{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"climate_tags":["tax policy"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":30,"relation":"eq"},"page":1,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?climate_tags=tax+policy","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?climate_tags=tax+policy&page=2","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"ember-000388","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/ember-000388","title":"Renewables shield Spanish consumers from elevated gas prices","publisher":{"name":"Ember","organization":"ember"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026-06-16","source_url":"https://ember-energy.org/app/uploads/2026/06/Report-PDF-Renewables-shield-Spanish-consumers-from-elevated-gas-prices.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Spain's strategic investment in wind and solar power has significantly reduced the influence of gas on electricity prices, keeping power costs among the lowest in the EU during the 2026 energy crisis. While high gas prices caused spikes in other European markets like Italy, Spanish consumers benefited from a decoupling effect that saved a typical household approximately €10 per month. The report also highlights policy responses following the April 2025 Iberian blackout, including reforms to battery storage and grid management, and temporary tax cuts to encourage electrification and reduce fossil fuel import dependency.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ember-000388#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The influence of gas on Spanish day-ahead electricity prices dropped from an estimated 52% of hours in 2021 to only 9% of hours in the first five months of 2026, primarily due to a 37% increase in wind and solar generation between 2021 and 2025.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ember-000388#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Spain and Portugal were among the three EU countries with the lowest day-ahead electricity prices in each of the first four months of 2026. In March 2026, Italy's average power prices (€143/MWh) were three times higher than Spain's (€42/MWh).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ember-000388#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A typical Spanish household on a regulated tariff saved an estimated €10 (or 19%) per month on electricity bills during the 2026 crisis compared to a scenario where prices remained as linked to gas as they were in 2021.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ember-000388#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The financial benefit of wholesale market shielding was partially offset by rising grid balancing costs. Between 2021 and 2025, annual grid balancing costs rose from €1.3 billion to €3.8 billion, and renewables curtailment increased from 0.1 TWh to 4.6 TWh.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ember-000388#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Following the Iberian blackout of April 2025, Spain maintained its renewable expansion, adding an average of 1.3 GW of wind and solar capacity per month between May 2025 and February 2026. Additionally, the capacity of large batteries in Spain is expected to quadruple in 2026.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ember-000388#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To promote electrification and reduce a fossil import dependency that stands at 71% (higher than the EU average of 57%), Spain implemented temporary tax cuts ending June 1, 2026, including reducing VAT on electricity from 21% to 10% and the electricity tax from 5.1% to 0.5%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"ember-000388#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["wind power","solar energy","battery energy storage system","electricity price","electrification","Resilience (power system)","wide area synchronous grid","energy security","tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["Portugal","Italy","European Union"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["economic impact assessment","policy evaluation"]},{"id":"saiia-000424","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/saiia-000424","title":"Harnessing DPI to Address Informality and Boost DRM: A Case of the Shadow Economy","publisher":{"name":"South African Institute of International Affairs","organization":"south-african-institute-of-international-affairs"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2025-09-15","source_url":"https://saiia.org.za/research/harnessing-dpi-to-address-informality-and-boost-drm-a-case-of-the-shadow-economy/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The policy brief examines the role of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI)—comprising digital identity, payments, and data-sharing systems—in addressing the shadow economy in Africa, which is estimated by the IMF to represent roughly 35% of GDP (approximately $1–1.2 trillion). It distinguishes between the general informal economy and the 'shadow economy,' focusing on high-value transactions deliberately structured to evade taxes. The document highlights that cash transactions enable this opacity, while digitalisation can increase visibility and audit trails. Drawing on lessons from South Korea's Tax Incentive for Electronically Traceable Payments (TIETP) and India's 'India Stack' and demonetisation, the brief suggests that incentivising consumers to use digital payments is more effective than solely targeting sellers. It notes that while Uganda has used DPI to register over 350,000 informal participants, revenue gains were limited by weak enforcement and data-sharing obstacles. The brief recommends that South Africa, during its 2025 G20 presidency, advocate for an 'Africa Stack' of open APIs and modular technology to spur private sector innovation and improve tax administration across the continent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000424#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The shadow economy in Northern, Southern, Central and Eastern Africa is estimated by EY to range from 24.1% to 41.6% of GDP, resulting in billions of dollars in lost revenue.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000424#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The IMF estimates that informal economic activity in Africa accounts for approximately 35% of GDP, valued at around $1–1.2 trillion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000424#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Korea significantly reduced its shadow economy from approximately 28% of GDP in 1999 to about 7.6% currently by implementing the Tax Incentive for Electronically Traceable Payments (TIETP), which encouraged consumers to use electronic payments via tax deductions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000424#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Uganda, integrating taxpayer identification numbers with the national ID system allowed the Uganda Revenue Authority to register more than 350,000 informal sector participants by 2022, though revenue impact was limited by legal obstacles to data sharing and weak enforcement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000424#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Digital payments can reduce the shadow economy by creating audit trails and increasing transaction visibility, but adoption by consumers alone is insufficient if non-compliant firms refuse to adopt point-of-sale systems.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000424#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"African countries have attempted to raise revenue through taxes on digital financial services (DFS), with over 10 countries levying transaction taxes between 0.2% and 5% in 2022; however, excessively high rates can hinder financial inclusion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-000424#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Uganda","India","South Korea","Sierra Leone","Niger","Ethiopia","Uruguay"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy brief"]},{"id":"saiia-001179","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/saiia-001179","title":"Harnessing DPI to Address Informality and Boost DRM: A Case of the Shadow Economy","publisher":{"name":"South African Institute of International Affairs","organization":"south-african-institute-of-international-affairs"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2025-08","source_url":"https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SAIIA_PB-314_HarnessingDPI.