{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"geography":["Sudan"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":697,"relation":"eq"},"page":6,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?geography=Sudan&page=6","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?geography=Sudan&page=7","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"saiia-001952","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/saiia-001952","title":"Le continent de Moscou : Les principes de l’engagement de la Russie dans la politique africaine","publisher":{"name":"South African Institute of International Affairs","organization":"south-african-institute-of-international-affairs"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"fr","date_published":"2024-03","source_url":"https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SAIIA_OP_355_leContinentMoscou.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes Russia's strategic pivot toward Africa as a means to diversify partners and evade Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine. It argues that while Africa is not a central priority for the Kremlin, it serves as a critical 'theater' for projecting power, securing natural resources, and challenging US-led unipolarity. The paper details Russia's approach across several sectors, including arms sales, nuclear energy, and mining, while highlighting the role of the Wagner Group in providing security in exchange for resource access. It concludes that Russia leverages African support at the UN to maintain its status as a global power and to promote a multipolar international system.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Russia's engagement in Africa is structured around three primary themes: the pursuit of alternative economic partnerships, the search for geopolitical influence, and the promotion of multipolarity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite increasing efforts, Russia's trade volume with Africa remains small compared to other global powers; in 2021, trade between Russia and Africa was estimated at just over $17 billion, whereas trade with China exceeded $190 billion and trade with the EU exceeded $333 billion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Russian policy-making process is described as 'top-down,' where the Kremlin sets the general tone, but implementation is carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, state-owned companies, oligarchs, and informal actors like the Wagner Group.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russia utilizes Africa as a tool to bypass Western sanctions by accessing resources like gold from Sudan and diamonds from the Central African Republic, which are harder to freeze than financial assets.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russia is a dominant supplier of military equipment to Africa, providing approximately 44% of the continent's imported military equipment between 2017 and 2021, benefiting from a lack of human rights conditions on sales.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In the energy sector, Russia's state company Rosatom is building Egypt's first nuclear power plant in El-Dabaa, a project that creates long-term dependence on Russian expertise and materials.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russia seeks to secure critical minerals for the green economy transition, such as bauxite in Guinea via Rusal and diamonds and copper in Angola via Alrosa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Wagner Group acts as a flexible instrument for the Kremlin, providing security to regimes in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) and other regions in exchange for concessions to natural resources.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russia aims to project naval power into the Indian Ocean by attempting to establish port access in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, specifically targeting Sudan and Djibouti.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Russia promotes a 'multipolar' world order to appeal to African nations' anti-colonial sentiments and their desire for non-alignment, using this to block US-led initiatives at the UN.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001952#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["critical minerals","nuclear power","food security"],"geography_discussed":["Russia","Egypt","Algeria","Libya","Mali","Burkina Faso","Central African Republic","Sudan","Angola","Guinea","South Africa","Ethiopia","Mozambique","Ukraine"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["geopolitical analysis","economic assessment"]},{"id":"geconco-000143","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/geconco-000143","title":"2024 - Crisis tribes, elections, and a systemic solidarity response","publisher":{"name":"Green Economy Coalition","organization":"green-economy-coalition"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2024-02-08","source_url":"https://www.greeneconomycoalition.org/news-and-resources/2024-crisis-tribes-elections-and-a-systemic-solidarity-response","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The author contends that treating climate change, pandemics, and economic instability as separate issues leads to fragmented solutions that may worsen other crises. Drawing on the concept of 'crisis tribes'—groups defined by the specific traumas they have experienced—the text argues that current dominant policy responses often prioritize narrow interests over systemic health. To counter this, the Green Economy Coalition proposes a 'new eco-social contract for a shared global green deal' focused on building global partner networks, developing national eco-social contracting prototypes, and establishing a collective global green economy architecture to ensure a fair transition for all nations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"geconco-000143#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"European politics is characterized by 'crisis tribes'—identities formed by trauma from economic, security, health, climate, and migration crises over the last decade—rather than a simple left-right or pro-anti integration divide.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"geconco-000143#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Addressing crises as separate issues risks creating solutions that fail to tackle root causes and may exacerbate other manifestations of the same underlying global geo-political and economic governance malaise.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"geconco-000143#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Dominant policy responses across health, economy, migration, security, and climate are often contradictory or harmful to other sectors; for example, prioritizing oil and gas for security or pensions can lead to abandoning net zero goals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"geconco-000143#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Green Economy Coalition's 2024 strategy for a 'new eco-social contract for a shared global green deal' involves three priorities: expanding its global partner network, creating national eco-social contracting prototypes for local green deals, and progressing a collective global green economy architecture for an inclusive transition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"geconco-000143#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change","Net-zero emissions","green economy","just transition","environmental protection"],"geography_discussed":["Ukraine","Palestine","Yemen","Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","strategic statement"]},{"id":"issafri-002815","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002815","title":"A New Approach to United Nations Peace Operations: Pathways for Demand-Driven Interventions","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2024-02","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/UN-Peace-Operations-PB.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that UN peace operations are in a 'period of retrenchment' due to a crisis of confidence and a failure to adapt to evolving conflict landscapes. It identifies systemic issues such as 'Christmas Tree mandates'—overly ambitious and multi-dimensional tasks—and a reliance on 'templated and bureaucratic approaches' to deployment. The authors advocate for a shift toward tailored, adaptive, and people-centered mission models. Key recommendations include prioritizing strategic objectives over individual tasks, improving coordination between peace operations and UN country teams, and leveraging partnerships with regional organizations like the African Union. The brief also emphasizes the need for proactive transition planning to avoid the 'peacebuilding financing cliff' and calls for more predictable, flexible resourcing to replace current arbitrary budget cuts and liquidity shortfalls.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002815#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"UN peace operations are currently experiencing a crisis of confidence and a period of retrenchment, evidenced by the fact that the UN Security Council has not mandated a new peacekeeping operation since 2014.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002815#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The tendency to create 'Christmas Tree mandates'—wide-ranging and multi-dimensional tasks—often distracts missions from clear political strategies and is frequently unsupported by adequate resources.