{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"geography":["South Sudan"]},"warnings":[{"code":"facet_value_not_in_vocabulary","message":"Value 'South Sudan' for facet 'geography' is not in the controlled vocabulary."}]},"total":{"value":367,"relation":"eq"},"page":10,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?geography=South+Sudan&page=10","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?geography=South+Sudan&page=11","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"prio-001531","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001531","title":"Heating Up the Dry Debate","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2020","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/538d4bcc-c0ec-42a4-9d94-42831b945386/MA_Fredrik_Methi.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study evaluates the relationship between three drought indicators and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa (1989-2014) using multilevel logistic regression. It finds that while all three measures are positively associated with conflict, the strength of the relationship increases as the measure moves from meteorological (SPEI) to agricultural (NDVI) and finally to socio-economic (EM-DAT) impacts. Specifically, socio-economic droughts approximately double the odds of experiencing violent conflict. However, the author notes that the NDVI effect may be driven by spatial correlation—where conflicts and vegetation loss occur in the same land types—rather than a direct temporal causal link. The study concludes that preventing meteorological droughts from escalating into socio-economic disasters could potentially reduce communal conflict risks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"All three drought indicators (SPEI, NDVI, and EM-DAT) are positively associated with a higher likelihood of communal conflict across Sub-Saharan Africa, supporting the hypothesis that droughts generally increase conflict risk.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Socio-economic drought, as measured by EM-DAT, has the most significant effect, approximately doubling the odds of experiencing violent conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Agricultural drought (NDVI) is significant in all main models, with odds ratios for conflict ranging between 1.39 and 1.92.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Meteorological drought (SPEI) shows a weak and inconsistent relationship with conflict, becoming significant primarily when considering droughts in neighbouring areas.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The relationship between NDVI drought and communal conflict is likely based on spatial correlation (occurring in the same types of land) rather than temporal correlation (occurring in the same years).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a sequential relationship between the three drought types: lack of precipitation (SPEI) increases the likelihood of reduced vegetation quality (NDVI), which in turn increases the likelihood of a socio-economic disaster (EM-DAT).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The level of democracy is a strong negative predictor of communal conflict, with higher democracy scores significantly decreasing the odds of conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Previous conflict in a cell is the strongest predictor of current conflict, increasing the odds of a conflict in year t by four to six times if a conflict occurred in year t-1.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ethnic exclusion, as measured by the GeoEPR 2014 dataset, was not found to have a significant effect on the likelihood of communal conflict in this study.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001531#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["drought","climate variability"],"geography_discussed":["Sudano-Sahelian Region","Somalia","Nigeria","Kenya","Uganda","Ethiopia","South Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["multilevel logistic regression","sensitivity analysis","spatial analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001547","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001547","title":"Countering the Drone Threat","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2020","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4901dc71-7424-415c-99cd-8f6e6545e64c/Martins et al - Countering the Drone Threat - PRIO Paper 2020.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the technical, legal, and strategic landscape of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), arguing that current technology is often ineffective and hindered by outdated legal frameworks. It assesses specific risks to Norwegian infrastructure, such as airports and oil platforms, and explores how Norway can leverage EU and NATO initiatives to enhance its capabilities while avoiding the over-securitization of civilian airspace.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"C-UAS technology is frequently ineffective in real-world applications, and users face significant obstacles regarding safety, planning, coordination, and legality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Existing legal frameworks have failed to keep pace with technological advancements, resulting in many C-UAS solutions being unusable in civilian environments due to legal constraints.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Norway, the police are the only entity legally permitted to intercept drones, but they lack the legal authority to interfere with electronic communications, meaning jamming is typically only permissible under the principle of necessity (nødrett) for threats to national security or life.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Detection systems face numerous technical limitations, including difficulty detecting small drones flying low, interference in urban environments, and a reliance on libraries of known drone sounds or frequencies that cannot cover all emerging models.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Interdiction methods carry inherent risks, such as kinetic systems causing drones to fall with force, jamming interfering with legitimate communications (including airport Instrument Landing Systems), and lasers posing threats to aircraft flying above the target.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Advances in drone technology, such as the development of drones capable of operating in GPS-denied environments or using LTE networks for control, threaten to render current jamming-based C-UAS systems obsolete.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"C-UAS technology is prohibitively expensive for many small organisations; a 2019 Sandia National Laboratories study found that 77 out of 123 products with available pricing cost over $100,000.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Norway can enhance its C-UAS capabilities by participating in EU initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) scheme, and the Horizon 2020 research programme.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"NATO has established a C-UAS Working Group to centralise efforts, focusing on building a community of practitioners, reviewing policy and doctrine, developing universal technical standards for interoperability, and conducting R&D exercises.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The deployment of C-UAS technology raises significant societal concerns, including privacy risks from surveillance and the potential for psychological stress or an inflated perception of threat.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001547#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["European Union","United States","Finland","Denmark","Oslo","Stavanger","Afghanistan","South Sudan","Mali","Iraq"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["technological assessment","legal analysis","strategic assessment","risk assessment"]},{"id":"prio-001789","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001789","title":"The conflict – inequality trap? How internal armed conflict affects horizontal inequality","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2019-12-12","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/d6348de7-ee47-440b-89e9-d794d051622d/The Conflict-Inequality Trap How Internal Armed Conflict Affects Horizontal Inequality.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The paper examines the relationship between internal armed conflict and horizontal inequality, using regional disparities in human development as a proxy. The authors find that high-intensity, long-duration conflicts (over 1,000 battle deaths and lasting more than 5 years) are associated with significantly higher levels of horizontal inequality in infant mortality, wealth, and education. This inequality persists for many years, with declines only appearing 10-15 years after conflict termination. Sub-national analysis suggests that regions directly exposed to fighting suffer more, further widening the gap. Preliminary findings indicate that neither peace agreements nor UN peacekeeping operations significantly mitigate these increases in horizontal inequality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"High-intensity, long-duration conflicts—defined as those with more than 1,000 battle deaths lasting over five years—are associated with substantially higher levels of horizontal inequality in the post-conflict phase.