria, the sudden withdrawal of kerosene subsidies caused particular hardship for women. Swaps can address these issues by improving the affordability of clean energy alternatives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"India has shifted public financial flows from petroleum products to renewable energy and electricity distribution between fiscal year 2014 and 2017. The report suggests a specific swap opportunity to redirect funds from kerosene subsidies, which suffer from 51 per cent leakage due to illegal diversion, toward off-grid solar products for marginalized households.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Indonesia has a history of successful subsidy reform, such as saving USD 15.6 billion from gasoline and diesel reforms in 2015. However, coal subsidies and a coal price cap of USD 70 per tonne (introduced in 2018) make renewables less competitive. The report suggests swapping coal and LPG subsidy savings to support the renewable sector.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Zambia can implement a swap by replacing diesel-generated electricity with solar PV and promoting energy efficiency in the mining sector, which accounts for 55 per cent of all electricity consumption. Solar tariffs from recent auctions (USD 0.07 per kWh) are significantly lower than diesel-generated electricity costs (USD 0.16–0.17 per kWh).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Morocco aims for 52 per cent of total installed capacity to be renewable by 2030. The report proposes swapping the remaining fossil fuel subsidies, specifically those for butane gas (estimated at USD 1.2 billion in 2018), to fund solar water heaters for households and solar pumps for farmers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"To maximize impact, the report recommends that governments focus on large-scale on-grid renewable energy swaps and use public resources to de-risk projects, thereby leveraging private finance. It also emphasizes the need for correct fossil fuel taxation to internalize externalities like greenhouse gas emissions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001422#insight-11","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel subsidies","renewable energy","energy transition","carbon emissions","fiscal policy","just transition"],"geography_discussed":["India","Indonesia","Zambia","Morocco","Bangladesh","Nigeria","People's Republic of China"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","case study","economic analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-001727","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001727","title":"Peace & Security Council Report","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-04","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pscreport112.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The April 2019 Peace & Security Council Report by the Institute for Security Studies examines critical stability challenges across Africa, focusing on the fragility of peace deals in the Central African Republic and South Sudan, the trend of constitutional amendments to extend presidential terms, and the escalating crises in Cameroon and Sudan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001727#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The African Union (AU) intervened in March 2019 in Addis Ababa to prevent the collapse of the February 6 Khartoum agreement in the Central African Republic (CAR). The crisis was triggered by the appointment of a cabinet that armed groups felt was not inclusive, as key ministries were retained by the government and prominent leaders like Ali Darassa were excluded from ministerial roles. A compromise was reached where three rebel leaders—Darassa, Mahamat Al Katim, and Bi Sidi Souleymane—were appointed as advisors to the prime minister to manage mixed special security units in regions they already control.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001727#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"There is a growing trend of African incumbents amending national constitutions to extend term limits or centralise power, which the report identifies as a threat to stability. Since 2015, countries including Algeria, Burundi, the Comoros, Chad, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Togo, and Uganda have made such amendments. The report notes that the AU has been reactive rather than proactive, as only military coups are currently sanctioned under the charter, while constitutional 'tampering' often evades attention or is viewed as having a 'semblance of legality' through referendums.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001727#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The peace agreement in South Sudan, signed in September 2018 to revitalise the 2015 deal, shows macro signs of progress but remains fragile. While exiled opposition leaders have returned to Juba and approximately 135,000 internally displaced people have returned home, 56% of crucial pre-transition milestones remain unmet. These include the unification of the army, determination of state boundaries, and constitutional amendments. Implementation is further hindered by a lack of funding, with the National Pre-Transitional Committee's US$285 million budget receiving only a US$10 million pledge from the government as of February 2019.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001727#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The African Union is deeply divided over the Western Sahara conflict, as evidenced by two competing conferences in March 2019. A SADC 'Solidarity Conference' in Pretoria supported self-determination and decolonisation, while a Moroccan conference in Marrakesh pushed for the exclusion of most AU organs from negotiations, limiting involvement to the AU troika. The report argues that the Peace and Security Council (PSC) must meet at the level of heads of state to resolve these divergent views and remain relevant.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001727#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Cameroon is facing a dual security crisis involving Boko Haram attacks in the extreme north and an armed insurrection in the anglophone north-west and south-west regions. The 'anglophone crisis' has led to an estimated 437,513 internally displaced people and significant economic losses, including 56 billion CFA francs in the coffee-cocoa sector for 2017-2018. Despite these threats and a polarised political climate surrounding President Paul Biya, the PSC has not yet discussed the situation in Cameroon.