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002815#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UN's reliance on 'templated' multidimensional peacekeeping models is inflexible and fails to adapt to specific country contexts, a problem exacerbated by the institutional bifurcation between peacekeeping and special political missions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002815#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Coordination between peace operations and UN country teams is often hindered by differing institutional cultures and mandates, sometimes leading missions to disregard country teams due to their size.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002815#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UN-AU partnership has been strengthened by Security Council resolution 2719 (2023), which provides a framework for financing African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002815#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Mission transitions are often reactive rather than proactive, frequently occurring due to deteriorating political support or withdrawal of consent by host governments, such as in Mali and Sudan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002815#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Countries face a 'peacebuilding financing cliff' upon the departure of peace operations, where a drop in international attention and funding threatens hard-won gains.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002815#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Financial constraints are driven by a cycle of self-censorship by the Secretariat and arbitrary budget cuts by the General Assembly's Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002815#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["multilateralism","climate finance"],"geography_discussed":["Democratic Republic of the Congo","Mali","Sudan","Afghanistan","Iraq","Syria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy brief"]},{"id":"glorespar-000075","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/glorespar-000075","title":"Terminal Review of the UNDP-GEF ‘Resilience for Peace and Stability, Food and Water Security Innovation Grant Programme’ PIMS 6467, GEF ID 10430","publisher":{"name":"Global Resilience Partnership","organization":"global-resilience-partnership"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2024","source_url":"https://www.globalresiliencepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/final-report-10-10-2024.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The terminal review evaluates a UNDP-GEF project aimed at scaling early-stage innovations to enhance climate resilience in fragile regions of Uganda and Sudan. The project achieved high effectiveness, with 98% compliance of objective indicators and 94.8% of outcome targets, despite the civil war in Sudan. Key successes include the empowerment of women and the use of innovative finance mechanisms for agro-forestry commodities like coffee in Uganda and Gum Arabic in Sudan. The review highlights the success of a 'hands-off' implementation model where UNDP provided oversight while the Global Resilience Partnership (GRP) managed execution. While the project is considered highly cost-effective and sustainable, remaining risks include conflict-related challenges in Sudan and perceived high investment risks in fragile states.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000075#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The project demonstrated high effectiveness, achieving an average of 98% compliance with objective indicators and 94.8% of outcome targets. The only target falling behind was the number of people trained, primarily due to the civil war in Sudan since 2023.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000075#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Sudan, the project successfully adapted to the outbreak of civil war by relocating its coordination hub to Kassala, transitioning to remote management via WhatsApp, and utilizing mobile transfers (Benkek) to ensure the continuation of loan capital disbursement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000075#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The project had a significant positive impact on gender equality, with women taking active leadership roles in decision-making. In Sudan, women led all supported cooperatives, and in Uganda, a price premium for coffee produced by women encouraged men to allocate land to their wives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000075#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The implementation model, described as a 'hands-off approach', was successful; UNDP served an oversight role and provided initial design training, while the Global Resilience Partnership (GRP) was delegated responsibility for GEF resources and co-financing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000075#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The project is considered highly cost-effective and efficient, achieving results on time with a low budget over three years. This was attributed to building on established partnerships and local knowledge, which allowed activities to start without the typical delays seen in other GEF projects.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000075#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Financial sustainability is viewed positively, as Mountain Harvest in Uganda operates a sustainable business and rural cooperatives in Sudan utilize rotational credit funds. However, scaling up these benefits would require new funding sources.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000075#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The project faced significant barriers regarding the 'perceived risk' of investing in fragile countries, which limits access to capital and increases financing costs despite the potential for high investment gains.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000075#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The project's environmental focus was on climate change adaptation through agro-forestry: organic coffee in Uganda and Gum Arabic (Acacia senegal) in Sudan. In Uganda, Mountain Harvest maintained a strict non-pesticide policy to preserve organic certification.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000075#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change adaptation","Community based adaptation","climate resilience","agroforestry","gender equality","Sustainable land management","biodiversity conservation"],"geography_discussed":["North Kordofan State","Kassala","Mount Elgon"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["terminal evaluation","impact assessment"]},{"id":"glorespar-000110","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/glorespar-000110","title":"INVESTING IN RESILIENCE Project Portfolio 2024","publisher":{"name":"Global Resilience Partnership","organization":"global-resilience-partnership"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2024","source_url":"https://www.globalresiliencepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/project-portfolio-2024.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Global Resilience Partnership (GRP) has invested over US$45 million in resilience innovations across the Global South, supporting 7 million people. The 2024 portfolio highlights several specific projects: the Near East Foundation's community-based credit systems in Sudan; Mountain Harvest's regenerative coffee farming in Uganda; MetaMeta's 'Green Roads for Water' initiative in Kenya and Ethiopia; Farm to Feed's digital marketplace for surplus produce in Kenya; FSPN Africa's carbon farming in Kenya and Tanzania; ROOH's climate-resilient housing in India; Mahila Housing Trust's heat action plans in India, Bangladesh, and Nepal; and Centro Sabiá's greywater reuse and agroforestry in Brazil.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Global Resilience Partnership (GRP) has invested more than US$45 million in resilience innovations across the Global South, benefiting 7 million people and providing capacity building to over 1,500 organisations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Sudan, the Near East Foundation (NEF) uses community-based credit (CBC) systems to support 13 cooperatives, primarily women, producing non-timber forest products to build resilience against climate fluctuations and extreme weather.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Mountain Harvest in Uganda employs regenerative agricultural practices for 1,042 coffee farmers, increasing productivity from 0.4kg to 0.65kg of green coffee per tree and paying farmers up to 30% higher farm gate prices.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Green Roads for Water (GR4W) initiative, led by MetaMeta, integrates water management into road design; it has been implemented in 14 countries, benefiting 6 million people in Ethiopia and over 50,000 people in Kenya.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Farm to Feed operates a tech-enabled marketplace in Kenya to reduce food loss by selling imperfect produce, generating over US$42,000 in monthly revenue and utilizing a carbon credit scheme launched by Verra.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The CAFAESUP project by FSPN Africa uses AI and machine learning to quantify carbon sequestration for smallholder farmers in Kenya and Tanzania, aiming to cover 400,000 acres and sequester up to 1 million metric tonnes of carbon.