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Low-intensity and short-lived conflicts (lasting 1-5 years) do not show a systematic link to increased levels of horizontal inequality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The increase in horizontal inequality following high-intensity conflict is observed across multiple human development indicators, including infant mortality, wealth, and education, though not significantly for access to electricity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Increases in horizontal inequality are enduring; declines in infant mortality inequality are only statistically significant in the late post-conflict stage, 10-15 years after the conflict ends.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Sub-national analysis indicates that regions directly exposed to armed conflict experience higher infant mortality rates than regions not affected, suggesting that localized destruction and disruption drive horizontal inequality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Preliminary evidence suggests that peace agreements, including comprehensive peace accords, do not effectively alleviate horizontal inequality in the late post-conflict phase.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The presence of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), regardless of mandate size or budget, does not show a discernible mediating effect on reducing post-conflict horizontal inequality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Colombia","Sri Lanka","South Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["cross-national study","panel data analysis","sub-national analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002230","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002230","title":"Citizens’ perceptions on transitional justice processes in South Sudan","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-11","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-29.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that South Sudanese citizens have very low awareness of the transitional justice mechanisms outlined in the 2015 peace agreement, with many viewing transitional justice through the lens of either customary law or retributive justice. While 60% of respondents prioritize the Commission for Truth Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), there is significant skepticism regarding the political will of the government to implement these processes, as many current leaders were involved in the violations. The study highlights a tension between the government's narrative that judicial accountability is a foreign agenda and the victims' desire for justice, while recommending a more inclusive, victim-centered, and gender-sensitive approach to implementation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002230#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Public awareness and understanding of the transitional justice mechanisms mandated by the 2015 peace agreement are very low among ordinary citizens. Understanding is often subjective, based on personal experiences with customary justice systems or statutory courts rather than the formal peace agreement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002230#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a clear preference among respondents for non-judicial mechanisms over judicial ones, with 60% prioritizing the Commission for Truth Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), compared to 49% for the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) and 7% for the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002230#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The South Sudanese government promotes a narrative that the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) is an externally driven, retributive process intended to facilitate regime change, which has limited the space for civil society to advocate for judicial accountability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002230#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Implementation of transitional justice is severely hindered by a lack of political will, as the political and military leaders currently in power are often the same individuals responsible for the human rights violations that the processes are intended to investigate.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002230#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The national judiciary is perceived as compromised, underfunded, and susceptible to executive influence, with citizens reporting bribery, intimidation, and a fear of reprisal when seeking justice through statutory courts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002230#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Victims of human rights violations are largely absent from the transitional justice agenda due to fear of reprisals and a lack of victim-centered programming, often feeling isolated even from the international organizations advocating on their behalf.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002230#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Juba","Yei","Yambio","Torit","Wau","Equatoria","Bahr el Ghazal","Upper Nile"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"saiia-000858","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/saiia-000858","title":"Is the Global Compact on Refugees Fit for Africa’s Purposes?","publisher":{"name":"South African Institute of International Affairs","organization":"south-african-institute-of-international-affairs"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2019-10","source_url":"https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Occasional-Paper-302-Small-Mlauzi.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), arguing that while they offer a progressive 'whole of society' approach to refugee integration, their non-binding nature and flawed funding mechanisms hinder their effectiveness in Africa. It highlights a gap between liberal policy and implementation in South Africa and the failure of the CRRF in Tanzania due to financial burdens. The authors advocate for a results-based management system and a stronger link between security, development, and migration to address the root causes of displacement on the continent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000858#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) are non-binding, which the authors identify as a critical limitation that prevents accountability and allows states to ignore commitments without penalty.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000858#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Funding mechanisms for the CRRF, specifically the World Bank's IDA18 and GCFF, are criticized for requiring loans that increase the debt of developing countries already burdened by hosting refugees.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000858#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Africa possesses a progressive legal framework and a non-encampment policy, but suffers from a massive implementation gap, including a backlog of 150,000 to 184,200 asylum applications.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000858#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Africa is moving toward a more restrictive refugee regime through the 2017 White Paper on International Migration and the Border Management Authority Bill, which propose encampment and processing centres.