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that digital public infrastructure (DPI)—comprising digital identity, payments, and data-sharing systems—can increase the visibility of economic activities in Africa's shadow economy, which accounts for roughly 35% of GDP. It contrasts the approach of some African nations, which tax digital financial services (DFS) transactions directly, with the strategies of South Korea and India, which used digital systems to create audit trails and improve broader tax compliance. The brief recommends that African governments adopt a multi-layered DPI ecosystem, prioritize strategic compliance targeting of high-value non-compliant actors, and leverage South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency to foster an 'Africa stack' for scalable deployment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001179#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The shadow economy in Africa, which includes both informal and illicit activities designed to evade regulation, represents approximately 35% of GDP, valued at around $1–1.2 trillion according to the IMF.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001179#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Cash transactions are a primary driver of the shadow economy because they lack a formal audit trail, contributing to a tax gap where the three countries with the largest shadow economies—Sierra Leone, Niger, and Ethiopia—have tax-to-GDP ratios below the regional average of 16%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001179#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a strategic difference between African countries like Uganda that levy taxes on digital financial services (DFS) transactions (ranging from 0.2–5%) and countries like South Korea and India, which used digital systems to increase transaction transparency to expand the overall tax net.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001179#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Korea significantly reduced its shadow economy from approximately 28% of GDP in 1999 to 7.6% by implementing the Tax Incentive for Electronically Traceable Payments (TIETP), which incentivized consumers to use electronic payments via tax deductions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001179#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Uganda, integrating taxpayer identification numbers with the national ID system allowed the Uganda Revenue Authority to register over 350,000 informal sector participants by 2022, though revenue gains were limited by weak enforcement and data-sharing obstacles.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001179#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document recommends that African tax authorities avoid targeting small-scale unregistered vendors and instead focus on 'strategic compliance targeting' of registered actors with higher earning potential, such as construction firms and professional services, who deliberately evade taxes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001179#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Uganda","India","South Korea","Sierra Leone","Niger","Ethiopia","Uruguay"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","comparative study","case study"]},{"id":"pestake-000092","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/pestake-000092","title":"Private Equity, Public Damage","publisher":{"name":"Private Equity Stakeholder Project","organization":"private-equity-stakeholder-project"},"document_type":"executive summary","language":"en","date_published":"2025-02-14","source_url":"https://pestakeholder.org/reports/private-equity-public-damage/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The executive summary describes the private equity (PE) business model as one of 'legalized looting,' where firms use aggressive cost-cutting, excessive fees, and debt-funded dividends to extract short-term value from acquired companies. It highlights that these practices increase bankruptcy risks and are subsidized by a tax code that provides loopholes, such as carried interest, which benefit wealthy executives while burdening workers and the environment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pestake-000092#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Private equity firms utilize aggressive financial-engineering strategies, including mass layoffs, excessive management fees, and debt-funded dividends, which prioritize short-term extraction over long-term company stability and can harm workers, consumers, and communities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pestake-000092#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Companies taken private via leveraged buyouts are significantly more prone to failure; one study of nearly 500 public companies found they were 10 times more likely to go bankrupt than comparable firms not acquired by private equity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pestake-000092#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The private equity industry is subsidized by the tax code through loopholes and preferential rules, such as the carried interest loophole, which allowed eight executives from Blackstone and KKR to save $335 million in taxes over five years.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pestake-000092#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The industry is seeking to restore an expired business tax break on loan interest from the 2017 Trump-GOP tax law, which would increase the amount of destructive debt placed on acquired companies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pestake-000092#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["tax policy"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic critique"]},{"id":"iisd-003425","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-003425","title":"Ring-Fencing Mining Income","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":"2025","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/ring-fencing-mining-income-toolkit-en.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document defines ring-fencing as a limitation on the consolidation of income and deductions across different projects or activities for tax purposes. It argues that while ring-fencing can discourage investment in marginal ore bodies and increase compliance costs, it is essential for capturing economic rents, preventing permanent revenue loss from unsuccessful exploration, and mitigating BEPS practices. The guide recommends ring-fencing by mining licence area and suggests that profit-based taxes like Resource Rent Tax (RRT) and Additional Profit Tax (APT) must be ring-fenced to be effective. It also provides technical recommendations on apportioning indirect and general expenditures, suggesting that capital expenditure (CapEx) is a more effective allocation key than production volumes to avoid tax deferral.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Ring-fencing accelerates the delivery of government revenues by preventing mining companies from offsetting exploration and development costs of new projects against the profits of existing producing mines.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Without ring-fencing, governments face the risk of permanent revenue loss when investors offset costs from unsuccessful exploration projects against the profits of producing mines.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ring-fencing can mitigate BEPS practices, such as the use of structured financial derivatives to intentionally generate losses in a mining entity while booking gains in a related overseas company.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The most administratively simple method of ring-fencing is by mining licence area, as it aligns tax treatment with geographical locations defined in the licence and regulatory reporting.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Profit-based taxes, specifically Resource Rent Tax (RRT) and Additional Profit Tax (APT), require ring-fencing to be effective; otherwise, consolidation of results across projects can delay the point at which the required internal rate of return (IRR) threshold is met.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Using production volumes as an allocation key for indirect and general expenditures can be counterproductive, as it allocates 100% of costs to producing mines, thereby deferring taxes and undermining the purpose of ring-fencing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The guide recommends using capital expenditure (CapEx) as an allocation key for indirect and general expenditures because it preserves the policy intent of ring-fencing by allocating costs to projects regardless of whether they are currently producing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To prevent profit shifting between ring-fenced activities within a single legal entity, countries should apply transfer pricing rules to internal 'dealings' based on the arm's-length principle.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ring-fencing can create a more equitable environment for new entrants by removing the tax advantage incumbent operators have when offsetting new exploration costs against existing income.