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Roof Over Our Heads (ROOH) campaign focuses on climate-resilient, low-carbon housing for informal settlements, having established learning labs across 17 settlements in nine Indian cities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Mahila Housing Trust (MHT) develops Heat Action Plans (HAPs) and Heat Risk Assessments for small and medium-sized cities in India, Bangladesh, and Nepal, having served 4 million individuals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Centro Sabiá in Brazil's semi-arid region implements women-led technology that repurposes 50,000 litres of greywater annually per system for agroforestry, with over 10,000 adaptation technologies implemented.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glorespar-000110#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change adaptation","regenerative agriculture","carbon credit","nature-based solutions","water management","food security","agroforestry","microfinance","carbon sequestration"],"geography_discussed":["Sudan","Kenya","Ethiopia","Tanzania","India","Bangladesh","Nepal","Brazil","South Africa","Sweden"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["project portfolio","impact assessment"]},{"id":"prio-001299","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001299","title":"Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2023","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2024","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/92a7aad5-3572-4886-9e9c-8aa155f1d0f4/Conflict_Trends-2024_DIGITAL.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes global conflict trends using Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data. It finds that while battle-related deaths from state-based conflicts decreased in 2023 compared to 2022, 2023 remains the third most violent year since 1989, driven largely by wars in Ukraine and Gaza. The report notes a record high of 59 state-based conflicts in 2023, suggesting a more complex conflict landscape where fewer countries experience a higher number of simultaneous conflicts. Non-state conflicts have stabilized at a higher level than a decade ago, with the Americas now the most affected region due to cartel violence in Mexico and Brazil. One-sided violence continues to be driven primarily by non-state actors, though thirteen governments were still responsible for such violence in 2023.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001299#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In 2023, the number of state-based conflicts reached 59, the highest number recorded since 1946. However, the number of conflict-affected countries decreased to 34, indicating that a greater number of conflicts are occurring within a smaller number of countries, which suggests the conflict landscape is becoming more complex.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001299#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Battle-related deaths from state-based conflicts in 2023 totaled approximately 122,000. While this was a halving of deaths compared to 2022, 2023 was the third most violent year since 1989. The primary drivers of these fatalities were the Russian invasion of Ukraine (71,000 deaths) and the war between Israel and Palestine (23,000 deaths in less than three months).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001299#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state conflicts, which involve organized groups without governmental links, have stabilized at a higher level than ten years ago. In 2023, there were 75 such conflicts resulting in around 21,000 battle-related deaths. The Americas became the region with the highest number of non-state conflicts (36), largely due to drug cartel violence in Mexico and Brazil.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001299#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"One-sided violence against civilians resulted in more than 10,200 fatalities across 35 countries in 2023. Non-state actors were the primary perpetrators, causing 7,200 fatalities, while government actors caused 2,000. This reflects a widening gap between non-state and state-perpetrated one-sided violence, although thirteen governments were still responsible for such acts in 2023.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001299#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional analysis of state-based conflicts shows that Africa remains the most affected region with 28 conflicts in 2023, nearly double the 15 recorded in 2013. In the Middle East, battle-related deaths rose from just over 5,000 in 2022 to almost 26,000 in 2023, with the vast majority occurring in the Israel-Palestine war.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001299#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report identifies a trend of increasing internationalization in civil conflicts over the last decade. In 2023, 23 out of 59 state-based conflicts were internationalized civil conflicts, defined as those where third-party governments deploy combat personnel to support one side.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001299#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Ukraine","Ethiopia","Gaza Strip","Mexico","Brazil","Africa","Americas","Middle East","Asia","Europe","Haiti","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["trend analysis","statistical overview"]},{"id":"prio-001665","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001665","title":"The Pillars of Protest: Demands, Strategy, Composition and Organization","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2024","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/c372bb97-c95c-445f-abae-c5088abc0ad5/PRIO Paper-Pillars of protest.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies four 'pillars' of protest—demands, strategy, composition, and organization—that influence the size of a movement and the likelihood of regime loyalty shifts. It argues that non-violent, broad-based campaigns demanding regime change are most likely to succeed and lead to democratic consolidation. However, it notes a recent decline in the success rate of such movements and a rise in anti-liberal protests. For international democracy promoters, the report recommends investing in civil society infrastructure during stable periods rather than attempting to instigate regime shifts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Mass movements are most likely to achieve their primary objectives when they demand the end of the regime using a non-violent strategy, mobilize a large and diverse set of actors across social divisions, employ tactical diversity, and rely on existing organizational networks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-violent campaigns generally have a significant 'mobilizing advantage' over violent ones because they present fewer moral, physical, and logistical barriers to entry, allowing them to attract a more diverse participant base.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-violent strategies are more effective at inducing loyalty shifts within security forces due to a 'morality mechanism' (higher psychological costs of repressing unarmed people) and a 'network-tie mechanism' (greater social overlap between a diverse movement and security forces).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The type of demand influences both the success rate and the democratic outcome; regime-changing campaigns have the highest success rate (41%), while secessionist campaigns have the lowest (9%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Urban social groups, particularly students and industrial workers, are more likely to mobilize, more likely to adopt non-violent strategies, and more likely to be guided by a pro-democratic ideology than rural peasant groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"High levels of female participation are correlated with increased movement size, a higher propensity for non-violent strategies, and a greater likelihood of success, potentially by increasing the moral cost of repression for security forces.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Pre-existing organizational networks in civil society reduce collective action problems and improve a movement's ability to sustain mobilization and enforce tactical compliance, even after state repression.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There has been a substantial increase in 'anti-liberal' mass movements since 2000, which advocate for authoritarian regimes or the restriction of civil liberties, often correlating with economic hardship and democratic erosion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The effectiveness of non-violent mass mobilization in promoting democratization appears to have declined after 2010, possibly due to smaller population mobilization, more uniform tactics, and improved state repression technologies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"International support for pro-democracy movements can be counterproductive if it undermines the legitimacy of domestic actors by making them appear as 'foreign puppets'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001665#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Romania","Philippines","German Democratic Republic","Tunisia","Egypt","Lithuania","Russia","Myanmar","Spain","Italy","Zimbabwe","Venezuela","Chile","Syria","Sudan","North Korea","Serbia","Ireland","Uzbekistan","Hong Kong","Brazil","South Africa","Algeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["literature review","dataset analysis","policy recommendations"]},{"id":"prio-001667","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001667","title":"Engaging with the Humanitarian Localisation Agenda from ‘Below’ in Uganda","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2024","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/7edafb37-d92a-4f74-a23d-c4d0317487b5/PRIO Policy Brief 10-2024.