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000858#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Tanzania withdrew from the CRRF in 2018 due to underfunding and social pressures, and has historically used an encampment approach that restricts freedom of movement and fuels dependency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000858#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa is disproportionately affected by forced displacement, hosting more than 26% of the global refugee population and containing half of the world's 20 most violent conflicts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000858#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors argue that for the GCR to succeed in Africa, it must address a 'security–migration–development nexus' rather than treating migration and development in isolation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000858#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UNHCR is encouraged to implement a results-based refugee management system to track the effectiveness of services and the actual impact on refugees' lives rather than just counting numbers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000858#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change","environmental degradation","natural disaster","climate finance","international cooperation"],"geography_discussed":["Uganda","Ethiopia","Kenya","Cameroon","Chad","Burundi","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Somalia","South Sudan","Djibouti","Rwanda","Zambia","World"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","case study"]},{"id":"issafri-002754","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002754","title":"South Africa’s support to peace and security in Burundi","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-09","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar29.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines South Africa's historical and recent involvement in Burundi, highlighting a transition from significant military and diplomatic leadership during the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement to a more peripheral role following Burundi's 2015 political crisis. While South Africa has provided tangible support in electoral capacity building and civil service training, the report finds that bilateral agreements have been implemented in a fragmented manner. It emphasizes the value of 'citizen diplomacy' through civil society and academic exchanges, particularly in supporting Burundi's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The authors argue that South Africa should leverage its remaining political capital and technical expertise through a holistic strategy that navigates complex regional dynamics involving the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"South Africa's historical involvement in Burundi, particularly its role in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, established it as a credible leader in continental peace and security, though its role has been viewed as peripheral since the 2015 elections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Africa has provided targeted electoral support to Burundi since 2005, primarily through bilateral efforts involving the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), including an assessment mission in December 2014.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Regional Capacity Building (RCB) project (2008–2013), funded by the Canadian International Development Agency for CAN$10 million, aimed to improve civil service management and leadership at the National School of Administration of Burundi (ENA Burundi).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Bilateral cooperation agreements signed in 2007 and 2011 cover defence, education, agriculture, and economic cooperation, but their implementation has been fragmented and lacks meaningful follow-up.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic diplomacy has declined since 2014, exemplified by South African Airways cancelling direct flights to Burundi in 2015 due to rising costs and falling profits.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South African civil society and academic institutions have significantly contributed to Burundi's transitional justice efforts, specifically by providing models and training for the Commission Vérité et Réconciliation (CVR).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Africa has been criticized for a 'muted' and inconsistent foreign policy position on Burundi since 2015, including its endorsement of the government's Kayanza Road Map while ignoring the opposition's Entebbe Road Map.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional mediation efforts led by the East African Community (EAC), including the Inter-Burundi Dialogue facilitated by Benjamin Mkapa, have largely failed to deliver meaningful outcomes and ended in February 2019.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has been largely ineffective in addressing Burundi's crisis due to limited resources and a lack of impartiality caused by its headquarters being located in Bujumbura.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002754#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Lesotho","Namibia","South Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Uganda","Tanzania","Kenya","Bujumbura","Cape Town","Pretoria","Kigali","Johannesburg","Lusaka","Zambia","Angola","Luanda","Mauritania","Senegal","Gabon","Ethiopia","Ivory Coast","Equatorial Guinea"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["foreign policy analysis","peace and security assessment","bilateral relations review"]},{"id":"wri-001765","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/wri-001765","title":"MAKING PEACE WITH CLIMATE ADAPTATION","publisher":{"name":"World Resources Institute","organization":"world-resources-institute"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2019-08-02","source_url":"https://files.wri.org/s3fs-public/uploads/Making_Peace_with_Adaptation_Paper_-_Global_Commission_on_Adaptation.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the intersection of climate change, security, and adaptation, arguing that climate impacts act as 'threat multipliers' that can destabilize states and international relations. It highlights risks such as transboundary water conflicts, food insecurity, Arctic geopolitical shifts, and mass migration. The authors warn against 'maladaptation'—adaptation efforts that inadvertently increase inequality or tension—and advocate for a 'preventive' approach. Key recommendations include creating multidimensional early warning systems, implementing risk-tolerant and 'nexus' financing for insecure regions, and ensuring adaptation strategies are timely, strategically targeted, and informed by political economy analysis to avoid exacerbating existing social and political frictions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-001765#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Climate change acts as a systemic security risk and a \"threat multiplier\" that can increase tensions within and between states, potentially leading to violence if unmanaged.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-001765#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Interstate security risks are emerging in four primary areas: transboundary water basins where dam construction and scarcity increase tensions; international food trade chokepoints vulnerable to climate hazards; the melting Arctic, which opens new shipping routes and resource competition; and unmanaged climate-related migration.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-001765#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Intrastate instability can be triggered by slow-onset events like prolonged drought, which erode resilience and serve as a tipping point for social unrest, or acute shocks like food price spikes and natural disasters that cause societal chaos in fragile contexts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-001765#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Poorly planned adaptation can lead to 'maladaptation,' where infrastructure or policies exacerbate inequality, exclude local voices, or harm specific interests, thereby increasing security risks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-001765#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The transition to a low-carbon economy poses its own security risks, including economic destabilization for countries highly dependent on fossil fuel rents, such as Libya and Iraq, and the potential loss of millions of jobs in fossil-dependent industries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-001765#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant gap between the financial resources allocated to military spending and fossil fuel subsidies compared to climate action; in 2017, $1.7 trillion was spent on global military spending while only $410 billion was spent on climate action.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-001765#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Effective adaptation in fragile contexts must be 'timely, political economy-informed, and strategically targeted' to avoid creating new conflicts and to ensure that transitions do not lead to turmoil.