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Some jurisdictions, including Papua New Guinea, Kenya, and the Cook Islands, use exceptions to allow the limited recovery of unsuccessful exploration expenditures to balance revenue needs with the goal of attracting exploration investment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-003425#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["mining","tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["Africa","Sierra Leone","Papua New Guinea","South Africa","Tanzania","Zambia","Kenya","United Kingdom","Mongolia","Mozambique","Cook Islands","Zimbabwe","Ethiopia","Liberia","Ghana"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy guide","comparative analysis"]},{"id":"iejza-000353","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iejza-000353","title":"ARE BINDING FISCAL RULES THE RIGHT SOLUTION FOR DEBT SUSTAINABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA?","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Economic Justice","organization":"institute-for-economic-justice"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2024-10","source_url":"https://iej.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/IEJ-Discussion-Document-on-Fiscal-Anchors.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Institute for Economic Justice argues against the National Treasury's proposal for a binding fiscal rule in South Africa, claiming it misdiagnoses the debt problem by focusing on the quantum of debt rather than the cost of borrowing. Drawing on case studies from Brazil and Indonesia, the paper asserts that fiscal rules often lead to 'creative accounting', inappropriate budget cuts to social services, and reduced flexibility during crises, without necessarily lowering borrowing costs. The authors suggest that sustainable public finances can only be achieved through economic expansion, progressive revenue mobilization, and direct interventions to lower interest rates.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000353#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The authors argue that National Treasury's focus on the quantum of debt is misplaced, as South Africa's debt-to-GDP ratio of 73.9% in 2023/24 is consistent with the emerging market and middle-income average of 73.1%, yet its borrowing costs are significantly higher than its peers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000353#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Africa's existing nominal expenditure ceiling has shown inconsistent efficacy; while non-interest spending largely stayed within targets from 2012/13 to 2018/19, it significantly exceeded limits every year from 2019/20 to 2023/24.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000353#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document suggests that a binding fiscal rule may not legally restrict Parliament's power to appropriate funds under the current South African constitutional framework, potentially requiring a constitutional amendment to be truly binding.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000353#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Fiscal rules risk causing 'inappropriate budget cuts' to social priorities with weak political backing, such as school nutrition and transport, as governments seek to meet numerical targets.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000353#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Evidence from Brazil indicates that fiscal rules can incentivize 'creative accounting' and the systematic denial of approved expenditures to create an illusion of compliance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000353#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Case studies of Brazil and Indonesia suggest that economic growth, such as the global commodities boom, was the primary driver for improving debt dynamics and lowering borrowing costs, rather than the implementation of fiscal rules.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000353#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors contend that the adoption of fiscal rules in developing countries is often driven by IMF conditions in exchange for financial support, which undermines domestic policy sovereignty.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000353#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To restore public finances, the document recommends a government-wide spending review, progressive revenue raising (such as restoring the corporate income tax rate to 28%), and direct tools to lower borrowing costs like central bank intervention and capital management techniques.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000353#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["economic growth","tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["Brazil","Indonesia","Western Cape","KwaZulu-Natal","Gauteng"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","comparative case study","economic analysis"]},{"id":"afrodad-000004","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/afrodad-000004","title":"Reforming fiscal policies to reduce inequalities and eradicate poverty (SDG 1, 10)","publisher":{"name":"African Forum and Network on Debt and Development","organization":"african-forum-and-network-on-debt-and-development"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2024-09-12","source_url":"https://afrodad.org/news-events/articles/taxation-wealth-eradication-poverty-and-inequality","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document advocates for a progressive tax agenda to address extreme poverty and wealth concentration, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It proposes several instruments: Financial Transaction Taxes (FTTs) to curb speculation and raise billions annually; net wealth taxes to target the super-rich; property taxes to leverage immobile assets; and Resource Rent Taxes (RTT) for the extractives sector. Using South Africa as a case study, the brief demonstrates that a combination of these taxes could generate substantial revenue to fund social protection, healthcare, and a Universal Basic Income Guarantee, potentially increasing GDP growth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afrodad-000004#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Sub-Saharan Africa faces severe poverty and wealth concentration, with over 389 million people living in extreme poverty in 2018 and the wealthiest 10% owning more than half of the region's wealth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afrodad-000004#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"African tax structures are disproportionately reliant on regressive consumption taxes compared to other regions; in 2021, VAT accounted for 27.8% of total tax revenue in Africa, compared to 25.6% in the Asia-Pacific and 20.2% in the OECD.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afrodad-000004#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) could generate significant global revenue, with estimates ranging from $200 billion to $900 billion annually depending on the rates and types of taxes applied.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afrodad-000004#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Wealth taxes on the world's richest individuals are proposed as a means to fund social protection and a just transition, with an estimate that taxing the richest 3,000 people globally could raise approximately $250 billion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afrodad-000004#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Property taxation is identified as an underutilised revenue source in developing countries, which collect only 0.5% of GDP from property taxes compared to 2% in developed countries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afrodad-000004#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In South Africa, implementing a progressive net wealth tax of 3-7% could raise between R70 billion and R160 billion, while a broader Financial Transaction Tax at 0.1% could generate over R40 billion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afrodad-000004#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A 'high-ambition' basic income grant scenario in South Africa, funded by progressive taxation, is estimated to increase average GDP growth from 2.2% in 2023 to 3.5% by 2030.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afrodad-000004#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["tax policy","extractive industry","climate justice","just transition","social protection"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Zimbabwe","Kenya","Namibia","Comoros","Angola","Botswana","Lesotho","Eswatini","Spain","Sweden","Norway","Switzerland","Argentina","Colombia","Ecuador","Uruguay","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic modelling","comparative analysis"]},{"id":"iejza-000434","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iejza-000434","title":"Understanding the role of civil society research in influencing government policies towards fair tax systems in Africa","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Economic Justice","organization":"institute-for-economic-justice"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2021-11","source_url":"https://iej.