{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"geography":["Yemen"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":156,"relation":"eq"},"page":3,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?geography=Yemen&page=3","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?geography=Yemen&page=4","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"prio-000743","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-000743","title":"Evidencing the Gendered Dimensions of Climate Insecurity to Enhance Climate Change Adaptation","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2024","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/74e3f187-eed3-4175-9220-c08177ae563d/GPS Policy Brief 02-2024.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines how climate change acts as a 'threat multiplier' that exacerbates gender-based violence (GBV) by interacting with existing structural vulnerabilities and gender power dynamics. It highlights that women and gender minorities face distinct risks due to their specific labor roles, such as water collection and farming, and limited access to resources. While review articles show an increase in GBV following extreme weather events, the author notes a lack of robust quantitative data and a significant knowledge gap regarding sexual and gender minorities. The brief calls for governments to translate UN Women, Peace and Security (WPS) commitments into action through gender-sensitive disaster relief and the inclusion of marginalized groups in adaptation planning.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000743#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Climate change increases the risk of conflict and violence by intensifying existing political tensions, grievances, and structural vulnerabilities, effectively serving as a 'threat multiplier'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000743#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Gender-based violence (GBV) during or after extreme weather events is often driven by factors such as food insecurity, economic instability, mental stress, disrupted infrastructure, and increased exposure to men outside a woman's own community.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000743#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Specific labor tasks performed by women, particularly water collection and farming in low-income societies, increase their susceptibility to GBV and displacement under climate-induced insecurity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000743#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a critical lack of research on how climate change affects sexual and gender minorities, with only one identified paper on the subject of extreme weather and this group.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000743#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Current research on the climate-GBV nexus is limited by a reliance on qualitative, self-reported data, creating a need for robust quantitative studies and new data collection to establish causal links.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000743#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"USAID estimates identify Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, and Afghanistan as the countries with the highest risk scores regarding the nexus of gender and climate insecurity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000743#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While some UN Member States have included climate change in their National Action Plans (NAPs) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)—including Norway, Finland, and the United States—the translation of these commitments into material changes remains uncertain.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000743#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change adaptation","extreme weather event","food insecurity"],"geography_discussed":["Somalia","Yemen","South Sudan","Afghanistan","Norway","Finland","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy brief","literature review"]},{"id":"prio-001330","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001330","title":"Issue Paper Illicit Firearms Trafficking– Addressing the Criminal Side of Diversion","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2024","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/046c63ff-1c48-43aa-b6b2-fa667c75bc9b/Diversion_Issue_Paper_ENG_web.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes the relationship between the diversion of firearms—the transfer of weapons from legal to illicit realms—and illicit trafficking. It details various diversion typologies, including 'leakage' from state stocks, straw purchases, and the misuse of export documentation. Through 12 case studies spanning Europe, Africa, the Americas, and Asia, the document demonstrates how the UN Firearms Protocol's requirements for marking, record-keeping, and international judicial cooperation are critical for dismantling trafficking networks. It emphasizes that while diversion can occur domestically, it often serves as a prerequisite for cross-border trafficking, which requires a coordinated international criminal justice response to be effectively countered.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The vast majority of trafficked firearms are not produced illicitly but are instead legally manufactured weapons that are diverted to the black market. Data from 38 countries shows that an average of 89 per cent of seized firearms had unique markings from lawful manufacture or import, while only 11 per cent were produced illicitly.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Diversion is defined as the transfer of firearms, their parts, or ammunition from the legal to the illicit realm and is considered a prerequisite for trafficking.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Diversion occurs through various modalities, including 'leakage' (theft, corrupt sale, or loss from stocks), straw purchases, the use of forged documentation in international trade, and the collapse of state institutions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Europe, the illicit conversion of non-lethal firearms (such as blank-firing pistols) and the reactivation of deactivated weapons are significant methods of diversion. In the UK, 39 per cent of firearms seized in 2017 were either modified, converted, or reactivated.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Straw purchasing in the United States is a primary source of firearms for organized crime in Mexico and the Caribbean. Between 2014 and 2018, the US ATF traced 79,997 firearms seized in Mexico, finding that 70.2 per cent (56,162) were of US origin.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Large-scale diversion often occurs during state collapse or through inadequate stockpile management. In Libya, the 2011 collapse of government authority led to the looting of military depots, with weapons subsequently trafficked to at least 10 countries and territories, including Mali and Syria.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"State-sanctioned trafficking can occur when governments arm proxies in violation of international embargoes. For example, maritime seizures between 2018 and 2020 revealed a route from Iran to Houthi movement groups in Yemen, involving the transfer of Iranian-produced anti-material rifles and Chinese-made assault rifles.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UN Firearms Protocol is the only global agreement establishing the criminal offences and justice responses needed to prosecute arms trafficking. It requires states to criminalize illicit manufacturing, trafficking, and the tampering of markings.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Effective criminal justice responses depend on the ability to trace seized firearms, which allows law enforcement to identify the point of diversion and the last legitimate owner. The Protocol requires states to keep records for at least ten years to facilitate this.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"International and inter-agency cooperation is essential for dismantling trafficking networks, as these operations often span multiple jurisdictions. This includes the use of joint investigation teams and the exchange of intelligence via national Firearms Focal Points.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001330#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Europe","Slovakia","North Macedonia","Turkey","Italy","France","United States","Mexico","Iraq","Afghanistan","Syria","Bosnia and Herzegovina","Switzerland","South Sudan","Uganda","Israel","Bulgaria","Germany","Colombia","Yemen","Iran","Oman","Haiti","South Africa","Brazil","Austria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","policy analysis","legal analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001672","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001672","title":"Digital Transformations, Inclusion and Confidentiality in Peace Mediation","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2024","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/13be50bd-d73f-495f-85d2-9c1f7e276724/PRIO Policy Brief 19 2024.