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-001765#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors recommend the creation of multidimensional early warning systems that map environmental changes against social, political, and security factors, and the development of 'nexus financing' that achieves both development and security outcomes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-001765#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change adaptation","food security","climate migration","maladaptation","energy transition","climate finance","early warning system","low-carbon economy"],"geography_discussed":["Somalia","Jordan","Syria","Libya","Iraq","Hindu Kush-Himalaya","Arctic","Sahel","South Sudan","Nepal","Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","risk assessment","geopolitical analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-002682","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002682","title":"Peace & Security Council Report","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-05","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-113-2.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the complex relationship between the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), specifically the application of 'subsidiarity'—the principle that regional structures should lead in their own jurisdictions. It highlights systemic failures in North Africa due to the inactivity of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), tensions between the AU and SADC over elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the AU's successful re-assumption of leadership in the Central African Republic. The document also notes the East African Community's (EAC) internal trade disputes, ECOWAS's struggle to adapt to violent extremism in the Sahel, and the general lack of civil society engagement within the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002682#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The principle of subsidiarity is inconsistently applied and often lacks legal clarity, leading to 'battles of supremacy' between the AU and RECs. For example, the AU and ECCAS clashed over the management of the Central African Republic (CAR) crisis between 2012 and 2014, though the AU's leadership since late 2016 has been more effective.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002682#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"North Africa lacks a functioning regional organisation to lead peace and security efforts. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is described as 'inactive' and 'paralysed by infighting', having held its last high-level meeting in 2008. This vacuum is exacerbated by overlapping memberships in other RECs like CEN-SAD and COMESA, and the fact that the North African Regional Capacity (NARC) has never been deployed.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002682#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The AU and SADC have experienced significant friction over the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) electoral dispute following the December 30, 2018 elections. While SADC supported the government and the victory of President Felix Tshisekedi, the AU expressed 'serious concerns' and attempted to delay the publication of results.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002682#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The East African Community (EAC) is the fastest-growing region on the continent with a GDP growth forecast of 5.9 percent, but it faces internal instability. Tensions between Rwanda and Uganda led to the closure of the Katuna/Gatuna border post on February 27, 2019, sparking fears of a repeat of the community's 1977 collapse.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002682#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"ECOWAS has struggled to respond to the evolving threat of violent extremism in the Sahel, as its existing response mechanisms are not adaptable enough. This has led to the rise of AU-mandated ad hoc structures like the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which fill response gaps but may overstretch national military capacities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002682#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant disconnect between the AU and African citizens, particularly within IGAD, where collaboration has been 'devoid of any citizen participation'. Efforts to include civil society are hindered by dysfunctional bodies like the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the IGAD NGO/CSO Forum.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002682#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["governance"],"geography_discussed":["Central African Republic","Democratic Republic of the Congo","The Gambia","Libya","Morocco","Algeria","Egypt","Zimbabwe","Lesotho","Madagascar","Comoros","Kenya","Rwanda","Uganda","Burundi","South Sudan","Tanzania","Chad","Republic of the Congo","Gabon","Cameroon","Mali","Niger","Burkina Faso","Nigeria","Somalia","Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["institutional analysis","policy assessment","regional case studies"]},{"id":"saiia-001348","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/saiia-001348","title":"BAPA+40 in the African Context: Is there a role for peace and security?","publisher":{"name":"South African Institute of International Affairs","organization":"south-african-institute-of-international-affairs"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2019-04-25","source_url":"https://saiia.org.za/research/bapa40-in-the-african-context-is-there-a-role-for-peace-and-security/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The paper examines the evolution of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) and the 2019 BAPA+40 conference, arguing that while South-South Cooperation (SSC) has traditionally focused on economic and social activities, it must now incorporate peace and security to address the realities of intra-state conflict in Africa. It highlights the alignment between peace and development as seen in the African Union's Agenda 2063, the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (specifically SDG 16), and UN resolutions on sustaining peace.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001348#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The original 1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) focused on a new international economic order and national and collective self-reliance, but it did not address peace and security.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001348#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While global inter-state conflict has decreased, intra-state conflict has increased, with several African countries—specifically Somalia, Sudan, Burundi, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Libya—experiencing high levels of political violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001348#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a growing global and regional recognition of the link between peace and development, evidenced by the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on 'Peaceful, Just and Inclusive societies'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001348#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"African development partners have already been sharing personnel, technologies, and best practices regarding peace and security, yet these efforts have not been reflected in the formal South-South Cooperation (SSC) discourse.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001348#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["South–South cooperation","sustainable development"],"geography_discussed":["Argentina","Somalia","Sudan","Burundi","South Sudan","Nigeria","Libya"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-001158","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001158","title":"Sudan and South Sudan: Violence trajectories after peace agreements","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-03","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-22.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"This report by the Institute for Security Studies analyzes the trajectories of political violence in Sudan and South Sudan following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). Using ACLED and UCDP GED data, it examines whether these agreements resolved, reshaped, or perpetuated violence, concluding that while the CPA ended a long civil war, it left other conflict systems unaddressed and reinforced a pattern of state-led political violence. In South Sudan, the ARCSS is described as having failed due to poor implementation and a 'winner-takes-all' political framework that incentivized continued violent competition for power.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#summary","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Sudan and South Sudan are among the African countries with the highest number of conflict fatalities between 2011 and 2017, despite the implementation of ambitious peace interventions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan led to a dramatic decline in armed conflict and fatalities, resulting in approximately six years of 'negative peace' before violence revived during South Sudan's independence in July 2011.