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001727#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Following the deposition of President Omar al-Bashir on 11 April 2019, Sudan is in an uncertain transition. The protests were driven by structural factors—including 30 years of autocracy and Sharia rule—and triggered by the removal of subsidies on wheat and electricity amid inflation spiking at around 70%. The transition's success depends on the Military Council's ability to navigate four power coalitions: the armed groups, civilian political forces (such as the Freedom and Change Coalition), the 'deep state' of the defunct National Congress Party, and international actors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001727#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Ethiopia","Nigeria","Algeria","Burundi","Comoros","Chad","Gabon","Republic of the Congo","Rwanda","Togo","Uganda","Egypt","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Morocco","South Africa","Namibia","Zimbabwe","Lesotho"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy_analysis","security_assessment","governance_monitoring"]},{"id":"cdkn-000758","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/cdkn-000758","title":"Smart Incentives for Mini-Grids through Retail Tariff and Subsidy Design","publisher":{"name":"Climate and Development Knowledge Network","organization":"climate-and-development-knowledge-network"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://cdkn.org/sites/default/files/files/Smart-Incentives-for-Mini-grids-through-Retail-Tariff-and-Subsidy-Design_-A-Guide-for-Policymakers_LEDS-GP-FWG-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"This guide provides policymakers with a framework for designing retail tariffs and subsidies to incentivize private sector investment in mini-grids, primarily in Africa. It highlights the 'viability gap' where high costs and low rural revenues hinder commercial viability. The document details various tariff approaches (uniform, cost-reflective, and case-by-case) and subsidy structures (input, output, and auction-based), emphasizing that confidence in timely disbursement and a balance between verification and effectiveness are key to successful implementation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000758#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Mini-grids face a 'viability gap' because rural customers often cannot afford the cost of energy delivery, while the cost to connect and service these customers is high. To be commercially viable, payback periods for capital expenditure should be 4-6 years, aligning with expected equity returns of 15-20% per year; however, an IFC review from 2018 found that average payback periods actually exceed seven years.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000758#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Retail tariff policies range from low flexibility to high flexibility. Uniform National Tariffs (UNT), where all customers pay the same rate regardless of location, are often too low to attract private investment without subsidies. Cost-reflective tariffs allow operators to recover capital and operational costs plus a reasonable return, though these may exceed customer willingness to pay. Other approaches include case-by-case upfront setting (used in Kenya and Uganda) and post-operational reviews.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000758#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Subsidy policies can be structured as financial transfers for inputs, outputs, generation, or distribution outcomes. Output-based capital subsidies for connections are common. The timing of disbursement is critical: payments can be made in advance, upon completion, or in tranches based on milestones. Tranches matched to capital needs reduce upfront financing requirements for developers but increase the risk for the granting agency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000758#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The quantification of subsidies can be determined through several methods: as a fixed percentage of costs, a standardized amount based on economic assessments (as seen in Tanzania), case-by-case assessments of financial proposals (as seen in Kenya), avoided-cost of grid extension, or through reverse auctions to discover the lowest necessary subsidy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000758#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Developer confidence in the timely disbursement of subsidies is essential for effectiveness. Due to past experiences with payment delays or non-payment, developers may discount the value of a subsidy or slow deployment by phasing projects. To build trust, governments may implement programs through trusted third-party agents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000758#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Verification of subsidy triggers involves a balance between certainty (ensuring payments are only for actual outcomes) and effectiveness (minimizing cost and time). High verification costs and long timelines can reduce the impact of the subsidy. The document suggests using remote monitoring systems and mobile connectivity to streamline this process.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000758#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Different subsidy types have different economic impacts: operational (opex) subsidies generally improve long-term sustainability by improving unit economics, whereas capital (capex) subsidies may attract short-term developers. Additionally, fixed connection subsidies tend to prioritize densely populated communities over dispersed ones.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000758#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The guide identifies two specific tools to help regulators assess tariffs and subsidies: the EUEI-PDF Mini-grid Policy Toolkit, which uses Excel to calculate required retail tariffs and feed-in tariffs, and NREL REopt, a techno-economic model that determines the Least Cost of Energy (LCoE) to serve as a proxy for cost-reflective tariffs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000758#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Ghana","Kenya","Uganda","Tanzania","Uttar Pradesh","India","Senegal","Philippines","Niger State"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"gem-000027","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/gem-000027","title":"Bùng nổ và thoái trào","publisher":{"name":"Global Energy Monitor","organization":"global-energy-monitor"},"document_type":"report","language":"vi","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://globalenergymonitor.org/sites/default/files/migration/reports/2803-BoomAndBust_2019_VNI_Final_11.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report 'Bùng nổ và thoái trào 2019' by Global Energy Monitor, Sierra Club, and Greenpeace analyzes global coal power plant trends in 2018. It highlights a general decline in new coal capacity, particularly in India and China, while noting a resurgence of construction in China due to the reactivation of previously frozen projects. The report also details the record-high closure of coal plants in the US and the growth of renewable energy in India and Vietnam.