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/TJNA-Report-A4_Understanding-the-role-of-civil-society-research-in-influencing-government-policies-towards-fair-tax-systems.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report explores the 'Use of Research Evidence' (URE) by policymakers in Africa, focusing on the intersection of CSO research and tax policy. Through case studies in Tunisia, Nigeria, Zambia, and Uganda, it finds that while the technical quality of CSO research is generally high, its influence is primarily determined by non-technical factors such as the timing of engagement, the perceived non-partisan reputation of the CSO, and existing relationships with policymakers. The document provides strategic lessons for CSOs to increase their policy impact and recommendations for funders to better support internal capacity and flexible funding timelines.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The technical quality of research produced by CSOs is generally not the primary barrier to policy influence; instead, non-technical constraints and opportunities are the critical factors in the Use of Research Evidence (URE).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Policymakers show a strong preference for research evidence that utilizes international data and examples from comparable developing countries to demonstrate that proposed policy changes are feasible.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Strategic timing and the ability to identify 'windows of opportunity' are essential for URE, as CSOs often produce research independently of the immediate policymaking cycle and must enter the process when the timing is right.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A CSO's perceived non-partisan status and its reputation for objectivity are critical for gaining the trust of policymakers, who are often reluctant to attribute policy ideas directly to CSOs to avoid appearing influenced by stakeholders.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Tunisia, the Tunisian Observatory of the Economy (TOE) successfully influenced amendments to the law on tax incentives by focusing on a few feasible, high-impact recommendations rather than a complete policy overhaul.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Nigeria, the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) influenced local government tax policies by combining technical research with mass mobilisation and 'live testimonies' from informal sector workers to pressure officials.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Zambia, the Centre for Trade Policy and Development (CTPD) faced challenges in the URE of tobacco legislation due to competing mandates between government departments, specifically the tension between increasing revenue and improving health outcomes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Uganda, the Southern and Eastern Africa Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI) found that research on Double Tax Agreements (DTAs) often reached policymakers indirectly through media reports and websites rather than through formal government channels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Funders often impose rigid timelines and a bias toward technical capacity building that ignores the political nature of tax reform, which can hinder the effectiveness of CSO advocacy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000434#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["tax policy","tax incentive","climate finance"],"geography_discussed":["Tunisia","Nigeria","Zambia","Uganda","Morocco","Senegal"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","exploratory research","mixed-method"]},{"id":"cdkn-000759","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/cdkn-000759","title":"USING POST-HARVEST TECHNOLOGIES TO MITIGATE CLIMATE RISKS IN FOOD SYSTEMS FOR IMPROVED FOOD SECURITY & LIVELIHOODS: Hermetic Storage Technologies in Kenya and Uganda","publisher":{"name":"Climate and Development Knowledge Network","organization":"climate-and-development-knowledge-network"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2021-05","source_url":"https://cdkn.org/sites/default/files/files/SNN-HST-Policy-Brief-WEB.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines how climate change increases post-harvest losses in Kenya and Uganda through heightened pest and disease pressure, and proposes hermetic storage technologies (HSTs) as a solution to improve food security and farmer livelihoods.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000759#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Climate change exacerbates post-harvest losses in Kenya and Uganda by increasing production volatility and intensifying pressure from pests and diseases, which leads to the wasted use of land, labour, water, and agro-chemicals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000759#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Grain post-harvest losses in Kenya and Uganda are estimated between 15% and 30% of total production, significantly exceeding the global average for cereals of 19% and Brazil's rate of 6%. In Uganda, annual losses include approximately 493,000 metric tonnes (MT) of maize, 26,500MT of millet, and 31,000MT of rice; Kenya loses over 700,000MT of maize.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000759#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Climate-driven temperature increases raise the risk of mycotoxins, specifically aflatoxins, which are carcinogens. Aflatoxin contamination is estimated to cost Uganda USD 7.48 million in grain exports and Kenya approximately USD 3 million in maize value.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000759#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Hermetic storage technologies (HSTs) reduce losses by asphyxiating pests without pesticides, allowing farmers to store grains longer and fetch higher prices. Maize stored in HSTs can fetch prices approximately 75% higher than maize sold without storage and 27% higher than maize in traditional storage.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000759#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The adoption of HSTs is hindered by the proliferation of counterfeit and sub-standard products, which leads farmers to believe the technology is ineffective. While Kenya gazetted standards for hermetic bags and plastic silos in August 2019, Uganda is still developing standards based on the Kenyan experience.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000759#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"High costs driven by Value Added Tax (VAT) restrict the uptake of HSTs. VAT is 16% in Kenya and 18% in Uganda. In Uganda, the Revenue Authority has sometimes charged VAT on each component of a bag separately, potentially increasing the total VAT to 36% or 54% of the product's value.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000759#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Removing VAT on HSTs could significantly benefit society; a study in Tanzania found that such a move could create a net gain of USD 38.9 million per agricultural season.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000759#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["Post-harvest losses","climate change adaptation","food security","agricultural productivity","climate finance","tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["Tanzania","Brazil","Luwero District","Masaka District"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic assessment"]},{"id":"sei-000547","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/sei-000547","title":"The Role of Fossil Fuel Subsidies in Preventing Action on the Climate Crisis","publisher":{"name":"Stockholm Environment Institute","organization":"stockholm-environment-institute"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2021-04-22","source_url":"https://www.sei.org/features/fossil-fuel-subsidies-hearing/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The testimony argues that US fossil fuel subsidies primarily increase excess profits rather than creating jobs, undermine global climate goals, and contribute to public health crises and environmental inequalities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000547#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Fossil fuel subsidies in the US are an inefficient tool for economic support because the vast majority of their value benefits oil and gas wells that are already profitable and would be developed without assistance. Research indicates that more than 96% of subsidy value goes toward excess profits beyond the minimum investment requirements, meaning they do not significantly contribute to job creation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000547#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Subsidies undermine climate goals by increasing greenhouse gas emissions during periods of low oil and gas prices and by sending a symbolic signal to other nations that the US is not committed to climate action. This contradicts a 2016 commitment made by the US and other G7 governments in Japan to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies by 2025.