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the role of digital technologies in peace mediation, focusing on how non-governmental Peace Facilitation Organizations (PFOs) integrate 'PeaceTech' and manage digital conflict. It explores the tension between the need for confidentiality in high-level negotiations and the potential for digital tools to increase transparency and inclusion in community-level dialogues. While acknowledging that digital platforms can reach new demographics, the authors argue that technology is not a guarantee of equitable representation and should complement rather than replace traditional mediation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001672#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Peace Facilitation Organizations (PFOs) are adopting two main digital strategies: using digital tools as platforms for mediation and inclusion, and managing digital conflict drivers such as social media polarization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001672#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Specific 'PeaceTech' tools are being used to enhance mediation; for example, CMI's INCLUS software was used in Yemen to visualize points of agreement and disagreement among stakeholders via scatter plots.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001672#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"PFOs are actively addressing digital conflict through methods like the 'Redirect Method' by Moonshot, Ushahidi's monitoring of violence in Kenya, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's (HD) 'social media peace agreement' in Nigeria.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001672#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Digitalization complicates confidentiality in high-stakes negotiations by making it harder for participants to hide their locations and increasing the risk of instant leaks of documents and photos.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001672#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While confidentiality is vital in early stages, digital tools can be used in later stages to maintain narrative control and transparency, as seen during the 2018 Libyan National Conference via a public interactive website.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001672#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Digital platforms can expand inclusion by reaching hard-to-access areas or new demographics, but they do not automatically ensure equitable representation or a full understanding of the platform by participants.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001672#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The use of digital tools introduces significant security risks for PFOs; in one reported instance, a PFO faced government surveillance, including tapped phones, followed employees, and a stolen computer.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001672#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Yemen","Kenya","Nigeria","Libya","Philippines","Switzerland","Finland"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy brief","case study analysis"]},{"id":"greeneur-000312","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/greeneur-000312","title":"The EU needs to address its inconsistent Middle East foreign policy","publisher":{"name":"Green European Journal","organization":"green-european-journal"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2023-10-20","source_url":"https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/the-eu-needs-to-address-its-inconsistent-middle-east-foreign-policy/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The author contends that the EU's response to the Israel-Palestine crisis and other regional issues is hampered by internal divisions and the lack of a comprehensive Middle East strategy. The text highlights how the unanimity rule allows single member states to block collective action, such as ceasefire calls or opposition to US-led peace plans. It suggests that as US influence in the region wanes, the EU has an opportunity to establish an independent role, potentially through 'green diplomacy', provided it can overcome its internal fragmentation and move toward qualified majority voting.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000312#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The EU lacks a comprehensive Middle East strategy, unlike its specific strategies for the Sahel (2021) and Central Asia (2019), leading to an uncoordinated and reactive approach to geopolitical issues like the Syrian civil war.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000312#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU's foreign policy is frequently paralysed by the unanimity rule, which allows a single dissenting member state to block collective action. Examples include Hungary vetoing a ceasefire proposal in 2021 and six member states, including Italy, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, resisting a joint statement against Donald Trump's 'deal of the century' in 2020.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000312#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004 to encourage reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, has been criticised for a top-down approach that fails to consult regional perspectives and has 'largely failed to convince regional audiences.'","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000312#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU's response to the 2023 Israel-Palestine crisis is characterised by inconsistent rhetoric and a reluctance to hold Israel accountable for documented violations of international law, which the author suggests undermines the EU's credibility in establishing genuine partnerships with MENA countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000312#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"As the US reduces its military and political presence in the Middle East, the EU has an opportunity to define an independent role, which could include 'green diplomacy' providing financial and technical assistance for climate and environmental issues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000312#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance"],"geography_discussed":["Israel","Palestine","Gaza Strip","Netherlands","Ireland","France","Spain","Greece","Sahel","Central Asia","Syria","Lebanon","Jordan","Italy","Hungary","Czech Republic","United States","People's Republic of China","Iran","Saudi Arabia","Iraq","Afghanistan","Yemen","Austria","Poland","Germany","Jerusalem"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","political commentary"]},{"id":"trendas-000139","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/trendas-000139","title":"200+ Organizations Call on Governments to Address UAE Human Rights Abuses Ahead of COP28 Climate Negotiations","publisher":{"name":"Trend Asia","organization":"trend-asia"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2023-09-13","source_url":"https://trendasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Letter-to-COP28.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"A coalition of over 200 civil society organizations has issued a formal call to governments attending COP28, arguing that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an unsuitable host due to systemic human rights violations and a conflict of interest involving the COP28 president. The letter demands that the UAE end unlawful surveillance, release prisoners of conscience, and abolish the Kafala system. It specifically highlights abuses of migrant workers at Expo City Dubai and the UAE's role in regional conflicts in Yemen and Libya. Furthermore, the organizations condemn the UAE's 'greenwashing' and the dual role of Sultan al-Jaber as both COP28 president and CEO of the state oil company ADNOC, calling for a global commitment to phase out all fossil fuels to maintain the 1.5C temperature goal.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"trendas-000139#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The coalition argues that the legitimacy of COP28 is compromised because it is hosted by a \"repressive petrostate\" and overseen by an oil executive, which they describe as a \"blatant conflict of interest\".","ai_generated":true,"unit":"trendas-000139#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UAE is accused of operating as a \"surveillance state\", utilizing technology and apps like ToTok to spy on millions of people, including journalists and human rights defenders such as Ahmed Mansoor and Tawokkol Karman.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"trendas-000139#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document calls for the release of the \"UAE94\", a group of over 60 Emirati human rights defenders and dissidents, noting that more than three-quarters remain imprisoned despite some completing their sentences.