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The CPA failed to change Sudan's fundamental political order and instead reinforced a system where the government in Khartoum uses force to suppress all political opposition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The exclusion of certain groups from the CPA peace process, particularly in Darfur, is linked to the outbreak of insurgency in that region as actors sought to challenge the concentration of power at the center.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"Following the CPA, the conflict in Sudan mutated into lower-intensity fighting via proxies, with an increase in conflict events involving ethnic and communal militias after 2005.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"In South Sudan, the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) suffered from very poor implementation; by the time it collapsed in 2016, only 20 percent of its provisions had been implemented.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The ARCSS reinforced a political order based on violent competition for resources and power, as the provision for a unity government followed by 'winner-takes-all' elections increased incentives for political violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-08-17"},{"text":"The collapse of the ARCSS led to the spread of political violence across South Sudan, including into Greater Equatoria, and an increase in violence against civilians.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001158#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-08-17"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Darfur","Khartoum","Abyei","Southern Kordofan","Blue Nile State","Greater Equatoria","Upper Nile","Jonglei","Unity"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"issafri-000774","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-000774","title":"AU summit 32: Egypt takes the wheel at the AU","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02-07","source_url":"https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-summit-32-egypt-takes-the-wheel-at-the-au","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Egypt's 2019 AU chairmanship focuses on economic goals, intra-African trade, and institutional reform, though the author notes a significant gap regarding governance and the need for Egypt to ratify the CFTA.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Egypt outlined six priority areas for its 2019 AU chairmanship: building bridges among Africa’s people, cooperating with partners, economic and regional integration, economic and social development, institutional and financial reform of the AU, and peace and security.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Egypt's chairmanship emphasizes economic development and intra-African trade, with President Sisi stating that Egypt increased its investments in Africa by $1.2 billion in 2018 to reach a total of $10.2 billion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite promoting the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) agreement, Egypt had not yet ratified the agreement at the time of the report.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author identifies a major policy gap in Egypt's priorities: the absence of governance issues, which are described as central to Africa's underdevelopment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Egypt's peace and security priorities include establishing the AU Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Cairo and launching the Aswan Forum for Peace and Sustainable Development.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-000774#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change"],"geography_discussed":["Addis Ababa","Sharm el-Sheikh","Nigeria","Cairo","Aswan","Libya","Sahel","Sudan","South Sudan","Somalia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001509","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001509","title":"How Does Political Violence Target Women?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2019-02","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/08fd6c57-da25-46ad-90c1-69cfed5e1061/Kishi Roudabeh and Louise Olsson - How Does Political Violence Target Women GPS Policy Brief 2-2019.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The document introduces ACLED data on political violence targeting women (PVTW), defining it as the use of physical force by groups with political motivations in the public sphere. The analysis reveals that while sexual violence is a significant threat, non-sexual attacks are the most commonly reported type of PVTW globally. The brief highlights regional variations in both the types of violence and the perpetrators, noting that anonymous armed groups are the most frequent offenders overall, while state forces, political militias, and mobs dominate in specific regions. The authors argue that understanding these patterns is essential for evidence-based Women, Peace and Security (WPS) policies and for achieving 'security equality' by recognizing women as active political agents rather than mere victims.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001509#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Non-sexual attacks are the most frequently reported form of political violence targeting women (PVTW) globally, contrary to common assumptions that such violence is primarily sexual. This type of violence accounts for more than two-thirds of PVTW in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Southeastern and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001509#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Sexual violence represents a substantial proportion of PVTW in specific regions, comprising more than one-third of reported cases in both Southeast Asia and Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001509#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Anonymous or unidentified armed groups are the most common perpetrators of PVTW, accounting for over one-third of all reported cases. This anonymity may be a strategic choice by perpetrators to avoid responsibility or a result of reporting limitations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001509#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Perpetrator types vary significantly by region: state forces (military or police) are the primary perpetrators in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Caucasus and Central Asia; political militias are highly active in Africa; and mobs are the primary perpetrators in South Asia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001509#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Mob violence and abductions/forced disappearances are often under-analyzed in Women, Peace and Security (WPS) settings. Mob violence is particularly prevalent in South Asia and Africa, while abductions and forced disappearances are most commonly reported in Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001509#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Political violence targeting women is a strategic tool used to hinder women's political participation, and it occurs both within war-time contexts and in non-war environments where political processes are contested.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001509#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Middle East","Southeastern and Eastern Europe and the Balkans","Caucasus and Central Asia","Latin America and the Caribbean","Africa","Southeast Asia","South Asia","Syria","South Sudan","Myanmar","Zimbabwe","India","Nigeria","Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Afghanistan","Greece","Philippines","Burundi","West Bank"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"prio-001503","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001503","title":"Prospects for a Transformed Sudan","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2019","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/d4cb8213-b853-406f-9a76-b537a5b3f1a3/Johnson Hilde F - Prospects for a Transformed Sudan PRIO Policy Brief 16-2019.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the transition in Sudan after the ousting of Omar al-Bashir, highlighting the tension between the civilian-led Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the military-led Transitional Military Council (TMC). It argues that while regime change occurred on paper, the 'Islamic security state' remains influential. The author outlines five scenarios ranging from a return to the status quo or civil war to successful systemic reform, emphasizing that economic recovery and security sector transformation are critical for success.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001503#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 2019 Sudanese Revolution, sparked by economic crises including the cost of bread and fuel, ended the 30-year rule of the National Congress Party and former president Omar al-Bashir.