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000547#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Fossil fuel subsidies indirectly cause air and water pollution that harms community health. In Appalachia, the cumulative health damages from the shale gas boom exceed the employment benefits. In Texas's Eagle Ford basin, the practice of burning off waste natural gas releases toxic and carcinogenic compounds, which occurs more frequently in Hispanic neighborhoods than in non-Hispanic ones.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000547#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Subsidies take various forms beyond direct payments, including tax code provisions like the percentage depletion allowance and the intangible drilling cost provision. Additionally, inadequate fees for retiring oil and gas wells have created a clean-up liability totaling hundreds of billions of dollars that may be borne by the public.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000547#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel subsidy","greenhouse gas emissions","energy transition","air pollution","water pollution","environmental justice","tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["Appalachia","Texas","Japan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic analysis"]},{"id":"pari-000046","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/pari-000046","title":"A Covid-Era Discussion: Mobility of the Informal Sector, Fiscal Legitimacy and the Fiscal Contract in Kenya","publisher":{"name":"Public Affairs Research Institute","organization":"public-affairs-research-institute"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2020-12-03","source_url":"https://pari.org.za/covid-mobility-informal-sector-fiscal-legitimacy-kenya/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines how Covid-19 restrictions in Kenya disproportionately affected the informal sector, which comprises 83.6% of the employed population. It argues that a compromised fiscal social contract—characterized by poor healthcare delivery, corruption, and limited transparency—discourages tax compliance among informal workers. While the government implemented some tax reliefs, the authors contend that true fiscal legitimacy requires systemic reforms in accountability, access to fiscal information, and sustainable debt management to ensure an inclusive system.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000046#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The informal sector represents approximately 83.6% of Kenya's employed population, yet the national fiscal system relies heavily on indirect taxes because only 28% of the population is registered for income tax.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000046#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Lockdown measures and curfews severely impaired the informal economy, which lacks the protections and remote-working capabilities available to the formal sector.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000046#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To mitigate economic strain, the Kenyan government introduced several tax reliefs, including reducing the VAT rate from 16% to 14% and lowering the Turnover Tax rate for those with annual turnovers under 5 million Kenya shillings from 3% to 1%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000046#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The fiscal social contract in Kenya is compromised, as evidenced by the fact that while there are 7.6 million registered taxpayers, only about 4 million actually file annual returns.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000046#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A lack of fiscal legitimacy—driven by corruption in tendering processes and poor healthcare service delivery—leads members of the informal sector to distrust the state and rely on expensive out-of-pocket payments for health services.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000046#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors suggest that repairing the fiscal social contract requires improving access to public fiscal information, fighting corruption, easing tax compliance for the informal sector, and establishing a debt ceiling adjustable only by citizen decision.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000046#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["Nairobi","Mombasa","Kilifi","Mandera","Trans-Nzoia county","Uasin Gishu County"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","socio-economic assessment"]},{"id":"pari-000197","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/pari-000197","title":"Nigeria’s Response To Covid-19","publisher":{"name":"Public Affairs Research Institute","organization":"public-affairs-research-institute"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2020-11-03","source_url":"https://pari.org.za/nigeria-response-covid/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Nigeria's response to Covid-19 was characterized by low reported death rates, potentially due to limited testing capacity, and a reliance on lockdowns that exacerbated poverty for low-income earners. The pandemic exposed critical weaknesses in the national health system, which had received funding below the 15% Abuja Declaration target, and highlighted the economic risk of the country's heavy dependence on oil revenue. To mitigate economic contraction, the government adjusted its oil benchmark price, secured a $3.4 billion IMF loan, and implemented various tax reliefs and intervention funds for small businesses and the healthcare sector.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000197#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Nigeria's public health system was poorly equipped for the pandemic due to decades of underinvestment. The 2020 annual health budget was 4.16% below the 15% target established by the Abuja Declaration, and a 2017 WHO Joint External Evaluation indicated poor scores for the country's prevention and response indicators.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000197#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While reported Covid-19 deaths in Nigeria remained low (around 1,000 by the end of August 2020), this may be a result of low testing capacity rather than a lack of virus impact. Additionally, public resistance occurred because some citizens believed the virus primarily affected the elite, leading some patients to hide or flee quarantine.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000197#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Government-mandated lockdowns and social distancing policies created significant socio-economic hardship. Low-income earners in congested settlements found social distancing impossible and lacked access to basic hygiene items like soap and sanitisers. Many daily wage earners fled to rural areas to avoid economic ruin, potentially increasing the spread of the disease.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000197#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The pandemic and falling oil prices severely impacted Nigeria's fiscal capacity, leading to a projected recession. The government responded by reducing the crude oil benchmark price from USD 57 to USD 30 per barrel and lowering the projected oil production volume from 2.18 million to 1.70 million barrels, resulting in a 39% reduction in revenue projections.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000197#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To cushion the economic blow, Nigeria implemented several financial measures, including a 3.4 billion dollar emergency loan from the IMF, a 50 billion naira fund for households and small enterprises, and a 100 billion naira fund for healthcare. Tax reliefs were also introduced by the FIRS and subnational governments in Kaduna and Jigawa states.