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"trendas-000139#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The letter demands reparations for migrant workers at Expo City Dubai, the site of COP28, alleging that the \"majority of Expo 2020 Dubai workers interviewed faced forced labour practices\".","ai_generated":true,"unit":"trendas-000139#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UAE is urged to cease supporting human rights violations in the Middle East and North Africa, specifically calling for reparations for victims of the Saudi/UAE-led war and blockade in Yemen and an end to arms supplies to Libya in violation of a UN Security Council embargo.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"trendas-000139#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The organizations condemn the appointment of Sultan al-Jaber as COP28 president while he remains CEO of the state oil company ADNOC, labeling this as \"fossil fuel hypocrisy\".","ai_generated":true,"unit":"trendas-000139#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The coalition demands a global commitment at COP28 to phase out all fossil fuels and subsidies to keep global average temperature increases below 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"trendas-000139#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate justice","human rights","fossil fuel subsidy","fossil-fuel phase-out","greenwashing"],"geography_discussed":["Yemen","Libya","Bahrain","Egypt","Tunisia","Dubai"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"commyale-000014","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/commyale-000014","title":"Global Warming’s Six Audiences: A Cross-National Comparison","publisher":{"name":"Yale Program on Climate Change Communication","organization":"yale-program-on-climate-change-communication"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023-08-01","source_url":"https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/global-warmings-six-audiences-a-cross-national-comparison/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report uses the Six Americas Super Short Survey (SASSY) to categorize Facebook users in 110 countries and territories into six groups: Alarmed, Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful, and Dismissive. The 'Alarmed' group is the largest in approximately 80 of the surveyed locations, with the highest percentages found in Chile (65%), Mexico (64%), Malawi (63%), Bolivia (62%), and Sri Lanka (61%). Conversely, the United States exhibits a higher proportion of 'Doubtful' and 'Dismissive' respondents (22%) compared to other major carbon emitters and is less 'Alarmed' (34%) than many of its peers. Regional analysis shows South America has the highest proportion of countries with a majority of 'Alarmed' respondents, while Southwest Asia and North Africa show higher levels of doubt or dismissal, particularly in Yemen (34%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000014#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 'Alarmed' audience—those who view climate change as an urgent, human-caused threat and support climate policies—is the most prevalent group in about 73% of the surveyed countries and territories (80 out of 110). In 29 countries, at least 50% of respondents are Alarmed, with the highest concentrations in Chile (65%), Mexico (64%), Malawi (63%), Bolivia (62%), and Sri Lanka (61%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000014#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Among the world's top carbon-emitting nations, the United States has a notably higher proportion of 'Doubtful' and 'Dismissive' respondents (22%) than other major emitters. The U.S. is also less 'Alarmed' (34%) than other top emitters like Mexico (64%), Brazil (59%), and India (55%), and shares one of the lowest percentages of Alarmed respondents with Germany (34%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000014#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional variations in climate attitudes are significant: South America has the highest frequency of countries where a majority of the population is 'Alarmed' (6 out of 9 countries), while the region of Southwest Asia and North Africa shows high levels of skepticism, with Yemen reporting 34% of respondents as 'Doubtful' or 'Dismissive'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000014#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The survey identifies specific national extremes in climate attitudes, such as Czechia and Yemen having the lowest percentages of 'Alarmed' respondents (both 9%), and the United States, Saudi Arabia (17%), and Australia (16%) having the highest percentages of 'Doubtful' or 'Dismissive' respondents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000014#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["carbon dioxide emissions"],"geography_discussed":["Chile","Mexico","Malawi","Bolivia","Sri Lanka","Czech Republic","Yemen","United States","Brazil","India","Germany","United Kingdom","Saudi Arabia","Indonesia","Australia","Thailand","New Zealand","Portugal","Norway","Finland","Kosovo","Netherlands","Sweden","Cyprus","Armenia","Denmark","Bosnia and Herzegovina","Ireland","Romania","Costa Rica","El Salvador","Puerto Rico","Panama","Nicaragua","Guatemala","Honduras","Haiti","Canada","Uruguay","Turkey","Jordan","Iraq","Nigeria","Benin","Kenya","Congo","Tanzania","Asia and the Pacific","Europe","North America","South America","Southwest Asia and North Africa","sub-Saharan Africa"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["cross-national comparison","survey"]},{"id":"sei-000325","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/sei-000325","title":"Assessment of the Post-Paris Agreement Era","publisher":{"name":"Stockholm Environment Institute","organization":"stockholm-environment-institute"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2023-05-08","source_url":"https://www.sei.org/publications/assessment-of-the-post-paris-agreement-era/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study analyzed bilateral climate finance from 2016 to 2020 for ten countries with low governance scores, finding a total disbursement of US$1.3 billion. The funding was heavily skewed toward mitigation (92%) and dominated by Japan, which provided US$1 billion specifically for natural gas-fired power plants in Uzbekistan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000325#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Between 2016 and 2020, ten countries with low governance scores received a total of US$1.3 billion in disbursed bilateral climate finance, with the vast majority (92 percent) allocated to mitigation, 7 percent to adaptation, and 1 percent to both.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000325#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Japan was the primary provider of bilateral climate finance to the studied group, contributing US$1 billion to support natural gas-fired electric power plants in Uzbekistan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000325#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regarding financial instruments, development-focused loans were the most common cumulatively, while grants were the most common instrument when measured on a per-country basis.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000325#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance","climate change mitigation","climate change adaptation","governance"],"geography_discussed":["Japan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001618","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001618","title":"Conflict Trends in the Middle East, 1989–2022","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2023-04","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/a025e684-30d0-4394-a7a5-db4cdc86bc9d/Obermeier - Conflict Trends in the Middle East 1989-2022 - Conflict Trends 4-2023.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Middle East experienced a significant decline in battle-related deaths in 2022, primarily due to de-escalation in Syria and Yemen. While state-based conflicts remain the deadliest and most common, non-state conflicts proliferated in the 2010s before declining. One-sided violence increased in Iran in 2022 following protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001618#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Battle-related deaths from state-based conflicts in the Middle East dropped from over 26,000 in 2021 to approximately 5,000 in 2022, marking the lowest level since 2011.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001618#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The conflict in Yemen saw a major de-escalation in 2022 following a UN-mediated ceasefire in April, with deaths falling to fewer than 3,000 from a peak of over 23,000 in 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001618#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The civil war in Syria de-escalated between 2021 and 2022, resulting in its reclassification from a war to a conflict in 2022.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001618#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state conflicts in the region peaked in the mid-2010s due to the spread of IS and instability in Syria, but have since declined, reaching their lowest point since 2012 for two consecutive years as of 2022.