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000027#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Global indicators for coal power capacity growth declined for the third consecutive year in 2018, with new construction capacity falling 39% compared to 2017 and 84% compared to 2015.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000027#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"China is an exception to the global downward trend, as it resumed construction on over 50 GW of coal plants that were previously frozen. The China Electricity Council proposed increasing the national coal capacity limit to 1,300 GW by 2030, which would allow for an additional 290 GW of capacity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000027#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The United States led the world in coal plant closures in 2018, with 17.6 GW of capacity shut down, despite efforts by the Trump administration to maintain older plants.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000027#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"India has seen a significant drop in new coal permits, with only 3 GW licensed in 2018 compared to an average of 31 GW between 2008 and 2012. This is attributed to the rise of cheaper solar and wind power, which have outpaced coal additions for two consecutive years.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000027#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Vietnam has experienced the fastest growth in coal capacity among countries with over 4 GW, increasing by 75% (13 GW) over the last five years. As of the report, Vietnam has over 17 GW of operating coal power and nearly 33 GW in the pre-construction phase.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000027#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"To limit global warming to 1.5°C, the IPCC estimates that coal power production must be reduced by 70% by 2030 and completely eliminated by 2050. For a 2°C limit, a 55% reduction is required by 2030.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000027#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["energy transition","coal power","climate change","renewable energy","carbon emissions"],"geography_discussed":["United States","European Union","United Kingdom","Germany","South Africa","Japan","South Korea","Philippines","Nigeria","Russia","Bangladesh","Indonesia","Pakistan","Hanoi"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis","policy review","monitoring report"]},{"id":"gem-000070","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/gem-000070","title":"Boom and Bust 2019","publisher":{"name":"Global Energy Monitor","organization":"global-energy-monitor"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://globalenergymonitor.org/sites/default/files/migration/reports/BoomAndBust_2019_r6_11.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The 'Boom and Bust 2019' report by Global Energy Monitor, Sierra Club, and Greenpeace tracks the global coal plant pipeline, noting a general decline in construction starts, pre-construction activity, and plant completions in 2018. While global trends show a shrinking pipeline and record retirements, China remains a significant exception due to the resumption of previously shelved projects and industry proposals for continued expansion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000070#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Most leading indicators of global coal power capacity growth declined in 2018, including construction starts, pre-construction activity, and plant completions. Specifically, new construction starts dropped 39% from 2017 and 84% since 2015, while newly commissioned capacity fell 20% from 2017 and 53% from 2015.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000070#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The global pre-construction pipeline for coal power has shrunk significantly, falling from 1,090 GW in 2015 to 339 GW in 2018. This decline was most pronounced in China, where planned capacity fell 86% from 515 GW to 70 GW, and India, where it fell 83% from 218 GW to 36 GW.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000070#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"China is a major exception to the global decline, with coal power capacity under construction increasing 12% in 2018 to nearly 236 GW. This was driven by the quiet resumption of construction on over 50 GW of capacity previously postponed by the central government. Furthermore, the China Electricity Council proposed a 2030 coal power cap of 1,300 GW, which would allow for an increase of 290 GW over current levels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000070#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Coal plant retirements reached a near-record pace in 2018, totaling nearly 31 GW globally. The United States led these retirements with 17.6 GW, marking the second-highest year for US retirements after 2015. In the EU, 2018 retirements totaled 3.7 GW, with 2.8 GW coming from the UK.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000070#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"India's coal pipeline has collapsed due to a previous over-permitting boom, financial stress, and competition from renewables. In 2018, India permitted less than 3 GW for construction, compared to an annual average of 31 GW between 2008 and 2012. For two consecutive years, India added more solar and wind power capacity than thermal power capacity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000070#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Chinese state-owned entities (SOEs) are a dominant force in global coal finance, funding one quarter of all global coal power capacity under development outside China. When combined with domestic projects, Chinese financing supports over 50% of all global coal power capacity currently under development.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000070#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Current coal plant operations are incompatible with IPCC climate goals. To limit warming to 1.5°C, a 70% reduction in coal power generation is required by 2030 and a full phase-out by 2050. For a 2°C target, an over 55% reduction is needed by 2030.