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001503#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite the establishment of a power-sharing agreement and a civilian-led cabinet under Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the military and Islamist elements maintain significant control over government institutions and the security apparatus.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001503#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The success of the transition is threatened by the influence of Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), who controls the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), gold trade, and maintains close ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001503#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author identifies five potential scenarios for Sudan: the Status Quo (where NCP forces stall reforms), a Tug of War (partial reforms but security sector deadlock), Reversal (Islamists and military regain power), the Worst Case (civil war and state disintegration), and Reform (successful partnership with armed opposition and security sector transformation).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001503#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic recovery is viewed as one of the most critical factors for the success of the transitional government, as improved living conditions increase the Prime Minister's chances of succeeding.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001503#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"International stakeholders, including the Troika (US, UK, Norway) and Gulf countries, are urged to pressure the government for security sector transformation and provide debt relief and financial assistance conditional on transparency and accountability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001503#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["South Sudan","United Arab Emirates","Saudi Arabia","Egypt","Ethiopia","Qatar","Iran","Norway","United Kingdom","United States","Kenya","Darfur","Southern Kordofan","Blue Nile State"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["scenario analysis","policy recommendation"]},{"id":"seforall-000190","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/seforall-000190","title":"CHILLING PROSPECTS: TRACKING SUSTAINABLE COOLING FOR ALL 2019","publisher":{"name":"Sustainable Energy for All","organization":"sustainable-energy-for-all"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"en","date_published":"2019","source_url":"https://www.seforall.org/system/files/2019-11/SEforALL-Chilling_Prospects-Infographic.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document reports that 1.05 billion people remained at the highest risk of cooling insecurity in 2019, down from 1.1 billion in 2018. It identifies the 'Critical 9' countries with the largest populations at high risk, including India, China, and Nigeria, and notes that China and India have already developed National Cooling Plans, while Brazil, Nigeria, and Bangladesh are currently developing them.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000190#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In 2019, 1.05 billion people remained at the highest risk of cooling insecurity, a decrease from 1.1 billion in 2018. This high-risk group consists of the Rural Poor (365 million) and Urban Poor (680 million).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000190#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Twelve African countries have over 60% of their populations at high risk (Rural and Urban Poor): Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Djibuti, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Togo.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000190#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'Critical 9' countries with the largest number of people at high risk are India, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mozambique, Sudan, and Brazil. China and India have developed National Cooling Plans, while Brazil, Nigeria, and Bangladesh are in the process of developing them.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"seforall-000190#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["energy access","greenhouse gas emissions","energy efficiency"],"geography_discussed":["Africa","Asia","Angola","Benin","Burkina Faso","Djibouti","Guinea-Bissau","Liberia","Malawi","Mali","Mozambique","Nigeria","South Sudan","Togo","India","People's Republic of China","Indonesia","Pakistan","Bangladesh","Sudan","Brazil"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","trend analysis"]},{"id":"issafri-001157","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001157","title":"Nobody came to ask us","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-20.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report presents findings from interviews with 106 South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and Uganda, highlighting a widespread feeling of exclusion from the peace process. Key issues include a lack of trustworthy information, deep frustration with political leadership, and sharp divisions over the number of states in South Sudan. While all respondents desire to return home, many remain cautious, citing the need for proven stability and security before repatriation is safe.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Refugees reported a significant lack of accurate and trustworthy information regarding the peace process, often relying on second-hand accounts, word-of-mouth, and the internet via smartphones.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is widespread frustration with South Sudanese political leadership, with many refugees viewing the leaders as being concerned with personal interests rather than national ones and advocating for new leadership through elections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The issue of the number of states in South Sudan is a major point of contention and division among refugees, with views often split along regional lines, ranging from support for a three-region federal model to the 32-state plan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While all interviewed refugees expressed a strong desire to return to South Sudan, many are cautious and believe several years of monitoring the peace agreement's implementation are necessary before it is safe to do so.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Refugees expressed pessimism toward the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as a mediator, citing perceived biases, the pursuit of member states' own interests, and a failure to address the root causes of the conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite the inclusion of some refugee observers in the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF), most interviewed refugees felt they lacked a genuine voice and that the selection process for representatives lacked transparency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Perceptions of political representation varied by location: refugees in Gambella showed strong allegiance to the SPLM-IO, while those in Adjumani were more fragmented and often felt unrepresented by any of the parties in Khartoum.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Female respondents specifically highlighted a lack of gender inclusivity in the peace talks, arguing that the process is dominated by men who do not understand the specific suffering of women.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001157#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Gambela Region","Adjumani District","Sudan","Kenya"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["perception survey","policy analysis","field research"]},{"id":"issafri-002225","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002225","title":"Compound fractures","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-21-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the fragmented political and security environment in South Sudan as it attempts to implement the R-ARCSS. It details the proliferation of armed opposition groups, the concentration of power within the government, and the challenges facing the IGAD-led mediation process, including the influence of bilateral interests from regional powers like Sudan and Uganda.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed in September 2018, but its implementation faces a difficult environment because the country's political and security sectors have become increasingly fragmented and incoherent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Government forces have achieved a military advantage on the battlefield through various offensives, but this has resulted in the alienation of civilians and a loss of confidence from international allies, specifically the United States.