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the role of 'civic humanitarians'—local actors embedded in society through faith, community, or ethnic ties—within Uganda's refugee response. It argues that while Uganda's progressive policies facilitate refugee-led organisations (RLOs), the localisation agenda is hindered by stringent national registration requirements and narrow, techno-managerial definitions of accountability. The authors highlight that refugees rely heavily on sociocultural support practices (such as 'saidu' and 'ubuntu' philosophy) that remain invisible in formal humanitarian debates. To improve localisation, the brief recommends creating separate registration tracks for RLOs, developing flexible funding mechanisms, and broadening the understanding of accountability to include community-driven and relational models.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001667#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Community-led assistance and sociocultural practices of helping and sharing among refugees and host communities are critical to the aid landscape but frequently go unacknowledged by international actors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001667#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Sudanese refugees in Uganda utilise specific sociocultural support practices based on communitarian ethics and Ubuntu philosophy, including 'saidu' (help), 'oya' (communal labour), 'lokita' (rotational labour), and 'rabita' (crowdfunding and savings).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001667#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The humanitarian localisation agenda in Uganda is obstructed by rigid top-down frameworks and stringent national registration requirements under the Uganda National NGO Act, which apply the same standards to small community groups as to large international NGOs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001667#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Because partnerships are restricted to formally registered organisations, many refugee-led organisations (RLOs) act merely as extensions of international actors without real influence over resource allocation or decision-making.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001667#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a conflict between the 'techno-managerial' accountability required by international donors and the 'relational' accountability used by local civic actors, which is based on trust, kinship, and community leaders.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001667#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors recommend that donors and policymakers implement flexible funding, such as 'seed funding', and create a separate registration track for community and refugee-led organisations to avoid excluding specialised groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001667#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Bidi Bidi Refugee Settlement","Kampala","South Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Somalia","Burundi","Eritrea","Rwanda","Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","qualitative research"]},{"id":"saiia-000440","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/saiia-000440","title":"Africa’s Debt Priorities: A Sustainability Perspective","publisher":{"name":"South African Institute of International Affairs","organization":"south-african-institute-of-international-affairs"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2023-12-14","source_url":"https://saiia.org.za/research/africas-debt-priorities-a-sustainability-perspective-required-support-from-the-g20/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the increasing debt distress in Africa, noting that public debt reached 65.6% of GDP in 2022. It highlights the shift toward non-concessional debt and the role of private creditors, who now hold over 40% of Africa's total external debt. The brief argues that the G20's Common Framework needs reform to be more inclusive of middle-income countries and private creditors. It advocates for the establishment of an African Credit Rating Agency to counter perceived biases from global agencies and the creation of an African Debt Monitoring Mechanism by June 2024 to improve transparency. Key recommendations include restructuring multilateral development banks, extending debt repayment periods, and increasing IMF Poverty Reduction Growth Trust access limits.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000440#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Africa's public debt was 65.6% of GDP in 2022, with eight countries in debt distress and 13 at high risk. Specific countries in debt distress include the Republic of Congo, Ghana, Malawi, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000440#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The composition of African external debt has shifted toward private creditors, who now account for more than 40% of the total. Bilateral debt has also expanded beyond the Paris Club to include China, Saudi Arabia, India, and the United Arab Emirates.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000440#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"High debt servicing costs are diverting resources from social and development spending; for the 2019–2021 period, the ratio of public debt interest payments to health expenditure was 147%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000440#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The G20's Common Framework for Debt Treatments is viewed as needing improvement in effectiveness and transparency. Proposed reforms include expanding the creditor committee to include private sector creditors and extending coverage to middle-income countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000440#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"African leaders perceive bias in the 'big three' credit rating agencies (Fitch, Standard and Poor’s, and Moody’s), suggesting that more objective ratings could save African countries up to $74.5 billion. Consequently, an African Credit Rating Agency is planned for launch in early 2024.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000440#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To improve debt transparency, African leaders agreed during the September 2023 Africa Climate Summit to adopt an African Debt Monitoring Mechanism by June 2024.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000440#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a call for the IMF to align Poverty Reduction Growth Trust (PRGT) access limits with those of the General Resource Account (GRA), specifically increasing the annual access limit to 200% and the cumulative limit to 600%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000440#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance","multilateral development bank"],"geography_discussed":["Nigeria","Rwanda","Ghana","Zambia","Mali","Ethiopia","Chad","Republic of the Congo","Malawi","São Tomé and Príncipe","Somalia","Sudan","Zimbabwe","Burundi","Cameroon","Central African Republic","Comoros","Djibouti","The Gambia","Guinea-Bissau","Kenya","Mozambique","Sierra Leone","South Sudan","South Africa","Angola","Egypt","Morocco","Niger","Senegal","Seychelles","Cape Verde","Eswatini","Namibia","Lesotho","Botswana"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy brief"]},{"id":"afripo-000108","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/afripo-000108","title":"Rising Voices: The African Youth's Fight for a Sustainable Future","publisher":{"name":"Africa Policy Research Institute","organization":"africa-policy-research-institute"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2023-12-01","source_url":"https://afripoli.org/rising-voices-the-african-youths-fight-for-a-sustainable-future","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the disproportionate impact of climate change on African youth and their subsequent rise in activism. It highlights the gap between youth demographics and political leadership in Africa, the specific climate vulnerabilities in countries like Nigeria and Sudan, and the systemic barriers activists face, including financial constraints and state repression. The author calls for the establishment of youth councils, dedicated funding, and protection mechanisms to ensure young people can shape climate-resilient policies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000108#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"African youth are disproportionately vulnerable to climate change, with an estimated 80% of health risks and threats to life attributed to climate disruption falling on young people, despite Africa contributing only about 4% of global emissions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000108#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant demographic disconnect in African political leadership; while 60% of the population is under 25, the median age of political leaders is 62, leading youth to use activism as a primary means to effect change.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000108#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Climate action in Africa varies by national context: in Nigeria, activism focuses on closing a knowledge gap in a fossil-fuel-dependent economy, whereas in Sudan, climate action is inextricably linked to security and peace due to conflict and desertification.