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000070#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["coal power","energy transition","climate goals","fossil fuel finance","power capacity"],"geography_discussed":["United States","European Union","United Kingdom","Japan","South Korea","Russia","Egypt","South Africa","Bangladesh","Philippines","Nigeria","Vietnam","Poland","Indonesia","Germany"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["trend analysis","capacity tracking"]},{"id":"gem-000072","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/gem-000072","title":"Yükseliş ve Çöküş 2019 KÜRESEL KÖMÜRLÜ TERMİK SANTRAL TAKİBİ","publisher":{"name":"Global Energy Monitor","organization":"global-energy-monitor"},"document_type":"report","language":"tr","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://globalenergymonitor.org/sites/default/files/migration/reports/BoomAndBust_2019_t2_11.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This March 2019 report by Global Energy Monitor, Sierra Club, and Greenpeace analyzes global trends in coal-fired power plant capacity. It highlights a general decline in new construction and pre-construction activities, alongside record retirements, while noting that China remains a significant outlier due to the resumption of previously suspended projects and its role as a primary financier of coal infrastructure globally.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000072#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The year 2018 marked the third consecutive year of decline across major growth indicators for coal-based electricity generation, including construction starts, pre-construction activities, and project completions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000072#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Global coal plant retirements continued at a record pace in 2018, with the United States leading the trend by retiring 17.6 GW of capacity, despite efforts by the Trump administration to keep aging plants operational.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000072#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Pre-construction capacity for coal plants dropped significantly from 1,090 GW in 2015 to 339 GW in 2018, driven largely by sharp decreases in China and India.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000072#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"China is an exception to the global decline in coal development; construction capacity increased by 12% in 2018 to 236 GW because the central government quietly resumed construction on over 50 GW of previously suspended capacity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000072#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"China's influence on global coal is substantial, as it finances more than 50% of all coal-fired power capacity currently under development worldwide, including its own domestic projects.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000072#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"In India, new solar and wind capacity exceeded new coal capacity for the second consecutive year in 2018, as coal projects faced financial pressure and competition from cheaper renewables.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000072#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Turkey's coal capacity reached 19 GW in 2018, adding 330 MW that year. While the government supports new coal, public opposition is high, with only 17% of survey respondents favoring coal over renewables.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000072#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"According to IPCC analysis, current operational coal plants with average lifespans will produce emissions that exceed the limits required to keep global warming within 1.5°C or 2°C.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000072#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["coal-fired power plants","energy transition","decarbonization","climate targets","renewable energy"],"geography_discussed":["United States","European Union","United Kingdom","Germany","South Africa","Russia","Egypt","Bangladesh","Japan","South Korea","Philippines","Nigeria","Indonesia","Vietnam","Poland","Pakistan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["capacity tracking","trend analysis","policy review"]},{"id":"gem-000158","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/gem-000158","title":"รุ่งเรืองและร่วงโรย การติดตามแผนการสร้างโรงไฟฟ้าถ่านหินทั่วโลก ปี 2562","publisher":{"name":"Global Energy Monitor","organization":"global-energy-monitor"},"document_type":"report","language":"th","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://globalenergymonitor.org/sites/default/files/migration/reports/ThaiBoomBust2019_11.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This March 2019 report by Global Energy Monitor, the Sierra Club, and Greenpeace analyzes global coal power plant trends, highlighting a general decline in new construction and planning, contrasted by specific policy shifts in China and continued development in Southeast Asia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000158#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"India has seen a historic low in coal plant approvals, with less than 3 GW approved in 2018 compared to an average of 31 GW per year between 1998 and 2012. For the second consecutive year in 2018, India added more wind and solar capacity than coal capacity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gem-000158#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["coal power","energy transition","decarbonization","climate targets"],"geography_discussed":["Japan","South Korea","Thailand","Indonesia","Vietnam","Turkey","European Union","United Kingdom","Germany","Russia","Egypt","South Africa","Bangladesh","Philippines","Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["trend analysis","policy review"]},{"id":"iisd-001744","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-001744","title":"Local Content Policies in the Mining Sector: Scaling up local procurement","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/local-content-policies-mining.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report analyzes local procurement policies (LCPs) in the mining sector, examining how governments can increase the purchase of goods and services from domestic suppliers to foster industrial development and economic diversification. It details various ways to define \"local\"—through geography, value addition, or ownership—and evaluates demand-side and supply-side policy instruments, ranging from mandated percentages and targeted lists to supplier development programs and access to finance. The document emphasizes that LCPs are most effective when supported by a conducive business climate, reliable data, and complementary capacity-building measures for local firms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001744#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Governments implement local procurement policies for several strategic reasons: to address fiscal crises following commodity downturns, to align with regional visions like the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) and global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to secure a social licence to operate amidst public unrest, and to respond to pressure from civil society organizations such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001744#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The definition of \"local\" typically follows one of three criteria: geography (location of the business), value addition (the proportion of processing performed in-country), or ownership (participation of nationals in equity, management, or employment).