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Numerous armed opposition groups have emerged due to the spread of conflict, falling government revenues, and the hope of gaining power through peace processes. These groups are typically led by military officers or politicians who defected or were removed from the government or the SPLM-IO.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) successfully brokered the agreement, but the mediation process was hindered by the zero-sum mentality of the warring parties and the pursuit of bilateral interests by regional leaders.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The conflict has had a devastating human and economic toll, with an estimated 382,000 deaths (approximately 3% of the population), the displacement of 4.2 million people, and a peak inflation rate exceeding 800% in October 2016.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Political power within the government is increasingly concentrated among a small group, specifically those from the Rek subgroup of Dinka, a trend described as the 'Gogrialization of government'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The SPLM-IO remains the largest armed opposition group and maintains strong grassroots support, particularly as a symbol for the Nuer nation, despite internal divisions and military losses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The conflict expanded into Greater Equatoria after July 2016, leading to the rise of regional movements like the National Salvation Front (NAS) as communities sought to protect themselves from a state they perceive as Dinka- and Nuer-dominated.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) was formed in 2018 by ten opposition groups to create a unified front in the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF), though the alliance is tenuous and members often lack common goals beyond opposing the government.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional interference, particularly from Sudan and Uganda, has raised concerns that South Sudan could become an 'informal protectorate' of these neighbors, with Sudan specifically seeking security roles in oilfields.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002225#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Sudan","Uganda","Democratic Republic of the Congo","South Africa","Ethiopia","Kenya","Tanzania","Juba"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"issafri-002681","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002681","title":"Peace & Security Council Report","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-12","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-109-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the 2019 outlook for the African Union's Peace and Security Council, highlighting the potential return of major powers like South Africa and Ethiopia to the council. It critiques the slow implementation of AU reforms, specifically regarding financial self-sufficiency and the reduction of the AU Commission. The document details a volatile 2019 electoral calendar across 11+ countries and warns of escalating instability in Gabon, Cameroon, and the Sahel. Additionally, it discusses the progress of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the tensions surrounding AU-EU negotiations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 2019 elections for the 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) may see the return of South Africa, Ethiopia, and Algeria, which could provide clarity on 'strengthening the PSC'. South Africa's potential concurrent membership on the UN Security Council could improve coordination and information flow between New York and Addis Ababa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"AU institutional reforms are progressing slowly, particularly regarding financial independence. By mid-November 2018, only 50% of member states had paid their dues, and only about half of members were implementing the 0.2% import levy intended to make the AU financially self-sufficient.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The AU has approved reducing the number of commissions from eight to six, including a merger of the peace and security and political affairs departments to better address structural drivers of conflict. This new structure is expected to be in place by 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Gabon is facing institutional instability due to a controversial constitutional amendment introduced by the Constitutional Court to address the 'temporary unavailability' of President Ali Bongo. The report argues that the AU must use sanctions or other tools to prevent the erosion of democratic rules in Gabon.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The year 2019 is expected to be highly volatile with at least 11 presidential seats up for grabs. Concerns are raised about the lack of a level playing field, as incumbents often use constitutional amendments, electoral law changes, and repression to maintain power.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Security threats are evolving, with terror group activities in the Sahel tripling between September 2017 and September 2018. There is a risk of violent extremism spreading to coastal West African countries, including Ghana, Togo, and Benin.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) had 49 signatories and 12 ratifications as of the report date, with an expectation that it would enter into force by March 2019 once 10 more countries ratify. The agreement aims to eliminate tariffs and promote the free movement of people.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002681#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance","trade policy"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Ethiopia","Algeria","Gabon","Cameroon","Nigeria","Senegal","Somalia","South Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Central African Republic"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","political risk assessment"]},{"id":"recourse-000002","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/recourse-000002","title":"An Open Letter to States and Development Financiers on the need to ensure that development interventions support the realization of human rights, safeguard human rights defenders and guarantee meaningful public participation","publisher":{"name":"Recourse","organization":"recourse"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2018-10-31","source_url":"https://re-course.org/newsupdates/human-rights-defenders-are-a-cornerstone-of-sustainable-development/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Defenders in Development Campaign urges states and development finance institutions (DFIs) to integrate human rights protections into development projects, noting that defenders of land and environmental rights face extreme risks of violence and criminalization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"recourse-000002#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Human rights defenders (HRDs), particularly those protecting land, environmental, and indigenous peoples' rights, face increasing risks of retaliation, violence, and criminalization, often being labeled as \"anti-development.\"","ai_generated":true,"unit":"recourse-000002#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a high mortality rate among human rights defenders; an estimated 3,500 have been killed since 1998, with 67 percent of those murdered in 2017 working in the context of big business, extractive industries, and large investments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"recourse-000002#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Development interventions frequently ignore human rights contexts and impacts, leading to negative outcomes such as land grabbing, social conflict, and loss of access to essential services through austerity measures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"recourse-000002#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Development finance institutions (DFIs) have a critical responsibility to ensure their investments do not contribute to attacks on defenders and should implement ongoing human rights due diligence throughout a project's lifespan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"recourse-000002#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The letter demands that DFIs and states establish protocols to prevent reprisals, ensure the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples, and create safe mechanisms for defenders to report deteriorating environments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"recourse-000002#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Governments, as shareholders of development banks, are urged to ensure these institutions fulfill human rights obligations, as some national development banks and bilateral cooperation