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000108#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change adaptation","climate change mitigation","climate finance","Nationally Determined Contributions","environmental justice","fossil fuel","greenhouse gas emissions"],"geography_discussed":["Nairobi","Sudan","Nigeria","South Africa","Zimbabwe","Kenya","Seychelles","Algeria","Mali","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Colombia","Mexico","Philippines","France","Italy","Germany","Netherlands","Sweden","United Kingdom"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["qualitative","policy analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001243","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001243","title":"CLIMATE CHANGE, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT BEYOND THE DIVIDE IN CYPRUS: A CALL FOR A COLLABORATIVE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AGENDA TO ADDRESS THE MIGRATION CRISES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023-12","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/e41841f4-84ec-49d3-ade5-721dd1a4cee3/Beyond the divide in Cyprus EESulun.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the migration crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, highlighting the interconnectedness of forced displacement with climate change, energy poverty, water scarcity, and healthcare deficits. It focuses on Cyprus as a primary destination for asylum seekers, detailing the strain on infrastructure in the south and the lack of legal frameworks in the north. The author proposes a bi-communal strategy, including a joint Rapid Response Committee and a reception center in the UN Buffer Zone, to manage these transnational human security threats through cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001243#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Migration in the Mediterranean is driven by a complex blend of voluntary and forced movements, including armed conflicts, persecution, climate change, demographic pressures, and structural poverty.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001243#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Mediterranean is a highly perilous migration route; between 2014 and 2020, over 21,200 deaths were attributed to migration, and as of October 26, 2023, 28,196 migrants have been recorded as missing since 2014.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001243#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Climate change acts as a catalyst for forced migration in the Mediterranean, with predictions of higher temperatures, more frequent heatwaves, and reduced rainfall in the region.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001243#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a critical 'migration-energy nexus' where displaced populations lack basic power; only 10 percent of refugees have access to Tier 1-2 electricity (four hours of power daily).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001243#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Cyprus faces severe pressure as a migration hub, with the Republic of Cyprus registering 8,092 new asylum applications between January and September 2023 and hosting 18,836 Ukrainian refugees under temporary protection.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001243#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Reception facilities in southern Cyprus are severely overcrowded; the Pournara Reception Center, designed for 350 people, hosted approximately 2,000 people by November 2023, leading to inadequate access to electricity, heating, and water.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001243#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Northern Cyprus lacks a legal system for granting asylum, often resulting in the detention and swift deportation of irregular migrants, with the UNHCR providing only unofficial 'letters of protection'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001243#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report proposes two primary collaborative strategies for Cyprus: the establishment of a Bi-communal Rapid Response Committee and the creation of a joint-governance reception center in the UN Buffer Zone.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001243#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change","energy access","water scarcity","public health","environmental degradation","sustainable energy"],"geography_discussed":["Libya","Greece","Bulgaria","Turkey","Syria","Lebanon","Jordan","Iraq","Egypt","Pakistan","Morocco","Afghanistan","Sudan","Nicosia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy report","humanitarian assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-000016","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000016","title":"Background note on Africa’s Current Path Energy Future to 2043","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023-11-09","source_url":"https://futures.issafrica.org/special-reports/other/Energy/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report forecasts a significant increase in Africa's energy demand due to population growth, projecting that it will overtake the EU27 by 2043. While Africa possesses vast oil, gas, and hydropower reserves, its current energy mix remains heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with 'other renewables' making up only 1.6% of production in 2023. The document highlights a trajectory where Africa will eventually become a major global source of carbon emissions from fossil fuels, overtaking the EU by 2034.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000016#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Africa's energy demand is projected to grow significantly due to population increases, with its share of world energy demand rising from 4.35% in 2019 to 14.82% by 2063. On the 'Current Path' forecast, Africa's energy demand is expected to exceed that of the EU27 in 2043, the USA and India in 2050, and China in 2079.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000016#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The African energy production mix is dominated by fossil fuels. In 2023, oil accounted for 45.8%, gas 32.3%, and coal 17.3% of production, while 'other renewables' (primarily wind and solar) contributed only 1.6%. Transition points indicate gas will overtake oil in 2028, and other renewables will overtake hydro in 2033 and coal in 2042.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000016#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa is a net energy exporter, but many countries remain heavily dependent on imports. In 2023, Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, and Libya each exported more than ten billion dollars in energy. Conversely, several countries relied on imports for over 50% of domestic demand, including Senegal (95%), Morocco, Benin, and Mauritania.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000016#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa holds substantial proven reserves of fossil fuels, including 111.4 BBOE of oil (5% of global total) and 55.6 BBOE of gas (10% of global total). However, a lack of domestic infrastructure means much of the natural gas production is likely to be exported to Asia, especially as EU demand is expected to decline under the European Climate Law and REPowerEU proposal.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000016#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite having the highest untapped hydropower potential globally, Africa only had 37GW of installed capacity in 2023. Major projects include Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which has made Ethiopia the largest source of hydroelectric power in Africa, and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere Hydropower Plant.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000016#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Nuclear energy adoption is limited. South Africa operates the Koeberg station, and Egypt has contracted Russia's Rosatom for a 4.8 GW plant at El-Dabaa, with the first unit expected in 2028. Other countries exploring nuclear options include Ghana, Morocco, Uganda, and Rwanda.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000016#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa is projected to become a leading global source of carbon emissions from fossil fuels. Its emissions are forecast to overtake those of the EU in 2034, the USA in 2049, India in 2055, and China in 2061.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000016#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["energy demand","fossil fuel","petroleum","natural gas","coal","hydroelectricity","nuclear power","renewable energy","solar energy","wind energy","carbon dioxide emissions","liquefied natural gas","energy efficiency"],"geography_discussed":["World","Algeria","Nigeria","Angola","Libya","Morocco","Egypt","Ethiopia","Kenya","Tunisia","Uganda","Senegal","Tanzania","Mozambique","South Sudan","Republic of the Congo","Chad","Gabon","Benin","Mauritania","Mauritius","Eritrea","Mali","Togo","Burkina Faso","Ivory Coast","Zambia","Niger","Madagascar","Sudan","Rwanda","Cameroon","Djibouti","Central African Republic","Burundi","United States","India","South Africa","Zimbabwe","Botswana","Ghana","People's Republic of China","European Union","Democratic Republic of the Congo"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["forecasting","comparative analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-000081","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000081","title":"Background note on Africa’s Current Path Energy Future to 2043","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023-11-09","source_url":"https://futures.issafrica.org/special-reports/guide.pdf?report=other/Energy&topic=02-exports-vs-imports","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies Africa as a net energy exporter, though it forecasts that total energy demand will exceed production by 2039. While a small group of countries like Algeria, Nigeria, and Angola maintain high export values, a significant number of African nations remain heavily dependent on energy imports, a group expected to expand by 2043.