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001744#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Demand-side policy options used to compel or encourage local sourcing include mandated percentages of local spend, targeted lists of goods and services (set-asides), requirements for companies to submit local procurement plans, tax preferences, and \"best efforts\" clauses requiring preferential treatment \"to the extent feasible.\"","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001744#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Supply-side policy options focus on enhancing the capacity of local firms to compete. These include technology transfer requirements, mandated R&D spending, Supplier Development Programs (SDPs) providing mentorship and training, improving access to finance for SMEs, and the creation of supplier portals to bridge information gaps between mines and vendors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001744#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Community Development Agreements (CDAs), such as Impact Benefit Agreements (IBAs) in Canada and Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs) in Australia, allow for tailored local procurement targets negotiated directly between mining companies and host communities to secure a social licence to operate.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001744#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Successful implementation of LCPs requires several pre-conditions: a detailed analysis of local supplier capacity, a conducive business climate, investments in business capacity, time-bound targets to avoid dependency, robust monitoring and enforcement, and strong governance to prevent corruption and \"fronting\" (where shell companies are used to circumvent requirements).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001744#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Specific national examples of LCPs include South Africa's 2018 Mining Charter, which mandates specific spending percentages for historically disadvantaged persons and women/youth-owned companies; Ghana's use of a targeted list of products (initially eight, then 19, and moving toward 29) that must be sourced locally; and Kazakhstan's requirement for a CT-KZ certificate of origin to qualify as a national manufacturer.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001744#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["energy transition","industrial development","local content policies","mining sector","sustainable development"],"geography_discussed":["Canada","Mongolia","South Africa","Zambia","Australia","Kazakhstan","Botswana","Namibia","Indonesia","Senegal","Argentina","Norway","Sweden","Finland","Chile","Peru","Liberia","Nigeria","Ontario"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","case study review"]},{"id":"issafri-001652","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001652","title":"Peace & Security Council Report","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-111.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"This March 2019 issue of the Peace & Security Council Report examines the African Union's (AU) efforts to stabilize Libya, the integration of its rapid response capabilities, shortcomings in election observation in Nigeria and Senegal, and the challenges of restructuring Africa's strategic international partnerships. It also features an interview on the grassroots protests against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algeria.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001652#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) are collaborating to revive the peace process in Libya, aiming for an international reconciliation conference in July 2019 and elections in October 2019. However, the viability of the election deadline is doubted due to insecurity, deep-seated divisions, and a lack of consensus. Key obstacles include the proliferation of armed groups, contestation over resource wealth—exemplified by the December 2018 capture of the Al-Sharara oil field by Khalifa Haftar's army—and a lack of political will among those benefiting from the war economy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001652#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The AU is working to integrate the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) into the African Standby Force (ASF) framework, with a target completion date of February 2020. This effort seeks to resolve resource competition and duplication of functions, as neither body has ever been deployed despite the ASF being declared operational in 2015. The report notes that member states often prefer their own coalitions, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, over AU-led forces.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001652#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"AU election observer missions (AUEOM) in Nigeria and Senegal showed significant shortcomings in timing and credibility. In Nigeria, the AUEOM was surprised by a last-minute election postponement by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and produced a preliminary report containing contradictions regarding election-related violence. In Senegal, the AUEOM failed to address the 'sanitised' political environment that favoured incumbent Macky Sall, as the mission was deployed too late to observe pre-election legal amendments and the disqualification of opponents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001652#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The AU is attempting to coordinate Africa's strategic partnerships to ensure the continent 'speaks with one voice' and avoids being a passive recipient of initiatives from outside powers. While the AU-EU partnership is the only one where the AU Commission is integral to planning, other engagements like the Forum for China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) are more institutionalised. The AU proposes that future partnership meetings be represented by the AU Troika, REC chairpersons, and the NEPAD Agency chairperson.