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001618#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Government of Iran engaged in one-sided violence against civilians in 2022, resulting in more than 340 deaths during protests following the death of Mahsa Amini; additionally, executions increased by 36% in the first half of 2023 compared to the first half of 2022.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001618#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In 2022, the Egyptian military's efforts to counter IS and Wilayat Sina' in North Sinai involved razing hundreds of homes and farmland, which Human Rights Watch characterized as war crimes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001618#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["human rights"],"geography_discussed":["Syria","Yemen","Iran","Egypt","Turkey","Iraq","Israel","Palestine","Gaza Strip","North Sinai Governorate"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["trend analysis","quantitative analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001501","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001501","title":"Israel and the Abraham Accords: A Failed Expansion","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2023-02","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/1c9183fd-f15a-4ee0-8b60-a7c5c6540858/Jensehaugen - Israel and the Abraham Accords A Failed Expansion MidEast Policy Brief 2-2023.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that Israel's ambition to expand the Abraham Accords, particularly to Saudi Arabia, has been thwarted by a combination of far-right domestic policies and Saudi Arabia's strategic pivot toward normalization with Iran, Syria, and Hamas. While existing agreements with states like the UAE remain economically robust, the brief notes that the current Israeli government's actions in the West Bank and its judicial reforms have strained relations with the US and Jordan, while removing the primary incentive for Saudi engagement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001501#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Israel's goal of expanding the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia has been blocked by Saudi Arabia's decision to prioritize normalization with Iran and Syria over engagement with Israel.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001501#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Saudi-Iran normalization agreement signed on 10 March 2023, mediated by China, removed the shared enmity toward Iran that served as the primary driver for potential Israeli-Saudi cooperation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001501#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The current far-right Israeli government has undermined the possibility of a Palestinian settlement through military attacks in the West Bank and the de facto annexation of territories by transferring legal authority from the IDF to the Minister of Finance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001501#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Relations between Israel and Jordan have reached a low point due to the actions of far-right ministers, including Itamar Ben Gvir's visit to the Haram al-Sharif and Bezalel Smotrich's denial of the existence of a Palestinian people.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001501#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Existing Abraham Accords, particularly with the UAE, remain resilient primarily due to significant economic interests, such as a free-trade agreement that generates $2 billion annually, despite symbolic diplomatic friction over Israeli policies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001501#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Domestic instability in Israel, driven by massive protests against judicial reforms intended to reduce the judiciary's independence, has created tensions with the United States government.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001501#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Saudi Arabia","United Arab Emirates","Jordan","Iran","Syria","West Bank","United States","Yemen","Bahrain","Morocco","Sudan","People's Republic of China"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["geopolitical analysis","policy assessment"]},{"id":"ciel-000553","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/ciel-000553","title":"Human Rights Obligations in the Context of Climate Change","publisher":{"name":"Center for International Environmental Law","organization":"center-for-international-environmental-law"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2023","source_url":"https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/HRTB-Synthesis-Note-2024_CIEL_GIESCR_Committee-on-Economic-Social-and-Cultural-Rights-CESCR.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The CESCR addressed climate change in most of its 2023 work, including twelve Concluding Observations and seven Lists of Issues. The Committee focused on mitigation policies, urging states like Brazil, Panama, and Portugal to meet their Paris Agreement NDCs, and recommended that China expand its emissions trading system and stop financing overseas coal power. Adaptation efforts were highlighted in nineteen statements, with specific calls for national adaptation plans in Cambodia, Palestine, and Yemen, and an emphasis on the participation of Indigenous Peoples in Panama. Additionally, the Committee challenged the fossil fuel reliance of states such as Qatar and China, while inquiring about oil refinery pollution in Curaçao.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ciel-000553#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The CESCR reviewed mitigation policies in seventeen outputs, emphasizing Paris Agreement commitments. It specifically noted that Brazil, Panama, and Portugal were not on track to meet their nationally determined contributions (NDCs).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ciel-000553#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Committee provided specific mitigation recommendations to China, including the expansion of its emissions trading system and the cessation of financing and construction for coal-fired power plants both domestically and abroad due to adverse extraterritorial impacts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ciel-000553#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Adaptation was addressed in nineteen statements, with the Committee requesting that Cambodia, Palestine, and Yemen develop national adaptation plans (NAPs). In Portugal, the Committee recommended climate-smart land management for fire prevention and food systems that protect the environment and the rights of farmers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ciel-000553#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Committee emphasized the necessity of including marginalized groups and Indigenous Peoples in adaptation policies, specifically calling for effective consultation and free, prior, and informed consent in Panama, Brazil, and Cambodia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ciel-000553#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The CESCR addressed fossil fuel dependency in six outputs, expressing concern over Qatar's reliance on natural gas and oil and its plans to increase liquefied natural gas production and trade.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ciel-000553#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change","Paris Agreement","Nationally Determined Contributions","Net-zero emissions","renewable energy","emission trading","deforestation","national adaptation plan","agroforestry","indigenous rights","fossil fuel","natural gas","coal power","sustainable development"],"geography_discussed":["Armenia","Brazil","People's Republic of China","Palestine","Panama","Portugal","Lithuania","Qatar","Croatia","United Kingdom","Malawi","Rwanda","Netherlands","Russia","Kenya","Cambodia","Yemen","Chad","Curaçao"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy review","human rights monitoring"]},{"id":"commyale-000262","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/commyale-000262","title":"International Public Opinion on Climate Change: Extreme Weather and Vulnerability, 2023","publisher":{"name":"Yale Program on Climate Change Communication","organization":"yale-program-on-climate-change-communication"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023","source_url":"https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/app/uploads/2024/03/international-public-opinion-extreme-weather-vulnerability_b.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that majorities in all 73 surveyed low-emission areas have experienced extreme weather, with unusually hot weather being the most common hazard. Most respondents attribute these events to climate change, yet significant gaps in individual and household preparedness exist, particularly in South America and Europe. Recovery times vary widely, with some populations in Central Asia and the Balkans expecting recovery to take a year or more.