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000197#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["economic diversity","tax policy","fiscal policy"],"geography_discussed":["Africa","Kaduna State","Jigawa State"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","economic analysis"]},{"id":"iisd-000579","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-000579","title":"Mining Tax Policy Responses to COVID-19","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":"2020-04-08","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/publications/brief/mining-tax-policy-responses-covid-19","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document advises resource-rich developing countries on the use of tax policy to support the mining sector during the COVID-19 pandemic, noting that tax relief may be a more viable option than direct payments for countries with limited fiscal space.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000579#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"For many developing countries, tax policy is a more accessible tool for providing economic support to the mining sector than direct government payments to companies or workers, as the latter requires fiscal space typically only available to wealthier nations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000579#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Developing countries must carefully assess business tax relief options because they are already facing challenges in mobilizing sufficient domestic revenues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000579#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["mining","tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["World"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy guide"]},{"id":"iejza-000243","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iejza-000243","title":"BUDGETING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DURING COVID-19","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Economic Justice","organization":"institute-for-economic-justice"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"en","date_published":"2020","source_url":"https://iej.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/IEJfactsheet-Available-Resources-COVID19_2.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document assesses South Africa's adherence to the ICESCR during the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting failures in revenue generation and expenditure allocation. It argues that austerity measures have undermined healthcare, education, and social security, and proposes specific fiscal reforms—such as wealth taxes and a universal basic income grant—to ensure the progressive realisation of human rights.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000243#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The South African government has failed to sufficiently mobilise domestic resources through progressive taxation. Corporate income tax rates fell from 50% in 1990 to 28% in 2018, and personal income tax rates have declined since 1997, remaining less progressive than in peer countries like Brazil, Mexico, and Ethiopia.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000243#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The government's reliance on austerity measures has led to budget cuts in essential public services. Since 2016, average spending on social and economic programmes has lagged behind population and GDP growth, and the June 2020 Supplementary Budget cut R109 billion from social programmes to fund pandemic expenses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000243#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The public education system suffers from chronic underfunding and poor infrastructure. Between 2009/10 and 2018/19, real spending per learner decreased from R20,612 to R19,917, and over 3,500 schools lack water, security, and safe sanitation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000243#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Africa's healthcare system is characterized by deep inequality and chronic underfunding. In 2018, there was one public-sector doctor for every 2,457 people without medical aid, compared to one private-sector doctor for every 429 to 571 patients.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000243#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Social security measures are insufficient to prevent poverty and hunger. As of 2015, 55.5% of the population lived below the official national upper bound poverty line. The COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress grant of R350 per month remains below the poverty line of R1,227.51.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000243#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To meet its human rights obligations, the government should implement specific revenue-raising measures, including a wealth tax on the top 1% (estimated to raise R143 billion), a solidarity income tax for those earning above R1 million, and the introduction of a universal basic income grant.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000243#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["tax policy","human rights","poverty reduction"],"geography_discussed":["Brazil","Mexico","Ethiopia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","fiscal assessment","human rights monitoring"]},{"id":"iejza-000278","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iejza-000278","title":"Tax","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Economic Justice","organization":"institute-for-economic-justice"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2018-08","source_url":"https://iej.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Stream-2-Policy-Brief-3-Tax-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) identifies four critical failures in South Africa's tax management: significant revenue shortfalls (approximately R50bn in 2018), the undermining of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) by corruption and state capture, a tax mix that under-taxes wealth and corporate income, and high levels of illicit financial flows. The brief proposes increasing Personal Income Tax (PIT) and Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rates, introducing a permanent net wealth tax (0.5%-2.5%), and expanding VAT zero-rating for 23 categories of essential goods to support low-income households. To recover lost revenue, the IEJ recommends revitalizing SARS through a Presidential Commission, reintroducing a special priority crime unit, and increasing transparency of corporate and offshore structures. These measures are intended to fund a fiscal stimulus, public employment guarantees, and social services to enhance job creation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000278#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"South Africa's tax system is characterized by four primary failures: a revenue shortfall of approximately R50bn in the 2018 National Budget, the erosion of SARS's administrative capacity due to corruption and state capture, a tax mix that is not sufficiently progressive regarding wealth and corporate income, and the prevalence of illicit financial flows and tax evasion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000278#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Increasing Personal Income Tax (PIT) could generate significant additional revenue. Scenario 1, raising rates for those earning over R500,000, could raise R27.2bn (R17.7bn adjusted for elasticity), while Scenario 2, raising the top three rates, could raise R47.4bn (R30.8bn adjusted for elasticity).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000278#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Adjusting Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rates between 30% and 35% could raise between R4.1bn and R43.4bn, even if taxable income falls by 5% due to the rate increase.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000278#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The brief proposes several wealth and luxury tax measures, including a permanent net wealth tax of 0.5%-2.5%, raising the Capital Gains Tax (CGT) inclusion rate to 100%, implementing a land property tax on vacant land, and increasing ad valorem excise duties on luxury goods.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000278#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To support poor households and advance rights to health and education, the IEJ recommends reducing VAT to 14% within three years and zero-rating 23 categories of essential food and non-food items, such as baby food, sanitary towels, and textbooks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000278#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Administrative reforms to SARS are deemed essential, including the suspension of officials implicated in corruption, the appointment of a Presidential Commission for revitalization, and the reintroduction of a special priority crime unit to fight tax evasion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000278#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Insufficient tax revenue directly hinders job creation by limiting the state's ability to fund formal state-sector jobs, public works schemes, and private-sector generating infrastructure like hospitals and roads.