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001652#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Widespread, grassroots protests in Algeria against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's mandate extension are described as unprecedented due to their geographic scale and duration. The protests are driven by a desire to dismantle the 'clan power structure' around the president and address grievances related to housing and employment. Experts suggest that foreign meddling would be counterproductive and that the drivers of these protests are similar to those driving a sharp increase in migration from Algeria observed throughout 2018.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001652#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Mali","South Sudan","Madagascar","Togo","Tunisia","Egypt"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"issafri-001855","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001855","title":"Guinea-Bissau: Priorities for long-term stability","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war22.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"This report by the Institute for Security Studies analyzes the political instability in Guinea-Bissau leading up to the March 2019 legislative elections. It argues that while elections are a step toward legitimacy, long-term stability requires deep institutional reforms to address the structural weaknesses and constitutional ambiguities that fueled the 2015 political crisis.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The legislative elections scheduled for 10 March 2019 are expected to clarify the political landscape and enable the formation of a legitimate government, but they are insufficient on their own to ensure long-term stability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The political crisis that began in August 2015 was driven by both leadership conflicts and fundamental institutional failures, specifically a lack of constitutional clarity regarding the shared executive powers of the president and the prime minister.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The Conakry Agreement, signed on 14 October 2016 to end the political impasse, faced significant implementation challenges due to divergent interpretations by political actors and the appointment of prime ministers who lacked consensus.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The 10 March 2019 election faced logistical and financial hurdles, including a budget of $7.7 million that was not finalized on time and delays in the delivery of voter registration kits from Nigeria, which postponed the original November 2018 date.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"A Stability Pact adopted on 14 February 2018 by 21 political parties aims to prevent future crises by committing signatories to respect election results and implement reforms across the constitution, electoral laws, the judiciary, and the security sector.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Essential institutional reforms needed for stability include granting the National Electoral Commission financial autonomy, reforming the poorly implemented 1991 Framework Law on political parties, and reviving the 2015–2019 Justice Reform Programme.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The modernization of the defense and security sector remains a priority, though various strategies developed since 2006 have failed to be implemented due to financial constraints and political instability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001855#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Bissau","Nigeria","Guinea","Lomé"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"sei-001338","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/sei-001338","title":"What is equitable resilience?","publisher":{"name":"Stockholm Environment Institute","organization":"stockholm-environment-institute"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://www.sei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/equitable-resilience-discussion-brief-ensor.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This discussion brief by the Stockholm Environment Institute defines and operationalizes 'equitable resilience' to address the failure of traditional resilience concepts to account for power relations and social inequalities. Based on a review of 171 articles from 2005-2015, the authors propose a framework consisting of four interconnected elements—recognizing subjectivities, ensuring inclusion and representation, working across scales, and promoting transformative change—to ensure that climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction lead to socially just outcomes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-001338#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The authors define equitable resilience as a form of human-environmental resilience that considers social vulnerability and the unequal access to power, resources, and knowledge. This approach prioritizes the perceptions of individuals regarding their own position within a system and their need for changed circumstances to prevent future power imbalances.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-001338#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Recognizing subjectivities is a core element of equitable resilience, as lived experiences and social categorizations (such as race, gender, and ethnicity) determine an individual's ability to mobilize attributes in their favor or, conversely, subject them to further disenfranchisement and risk.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-001338#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Inclusion and representation are critical for effective interventions; excluding specific social groups from decision-making regarding risk reduction and adaptation creates barriers to resilient transformation. The authors emphasize the need to include diverse social groups, different knowledge systems, and both formal and informal governing arrangements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-001338#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Equitable resilience requires an understanding of geographical and temporal scales, as actions that increase resilience at one scale may increase vulnerability at another. For example, a coastal barrier protecting a city may cause problems for poorer outlying coastal communities that lack the capacity to adapt.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-001338#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Transformation is presented as a necessary alternative to simple adaptation when existing social-ecological systems degrade well-being or increase risks for certain groups. This process is inherently political and requires addressing systemic failures and the ways power is utilized.