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000262#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"A majority of respondents in every one of the 73 surveyed countries, territories, and geographic areas reported having experienced at least one extreme weather event or hazard.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000262#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Long periods of unusually hot weather were the most frequently reported recent hazard in 62 out of the 73 surveyed areas, with the highest reporting rates in Uzbekistan (77%), El Salvador (69%), and Puerto Rico (68%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000262#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Majorities in all 73 surveyed areas both experienced an extreme weather event and believed that climate change contributed to that event by either a 'moderate amount' or 'a great deal'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000262#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Significant levels of household unpreparedness were reported in 31 of the 73 areas, with Taiwan (76%), El Salvador (72%), and Azerbaijan (71%) having the highest proportions of respondents who felt 'not that prepared' or 'not at all prepared'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000262#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional disparities in preparedness are evident; majorities in all surveyed South American areas and European areas (Balkan countries and Armenia) reported being unprepared, whereas few areas in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia showed similar majority-unpreparedness.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000262#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A vast majority of respondents (67 out of 73 areas) believe that less than half or none of the people closest to them are prepared for extreme weather, with the highest perception of unpreparedness in Panama (84%), El Salvador (81%), and Turkey (81%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000262#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Recovery time from extreme weather events varies by region, with respondents in Uzbekistan (59%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (56%), and Bulgaria (55%) most likely to state it would take a year or more for their household to recover.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000262#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Social support networks for extreme weather recovery are weakest in Morocco and Lebanon (both 44%) and Pakistan (42%), where respondents are most likely to report having no relatives or friends to count on for help.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000262#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["extreme weather event","extreme event attribution","climate change vulnerability","climate change adaptation","heat wave","drought","flood","wildfire","sea level rise"],"geography_discussed":["Puerto Rico","Uruguay","Costa Rica","Dominican Republic","El Salvador","Congo DRC","Yemen","Angola","Uzbekistan","Serbia","Taiwan","Azerbaijan","Laos","Cambodia","Vietnam","Panama","Turkey","Romania","Philippines","Bosnia and Herzegovina","Bulgaria","Thailand","Benin","Indonesia","Morocco","Lebanon","Pakistan","Mozambique"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["public opinion survey","cross-regional analysis"]},{"id":"seforall-000100","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/seforall-000100","title":"Global access to cooling gaps 2023: Summary","publisher":{"name":"Sustainable Energy for All","organization":"sustainable-energy-for-all"},"document_type":"executive summary","language":"en","date_published":"2023","source_url":"https://www.seforall.org/chilling-prospects-access-to-cooling-gaps-2023/summary","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Chilling Prospects 2023 analysis identifies 1.12 billion people at high risk of lacking cooling access, primarily the rural and urban poor. While high-risk populations decreased slightly by 20.4 million since 2022, the lower-middle-income group at medium risk grew to 2.9 billion people. The report highlights significant gender disparities, with women overrepresented in high-risk groups, and identifies 'Critical 9' countries—including India, China, and Nigeria—where the most pronounced risks exist.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000100#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In 2023, 1.12 billion people among the rural and urban poor are at high risk due to a lack of access to cooling, representing a decrease of approximately 20.4 million people from the 2022 analysis. This high-risk group is composed of 596 million women and 525 million men, with women making up 52 percent of the high-risk population in rural areas and 54 percent in urban areas.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000100#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The lower-middle-income population at medium risk increased to 2.90 billion people, a 0.4 percent increase in the 2023 analysis and a 7.1 percent increase between 2019 and 2023. Approximately 80 percent of this group lives below the higher poverty line of USD 6.85 per day, which may create affordability constraints for women.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000100#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'Critical 9' countries—Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sudan—contain 772.2 million people at high risk. Mozambique has the highest proportional risk at 83 percent of its population, followed by Nigeria (53 percent) and Sudan (44 percent).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000100#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"India showed a significant shift in risk profiles: the rural and urban poor populations declined by 16.9 million and 4.2 million people respectively, while the lower-middle-income population at medium risk grew by 21.8 million people, likely due to improvements in rural electricity access and economic resilience.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000100#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Middle-income people at low risk grew by approximately 57 million people since 2022 to reach 958.7 million, with a relatively balanced gender distribution of 475 million women and 484 million men.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000100#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change adaptation","heat stress","energy access","decarbonization"],"geography_discussed":["People's Republic of China","Iran","Mexico","North Africa","sub-Saharan Africa","India","Bangladesh","Pakistan","Brazil","Mozambique","Nigeria","Sudan","Yemen","Indonesia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["risk assessment","demographic analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002241","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002241","title":"Ethiopia’s national dialogue","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2022-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/EAR-47-2.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report argues that Ethiopia's national dialogue initiative is hindered by a fundamental clash between a 'deliberative' approach favored by the government—which seeks a rational consensus to resolve differences—and the reality of a severely divided society characterized by deep-seated historical injustices. The author contends that the process will only succeed if stakeholders shift toward an 'agonistic' model that focuses on transforming antagonistic relations into adversarial politics and reckoning with the past, rather than attempting to manufacture a final consensus on fundamental national issues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002241#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Ethiopian government and opposition parties hold diametrically opposed visions of the national dialogue, with disagreements rooted in different conceptual frameworks rather than mere procedural disputes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002241#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Ethiopian state has failed to address historical wrongs, leading to a political environment defined by a dichotomy of 'the dominant' and 'the dominated' or 'the oppressor' and 'the oppressed'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002241#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The government's approach is based on deliberative democracy, which aims for a 'rational consensus' to resolve fundamental issues, a goal the author describes as 'political naiveté' given Ethiopia's deep socio-structural cleavages.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002241#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author advocates for an 'agonistic' approach to dialogue, which accepts that conflict is inherent and seeks to transform 'antagonism into agonism' and 'enemies to adversaries' rather than eliminating conflict through consensus.