efforts may currently be undermining protection efforts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"recourse-000002#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["land tenure","indigenous rights","extractive industry","public participation","sustainable development"],"geography_discussed":["Armenia","Argentina","Azerbaijan","Belgium","Bolivia","Brazil","Bulgaria","Canada","Colombia","Croatia","Czech Republic","Ecuador","Estonia","Finland","France","Georgia","Guatemala","Hungary","India","Indonesia","Ireland","Italy","Kazakhstan","Kenya","Kyrgyzstan","Latvia","Lithuania","North Macedonia","Mauritius","Mexico","Mongolia","Nepal","Netherlands","Nigeria","Norway","Peru","Philippines","Poland","Congo","Russia","Serbia","Slovakia","Slovenia","South Africa","South Sudan","Spain","Switzerland","Eswatini","Sweden","Thailand","Togo","Tunisia","Uganda","United Kingdom","Ukraine","United States","Uzbekistan","Zambia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy advocacy"]},{"id":"fsdafri-000235","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/fsdafri-000235","title":"Remittances in Uganda","publisher":{"name":"FSD Africa","organization":"fsd-africa"},"document_type":"case study","language":"en","date_published":"2018-10","source_url":"https://fsdafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Volume-3_Barriers-to-remittances-in-Uganda_FSDA_October-2018.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Uganda is a major net recipient of remittances, with inflows contributing approximately 4% to its GDP in 2016. While mobile money has expanded access, the sector faces significant hurdles, including high costs for transfers from developed countries, an oligopolistic mobile money market, and restrictive KYC requirements that exclude approximately 16% of adults without national IDs. Infrastructure gaps in rural areas—specifically poor roads and low electrification—further hinder the expansion of formal services. The report highlights the disruptive potential of the 2018 mobile money tax and recommends mandating interoperability, adopting a risk-based approach to AML/CFT, and transitioning from interim guidelines to a formal e-money law.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000235#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Uganda is a significant net recipient of remittances, ranking as the sixth-highest recipient in Africa. In 2016, inflows exceeded USD1 billion, adding approximately 4% to the national GDP.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000235#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Formal remittance costs remain high, particularly for transfers from developed nations. A USD200 transfer from the UK averages 7.3%, exceeding the Sustainable Development Goals' target limit of 3% to 5%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000235#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The mobile money market is characterized by an oligopoly where dominant operators stifle competition through a lack of interoperability and restricted access to infrastructure, such as towers and USSD access.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000235#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Strict Know-Your-Customer (KYC) requirements and the lack of a risk-based approach (RBA) exclude a significant portion of the population. Approximately 16% of adults lack the official ID required for services, affecting over 3.2 million people.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000235#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The introduction of a mobile money tax in July 2018 (initially 1%, later reduced to 0.5% for cash withdrawals) is viewed as a threat that may drive consumers toward informal remittance channels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000235#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Physical infrastructure deficits in rural areas, including poor road networks and low electricity access (18% in rural areas), increase the operational costs for remittance service providers and limit digital expansion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000235#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regulatory uncertainty persists because mobile money is governed by non-binding 2013 guidelines rather than formal law, leading to overlapping jurisdictions between the Bank of Uganda (BoU) and the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000235#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["financial regulation"],"geography_discussed":["United Kingdom","South Sudan","Rwanda","Kenya","United States","Saudi Arabia","United Arab Emirates","Oman","Tanzania"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","regulatory analysis","market assessment"]},{"id":"issafri-002132","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-002132","title":"Violence in Africa","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018-08","source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar-12-v1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that while armed conflict fatalities in Africa are generally declining, the continent remains vulnerable due to structural drivers including poverty, youth bulges, and poor governance. It notes a shift from rural armed conflict toward urban political protests and riots. The analysis identifies a core group of countries at the highest risk of armed conflict and argues that inclusive economic development and improved governance are the only long-term solutions for stability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Armed conflict fatalities in Africa have generally declined over the long term, though they peaked in 2014-15. Violence involving militant Islamist groups and the state responses to them have proven to be the most resilient forms of conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Armed violence is concentrated in a small number of countries. When adjusted for population size, the citizens most at risk of fatalities between 2001 and 2017 were in the Central African Republic, Somalia, Liberia, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Burundi.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa bears a disproportionately high global burden of non-state conflict, which often reflects the inability of governments to maintain territorial control and law and order across large areas of state land.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a growing trend of urban-based political violence. The number of non-violent protests and violent riots has increased twelvefold since 2001, though these events have become less deadly on average over time.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Extreme poverty remains a significant driver of instability. Approximately 37% of Africans live in extreme poverty (below US$1.90 per day), and the absolute number of people in this category is forecast to increase to 513 million by 2023 due to population growth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'youth bulge'—a high proportion of the population aged 15 to 29—increases the risk of criminal violence and conflict, particularly in countries with high unemployment and limited educational opportunities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regime type significantly impacts stability, with 'anocracies' (intermediate regimes with both autocratic and democratic elements) being six times more likely than consolidated democracies to experience new civil conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Conflict recurrence is a major trend, with 60% of conflicts repeating in the same countries. The report notes that the risk of recurrence drops by as much as 75% in countries where UN peacekeepers are deployed.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Poor governance is a critical vulnerability. The countries scoring worst on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (below 40/100) include Somalia, South Sudan, Eritrea, CAR, Sudan, Libya, DRC, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Burundi.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ten countries are identified as being at the highest risk of armed conflict in 2023 based on the intersection of multiple structural drivers: Somalia, DRC, CAR, South Sudan, Sudan, Burundi, Libya, Cameroon, Angola, and Chad.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-002132#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["governance","urbanization","climate change","food security"],"geography_discussed":["World","Somalia","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Central African Republic","South Sudan","Sudan","Burundi","Libya","Cameroon","Angola","Chad","South Africa","Egypt","Nigeria","Tunisia","Algeria","Kenya","Ethiopia","Niger","Rwanda","Madagascar","Liberia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["trend analysis","forecasting","structural assessment"]}]}