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-001338#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The authors argue that standard resilience indicators are insufficient on their own to achieve equitable outcomes. Practitioners must instead engage with critiques of resilience to avoid reinforcing existing power structures and resource disparities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-001338#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["climate change adaptation","disaster risk reduction","social-ecological resilience","equity","governance"],"geography_discussed":["Mexico","Lagos","Nigeria","Ethiopia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["literature review","conceptual framework"]},{"id":"issafri-000792","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000792","title":"AU summit 32: Beyond the hype of Africa’s free trade deal","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02-08","source_url":"https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-summit-32-beyond-the-hype-of-africas-free-trade-deal","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report by the Institute for Security Studies examines the progress and challenges of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) ahead of the 32nd AU summit. While political momentum is high, the document highlights a gap between the ceremonial launches and the technical reality, as critical tariff schedules and rules of origin remain unfinalized.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) faces a significant gap between its political launch and technical implementation. The African Union launched the agreement before establishing essential tariff schedules, rules of origin, or regulations for specific services sectors, meaning no goods will move duty-free in the immediate future.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The framework for the AfCFTA requires member states to liberalise 90% of trade, with a 10% exemption allowance. To prevent countries from using these exemptions to bypass the spirit of the agreement, AU trade ministers decided in December that excluded products cannot exceed 3% of tariff lines or 10% of the value of imports from other African nations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Negotiations regarding rules of origin are critical and contentious. If rules are too strict, they may become protectionist tools; if too lenient, there is a risk that non-African countries, such as China, could export goods into Africa by performing minimal assembly on the continent to label them as African goods.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"UNCTAD estimates that full 100% liberalisation of tariffs on goods could increase the value of intra-African exports by 33%. This could lead to a GDP increase of 1% to 3% for most African countries and a 1.2% rise in total African employment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"While South Africa, Kenya, and Ethiopia have joined, other major economies have not yet ratified the agreement. Nigeria has not ratified it yet, though the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria is now supportive, and Egypt, the AU chair for the year, has also not yet ratified.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000792#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["energy transition"],"geography_discussed":["Addis Ababa","South Africa","Niamey","Kigali","Cairo","Kenya","Ethiopia","Nigeria","Egypt"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"iisd-002174","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-002174","title":"Survey on Developing Country Investment Treaty Negotiations","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/survey-investment-negotiations-2018.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This IISD report presents the results of a 2018 online survey of 72 respondents from 54 developing countries regarding their investment treaty negotiation processes. It examines trends in treaty renegotiation, the impact of investment disputes, the use of model treaties, ratification procedures, and the specific government agencies involved in leading and supporting these negotiations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002174#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"A majority of surveyed countries are actively negotiating new investment treaties, while a smaller portion is renegotiating or terminating existing ones due to perceived imbalances or outdated terms. Specifically, 61% (33/54) of countries are negotiating new treaties, and 39% (21/54) are renegotiating or terminating existing ones.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002174#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Investment disputes and threats of arbitration have led some governments to adopt more cautious approaches, including freezing the negotiation of new bilateral investment treaties (BITs), reviewing or terminating existing ones, or implementing constitutional language to avoid extra-regional arbitration tribunals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002174#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The use of model investment treaties is split, with 41% (22/54) of countries reporting they have one and 41% (22/54) reporting they do not. Some countries utilize the Southern African Development Community (SADC) model as a basis for their negotiations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002174#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Parliamentary involvement in the creation of model investment treaties is low, with 57% (31/54) of respondents stating their Parliament is not involved. However, most countries (78% or 42/54) do have a ratification process for investment treaties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002174#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and investment authorities are the most common lead agencies in investment treaty negotiations. In the specific case of investment chapters within broader trade agreements, trade ministries see increased involvement compared to standalone treaty negotiations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002174#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Coordination for treaty negotiations typically involves a lead ministry—usually finance or foreign affairs—working with other relevant bodies such as trade, justice, treasury, and industry.