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002241#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A successful national dialogue in Ethiopia requires a 'relational' and 'transformative' process that focuses on changing inter-group relationships and reckoning with collective memory, rather than just making policy decisions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002241#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a profound trust deficit between the government and opposition, evidenced by the opposition's demand for third-party facilitators and their fears that the commission will be used to impose a hegemonic government narrative.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002241#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The National Dialogue Commission's 'bottom-up' strategy of convening 6,000 public conversations is criticized for assuming that political fault lines are primarily elite-driven and for ignoring horizontal inter-communal tensions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002241#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report concludes that it is unlikely a national dialogue can fully resolve Ethiopia's political divisions on 'fundamental national issues'; the most realistic goal is a 'conflictual consensus' on democracy and constitutionalism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002241#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["human rights"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Tunisia","Yemen","Addis Ababa","Tigray Region","Oromia Region","Dire Dawa"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["conceptual analysis","policy assessment","political analysis"]},{"id":"iisd-002817","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-002817","title":"Uncertain Climate Impact and Several Open Questions","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2022-10","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2022-07/energy-charter-treaty-agreement-analysis.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes the proposed modernization of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), concluding that the reforms are too modest to support the energy transition. Key criticisms include the continued protection of fossil fuel investments in most contracting parties, the retention of a 20-year survival clause, and the failure to reform the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. The authors argue that the 'flexibility mechanism' for fossil fuel carve-outs is limited in practice and that broad investment protection standards, such as Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET), remain out of step with modern treaty practice, potentially exposing states to significant financial liabilities for climate-related regulatory actions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002817#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The proposed reforms are insufficient to make the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) compatible with the global climate agenda, as they are described as \"too modest, too piecemeal, and too untested\" to support states' energy transition goals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002817#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Fossil fuel investment protection remains largely intact; only the European Union and the United Kingdom have opted for carve-outs. In more than 20 other contracting parties, existing and future fossil fuel investments will continue to be protected indefinitely.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002817#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'flexibility mechanism' intended to allow states to exclude fossil fuel protection is hindered by high voting thresholds, requiring unanimity for unilateral exclusions, which the report labels as a \"misnomer\" or \"deliberate greenwash.\"","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002817#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The treaty's scope is expanded to include new energy materials and technologies, such as carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS), which increases the risk of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims and may restrict regulatory flexibility.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002817#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The revised Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) provision remains problematic because it includes the frustration of an investor's 'legitimate expectations' as a stand-alone ground for a breach, contradicting modern treaty trends.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002817#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report identifies a major failure to reform the ISDS mechanism itself and the 20-year survival clause, the latter of which locks in investment protection for two decades after a state withdraws from the treaty.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002817#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The agreement fails to address valuation techniques, specifically the 'discounted cash flow' (DCF) method, which can lead to massive compensation awards for early-stage projects without a track record of profitability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002817#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The new Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO) provision aims to prevent intra-EU arbitration, but its effectiveness is uncertain as it is framed as a clarification rather than a new rule, and tribunals may still claim jurisdiction.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002817#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["fossil-fuel phase-out","climate finance","renewable energy","hydrogen","climate change litigation","energy transition"],"geography_discussed":["Japan","Switzerland","Turkey","Kazakhstan","Yemen","Spain","Italy"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","legal analysis"]},{"id":"geconco-000015","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/geconco-000015","title":"Continuing global conflicts demonstrate the need for a new eco-social contract","publisher":{"name":"Green Economy Coalition","organization":"green-economy-coalition"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2022-03-18","source_url":"https://www.greeneconomycoalition.org/news-and-resources/continuing-global-conflicts-demonstrate-the-need-for-a-new-eco-social-contract","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Green Economy Coalition (GEC) and partners in The People’s Global Summit express solidarity with populations suffering from armed conflict, specifically highlighting the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. The document emphasizes the need for a 'New Eco-Social World' and the pursuit of shared global values to create sustainable communities and environments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"geconco-000015#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The document highlights a severe global displacement crisis, noting that over 80 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced by conflict, with more than 3 million refugees specifically from Ukraine seeking asylum.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"geconco-000015#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The GEC and The People’s Global Summit partners are pursuing the development of a 'New Eco-Social World' based on shared global values and the inclusion of diverse groups—including UN agencies, faith groups, and local communities—to build sustainable environments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"geconco-000015#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Ukraine","Syria","Palestine","Yemen","Somalia","Sudan","Afghanistan","South Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statement"]},{"id":"sgr-000139","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/sgr-000139","title":"Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) Update on financial links with fossil fuels and arms corporations","publisher":{"name":"Scientists for Global Responsibility","organization":"scientists-for-global-responsibility"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2022-03","source_url":"https://www.sgr.org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-03/IET_progress_report_0.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report by Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) finds that the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) maintains significant financial ties to the arms and fossil fuel sectors through investments, corporate partnerships, and sponsorships. Despite adopting an ESG policy in 2019 and setting a net-zero target for its own operations, the IET has not excluded any asset types from its investments. SGR highlights that the IET invests in funds containing thermal coal, oil sands, and various controversial and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the IET maintains corporate partnerships with numerous arms companies and fossil fuel giants like BP and Shell. SGR argues these links contradict the IET's stated values of integrity and its goal of 'working to engineer a better world', especially as peers in other scientific and medical fields have moved toward full divestment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000139#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The IET has an ESG investment policy but does not exclude any specific asset types or individual investments, leading to holdings in fossil fuels and arms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000139#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The IET invests in the BlackRock Dynamic Diversified Growth Fund, which includes assets in thermal coal, oil sands, nuclear weapons, and several types of controversial weapons.