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000278#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["World"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","fiscal modeling"]},{"id":"iejza-000281","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iejza-000281","title":"Small and Medium Business Development","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Economic Justice","organization":"institute-for-economic-justice"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2018-08","source_url":"https://iej.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Stream-3-Policy-Brief-2-Small-and-Medium-Business-Development-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that while small and medium businesses are critical for formal employment in South Africa, the sector has remained stagnant or declined over the last decade. It critiques the National Development Plan's job creation targets as unrealistic and highlights a significant imbalance in government support, which heavily favors large businesses. The brief proposes a shift toward a 'national social compact' (Quadrant IV) involving economy-wide reforms, including tax incentives for startups, tenure reform in Traditional Authority Areas, telecommunications liberalisation, and the use of competition policy to open market access for small and black-owned businesses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000281#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The National Development Plan's (NDP) goal for small and medium businesses to create 90% of new jobs by 2030 is considered unrealistic, as it would require between 1.3 million and 9.9 million new enterprises depending on failure rates.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000281#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite their role in employment, the small business sector in South Africa has not grown significantly over the past ten years and may have actually decreased.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000281#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Small formal businesses are a major source of formal employment, employing 4.3 million people compared to 3.6 million in approximately 30,000 large formal businesses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000281#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"South Africa has one of the lowest rates of established business ownership globally, alongside low entrepreneurial intent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000281#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Government financial support is overwhelmingly directed toward large businesses, with small businesses receiving only 9.9% of subsidies and incentives and 1.39% of capital transfers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000281#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The brief identifies highly concentrated economic ownership, rather than labour regulations, as the primary cause for the slow growth of the small business sector.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000281#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Proposed interventions to support the sector include zero or lower taxes for formal startups, tenure security in Traditional Authority Areas, and completing telecommunications reforms to lower data costs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000281#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Competition policy can be used to assist small and black-owned businesses by mandating shelf space in supermarkets, limiting exclusive retail leases, and implementing supplier development programmes in agro-processing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000281#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["job creation","government procurement","land tenure","tax policy"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic assessment"]},{"id":"iejza-000114","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iejza-000114","title":"SOUTH AFRICA","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Economic Justice","organization":"institute-for-economic-justice"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://iej.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/2019-IEJ-S27-CESR-Factsheet-UN-review-min.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that South Africa, the most unequal country in the world, is implementing unwarranted fiscal austerity that undermines the rights to health and education. It highlights that while the government justifies cuts through debt concerns, South African debt is moderate by international standards. The report identifies systemic failures including 'state capture', corruption costing R27 billion annually, and a regressive tax mix. It recommends progressive tax reform, such as wealth and corporate tax increases, and a human rights-based approach to fiscal policy to expand the resources available for social services.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000114#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"South Africa is characterized by extreme income and wealth inequality, with the wealthiest 1% of the population owning half of all assets and the top decile holding 90–95% of the country’s wealth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000114#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Poverty rates have risen, with 55.5% of the population living below the official national upper bound poverty line of R992 per person per month in 2015, compared to 53.2% in 2011.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000114#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The government has implemented austerity measures, including increasing the VAT rate from 14% to 15% in April 2018 and raising fuel levies, which the document describes as retrogressive and discriminatory.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000114#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Fiscal austerity is justified by the government through debt concerns, yet South African debt, projected at 55% of GDP for the fiscal year, is considered moderate compared to an IMF average of 57.6% for emerging market and middle-income countries in 2023.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000114#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Public health is debilitated by real-term spending cuts and personnel shortages, with national and provincial health care spending cut by -0.1% in real terms in 2018/19.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000114#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Education spending per learner has declined by 10% since 2010, and the National Treasury reduced funding for school infrastructure by R7.2 billion over three years in the 2018 National Budget.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000114#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Corruption and 'state capture' significantly deplete available resources, with corruption estimated to cost South Africa at least R27 billion per year.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000114#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document proposes several alternatives to austerity to expand fiscal space, including a 1% annual net wealth tax to raise R65 billion and increasing the corporate income tax rate to 32% to raise R33 billion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iejza-000114#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["Eastern Cape","KwaZulu-Natal","Limpopo","Western Cape","Free State"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","human rights monitoring"]},{"id":"pari-000270","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/pari-000270","title":"State Capture and its Aftermath: Building responsiveness through state reform","publisher":{"name":"Public Affairs Research Institute","organization":"public-affairs-research-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2018","source_url":"https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/State-Capture-and-its-Aftermath-report.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document outlines the proceedings of a three-day conference focused on the causes, mechanisms, and aftermath of state capture in South Africa. It examines the role of apartheid legacies, the influence of the private sector, the vulnerability of state-owned enterprises, and the failure of oversight institutions. The report emphasizes that state capture is a politico-economic project involving both formal and informal power, often facilitated by the politicization of the bureaucracy and the erosion of the criminal justice system. It argues for comprehensive state reform, including electoral changes, transparency in party funding, and the protection of whistleblowers, while drawing comparisons with state capture in Nigeria, Kenya, and Angola.