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000081#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Africa is currently a net energy exporter, primarily exporting coal, unrefined oil, and gas to Asian and European markets, although total continental energy demand is projected to exceed production in 2039.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000081#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In 2023, Algeria, Angola, Libya, and Nigeria each had energy export values exceeding imports by more than ten billion US dollars, while Morocco's energy imports exceeded five billion US dollars.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000081#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"By 2043, Algeria is projected to be the largest energy exporter in Africa with a value of US$70.2 billion, surpassing the combined exports of Nigeria (US$32 billion), Angola (US$24.2 billion), and Mozambique (US$14.5 billion).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000081#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A significant number of countries relied on energy imports for over 50% of their domestic demand in 2023, including Senegal (95%), Morocco, Benin, Mauritania, Mauritius, Eritrea, Tunisia, Uganda, Mali, and Togo (59%). This group is expected to grow by 2043 to include countries such as Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Egypt.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000081#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["coal","natural gas","energy demand"],"geography_discussed":["Algeria","Nigeria","Angola","Libya","Morocco","Egypt","Ethiopia","Kenya","Tunisia","Uganda","Senegal","Tanzania","Mozambique","South Sudan","Republic of the Congo","Chad","Gabon","Benin","Mauritania","Mauritius","Eritrea","Mali","Togo","Burkina Faso","Ivory Coast","Zambia","Niger","Madagascar","Sudan","Rwanda","Cameroon","Djibouti"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["forecasting","economic analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-000254","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000254","title":"Background note on Africa’s Current Path Energy Future to 2043","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2023-11-09","source_url":"https://futures.issafrica.org/special-reports/guide.pdf?report=other/Energy&topic=07-hydro","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Africa possesses the world's highest untapped hydropower potential, yet only 11% of this capacity is currently installed. While large-scale projects like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Julius Nyerere Hydropower Plant are advancing, growth is hindered by the need for extensive transmission networks in unstable regions and institutional failures. By 2043, hydropower is forecast to contribute 5.3% of the continent's energy production.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000254#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Africa has the highest untapped hydropower potential globally, but only 37GW of installed capacity exists, representing approximately 11% of its total potential. In 2023, hydropower accounted for only 2.5% of the continent's energy production, or 0.16 BBOE.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000254#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Under the Current Path forecast, hydropower's contribution to Africa's energy production is expected to rise to 5.3% by 2043, which is equivalent to less than 0.5 BBOE.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000254#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a US$5 billion project on the Blue Nile, is the third-largest hydroelectric facility globally by installed capacity and can generate nearly 6.5 GW at peak. Its completion has made Ethiopia the largest source of hydroelectric power in Africa, surpassing the DR Congo.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000254#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Other significant projects include the Julius Nyerere Hydropower Plant and Dam in Tanzania, designed to deliver 2.1 GW, and the Grand Inga scheme in the DR Congo. The larger Grand Inga project has been delayed since the 1950s due to corruption, inefficiencies, poor planning, and the requirement for transmission lines spanning thousands of kilometres to reach markets in Nigeria and South Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000254#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A primary obstacle to the implementation of hydropower in Africa is the requirement for long transmission networks to move electricity, particularly through areas characterized as unstable.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000254#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["hydropower","electric power transmission","renewable energy"],"geography_discussed":["Ethiopia","Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Tanzania","South Africa","Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["forecasting","infrastructure assessment"]},{"id":"fsdafri-000068","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/fsdafri-000068","title":"Rapid Assessment of Food and Payment Systems in Sudan for a Coordinated Food Security Emergency Response","publisher":{"name":"FSD Africa","organization":"fsd-africa"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023-11","source_url":"https://fsdafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/23-11-24-Sudan-Emergency-Response-rapid-assessment-External.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies severe disruptions in Sudan's food systems and financial infrastructure due to conflict, noting that over 20 million people face acute food insecurity. It highlights a dramatic decrease in planted areas, the destruction of processing capacity in Khartoum, and the collapse of the Central Bank of Sudan's electronic banking switch. To address these, the document proposes 'twin-track' interventions focusing on prioritized value chains (sorghum, horticulture, and oilseeds) and the adoption of digital financial services and informal payment networks to bypass physical and institutional barriers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000068#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Sudan is experiencing a severe food security crisis, with over 20 million people—approximately 42% of the population—suffering from acute food insecurity, the highest number ever recorded in the country.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000068#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Agricultural production has declined significantly; the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry reported only 10 million hectares planted this year compared to 23 million last year, a potential 41% decrease. This is driven by a lack of input financing, high fuel prices leading to the abandonment of mechanization, and fear of conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000068#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A significant portion of Sudan's agri-processing capacity was destroyed because it was concentrated in Khartoum. This includes the oil pressing sector, which had over 60 facilities in the capital pre-conflict, and an estimated 40% of the country's wheat milling capacity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000068#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The financial system has largely collapsed due to the failure of the Electronic Banking Services (EBS) switch operated by the Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS), which was essential for interbank interoperability. Consequently, only 5 to 6 of the 37 banks in Sudan remain operational.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000068#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a surge in demand for digital financial services to replace non-operational banks, with MTN’s MoMo, Cashi, and the Bank of Khartoum’s bankak app emerging as leaders. However, these services are frequently hindered by unstable internet connectivity and electricity outages.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000068#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Informal payment systems known as hawala have increased to fill the gap in formal financial services, facilitating cross-border transfers and humanitarian aid, though they carry higher KYC and AML risks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000068#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food security","climate change"],"geography_discussed":["Khartoum","Port Sudan","Al Qadarif","Gezira","Kassala","Northern","Sennar","Blue Nile State","White Nile","South Kordofan","River Nile"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["rapid assessment","value chain analysis","policy recommendation"]},{"id":"issafri-002627","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002627","title":"Coups are back in Africa","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2023-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PB-186.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the 'epidemic' of military takeovers in Africa, identifying governance dysfunction, democratic decline, civil-military tensions, and Islamist insurgencies as primary drivers. It argues that the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) have relied on reactive, inconsistent, and ineffective blanket sanctions that fail to deter coup plotters. The author recommends a shift toward prevention, targeted sanctions, and the strengthening of civil-military relations and democratic legitimacy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002627#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There has been a dramatic increase in military coups across Africa since 2020, with nine successful takeovers occurring in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Gabon, and Niger.