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002174#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Algeria","Angola","Argentina","Bangladesh","Benin","Bolivia","Brazil","Burkina Faso","Burundi","Cambodia","Cameroon","Chad","Chile","Colombia","Ivory Coast","Djibouti","Dominica","Dominican Republic","Ecuador","Ethiopia","The Gambia","Ghana","Indonesia","Jamaica","Kenya","Laos","Liberia","Madagascar","Mali","Montserrat","Mozambique","Myanmar","Namibia","Niger","Nigeria","Peru","Philippines","Rwanda","São Tomé and Príncipe","Sudan","Trinidad and Tobago","Tunisia","Uganda","Uruguay","Venezuela","Zambia","Zimbabwe"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["survey"]},{"id":"issafri-001651","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001651","title":"Peace & Security Council Report","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-110.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The February 2019 Peace & Security Council Report by the Institute for Security Studies examines the election of four new members to the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC), the 2019 AU chairmanship of Egypt, and South Africa's upcoming 2020 chairmanship. It also analyzes the viability of a new peace deal in the Central African Republic, the humanitarian focus on refugees in 2019, and the escalating political crisis in Sudan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001651#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The election of four new members to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 7 February 2019—Lesotho, Burundi, Algeria, and Kenya—highlights a tension between member states wanting to prevent AU Commission interference and those seeking a stronger council. Burundi and Lesotho, both experiencing political instability, may use their seats to shield themselves from external scrutiny and prevent the PSC from intervening in their internal affairs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001651#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The PSC faces structural issues regarding the criteria for membership, with the regional representation system often leading to 'electoral cronyism' where states ignore the Protocol establishing the PSC. The report argues that the council needs a 'reboot' because countries not at peace internally are unable to effectively contribute to peace elsewhere.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001651#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Egypt's 2019 AU chairmanship, led by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, prioritizes economic development and intra-African trade, including the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), though Egypt has yet to ratify the agreement. The report notes a policy gap in Egypt's six priority areas: the omission of governance issues, which are central to Africa's underdevelopment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001651#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"South Africa's upcoming 2020 AU chairmanship presents an opportunity to promote good governance, democratisation, and the 'silencing the guns by 2020' initiative. The report suggests South Africa should use its position to oppose government-led internet and social media shutdowns, citing recent examples in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Cameroon.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001651#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The African Union has designated 2019 as the 'Year of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons,' proposing to move the refugee portfolio from Political Affairs to a new department for health, humanitarian affairs and social development. This shift aims to address the root causes of displacement in a region that hosts over one third of the world's forcibly displaced people, including 6.3 million refugees and 14.5 million internally displaced people.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001651#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"A peace agreement signed on 6 February 2019 between the Central African Republic (CAR) government and 14 armed groups is viewed as a diplomatic success for the AU, but its viability is questioned due to a history of failed agreements. Key challenges include the issues of power sharing and impunity, specifically regarding the use of presidential pardons and the role of the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001651#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Widespread anti-government protests in Sudan, which began in Atbara on 19 December 2018, have resulted in more than 50 deaths between mid-December 2018 and early February 2019. The report urges the PSC to table Sudan for discussion and deploy a fact-finding mission to address the government's use of excessive force and the demands for comprehensive reforms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001651#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["climate change"],"geography_discussed":["Lesotho","Burundi","Algeria","Kenya","Nigeria","Egypt","South Africa","Central African Republic","Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Zimbabwe","Chad","Cameroon","Atbarah","Bangui","Khartoum"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","political analysis"]},{"id":"iisd-000169","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-000169","title":"Gender and Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform: Findings from and recommendations for Bangladesh, India and Nigeria","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-01-29","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/publications/gender-and-fossil-fuel-subsidy-reform-bangladesh-india-and-nigeria","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"This report examines the gendered impacts of kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) subsidies and their subsequent reform in Bangladesh, India, and Nigeria, focusing on the welfare, productivity, and empowerment of women and girls in low-income households.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000169#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The research investigates how kerosene and LPG subsidy policies and specific national reform proposals affect the empowerment, productivity, and welfare of women and girls in low-income households, analyzing these impacts through the lenses of energy supply, energy use, and income effects.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000169#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The study's methodology involved a review of 28 reform episodes, the use of secondary data, focus group discussions, and household surveys covering more than 2,400 households across the three target countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000169#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel subsidies","energy transition","gender equality","energy poverty"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["gender analysis","socio-economic impact assessment"]}]}