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"State capture in South Africa is characterized by a specific pattern where a faction controls the political party, decisions are centralized in the party office, the bureaucracy is politicized, and the supply chain process is controlled to seize rents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The legacy of the apartheid era persists in the post-1994 period through continued secrecy, authoritarianism, and the survival of certain apartheid-era laws.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are primary targets for corrupt networks due to their high capital expenditure and investment needs; for example, Transnet was involved in locomotive contracts with Chinese companies resulting in R 43.5 billion in payouts, including significant kickbacks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The criminal justice system has been severely undermined by political appointments, leading to a collapse in crime intelligence and a low conviction rate for corruption; in 2016/17, only 18% of cases opened under the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (PRECCA) resulted in convictions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The private sector, including auditing firms and law companies, has facilitated state capture through conflicts of interest, lack of transparency, and the use of shell companies to channel resources.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Traditional leadership in South Africa has sometimes been used as a front for corruption and state capture, with chiefs extracting rent due to a lack of accountability and financial record-keeping.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Security structures in South Africa have been influenced by a 'warrior culture' of unquestioning obedience, allowing the security apparatus to be used to protect corrupt regime members and sidestep parliamentary oversight.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Comparative analysis shows that state capture is a widespread issue in the global South, with Nigeria experiencing a 'selfie state' where the state engineers its own capture, and Angola seeing the diversion of hundreds of millions of dollars from its national oil company.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Whistleblowers are essential for exposing state capture but face severe risks, including the weaponization of anti-corruption processes and the 'chilling effect' of laws that criminalize false disclosures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The South African Parliament is identified as a 'key enabler of state capture' due to its failure to provide effective oversight of the executive.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"pari-000270#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["civil society","tax policy","government procurement"],"geography_discussed":["Nigeria","Kenya","Angola","Brazil","India","Argentina","United Kingdom","United States","Canada","Australia","New Zealand","Cameroon","Mozambique","Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality","Mogalakwena Local Municipality","Limpopo","Northern Cape"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["conference report","comparative analysis","policy review"]},{"id":"saiia-001641","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/saiia-001641","title":"HARNESSING INVESTMENT IN TANZANIA’S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: WHERE TO FROM HERE?","publisher":{"name":"South African Institute of International Affairs","organization":"south-african-institute-of-international-affairs"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2017-06","source_url":"https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Occasional-Paper-260.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The paper examines the gap between Tanzania's high agricultural growth potential and the persistent poverty of its smallholder farmers. It analyzes the role of the Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC), the impact of land tenure insecurity, and the potential of 'mega-PPPs' like the Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) to drive inclusive development. The author argues that while policies exist to stimulate investment, structural bottlenecks in taxation, infrastructure, and land rights hinder smallholders from moving beyond subsistence farming into commercial value chains.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Tanzania's agricultural growth has historically been concentrated in commercial crops like rice, wheat, cotton, sugar, and tobacco, which has limited its impact on poverty reduction for smallholder farmers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the agricultural sector has been inconsistent, influenced by perceptions of an anti-investment sentiment and a lack of a comprehensive national investment strategy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Land tenure insecurity is a major barrier to investment and farmer stability, as only 3% of land in Tanzania is registered and foreigners are prohibited from owning land.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The horticultural sector shows high growth potential (9% to 12% over five years) but is dominated by a small number of large exporters, leaving smallholders with limited access to export markets compared to Kenya.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Smallholder farmers face significant financial hurdles, including high local bank interest rates (14% to 24%) and a tax regime that imposes VAT and tariffs on essential imported agro-inputs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) is categorized as a 'mega-PPP' with the potential to create 420,000 jobs and generate $1.2 billion in farming revenues by linking smallholders to commercial agriculture.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The US-funded Feed the Future Programme (FTFP) has invested $327 million (2010–2015) in Tanzania, focusing on productivity and market expansion through initiatives like NAFAKA, SHIFT, and TAPP.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Tanzanian supermarkets have struggled to source locally due to smallholders' inability to meet strict quality and volume requirements, and a historical tendency of some retailers to import produce from South Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC) uses mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) conditions to ensure investors contribute to local infrastructure and smallholder joint ventures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"saiia-001641#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["smallholder","public–private partnership","land tenure","climate change","food security","tax policy"],"geography_discussed":["Kenya","South Africa","Zanzibar Islands","Ethiopia","Malawi"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","case study","economic assessment"]},{"id":"iisd-000391","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-000391","title":"Meeting Canada's Subsidy Phase-Out Goal: What it means in Ontario","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2016-06-08","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/articles/policy-analysis/meeting-canadas-subsidy-phase-out-goal-what-it-means-ontario","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document outlines the need for Ontario to remove environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies to align with Canada's G-7 commitment to end such subsidies by 2025. It references a national estimate of CAD 2.9 billion in production subsidies and notes that while Ontario has phased out coal and implemented carbon pricing, further action is required regarding preferential tax treatments for fossil fuels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000391#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Canada and other G-7 nations have committed to a specific deadline of 2025 to end fossil fuel subsidies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000391#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A previous joint report by IISD, ODI, and OCI identified CAD 2.9 billion in national subsidies specifically for the production of fossil fuels in Canada.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000391#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite achievements in carbon pricing and the phase-out of coal, Ontario still maintains prominent subsidies that provide preferential tax treatment for fossil fuel use.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000391#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel subsidy","carbon price","Coal phase-out","tax policy"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]}]}