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002627#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The resurgence of coups is driven by several circumstantial factors, including the poor governance of elected leaders, a decline in the quality of democracy, tensions between civilian governments and the military, and the inability to contain Islamist insurgencies in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002627#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The African Union and regional economic communities have primarily employed reactive measures, such as blanket economic sanctions and suspensions, which the document asserts no longer deter military takeovers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002627#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The enforcement of anti-coup norms by the African Union is inconsistent, with some takeovers being swiftly punished while others, such as the event in Chad, are not recognized as coups or face delayed responses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002627#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A lack of coherence exists between the African Union and regional economic communities regarding the application of 'subsidiarity', exemplified by the differing responses of the AU and ECOWAS to the coup in Niger.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002627#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a growing trend of solidarity among coup plotters, suggesting an increasing movement among military personnel in favor of military rule across the continent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002627#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document highlights a chronic history of military dominance in certain states; for example, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Niger collectively have 116 years of military rule and 88 years of military leaders transitioning to civilian administrations over 316 years of independence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002627#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Mali","Burkina Faso","Chad","Guinea","Sudan","Gabon","Niger","Guinea-Bissau","The Gambia","São Tomé and Príncipe","Zimbabwe","Mauritania","Egypt","Tunisia","Libya","Cameroon","Sahel","Chad Basin"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"napglob-000296","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/napglob-000296","title":"Progress on Vertical Integration in National Adaptation Plan Processes","publisher":{"name":"NAP Global Network","organization":"nap-global-network"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023-11","source_url":"https://napglobalnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/napgn-en-2024-vertical-integration-nap-processes-synthesis-report.pdf.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines vertical integration in National Adaptation Plan (NAP) processes, finding that while most countries reference sub-national governments and non-governmental actors, there are varying levels of integration across planning, implementation, and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) stages.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000296#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Every National Adaptation Plan (NAP) analyzed references at least one non-governmental sub-national actor. The most frequently cited are civil society organizations (78%), local private sector actors or MSMEs (67%), and local communities (58%), alongside specific groups such as women (49%), farmers (40%), and Indigenous Peoples (40%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000296#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Sub-national governments are mentioned in nearly all reviewed NAPs, with specific roles assigned across different phases: 78% are assigned implementation roles, 76% are involved in planning, and 47% have a role in monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000296#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Coordination mechanisms across governance levels are mentioned in 78% of NAPs. These range from using existing multilevel governance structures and creating new multi-scale mechanisms to initiating ad hoc consultation processes during NAP development.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000296#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Approximately 69% of NAPs identify mechanisms for providing finance to sub-national levels, including the use of microfinancing, the mainstreaming of adaptation finance into sub-national budgets, and the channeling of international funding to local levels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000296#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A majority of NAPs (60%) reference sub-national-level adaptation plans, which may be developed at community, municipal, county, provincial, or state levels depending on the country's decentralization process.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000296#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a growing recognition of local dimensions of adaptation, with 51% of NAPs explicitly referencing community-based adaptation (CBA) and 40% referencing locally led adaptation (LLA).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000296#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["national adaptation plan","climate change adaptation","Community based adaptation","climate finance","ecosystem-based adaptation"],"geography_discussed":["Kuwait","Tonga","Sierra Leone","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Colombia","Costa Rica","South Sudan","Timor-Leste","Paraguay","Nepal","Cameroon","Brazil","Niger","Madagascar","Cape Verde","Saint Lucia","Kiribati","Papua New Guinea","Sudan","Benin","Armenia","Kenya","Ecuador","Bangladesh","Peru","South Africa"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["synthesis report","policy analysis"]},{"id":"napglob-000391","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/napglob-000391","title":"Progrès par rapport à l’intégration verticale dans le processus de plan national d’adaptation : Analyse des liens stratégiques entre les niveaux national et infranational","publisher":{"name":"NAP Global Network","organization":"nap-global-network"},"document_type":"report","language":"fr","date_published":"2023-11","source_url":"https://napglobalnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/napgn-fr-2023-integration-verticale-processus-pna.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines vertical integration in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), highlighting the roles of subnational governments and non-governmental actors. Based on an analysis of 45 multisectoral NAPs, it finds that while most countries recognize subnational roles in planning and implementation, gaps remain in monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) and stable financial flows to local levels. It provides recommendations for national governments, subnational authorities, development partners, and funding bodies to strengthen multi-level coordination and capacity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000391#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"All analyzed National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) identify non-governmental subnational actors as relevant to vertical integration. This includes civil society organizations (78%), local private sector and MSMEs (67%), and local communities (58%), as well as specific groups such as women (49%), indigenous peoples (40%), and youth (38%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000391#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Most countries assign specific roles to subnational governments within the NAP process, primarily in planning (76%) and implementation (78%), though fewer focus on monitoring, evaluation, and learning (SEA) (47%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000391#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A majority of NAPs (78%) mention coordination mechanisms between governance levels, utilizing either existing institutional arrangements, new structures, or ad hoc consultation processes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000391#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Approximately 69% of NAPs describe mechanisms for delivering climate finance to the subnational level, including microfinance, the integration of adaptation into subnational budgets, and the routing of international funds to local measures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000391#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Subnational adaptation plans are referenced in 60% of NAPs, with some countries integrating these plans at community, municipal, state, provincial, or territorial levels depending on their decentralization structures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000391#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Local dimensions of adaptation are recognized in many NAPs, with 51% explicitly mentioning community-based adaptation (ABC) and 40% addressing locally-led adaptation (ANL).