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000139#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The IET maintains corporate partnerships with over 100 entities, including fossil fuel companies BP and Shell, and numerous arms corporations such as BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000139#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The IET receives financial support from the arms industry through donations, event sponsorship, and education programme support, including contributions from Airbus, BAE Systems, Chemring Group, and Thales.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000139#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The IET has set a target to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions from its own operations within ten years, though it lacks a comprehensive environmental policy on its website.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000139#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"SGR argues that the IET's financial ties to the arms and fossil fuel industries contradict its own Rules of Conduct and its stated purpose of 'working to engineer a better world'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000139#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Several of the IET's peer organisations in science and medicine have already implemented stricter exclusions or full divestment from arms and fossil fuels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000139#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel","oil sands","Net-zero emissions","decarbonization","fossil-fuel divestment","Paris Agreement","carbon footprint","renewable energy","energy storage","carbon capture and storage"],"geography_discussed":["Yemen","Saudi Arabia","Canada","Germany","World"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","financial analysis","benchmarking"]},{"id":"sgr-000141","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/sgr-000141","title":"Institution of Mechanical Engineers Update on financial links with fossil fuels and arms corporations","publisher":{"name":"Scientists for Global Responsibility","organization":"scientists-for-global-responsibility"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2022-03","source_url":"https://www.sgr.org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-03/IMechE_progress_report.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report by Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) finds that the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IMechE) lacks transparency regarding its investments, making it impossible to determine the full extent of its financial ties to fossil fuels and arms. While IMechE has implemented some internal sustainability measures, such as LED lighting and travel reduction, it maintains corporate links to arms companies like Meggitt and Rolls Royce, and fossil fuel company Fugro, through its Company Based Registration scheme. SGR argues these links contradict IMechE's professional code of conduct and its role as a climate change thought leader, noting that several peer organisations have already divested from such industries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000141#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IMechE) lacks a transparent ethical investment policy, and SGR found no evidence of such a policy in the Institution's online documentation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000141#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"IMechE's investments are managed by Schroder & Co, BlackRock Investment Managers, and CCLA Investment Management, but the Institution does not disclose the specific funds or assets held, limiting the ability to track investments in arms or fossil fuels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000141#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Through its 'Company Based Registration' scheme, IMechE maintains formal links with corporations in the arms sector, specifically Meggitt and Rolls Royce, as well as the fossil fuel company Fugro.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000141#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"SGR highlights a specific ethical and legal concern regarding Rolls Royce's role in manufacturing the UK's nuclear-armed Dreadnought submarines, noting that nuclear weapons are illegal under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as of January 22, 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000141#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"IMechE has taken some operational steps toward sustainability, including converting 90% of its headquarters' lighting to low-energy LEDs and committing to report against the Streamlined Energy and Carbon Reporting (SECR) policy from January 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000141#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Several peer professional and medical organisations have adopted stricter policies than IMechE, with some fully divesting from fossil fuels and arms, including the Royal Meteorological Society, the Geological Society, and the British Medical Association.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sgr-000141#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["fossil-fuel divestment","climate risk","carbon neutrality","carbon footprint","Paris Agreement","carbon capture and storage","renewable energy","energy transition","environmental, social and corporate governance"],"geography_discussed":["Australia","Yemen","Canada","Germany"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","financial analysis","ethical review"]},{"id":"prio-001824","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001824","title":"Can the EU be an Effective Foreign Policy Actor Working for Peace in Libya?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2022-02","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/78ea06f5-9c2b-48e2-a414-1a2efa62588e/Tjonn - Can the EU be an Effective Foreign Policy Actor Working for Peace in Libya MidEast Policy Brief 2-2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that EU efforts to secure peace in Libya have been undermined by competing national interests, particularly between France and Italy, and a tendency to prioritize short-term goals like migration externalization and energy resource access. While the EU has successfully used Libya to limit migrant crossings through disputed agreements like the Valletta Memorandum, these same mechanisms have not translated into political stability. The author suggests that the EU should employ multi-track diplomacy and a concerted, unified approach that incorporates Libyan interests to achieve a sustainable peace.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001824#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The EU has prioritized short-term objectives in Libya, specifically the externalization of migration management and the securing of energy resources, over the long-term goal of establishing a stable and peaceful state.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001824#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"European migration management in Libya is facilitated by the 2017 Valletta Memorandum between Italy and the Libyan Government of National Accord, a deal supported and partially funded by the EU to limit migrant entries into the Union.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001824#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The externalization of migration has led to human rights concerns, including the containment of migrants in squalid conditions and the empowerment of the Libyan Coast Guard, which has ties to human trafficking.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001824#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Competing economic and political interests between France and Italy have hindered a coherent EU approach to Libyan peace. Italy's interests are tied to the oil company ENI, while France has supported warlord Khalifa Haftar to potentially open doors for the company Total.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001824#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"International peace efforts, including the UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and Berlin conferences in 2020 and 2021, have managed to establish a tenuous ceasefire but have failed to achieve lasting stability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001824#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author proposes that the EU adopt a unified stance and utilize multi-track diplomacy (MTD)—which it has used in Ukraine, Georgia, Mali, and Yemen—to engage Libyan actors and secure peace.