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000391#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is an increasing trend toward coordination beyond the national level, with 62% of NAPs referencing transboundary or regional coordination to align with the Paris Agreement and the Global Goal on Adaptation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000391#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["national adaptation plan","climate finance","Community based adaptation","multi-level governance","ecosystem-based adaptation"],"geography_discussed":["Kuwait","Tonga","Sierra Leone","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Colombia","Costa Rica","South Sudan","Timor-Leste","Paraguay","Nepal","Cameroon","Brazil","Niger","Madagascar","Cape Verde","Saint Lucia","Kiribati","Papua New Guinea","Sudan","Benin","Armenia","Kenya","Ecuador","Bangladesh","Peru","South Africa"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","document review"]},{"id":"gclifun-004742","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/gclifun-004742","title":"Consideration of accreditation proposals – Addendum V Re-accreditation assessment of RAPL040","publisher":{"name":"Green Climate Fund","organization":"green-climate-fund"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023-10-02","source_url":"https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/13-considersation-aps-add-v-rapl040-gcf-b37-03-add05.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Green Climate Fund's Accreditation Panel recommends the re-accreditation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) for a second term, maintaining its scope for medium-sized projects and medium environmental and social risk (Category B). The assessment confirms FAO's strong technical expertise in adaptation, REDD+, and the blue economy, and its ability to implement GCF's gender and environmental and social policies. While generally compliant, the Panel identified a gap in explicit policy statements regarding Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), making the re-accreditation conditional upon the formal approval of an AML/CFT policy or the inclusion of consistent statements within its prohibited practices policies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gclifun-004742#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The FAO portfolio consists of 20 approved funded activities, with 18 under implementation as of 31 July 2023, totaling a value of USD 1,049.25 million, of which GCF funding is USD 622.5 million.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gclifun-004742#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Eight funded activities are considered not to be on track due to COVID-19 pandemic impacts and operational challenges: FP062, FP089, FP108, FP118, FP126, FP159, SAP014, and SAP019.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gclifun-004742#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"FAO's current pipeline includes 21 proposals (15 concept notes and 6 funding proposals) with an estimated total financing of USD 1.1 billion, with a strong focus on adaptation and cross-cutting results.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gclifun-004742#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"FAO has a significant track record in REDD+ results-based payments, accounting for 38 per cent of approved REDD+ RBP projects, and has reduced a cumulative 430.4 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent from 2019 to 2021 across seven countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gclifun-004742#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Between 2018 and 2022, FAO's total investments in climate-related projects amounted to USD 4,377,506,862, with the agriculture sector dominating at 40.19 per cent and forestry at 13.55 per cent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gclifun-004742#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"FAO's corporate greenhouse gas emissions showed a 15 per cent drop from 2020 figures and are 67 per cent below the 2018 benchmark, with air travel remaining the primary contributor.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gclifun-004742#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"FAO's gender policy, procedures, and competencies are consistent with the Updated GCF Gender Policy, supported by a Gender Team of 36 headquarters staff and five regional officers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gclifun-004742#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The re-accreditation is conditional upon FAO providing evidence of a formally approved AML/CFT policy or including clear AML/CFT statements within its prohibited practices policies consistent with GCF standards.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"gclifun-004742#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change adaptation","climate change mitigation","Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation","climate finance","blue economy","Climate-smart agriculture","Environmental and Social Safeguards","gender equality","greenhouse gas emissions","fiduciary"],"geography_discussed":["Italy","El Salvador","Chile","Colombia","Argentina","Guatemala","Jordan","Republic of the Congo","Benin","The Gambia","Armenia","Ivory Coast","Sudan","Myanmar","North Korea","Afghanistan","Bhutan","Haiti","Kenya","Saint Lucia","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Costa Rica","Ghana","Indonesia","Laos","Mexico","Vietnam","Africa","Asia Pacific","Latin America and the Caribbean"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["institutional assessment","accreditation review","portfolio performance analysis"]},{"id":"napglob-000284","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/napglob-000284","title":"Transboundary Climate Risks and the National Adaptation Planning Process","publisher":{"name":"NAP Global Network","organization":"nap-global-network"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2023-09","source_url":"https://napglobalnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/napgn-en-2023-transboundary-climate-risks-and-nap-processe.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"A review of 41 multisector NAP documents reveals that transboundary climate risks are sporadically mentioned and lack a systematic approach, with most references limited to shared ecosystems like river basins. The document argues that the dominance of place-based adaptation and state sovereignty norms hinder the integration of cross-border risks, and recommends leveraging intergovernmental organizations and territorial framing to improve regional collaboration.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000284#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"A review of 41 multisector NAP documents submitted to the UNFCCC by January 2023 shows that countries do not systematically identify or assess transboundary climate risks, with only South Sudan and Timor-Leste featuring dedicated sections on the topic.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000284#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"References to transboundary issues in NAP documents are primarily focused on shared ecosystems and natural resources, particularly transboundary waterways, river basins, and lakes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000284#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Coastal countries and Small Island Developing States frequently discuss ocean warming, acidification, and the resulting decline in fish stocks and coral reef degradation, yet they typically do not label these as transboundary risks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000284#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Several African NAPs, including those from Chad, Sudan, Central African Republic, Togo, and Niger, highlight the risks to cross-border pastoralism, noting that climate hazards can trigger regional impacts and increase pastoral-herder conflicts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000284#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While 25% of the reviewed NAP documents mention the migration of disease vectors across borders, none explicitly categorize these as transboundary climate risks or assess the impact of neighboring countries' health crises on their own systems.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000284#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Conflict-affected countries such as South Sudan, Chad, and Benin identify climate change as a \"threat multiplier\" that can worsen security through the influx of refugees across borders.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000284#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"NAP documents rarely consider complex tele-connected risks, such as the climate vulnerability of trading partners, the impact on global supply chains, or the stability of overseas remittances.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000284#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The lack of transboundary integration in NAPs is attributed to the prevalence of place-based adaptation approaches, the principle of state sovereignty, and the absence of a universally agreed-upon framework for assessing such risks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000284#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["national adaptation plan","water security","ocean acidification","vector-borne disease","climate migration"],"geography_discussed":["South Sudan","Timor-Leste","Cambodia","Brazil","Sierra Leone","Liberia","Palestine","Bosnia and Herzegovina","Paraguay","Suriname","Kenya","Colombia","Albania","Chad","Sudan","Central African Republic","Togo","Niger","Burkina Faso","Benin","Cameroon","Indonesia","Amazon basin","Nile","Lake Chad","Himalayas","Amazon rainforest"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["systematic review","content analysis"]}]}