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001824#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["petroleum industry","human rights"],"geography_discussed":["Italy","France","Turkey","Russia","United States","Ukraine","Georgia","Mali","Yemen"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","geopolitical assessment"]},{"id":"commyale-000264","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/commyale-000264","title":"international public opinion on climate change 2022","publisher":{"name":"Yale Program on Climate Change Communication","organization":"yale-program-on-climate-change-communication"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/app/uploads/2023/07/international-public-opinion-on-climate-change-2022b.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report presents survey data from 108,946 Facebook users worldwide, revealing high global levels of worry and belief that climate change is happening, though perceptions of its causes and the responsibility for action vary significantly by region. While there is widespread support for renewable energy and the belief that climate action will not harm economic growth, willingness to engage in organized climate activism remains low in most regions, with a notable exception in Sub-Saharan Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000264#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"While a vast majority of respondents globally believe climate change is occurring, knowledge levels and beliefs about its causes vary. Respondents in Finland (92%) and Hungary (90%) are most likely to report knowing a moderate to large amount, whereas those in Benin (34%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Haiti (all 32%) are most likely to have never heard of it. Regarding causality, majorities in 108 of 110 areas believe human activities are at least partially responsible, but only 26 areas have a majority who believe it is mostly caused by humans, with the highest agreement in Spain (65%), Sweden (61%), and Taiwan (60%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000264#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Worry about climate change is widespread, with majorities in 108 of 110 areas expressing concern. The highest levels of worry are found in Mexico (95%), Portugal (93%), and Chile (93%), while the lowest are in Yemen (32%) and Jordan (48%). Most respondents (76 of 110 areas) believe climate change will harm future generations 'a great deal,' but far fewer (17 of 110 areas) believe it will harm them personally 'a great deal,' with the highest personal risk perceived in Malawi (62%) and Chile (61%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000264#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Perceptions of responsibility for reducing climate pollution are split across three main entities. In 42 areas, the government is seen as most responsible (e.g., Romania, Uzbekistan, and Lebanon at 50%); in another 42 areas, individual people are seen as most responsible (e.g., El Salvador at 52%); and in 25 areas, businesses are viewed as most responsible (e.g., Germany and Mexico at 43%). Despite these differences, 104 of 110 areas believe climate change should be a high or very high government priority.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000264#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is strong global support for the economic viability of climate action and the transition to renewable energy. Majorities in 109 of 110 areas believe that reducing climate change will either improve economic growth and jobs or have no effect. Additionally, 109 of 110 areas support increasing the use of renewable energy, with the highest support in Hungary (91%), Portugal (89%), and Spain (89%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000264#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Support for reducing fossil fuel use is less uniform than support for renewables. Majorities in 41 of 110 areas support decreasing fossil fuel use, led by Denmark (79%), the UK (72%), and Sweden (72%). Conversely, 13 areas have majorities who believe their country should increase fossil fuel use, including Ghana (58%) and Mozambique (57%), although these same populations also support increasing renewable energy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000264#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Willingness to join organized climate activism is generally low, with majorities in only 20 of 108 surveyed areas expressing a definite willingness to join such groups. This trend is most pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa, where majorities in 12 of 17 areas would join, including Zambia (75%) and Malawi (74%). In contrast, no surveyed areas in Europe, North America, or South America had a majority willing to join an organized group.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"commyale-000264#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["renewable energy","fossil fuel","economic growth","climate policy"],"geography_discussed":["Europe","sub-Saharan Africa","South America","Southwest Asia and North Africa","North America","Finland","Hungary","Benin","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Nigeria","Haiti","Spain","Sweden","Taiwan","Indonesia","Yemen","Germany","Algeria","Cambodia","Mexico","Portugal","Chile","Jordan","Puerto Rico","Costa Rica","Malawi","Czech Republic","Norway","Angola","Zambia","Sri Lanka","Romania","Uzbekistan","Lebanon","El Salvador","Panama","Australia","Bangladesh","Brazil","Japan","Mozambique","Ghana","Netherlands"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["public opinion survey"]},{"id":"prio-001631","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001631","title":"Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2021","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/988284ec-ec0d-4d9b-ba30-006b223ce98e/Palik et al - Conflict Trends A Global Overview 1946-2021 PRIO Paper 2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes global conflict dynamics, noting that state-based conflicts reached historic highs in 2019 and 2020. It highlights the significant role of the Islamic State (IS) in driving conflict numbers and the rise of non-state conflicts, particularly in the Americas and Africa. The document also tracks the declining success rates of non-violent resistance campaigns and the prevalence of conflict-related sexual violence, which is most frequently recorded in Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"State-based conflicts reached record highs in 2019 and 2020, with 56 conflicts recorded in each year. In 2021, 54 state-based conflicts were recorded across 35 countries, resulting in nearly 85,000 battle-related deaths.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The conflict in Yemen saw a massive escalation in fatalities, with battle-related deaths increasing from 2,300 in 2020 to more than 23,000 in 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The expansion of the Islamic State (IS) has been a primary driver of the increase in state-based conflicts. In 2021, there were 15 conflicts involving IS, and between 2015 and 2021, IS-related conflicts represented 26% to 33% of all conflicts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state conflicts have stabilized at higher levels than before 2012. In 2021, 76 non-state conflicts were recorded, resulting in 25,247 battle-related deaths, an increase of over 2,000 from the previous year.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state conflict in the Americas is primarily characterized by fighting between highly organized actors, specifically drug cartel violence in Mexico, whereas non-state conflict in Africa features a higher number of communal conflicts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"One-sided violence fatalities increased from 8,596 in 2020 to 10,003 in 2021. While non-state actors commit the largest share of this violence, there has been an increase in government-perpetrated one-sided violence since 2014.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-violent resistance campaigns were more prevalent than violent ones between 1989 and 2019, but their success rate has declined since 2010. In the last decade, six of ten years saw failure rates of 60% or higher.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is most frequently recorded in Africa, where 18% of all active conflict-actor-years between 1989 and 2019 experienced it. State actors are the most frequent perpetrators, responsible for more than half of all reported 'massive' levels of sexual violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001631#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Afghanistan","Yemen","Syria","Ethiopia","Mexico","Africa","Asia","Middle East","Americas","Europe","Tanzania"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","trend analysis","regional comparison"]}]}